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OPSOMMING
Dit is merkwaardig dat Bevolking, wat aan die middelpunt staan van die Rykdom van Volkere
indien nie van die Armoede nie, so weinig aandag in die ekonomiese literatuur van Suid-Afrika
geniet. Dit is waarskynlik waarom die regering in 1997 'n NUWE bevolkingsbeleid - so
gespesifiseer in die konsepwitskrif - kan voorstel wat weinig aanduiding toon van 'n waardering
vir die Ekonomie van Demografiese tendense. Hierdie dissertasie is 'n poging om te demonstreer
waarom die leemte gevul moet word, en om spesifieke onderwerpe, binne die breëre raamwerk,
vir verdere ondersoek aan die lig te bring.
Die demografiese toneel in Suid-Afrika leen homself tot 'n treffende demonstrasie van die
ekonomiese gevolge van demografiese tendense by wyse van 'n kontrastering van die
ondervinding van die snelgroeiende, jeugdige Swart bevolking - met 'n totale fertiliteitsyfer
(TFS) van nagenoeg 3.7, nadat dit gedurende die vyftigerjare 6,75 was - en dié van die
demografies-ouer nie-Swart bevolking, onder wie die Blankes, met 'n TFS wat reeds ver benede
verplasingskoers van 2,1 is, en Asiërs (Indiërs) en Kleurlinge wat alreeds byna daardie peil
bereik het. Aangesien eersgenoemde etniese groep ook nog 'n oorheersende aandeel van meer as
driekwart in die totale SA bevolkingsgrootte het, is dit onvermydelik dat die nadruk sal val op
die ekonomiese gevolge van snelle bevolkingsgroei met die daarmee samehangende
demografiese groothede: fertiliteit, mortaliteit, migrasie, leeftyd- en geslagsamestelling,
geografiese verspreiding en ook "ekonomiese kwaliteit" soos dit in die aanbod van ondernemer-
skap gemanifesteer word.
Die analise word in die tradisionele vraag en aanbod paradigma aangebied. Aanbod word ontleed
deur demografiese faktore te koppel met die vyf produksiefaktore waarvan die samewerking vir
die skepping van die nasionale produk verantwoordelik is: ondernemers, arbeid, natuurlike
hulpbronne, tegnologie en kapitaal. Die bevolking moet 'n voldoende aantalondernemers
verwek, en die twee menslike produksiefaktore benodig die bystand van een of meer van die nie-
menslike faktore, om die bevolking ekonomies te kan akkommodeer. Vermenigvuldigende
mensegetalle kan vernietigend inwerk op natuurlike hulpbronne en kan in konflik verkeer met
kapitaalvorming en tegnologie-akkumulasie en hul ekonomiese welsynsbevorderende werking.
Die vraag-aspekte word analiseer deur aan te sluit by die vier makro vraagkomponente in die
nasionale boekhoudingstelsel : huishoudelike verbruik, regeringskonsumpsie, belegging (vis-a-vis
besparing) en buitlandse handel. Aangeleenthede wat onder die loep geneem word, sluit, onder
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andere, die volgende in: stabiliteit wat voorspruit uit 'n bevolkingselastisiteit van vraag wat
nagenoeg 1 is; die vergelykende invloed van ekonomiese oorvloed teenoor die menslike
getallefaktor; die rol van hoë fertiliteit in die verkryging van ekonomiese mag deur middel van
die stembus en sy gevolge vir die omleiding van vraag; die kapitaal wat in "demografiese
beleggings" geabsorbeer word; en die betekenis van die Suid-Afrikaanse produksiefaktor-
begunstiging vir sy internasionale handel.
Uit bogenoemde ontledings kan gevolgtrekkinge gemaak word ten opsigte van ekonomiese
groei, armoede, werkloosheid en die ekonomiese waarde van 'n menselewe.
In menslike bevolkings - minstens sover dit sub-Sahara-Afrika betref - staan kwantiteit in 'n
adversatiewe houding teenoor kwaliteit.
III
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RESUMÉ
It is remarkable that population, which is at the centre of the economic problem - the Wealth if
not the Poverty of Nations - has received scant attention in economic research in South Africa.
Which is probably why we can have a NEW - so designated in the Draft Report - population
policy propounded by government (in 1997) which manifests little appreciation of the economics
of population. This dissertation is an attempt to demonstrate why the void should be filled and to
bring to light specific topics within the broader subject matter that could be fruitfully researched.
The demographic scene in South Africa lends itself to a telling demonstration of the economic
effects of population movements by way of contrasting the experience of the high fertility,
youthful Black population - with a total fertility rate of around 37 after having been 6,75 in the
1950s - and that of the demographically older non-Blacks, among whom the Whites exhibit a
fertility level way below the replacement rate of 2,1, while that of the Asians (Indians) and
Coloureds has almost reached that rate. Since the former has a share of more than a dominant
three-quarters in the aggregate South African population, the emphasis is inevitably on the
economic consequences of rapid population growth and its attendant demographic magnitudes:
fertility, mortality, migration, age and sex composition, spatial distribution and, what is called
"economic quality" of the population as manifested in its supply of enterprise.
The analysis is presented in the traditional supply and demand paradigm. Supply is examined by
linking demographic forces to the five factors of production whose co-operation is responsible
for the generation of the national product: entrepreneurship, (ordinary) labour, natural resources,
technology and capital. The population has to generate an adequate supply of entrepreneurs, and
the two human factors of production have to have one or more of the non-human factors at their
disposal to accommodate the population economically. Proliferating human numbers can be
destructive of natural resources, and in conflict with the formation of capital, the accumulation of
technology and their potential economic welfare-enhancing operation.
The demand aspects are analysed by linking on to the four macro demand components in the
national accounts system: Household consumption, Government consumption, Investment (vis-
a-vis saving) and foreign trade. Some of the issues discussed are: the stability deriving from a
population elasticity of demand close to 1,0; the comparative significance of the population
versus the affluence factor; the role of high fertility in the acquisition, at the election polls, of
iv
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economic power via political power, and its consequences for the diversion of demand; the
capital absorbed in "demographic investments"; and the significance of the South African factor
endowment for its foreign trade.
From the above analyses conclusions could be drawn about econormc growth, poverty,
unemployment and the economic value of a life.
In human populations, in sub-Saharan Africa at least, quantity is the adversary of quality.
v
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation deals with the economics of the South African population; the economic
consequences, that is, of demographic magnitudes and movements. However, the description
"economic demography" is preferred to convey a somewhat broader perspective in dealing with
the subject matter. In those instances where economic data are not available or cannot be
generated to quantify or otherwise depict the impingement of demographic forces upon
economic processes, the demographic magnitudes have to speak for themselves as proxies of the
effects at issue. The enquiry, moreover, involves some borrowing from related disciplines which
may be considered outside the province of traditional economics.
The analysis is not cast in the mould of any preconceived model. It is, in part, an exercise in
inference-permitting descriptive statistics, governed by economic and demographic logic. It begs
definitive delineation unless one is prepared to grace it with kinship to systems dynamics.
Interaction between demographic factors and the economy is, of course, a two-way process, with
the former functioning as both determinant and determinate. This dissertation will be concerned
in the main with demographic phenomena as determinants, and not the reverse course of
causation. While the discourse is conducted for the most part, at the macro level, recourse is had,
on occasion, to the micro level.
Different views can be held about how the investigation should proceed, i.e. the sequence in
which the material is to be organized and what the key issues should be around which the
problématique is to be presented. In this dissertation the customary supply-and-demand
approach has been elected. Part I treats of the interrelationships between population movements
and magnitudes on the one hand and the five factors of production which co-operate to produce
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or Gross National Product (GNP) or National Income (NI)
on the other, viz. entrepreneurship, labour, natural resources, capital and technology. As the co-
ordinator of the factors of production and as the initiator of economic growth and development,
the entrepreneur merits priority of treatment. But since he is a member of the labour force
(human resources) as a whole, the analysis will start off with a discussion of the latter.
In Part II the issue is approached from the demand side, with the components of the national
accounts depicting the generation of the GNP, by way of the demand emanating from private
households, general government, investment, and exports and imports, serving as the magnitudes
to be discussed in their relation to demographic factors. The demand in this context is to be
construed to encompass not only demand in the customary sense of needs supported by
individually possessed purchasing power, but also needs which are converted into demand by
vn
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means of government intervention, or which could be considered for such conversion because of
social and political conventions or pressure.
It is understood that, in the discussion of any sub-topic, any or all of the phenomena subsumed
under demography - population size and growth, mortality, morbidity, fertility, age and sex
composition, spatial distribution and migration - can serve as sources of economic change.
Wherever appropriate information or evidence from countries abroad is available, it will be
introduced into the analysis. But by and large, the focus is upon demographic and economic
conditions prevailing in South Africa. This geographic concept encompasses the total area
included in the erstwhile Union of South Africa, estimates of economic and demographic
magnitudes pertaining to the former TBVC countries having been included for those years in
which they functioned as autonomous regions.
It needs to be emphasised that the role of demographic forces in the South African economic
problématique is a very much neglected field of enquiry. This could be at least one of the reasons
why the Ministry of Welfare and Population Development espoused a policy approach which
appears to be tantamount to a virtual unwillingness to appreciate the importance of this role. In
their Draft White Paper for a Population Policy (Government Gazette No 17529 Volume 576,
31 October 1996) it is stated that such policy should "instead of the achievement of demographic
objectives, have as a major goal a broad range of social services to improve the quality of life of
the entire population" (par. 1.3, p. 11). The problems resulting from human reproduction, not the
levels of such reproduction, are addressed. Family planning is soft-pedalled as if quality of life is
not pervasively affected by the lack of it.
It is hoped that the present enquiry will demonstrate that the achievement of demographic
objectives is a meritorious endeavour, if not a sine quo non of population policy.
Vlll
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PART I:
SUPPLY
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER I
THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEMOGRAPHIC SCENE
A brief review of demographic magnitudes and movements IS presented below to serve as
background information to the analyses to follow.
Since reference to ethnicity tends to be frowned upon, it needs to be stressed that in South
African demography recourse to it is an indispensable aid in the production of reliable, or just
credible, population data. This arises from the differences in the demographic histories of the
four groups' (delineated as Whites, Asians, Coloureds and Blacks) differential levels and patterns
of fertility, mortality, migration and age structures, and differing levels of comprehensiveness
and errors in census and vital statistics. The relinquishment of the ethnic differentiation in the
registration of births and deaths - well-intentioned as it was - produced meaningless vital
statistics since 1991. Distinguishing between the four groups has the additional advantage of
providing us with the necessary contrasts for an explicit illustration of the economic implications
of population magnitudes. Below they are dealt with in diminishing order of demographic
modernity, which is defined by the adoption of, or the approach towards, the small family
system, which also defines their position on the demographic cycle. It needs to be mentioned that
the South African data used in this and other Chapters do not necessarily agree with official
statistics, but are the result of evaluations of, and adjustments to, those statistics. (Sadie 1970,
1972, 1988, 1992, 1993; Mostert and Lotter 1990; van Tonder & van Eeden 1975).
1.1 PROGRESSION ON THE DEMOGRAPHIC CYCLE
Figure 1.1 traces the progression of these four groups on the demographic cycle, which is not
only a stylized one but is based on the historic natural increase of the Coloured population. With
the 1991-1996 projected rates of natural increase as our frame of reference (Sadie 1993), the
graph shows all four groups to have progressed beyond the stage of maximum growth and to be
proceeding on the downward phase. Viewed in the aggregate, the South African population
moved along the first phase of almost uncontrolled fertility and mortality, at the rate of natural
increase of approximately 2% per annum, up to the end of the Second World War. The second,
explosive phase, with mortality declining while fertility remained unchanged or even increased,
lasted until the 1960s, the transitional phase of maximum growth (the third phase) registering a
2,86% per annum rate. The population is now (1996-2001) moving along the fourth phase of
declining natural increase, averaging a growth rate of some 1,9% per annum. The prospects are
that the downward trend will be continued.
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2However, when the aggregate is broken down into the traditional four population groups, we find
that the historic timing as well as the absolute levels of natural increase exhibited marked
differences. The White group, whose actual (total) growth rate has been fluctuating as a result of
the waxing and waning of immigration, has experienced its transition to lower levels of natural
increase in the first quarter of this century already - but showed a temporary revival after the
1929-1933 Depression - and was, during the middle 1990s, in the fifth phase of below-
replacement-level fertility, with natural increase at a 0,7% per annum rate. The people of Asian
origin reached their transition, with a maximum of 3,69% per annum natural increase, during
1946-1951, the subsequent downward course leading to a 1,34% per annum rate during 1991-96.
The Coloured population had their transition during 1960-1970, the rate of natural increase
peaking at 3,21%. By 1991-96 it was 1,44% per annum. In the case of the Black population the
transition to lower growth is of recent origin, the zenith of 3,0% per annum having been attained
during 1980-1985. It is now moving along the fourth phase of the demographic cycle.
1.2 FERTILITY
TABLE 1.1
TOTAL FERTILITY RATES BY ETHNIC GROUP
Whites Asians Coloureds Blacks
1924-1928 3,49
1930-1933 3,16
1935-1937 3,01 7,30 6,05 6,48
1941-1944 3,16 7,20 5,87 6,59
1945-1950 3,38 6,70 6,16 6,69
1950-1955 3,38 5,78 6,42 6,75
1955-1960 3,50 5,18 6,67 6,75
1960-1965 3,28 4,55 6,71 6,56
1965-1970 3,03 4,01 6,29 6,28
1970-1975 2,80 3,76 5,43 5,98
1975-1980 2,15 2,94 3,88 5,64
1980-1985 2,10 2,80 3,31 4,59
1985-1991 1,81 2,45 2,80 4,34
Projected:
1991-1996 1,73 2,29 2,37 3,96
1996-2001 1,66 2,13 2,21 3.53
2001-2006 1,58 1,97 2,04 3,10
2006-2011 1.50 1,81 1,87 2,66
Source: CSS(b); Mostert & Lotter, 1990; Sadie, 1970, 1988, 1992, 1993.
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3The fertility component of natural increase over a period of fifty years is summarized in Table
1.1. It will be seen that the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of the White population, after registering a
secondary peak of 3,50 in 1955-1960, moved monotonically downward to 1,81 in 1985-1991.
Since 1935-1937, when some fragmentary data and imputed magnitudes permitted us to estimate
the TFR of the Asian population at a very high 7,30, the fertility of this group has been
diminishing uninterruptedly, to reach a level, after half a century, of one-third of its initial value.
The fertility of the Coloured population appears to have risen after the Second World War, to
peak at 6,71 in 1960-1965, but since then has declined to a level approaching that of Asian
women, i.e. 2,50 compared to 2,45. The TFR of the Black population, too, has shown an increase
up to 1955-1960, but seems to have reacted fairly vigorously to the efforts of the Population
Development Programme (PDP), to reach 4,34 by 1985-1991. Even so, this latter Figure is sti11
55% and 140% higher than that of the Coloured and White populations respectively.
To promote the potential significance of our analysis for policy-makers it has been considered
preferable to quantify, illustrate and formulate conclusions and arguments by means of expected
or future, rather than past, trends. To this end the fertility rates (by age) have been projected over
the twenty-year period 1991-20 Il. The reasons for, and bases of, the projected values of the TFR
set out in Table l.1 have been furnished elsewhere (Sadie 1993, p.2), particular influence having
been attributed to the PDP among the high fertility communities. A11of them are expected to
decline, the rate of deceleration correlating positively with the 1985-1991 levels, so that the
Black/Coloured gap is reduced to 42%, the Black/Asian ratio to 47%, and the Black/White
differential to 77%.
Since the age incidence of motherhood may involve economic consequences for both mother and
child - the younger the mother the more onerous the burden - examples of the age pattern of
fertility are presented in Table 1.2.
TABLE 1.2
1991-1996: AGE-SPECIFIC FERTILITY RATES
Age of Mother: Whites Asians Coloureds Blacks
15-19 0,0196 0,0336 0,0467 0,130
20-24 0,0939 0,1531 0,1172 0,209
25-29 0,1324 0,1492 0,1351 0,163
30-34 0,0747 0,0797 0,0990 0,133
35-39 0,0216 0,0336 0,0557 0,100
40-44 0,0036 0,0083 0,0169 0,042
45-49 0,0003 0,0010 0,0040 0,015
TFR 1,73 2,29 2,37 3,96
Sources: See Table 1.1
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4Table 1.2 shows that the teenage fertility rates of Blacks, expressed as a multiple of the other
three groups, are:
2,8 compared to Coloureds,
3,9 compared to Asians, and
6,6 compared to Whites.
In terms of the intra-group age incidence of childbirth, weighted with the percentages of females
in the 15-19 age group, the probability of a child being born to a teenager is 0,054 among White
mothers, 0,080 among Asians, 0,109 among Coloureds and 0,224 among Blacks; which latter
therefore constitutes a multiple of 4,1 of the probability relating to the group of lowest fertility
(Whites), and of2,8 vis-a-vis Asians.
The data above also indicate that the duration of the reproductive process is positively correlated
with the level of fertility. Among Whites the process is almost completed at the age of 35, the
probability of bearing another child after that being down to 7,3%. At the opposite end of the
fertility spectrum the chances of a Black woman continuing to reproduce after age 35 are 19,8%.
She starts earlier and continues her reproduction into a later age, but a more rapid succession of
births than obtains among White women reduces the mean duration differential to below what
the comparative TFR values might suggest.
1.3. MORT ALITY
Mortality among the four S.A. population groups, as manifested ill its obverse, VIZ. the
expectation of life at birth, is quantified in Table 1.3:
TABLE 1.3
EXPECTATION OF LIFE AT BIRTH (YEARS)
Whites Asians Coloureds Blacks
1936-1941 61,7 51,8 43,4 40,0
1941-1946 64,1 50,6 43,4 38,3
1946-1951 65,9 55,0 46,4 41,2
1951-1956 66,7 59,1 50,7 45,7
1956-1960 67,1 60,1 53,7 51,1
1960-1965 68,1 61,5 54,1 53,8
1965-1970 68,5 61,8 53,7 54,5
1970-1975 69,0 62,5 54,5 56,7
1975-1980 69,7 64,3 57,6 57,8
1980-1985 70,5 66,4 59,5 60,0
1985-1991 72,9 67,8 61,6 61,3
Projected:
2006-2011 74,4 69,6 65,3 67,0
Sources: See Table 1.1
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5The White male and female expected life expectancies in Table 1.3 record that the White group
has always enjoyed a superior health status - the lowest mortality rates - followed by the Asians,
the Coloureds and the Blacks, in descending order. Over time, however, the dimensions of the
differentials have diminished, Whites having had 11,2 years, Asians 16 years, Coloureds 18,2
and Blacks 21,3 years added to their life expectancies during the fifty years since 1936-1941, to
reduce the White/Black ratio from 154: 100 to 119: 100. The ratio is expected to diminish further
to around 110:100 by 2006-2011, the inverse correlation between improvement in, and the level
of, life expectancy continuing to hold. Between 1960-1965 and 1980-1985 the expectation of life
of Blacks exceeded that of Coloureds, after having been lower for many decades.
It is interesting to note that, as a deviation from norm, Asian males enjoyed superiority over
females in life expectancy before 1946. This is to be associated with maternal mortality arising
from high fertility, to judge by the female survival ratios over the 15-49 age interval, which
remained lower than those for males for another ten years after 1946. Since then the superiority
of females in all four groups has been rising, to reach 7,1 years in the case of White women
(from 3,9 in 1936-1941),6,7 years for Asian women, 8,1 for Coloured women, and 7,0 years for
Black women (from 0,9 years in 1936-1941).
Life starts with a preponderence of males, the masculinity ratio at birth ranging from around
102:100 for the Coloured and Black group to 102,5: 100 for Asians and 104,5 in the case of
Whites. However, as a result of higher life expectancies for females than males, the excess is
whittled down with rising age, until at one or other stage, depending on the comparative levels of
survival probabilities, the differential is reversed to produce female majorities which increase
progressively. By 1996 the female preponderance in the age group 65 and older featured as
follows:
Female/Male
ratio
Female
majority
Whites
Asians
Coloureds
Blacks
1,42
1,39
1,60
1,53
90900
6900
28600
235300
Source: Sadie, 1993, pp. 37 et.seq.
Past migration has had some influence on the ratios. When this has been provided for we find a
negative association between the ratios and levels of life expectancy at birth. One of the side
effects of the above differential is that there are many more widows than widowers.
The most sensitive index of mortality and, as a rule, the one subject to the greatest diminution
over time, as socio-economic conditions improve and fertility declines, is the Infant Mortality
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6Rate (IMR). Estimates of this magnitude are assembled in Table 1.4, and show a weighted
aggregate rate of 67 per 1000 births (of all groups) for 1980-1985, and 55 for 1985-1991, the
latter embodying a variation from Il (Whites) to 60 (Blacks).
TABLE 1.4
INFANT MORTALITY RATES (Qer 1000 Births)
Whites Asians Coloureds Blacks
1936-1941 53 74 158 169
1941-1946 45 71 149 174
1946-1951 36 57 128 162
1951-1956 33 52 125 143
1955-1960 30 51 120 116
1960-1965 28 48 120 110
1965-1970 24 42 120 101
1970-1975 20 36 100 90
1975-1980 17 27 76 83
1980-1985 13 19 56 73
1985-1991 Il 15 43 60
Projected:
2006-2011 5 6 13 38
Source: CSS (b) & (c); Sadie, 1988, 1993.
It will be seen that the variation in IMRs is a great deal larger than shown by the total life
expectation (or its inverse, the death-rate of the stable population, respectively 13,7, 14,7, 16,2
and 16,3 in the Table 1.4 population group sequence). This arises from the smaller mortality
differentials among adults, and the effects of fertility levels upon infant mortality. The narrowing
of the per capita income gaps between the groups should have made for some reduction of the
relative IMR differentials as well. In absolute terms, the decrements in the IMR have been larger
the higher the initial levels. The increasing share of infant deaths in child mortality - for
example, from 74% in 1936-1941 to 88% in 1985-1991 in the case of Asian children - bears
testimony to the improvement of the environment into which children were being born.
1.4 MIGRATION
Migration of significant proportions during the past fifty years has been occurring only in the
case of the White and Black population groups. The former's net immigration has assumed the
following average annual dimensions since its hey-day.
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71963-1976
1977-1984
1985-1987
1988-1993
1994-1997
30280
16720
1 350
5340
-4090
Source: CSS (a) and (b)
The data testify to a very irregular movement of additions, by way of migration, to the White
group. What they reflect is that dramatic political events in South Africa incite emigration which
at times exceeds immigration in volume. When memories of these events have faded, while the
economy manifests sufficient confidence-inspiring buoyancy, emigration declines and
immigration surges, to produce a net inflow of new and returning inhabitants. What with the
radical change in government in 1994, the high incidence of violence and corruption and the
displacement of highly skilled White workers in the application of affirmative action, and the
decimation of formal sector employment, the political, social and economic climate has not been
conducive to the attraction of White immigrants since 1994. The actual loss through a net
outflow of migrants during 1994 to 1997 could be a good deal greater than the registered 4 090
per annum, since some South African residents who leave the country purportedly only for visits
abroad, do not return. For example, the excess in question over the five years 1991 to 1995,
amounted to 8 290 per annum on average, when only those travelling by air are considered, and
24460 when all modes of travel are taken into account (CSS(a) & (b)).
As the second millenium A.D. is drawing to a close, it does not appear as if net immigration is
going to add to the growth of the White population group in the foreseeable future. A similar
conclusion would hold for the Coloured and Asian communities.
Until the beginning of the nineteen-nineties the quantum of formal Black immigration (mostly
temporary labourers) could be gauged approximately by the number of foreign-born persons
registered during census enumerations, which showed diminishing numbers as from 1951 to
1985 and an increase at the time of the 1991 census, as follows:
1951
1985
1991
Male
482600
273300
314200
Female
120600
44800
108000
Total
603200
318 100
422200
Source: CSS (c)
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8It is difficult to put a Figure to the degree(s) of underenumeration, which has undoubtedly varied
from one census to the next. When the increase between 1985 and 1991, particularly that among
women, is considered in conjunction with the decline in the number of foreign (oscillating)
migrants recruited for, and working in, South African mines, it does signify a substantial influx
of persons from war-tom and poverty-stricken neighbouring countries, most of it probably
illegal.
After 1991 (or 1990) the situation appears to have changed quite remarkably. Estimates or
guestimates of the number of illegal immigrants living in South Africa - those who entered the
country without the required documents or temporary labour contracts, or who stayed behind
after the expiry of their visitor visas - range from two to eight million. On the basis of some
fragmentary data on the cross-border movement of persons from neighbouring states (CSS,
p.03 51) it has been estimated that South Africa's Black population numbers had, by 1996, been
swollen by some 1 800 000 foreigners, of whom at least 1 300 000 would have been staying in
the country illegally (Sadie, 1997).
Looking ahead, it seems unlikely that formal migration, as reflected in the numbers of foreign
Blacks, would make significant contributions to the size of this population group. However, to
the inhabitants of neighbouring countries not enamoured of national boundaries, South Africa
would, by comparison, no doubt continue to look like a haven in a sea of poverty, regardless of
the risk of detention and repatriation. To project their numbers is a statistically hazardous
exercise.
1.5 POPULATION SIZE
In Table 1.5 we present estimates of population members at various census dates, and as
projected to 20 11, on the assumption of natural increase only:
TABLE 1.5
TOTAL POPULATION OF SOUTH AFRICA
Whites Asians Coloureds Blacks Total
1936 2 016 700 227600 851 600 6950100 io 046 000
1946 2376600 314900 1 052 100 8618 000 12361 600
1951 2 649 600 377400 1 191 800 9645500 13 864300
1960 3 125 900 502 000 1 567300 12287200 17482400
1970 3 861 700 653800 2 130 200 16 022 000 22667700
1980 4 526 000 818400 2686700 21 061 600 29 092 700
1985 4 853 400 898600 2957800 24449800 33159600
1991 5 068 300 986600 3285600 28396700 37737200
Projected
2011 5 394 200 1 213 800 4112700 42371 200 53 091 900
Sources: CSS Ca); Sadie, 1988, 1993.
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9In Table 1.6 the main features of the population growth shown in Table 1.5 are focussed upon,
by presenting the rates of growth
(1) at the start of the 55-year period,
(2) when each group reached its maximum growth,
(3) at the end of our period, and lastly,
(4) as projected during 1991-2011.
TABLE 1.6
% GROWTH RATES PER ANNUM
1936-1946
1946-1951
1960-1965
1980-1985
1985-1991
Whites
1,7
Asians
3,3
3,7
Coloureds
2,1
Blacks
2,0
0,7 1,6 1,9
3,0
2,6
Total
2,1
2,3
2,7
2,7
2,2
2,1 3,2
Projected:
1991-2011 0,3 1,0 1,1 2,0 1,7
Throughout the 55-year period, the growth rate of the White group, despite contributions by
immigration (which was responsible for the peak of 2,1% during 1960-1965), remained at a
lower level than those of the other three groups. The growth rate of the Asian population has
been diminishing ever since its maximum in 1946-1951, ending up in 1,6% per annum in 1985-
1991. The growth of the Coloured population reached its peak during 1960-1965, and its decline
since then brought it down to 1,9% p.a. The growth rate of the Black population has been
increasing all the time to its maximum of 3,0% during 1980-1985, exceeding those of all the
others since 1965-1970. It is expected to continue doing so during the projection period, to
register a 2% p.a. natural increase, compared to 0,3 for Whites, 1,0% for Asians and 1,1% in the
case of the Coloured community. In the absence of immigration, it is projected to have a 91%
share in the increment of the aggregate population, i.e. 13 975 000 out of 15 355 000, to
dominate the demographic scene and bolster the aggregate rate of natural increase to 1,7% p.a.,
when the rest of the population will be expanding at 0,7% p.a. only. If they had multiplied at the
same rate as non-Blacks since 1970, there would have been 5 880 000, or 20,7% fewer of them
in 1991, of whom 4 340 000 (38%) would have been children whose coming into being would
have been averted.
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1.6 AGE STRUCTURES
It will be seen that of the four groups Whites are the demographically oldest and Blacks the
youngest population, the respective dependency ratios (children under 15 and persons 65 years
and older per 100 persons in the conventionally labelled economically active ages 15 to 64) in
1991 amounting to 46 and 80. Asians and Coloureds occupy intermediate positions. All groups
are due to experience some degree of ageing but it is only the Whites who will have reached the
tertiary stage by the year 2011 in which the 65+ age group is expanding faster than the under 15
category is shrinking, thus raising the dependency ratio. The other three populations will still be
experiencing the economically beneficial secondary stage, with the 15 to 64 category continuing
to expand in absolute and relative terms, to reduce the dependency ratios significantly, as the
child components are shrinking faster than the category of elderly people is increasing.
TABLE 1.7
AGE STRUCTURES OF THE FOUR POPULATION GROUPS
Coloureds
Age
0-14 15-64 65+ Total Dependency
Ratio
1991 22,1 68,5 9,4 100,0 46
2011 17,3 69,3 13,4 100,0 44
1991 30,5 66,1 3,4 100,0 51
2011 23,5 69,8 6,7 100,0 43
1991 33,4 63,2 3,4 100,0 58
2011 25,3 70,2 4,5 100,0 42
1991 40,9 55,6 3,5 100,0 80
2011 32,6 63,1 4,3 100,0 58
Whites
Asians
Blacks
Sources: Sadie, 1992, 1993.
The Black/non-Black demographic differential is at its most pronounced at the 0-14 age group.
In 1991 the numerical ratio was 454:100 when the aggregate ratio was 300:100, and it is
expected to rise to 613:100 by 2011 when the aggregate would stand at 390:100. The 1991-2011
change involves an absolute decline of 262000 non-Black children and an increase of 2 387 000
Black children. When the change relates to children of schoolgoing age (6 to 19 to make
allowance for some age retardation) it encompasses a 9 per cent decline (-221 000) and a 43 per
cent (+3072 000) increase respectively.
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1.7 URBANIRURAL DISTRIBUTION
Judging by the 1991 census results, adjusted for under-enumeration, the Coloured population
(83%), the Whites (91%) and the Asians (96%) can be considered more or less fully urbanized,
and it can be assumed that, probably, natural increase and immigration will add to the urban
numbers only. According to the former Central Statistical Service's definition of "urban", the
portion for the Black population would have been slightly above 35%. Judging by the push
factor inherent in the inability of the rural areas to sustain living standards or, worse still, just
life, one would expect the large majority of the 1991-2011 13 975 000 natural increase in the
Black population to be born, and/or settle, in the urban areas, regardless of whether the latter can
in actual fact provide a living to the new inhabitants.
1.8 CONCLUSION
In sum, breaking down the South African population into the customary four ethnic groups, and
disregarding some overlapping of characteristics, we can observe South Africa as a demographic
microcosm, with a First World, a Third World and an in-between component. Economically,
socially and politically the salient feature of the microcosm is the most rapid growth of the
numerically predominant Third World component, which is also the poorest; and at the opposite
pole, the ever-shrinking share of the First World, most highly economically developed,
constituent.
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CHAPTER2
THE MALE LABOUR FORCE
2.1 DEFINITION OF LABOUR FORCE
The labour force (LF), in population censuses referred to as the economically active (EA)
population, includes all persons who are participating, or are available for participation, in the
production of goods and services which, in monetary terms, add up to the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) or National Income (NI). It encompasses employees, employers and workers-on-
own-account, who are working at prevailing rates of payor profit, or are temporarily absent from
work, or are unemployed in the sense of, while not in employment or self-employment, being
available for it (according to the "expanded" definition of unemployment) and actively seeking it
(in the strict definition). Census data collected in conformity with the above definition do not, of
course, present a comprehensive picture of labour supply in the sense of labour time offered as
affected by the length of the working week, the duration of paid or unpaid holidays, the
prevalence of part-time work and multiple jobholding, and do not inform us of the intensity of
work effort or productivity. However, these forces do not operate directly in the demographic
sphere of influence. It needs, further, to be pointed out that the definition cannot allow for the
blurring of the dividing-line between membership and non-membership of the LF in traditional
societies with sizeable subsistence sectors, in which respondents may report their economic
status according to their perceptions instead of the factual situation.
For the purposes of our analyses, recourse will be had to the projections and other data contained
in this author's monographs published by the Bureau of Market Research (BMR) of UNISA: The
South African Labour Force J 960-2005 (BMR Research Report No. 178, 1991), A Projection of
the South African Population J 99J -2011 (BMR Research Report no. 196, 1993), and Projections
of the South African Labour Force 1991-2011 (BMR Research Report No. 200, 1994). The
extrapolations are exclusive of migration, so as to focus attention on the effects of mortality and
fertility.
2.2 POTENTIAL MANPOWER
It is common cause that the two proximate determinants of the size and composition of the LF
are
(1) the size, age and sex structure and growth-rate of the population, and
(2) the propensity to participate in the LF, as reflected in the LF participation rates (LFPRs).
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The first is a purely demographic force, whose role can be best illustrated by confining our
analysis to males, who can be labelled primary workers, that is, of whom it is invariably
expected to enter the LF at one or other stage of their lives - in contrast to women, whose
reproductive function may constitute an obstacle - and by making use of the potential manpower
concept.
The latter consists of all males in the EA category, which is 15-64, according to tradition. That
there are youths who become EA before age 15, or persons remaining economically active after
age 65, does not invalidate the outcome of our exercise.
The dynamics of manpower is then presented as the result of
1. entries, or accessions, to manpower per annum, defined as the number of survivors
among males younger than 15 who survive their 15th birthday, and
2. departures, or exits, from manpower, consisting of
(a) deaths among males within the 15-64 age group, and
(b) those who "retire" by virtue of having passed the upper age limit of the reference
group.
Rates of entries and departures are calculated by relating the numbers involved to the size of the
potential manpower group. The difference between the two rates represents the rate of natural
increase, while entries per 100 of departures are referred to as the co-efficient of replacement.
The rates in Table2.1 are averages over periods of five years, the average of the initial and final
values of the potential manpower acting as denominator. The manpower component is the
percentage of the male population in the 15-64 age category.
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TABLE 2.1
MANPOWER DYNAMICS
Manpower Rate of Rate of Rate of Departure Co-efficien t
Component Natural Entry due to of
0/0 Increase Retirement Death Replacement
Whites
1991-96 69,7 0,6 2,1 -0,9 -0,6 142
2006-2011 70,5 -0,1 1,9 -1,3 -0,7 98
Asians
1991-96 66,5 1,7 2,9 -0,5 -0,7 234
2006-2011 69,7 0,8 2,5 -0,8 -0,9 145
Coloureds
1991-96 63,8 1,9 3,2 -0,4 -0,9 239
2006-2011 69,4 1,2 2,8 -1,1 -0,5 176
Blacks
1991-96 56,4 3,1 4,3 -0,5 -0,7 364
2006-2011 62,1 2,3 3,5 -0,5 -0,7 303
The contents of Table 2.1 fit into the demographic situation depicted in Chapter 1. The close
inverse relationship between fertility, mortality and the relative size of the manpower component
is revealed, as well as the positive correlation between the first two magnitudes on the one hand
and the rates of entry and natural increase on the other. The high TFR of 3,96 combined with a
life table mortality rate of 16,3 (compared to 13,7 for Whites) introduces into the relatively small
Black manpower component (56,4%) large additions of children surviving to the age of 15 to
induce an entry rate of 4,3% p.a., which produces an annual rate of natural increase of 3,1% and
net departures of 0,5% p.a. through retirement and of 0,7% p.a. as a result of mortality. It is seen
that these rates of departure do not change between 1991-1996 and 2006-2011, which contrasts
with the situation obtaining among the three non-Black groups, whose rates of retirement will
change considerably. The natural increase of Blacks is most likely to decelerate over time - from
3,1% to 2,3% by 2006-2011 - because of a decline in the rate of entry, in concomitance with a
diminishing TFR. Even so, the deceleration will be less than expected to be experienced by the
other three groups, with that of Whites changing into a negative 0,1%. The latter, at the most
advanced stage of the ageing spectrum, have a large (69,7%) manpower component, relatively
small numbers of entries, and increasing retirements as well as departures due to mortality as the
age structure of the manpower moves upwards. The Asians and Coloureds occupy in between
positions, both of them with manpower components larger, and rates of entry smaller, than those
of Blacks. The departures from manpower correlate directly with the levels of mortality, while
the exits due to retirement are highest among the White, the demographically oldest, population.
Bearing most eloquent witness to the dynamics of manpower is the co-efficient of replacement.
The 1991-1996 index of 142 for Whites means that for every 100 males departing from the
manpower group through death and retirement, leaving behind them 100 vacancies to be filled,
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42 new job opportunities have to be created to provide full employment for this section of the
population. After the turn of the Century, the new jobs to be provided on this definition will
be -2 for every 100 departures. At 234 and 239, the co-efficients of replacement for Indian and
Coloured males respectively are still quite high, the result of the timing of the reduction in
fertility and mortality. Table 2.1 shows that, as these two population groups move further away
in time from their transition from high to low fertility, the indices are due to diminish very
significantly.
Not so in the case of the Blacks: Their co-efficient reveals that, during 1991-1996, for every 100
departures from manpower whose places can be filled by 100 entries, 264 new employment
opportunities have to be generated to provide for the burgeoning residual additions. This latter
magnitude is expected to decline, but to remain above 200 during 2006-2011, which is four-and-
a-half and two-and-two-thirds times that of the Indian and Coloured communities respectively,
while it is infinitely larger than the White males' -2. The differential job-creating demands upon
the economy emerge starkly.
The demographic mobility inherent in the high co-efficient of replacement, or rapid renewal of
manpower, of the youthful population has potential or theoretical economic merit in that the
continual inflow of large contingents of young entrants would increase the adaptability of
manpower to the needs of economic change and development. Instead of having to retrain and
re-educate older workers, set in their ways, the qualifications of the new entrants can be adapted
to fit the changing occupational requirements of the economy. However, for this potential merit
to be converted into practice, these new entrants should have employment opportunities in which
they can exercise their talents and skills. In the Third World communities - and the Black
population can, for the most part, be type-cast as such - this prerequisite for effective realisation
does not obtain. The theoretical merit is non-operative. Only the prejudicial attribute remains.
2.3 MALE LF PARTICIPATION
To convert the potential manpower data into LF magnitudes, we add age groups 65-69 and 70-74
to the EA age schedule - since some people continue working after age 65 - and apply the
relevant LFPRs to the relative population. The LFPRs can be compressed into a summary index,
the gross average years of EA life, by expressing them as fractions of 1 - to represent
probabilities of being in the LF at various ages - and aggregating these fractions. If five-year
intervals are used, multiplication by five is required. Using Wx (or worker rate) to symbolise an
LFPR at age x (or x+5 for quinquennial age groups), this summary index becomes LWX. To
demonstrate the influence of mortality on the duration of EA life, we calculate the net years of
EA life by applying the Lx values from the life table (the age composition of the stationary male
population) to Wx and dividing by Ix from the same life table, which in this case will be 115,
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Figure 2.1
WHITE MALE LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATIOS
100 .
90
80
70
we«,_
60.zw
U
Il:w...
50
40
30
20
1960
1991
15-19 21):24 25-29 3Q.34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70+
AGE COHORTS
Figure 2.2
ASIAN MALE LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATIOS
100
90
80
70
wo«,_
z 60.w
U
Il:w...
50
40.
30.
20.
15-19 2Q:24 25-29 :JO.34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70>
AGE COHORTS
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
18
Figure 2.3
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since LFP is presumed to start at age 15. The index can be connoted by l:Lwx/lx or TWx/Ix.
When we compute the duration of life spent in retirement, we have recourse to working-life
tables in which the divisor becomes lwx instead of lx, to denote the net expected years of life
spent outside the LF by only those who are, or have been, members of the LF. An example of
such a working-life table for Black males in 1991 is presented in Appendix A. The difference
between whole life and working life expectation equals expected length of life in retirement.
The LFPRs for 1960 and 1991 detailed in Appendix B, are graphically portrayed in Figures 2.1,
2.2, 2.3 and 2.4, and reflect a dome-like, or inverted, parabolic pattern of well-nigh universal
applicability. Differences among male populations relate to the absolute levels of the curves.
Typically, males start entering the labour market at one or other stage after age 15. By the age of
35 the process of accession comes to an end, with LFPRs attaining maxima close to 100%,
which levels are more or less maintained until the beginning of the withdrawal phase around the
age of 55. The changes that occur within the same communities over time and the different
LFPRs between communities at different levels of economic developments are, for the most part,
located at the accession and the withdrawal phases of EA life. In the former case the LFPRs at
_the beginning and end of EA life are declining. In the latter instance the less developed and
lower-income communities manifest higher LFP than the higher-income populations, but over
time the differences diminish. The Figures in Appendix B show that the range in indices of gross
years of EA in 1960 life between the highest income group (the Whites) and the lowest (Blacks)
was 50,9 and 55,8 respectively. By 1991 it had become 44,5 and 44,1 respectively. The latter
surprising result must be attributed to the abnormally low LFPRs of Blacks between ages 20 and
30, which are presumably the result of the violence, unrest and unemployment which were the
hallmark of life in the townships. The struggle for political power and the inability to find jobs
must have acted as disincentives even among Blacks in the ages of maximum participation
whose LFPRs were lower than those of Asians and Whites in 1991, as in the case of the 20-29
category. This means that the relatively small manpower component, as indicated in Section 2.2,
was no longer being compensated for by greater intensity ofLFP.
In Table 2.2 changes in the gross expected years of EA life of an average male over time are
compared with the net years ofEA life:
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TABLE 2.2
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GROSS AND NET YEARS OF EA LIFE
1960 1970 1980 1985 1991 2011
WHITES: Gross 50,9 50,1 46,7 45,4 44,5 42,0
Net 43,3 40,2 39,9 38,6
Diff. 7,6 5,2 4.6 3.4
ASIANS: Gross 50.8 47,7 46,1 45,2 44,7 42,4
Net 42,4 38,6 38,4 37,4
Diff. 8,4 6,6 6,3 5,0
COLOUREDS: Gross 53,3 49,7 45,7 44,1 41,7 41,1
Net 42,6 35,6 34,1 33,8
Diff 10,7 8,5 7,6 7,3
BLACKS: Gross 55,8 53,0 49,2 47,0 44,1 43,1
Net 42,1 37,8 36,4 37,0
Diff. 13,7 9,2 7,7 6,1
The difference between the two magnitudes has been diminishing for all four groups, indicating
a declining influence of mortality on the length of EA life. However, LFP, as reflected in the
gross years index, has been decreasing more rapidly than mortality has, effectively reducing the
number of years spent inside the LF and raising the number of years spent outside the LF. This
result is confirmed by the working-life table computations, the outcome of which, in the form of
the difference between total life and working life expectancy, is outlined in Table 2.3 for the
census years 1960 and 1991.
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TABLE2.3
DIFFERENCE IN YEARS BETWEEN TOTAL LIFE AND WORKING LIFE
EXPECTANCY
1960 1991 2011 1960 1991 1960 1991 1960 1991 2011
Age Whites Asians Coloureds Blacks
15 5,3 10,2 12,2 3,7 6,9 3,5 6,4 2,6 5,5 8,4
20 5,4 10,2 12,2 3,8 7,0 3,6 6,4 2,6 5,5 8,5
25 5,4 10,3 12,4 3,8 7,1 3,7 6,6 2,7 5,5 8,6
30 5,4 10,4 12,8 4,0 7,2 3,9 6,7 2,7 5,6 8,8
35 5,6 10,6 13,0 4,0 7,3 4,0 6,9 2,9 5,7 9,0
40 5,6 10,6 13,0 4,0 7,3 4,1 7,0 3,0 5,8 9,1
45 5,8 10,5 13,4 4,0 7,2 4,3 7,1 3,1 5,9 9,5
50 5,8 10,5 13,6 4,0 7,1 4,4 7,1 3,3 6,0 9,4
55 5,7 9,9 13,7 4,0 7,0 4,6 6,9 3,4 6,1 9,9
60 5,7 8,1 12,1 3,8 6,2 4,6 5,0 3,6 5,2 9,4
65 5,9 6,6 10,8 3,7 5,1 5,0 4,5 4,0 4,2 6,0
70 6,1 6,3 10,4 4,3 4,6 5,5 4,5 4,8 3,4 6,5
Over time the two opposing forces - increasing total life expectancy and decreasing working life
expectancy - have been raising the average years of life spent in retirement by the average male
LF member and, as exemplified by the extrapolated 20 Il values for Blacks and Whites, are due
to continue doing so, to add 4,2 and 4 years respectively to the numbers obtaining in 1991 for
age 60. The latter year had already revealed an advance of 1,6 and 2,4 years respectively on
those of 1960. For Asians the advance was 2,4 and for Coloureds 1,3 years. Obviously, to
maintain living standards during life in retirement, more had to be earned, and will have to be
earned, per year of shrinking EA life, to provide for increasing years of non-EA life. To facilitate
appreciation of the economic implication of this tendency, we can revert to the concept of the net
expected years of EA life - which means avoiding recourse to the statistical convention of the
working-life table of applying the maximum LFPR to ages below the age of maximum LFP - and
compare them with the whole life expectation at age 15 or whatever higher initial age we elect to
cover the whole age spectrum of EA. In this way we include the effect of the increase over time
in the average age of accession to the LF. Continuing the convention of 15 as initial age of entry
into the LF, we arrive at the comparative magnitudes presented in Table 2.4:
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TABLE2.4
YEARS OF EXPECTED LIFE AND EA LIFE
1960 1991 2011
WHITES:
Net years ofEA life 43,3 39,9 38,6
Total life expectancy at age 15 52,4 55,7 56,8
Difference 9,1 15,8 18,2
ASIANS:
Net years of EA life 42,4 38,4 37,4
Total life expectancy at age 15 49,1 51,1 52,2
Difference 6,7 12,7 14,8
COLOUREDS:
Net years ofEA life 42,6 34,1 33,8
Total life expectancy at age 15 47,5 47,7 47,9
Difference 4,9 13,6 14,1
BLACKS:
Net years ofEA life 42,1 36,4 37,0
Total life expectancy at age 15 46,1 49,3 52,8
Difference 4,0 12,9 15,8
The Figures in Table 2.4 show that all four groups have been experiencing considerable
increases between 1960 and 1991 in the expected number of years spent outside the LF after age
15. They range from 6 years among Asians to 8,9 among Blacks. The 2011 values indicate a
continuation of the trend, but at a reduced tempo. The 19'60-1991 trend is perhaps most explicitly
depicted by the changes in the ratios between life expectancies outside and inside the LF. They
increased from 21% to 40% for Whites, from 16% to 33% for Asian males, from 12% to 40% for
Coloureds, and from 10% to 35% for Blacks. To provide for the increasingly non-active life
during the decreasing years of EA life requires either larger savings out of wages or increases in
the latter, or both. If under 1960 LF conditions a 10% saving of a worker's wage deposited in a
pension fund earning a (real) rate of interest - money rate less allowance for inflation - of 5% per
annum were sufficient to provide for the period of life outside the LF, the 1991 conditions would
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demand a 16,8% saving in the case of White males, and a 36,6% saving in the case of Blacks, or
two-and-two-thirds times more than before. The alternative remedy would be a 68% and a 266%
increase respectively in their earnings. Deeming 1960 and 1991 as dating two successive LF
generations, this alternative would require an annual increase in productivity of 1,7% and 4,4%
respectively. In the light of the economic history of South Africa, the former percentage is on the
outer limits of likelihood; the latter lies far outside the realm of feasibility.
If we assume that no male engages in economic activity before age 15, we can determine the
portions of life spent by the average male as net consumer, by comparing the net years of EA life
with the expectation oflife at birth. The 1960, 1991 and projected portions are as follows:
1960 1991 2011
Whites 33,0% 42,4% 45,6%
Asians 29,5% 40,5% 43,2%
Coloureds 17,6% 40,8% 47,2%
Blacks 17,0% 37,1% 41,8%
The obverse of these magnitudes tells us that the EA portion of life has slipped from 67%
according to 1960 data to 57,6% in 1991 among Whites, and in the case of Blacks from 83% to
62,9%. Ceteris paribus, the burden per individual to provide for the net consumption phase of
life increases.
In discussions on pension schemes it has often been erroneously argued that Black persons do
not live long enough after retirement to derive full benefit (compared to the other population
groups) from pension funds, and should instead opt for provident funds. The comparative years
spent in retirement which appear in Table 2.3 cannot serve as evidence, since they are affected
by the level of the LFPRs. A worker who retires at age 55, 60 or 65 can expect the benefit of a
monthly pension for the rest of his life, not for the rest of life of those whose period of retirement
is being reduced by remaining in the LF after the above ages. So it is the total life expectancies
which have to be compared, as follows for 1991:
AGE:
55 60 65
Whites: 20,5 16,9 13,8
Asians: 17,3 14,2 11,5
Coloureds: 15,7 13,0 10,7
Blacks: 17,9 14,9 12,2
It is seen that Blacks are better off than Asians and Coloureds, and not significantly worse off
than Whites. The erroneous impression derives from the disparity in life expectancies at birth,
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which in the Black/White juxtaposition is 57,8 versus 69,3 years for the 1985-1991 period, and
which is for the most part a function of a disparity in infant and child mortality. Once the first
few critical years of life have been successfully passed, the probabilities of survival, as between
the four population groups, move closer to one another.
2.4 CAUSAL FACTORS IN LFP
Since intragroup changes over time and intergroup differences are, for the most part, located at
the lower and upper ends of the age profile of LFP, the forces operating among males at these
ages have to be identified. Obviously, age of entry into the LF is positively associated with the
periods spent in primary, secondary and tertiary educational institutions. That these periods may
be very long in some instances is evidenced by the fact that maximum participation is not
reached before age 35-39. They have been lengthened by the introduction and/or enforcement of
compulsory education combined with the enactment of minimum ages of formal employment.
As the technological content, the complexity and sophistication of the economic processes
increase, ever higher levels of education and training are demanded. For an equilibrating
response to be called forth the returns for investment in human capital by way of education and
training have to be adequate, since rising wages by themselves increase the cost of education by
way of raising the cost of non-participation in the LF. By means of its subsidisation or
defrayment of the costs of education the state reduces the expense to the individual, thus raising
the levels of human capital formation and lowering the LFPRs. The opportunity cost of
schooling in the form of earnings foregone is, of course, zero when the qualifications required
for a specific occupation have not yet been attained, or when jobs are not to be had. Up to 1985
the inverse relationship between ability to afford the direct and opportunity cost - as represented
by income per head - and the LFPRs for ages below 25 is reflected in the differential levels of
the latter. The 1991 Figures display some oddities which may be a manifestation of socio-
economic life in a turmoil.
Another determinant of the age of entry is the industrial composition of the economy. With child
labour proscribed in urban industries the importance of agriculture in the economic life of the
communities is manifested in the LFPRs of youthful males. Subsistence agriculture, where the
substitutability of labour for capital and technology is high, lends itself to the employment of
young children as unpaid family workers of whom it is expected to make a contribution to the
family's economic activity at an early stage. It is possible that not all of them are reported as
economically active in census forms. In so far as they are, the urbanisation process, which
reduces their opportunities while providing better educational facilities, has been reducing the
LFPRs.
At the upper end of the age scale workers have to contend with a force majeure at one or other
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stage, usually on the 65th birthday, in the form of an obligatory retirement age as prescribed by
employment and pension scheme provisions. But the progressively earlier retirement - at least
until 1994 - from the LF over time on the part of those who have not yet reached the age of
enforced retirement is, for the most part, a voluntary decision permitted by the necessary
financial capacity to do so. The meagre research on this topic undertaken in South Africa would
indicate that the large majority prefer not to remain economically active beyond the retirement
age (President's Council, 1988, p 105; Rip, 1979, p 37) while significant numbers would even
opt for early retirement if allowed to do so (Snyman, 1991), a reaction which was demonstrated
in practice during 1991-1993. This may be the result of a weak work ethic, the incapability of the
occupation to provide intellectual satisfaction to the worker, or a lack of interest in the work
performed. For some persons early retirement is an involuntary condition arising from an
inability to procure a job because of prejudice against older workers and an adverse stereotyping
of them. Worldwide the incidence of long term unemployment (12 months and longer)
experienced by them is highest, in a ratio, compared to young workers, which vary from 1,7:1 to
7,5: 1 (Tabah, 1988, p 130). It is also contended that a continuation of employment after
retirement would impede the upward mobility of younger workers, making for frustration and
less than optimum performance. This is not a valid argument since there is no reason why
persons who have reached the retirement age should not be moved out of the line function to
serve in a consultative capacity.
Of course, not all the characteristics attributed to the older workers which militate against their
employment, to induce lower LFP, are imagined rather than real. The latter will be discussed
after a review of the ageing process to be observed in the South African LF. At this stage it can
be mentioned that in so far as they militate against the employability of older workers in modem
industry a preponderance of mining and secondary industry with advancing technology, in the
process of modernisation of the economy, is likely to depress LFP at the higher ages. The
tendency is reinforced by the decline in the relative importance of agriculture where self-
employment permits of self-determined and gradual retirement. The growing importance of the
informal sector, where self-employment is also a pertinent feature, has a contrary effect, as has a
rising share of service industries in an advancing economy in which certain positive attributes of
older workers can come into operation.
Termination of LF membership or non-participation for reasons other than death presupposes
some financial ability to support life in the form of past savings, or government or family
assistance. Increasing provision of pension schemes, the financial strength of which is being
boosted by increasing receipts out of rising wages and salaries, and the augmentation of social
pensions, enhance the ability to retire, thus inducing a lowering of LFPRs. However, if pension
benefits are related to the last year's, or even the last day's salary or wage, they will not conduce
to retirement before the obligatory age, particularly when the economy is subject to chronic
inflation.
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With regard to men in the prime of their working lives, here defined as those aged 30 to 49 -
though some researchers prefer 25 to 54 - there was very little difference between the four
population groups in 1960, with LFPRs close to 100 per cent. Since then the levels have declined
in all cases, but least among Whites, which is in contrast to what would be expected if the ability
to remain outside the LF is measured by average amounts of financial resources available as
represented by the per capita personal income, as follows for 1991:
Whites
Asians
Coloureds
Blacks
Sources: Martins, et.al., 1994
23030
8560
5 180
2410
LFPR Age 30-49
%
97,3
95,6
91,5
93,5
Per capita personal income
However, point of time comparative per capita incomes cannot serve as urnque criteria of
welfare or measure the reaction to improvements in economic fortunes - of which the Whites
enjoyed the least (their average income having actually declined since the mid-seventies), and
the Asians the most, followed by the Coloured and Blacks, in that order - or reflect differences in
the taste for work (or work ethic). Disregarding the Coloured group, whose LFP is somewhat out
of line in the associatory context, the differential incomes can provide an explanation when they
are interpreted as the costs of non-participation. Clearly the cost will be lower for Blacks than for
Asians, whose cost in tum will be lower than that of Whites. By 1991 this has been reinforced by
the decline in expected income of Blacks arising from the very low probability of finding a paid
job within a stagnant economy. At the same time the cost of participation for them had increased
greatly by 1991 by reason of unrest, violence, arson, taxi wars and intimidation. LFP is reduced
on both counts. This would explain also the abnormally low LFPRs for 20-24 and 25-29 in 1991.
The financial resources for the assumption of this level of LFP are provided by way of the
mutual aid inhering in the extended family system, and the increasing amounts of social welfare
payments, such as old-age pensions, shared within this kind of household. About the pension
paid to rural Blacks it has been declared that "firstly, and most importantly, it is ... viewed as a
household asset. It does not get spent by the elderly persons themselves in the same way as a
pension going to a White elderly person" (Lund, 1993, p 18).
The LFP of Coloured males in the prime of life has been consistently below that of the other
three groups ever- since 1960, even after allowing for the slight differential in the incidence of
disability. In this they assimilate to the male LF of temperate South America (United Nations,
1988, p 39). The somewhat higher long-term rate of unemployment among them than among
Asians and Whites may be one of the reasons. There is some evidence that in the lesser skilled
circles the taste for work is lacking in intensity. One researcher found a negative attitude towards
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work among 16,2 per cent of his survey group who tended to turn down offers of employment
because of unrealistically high wage expectations (Wolmarans, 1976). To adopt this attitude they
need to be supported by wives, other relatives and the social security system. The latter in the
form of disability pensions, family maintenance payments, child allowances and foster parent
grants, expressed as a per capita average of the total population, amounted to R134 in 1990,
compared to R110 for Asians, R45 for Whites and R18 for Blacks. The addition of old-age
pensions raises these Figures to R223, R181, R142 and R81 respectively (Lund, 1992, p 90), all
of which add to the sustenance of three generation families. We are informed by social workers
that there are indeed many families living on the proceeds of social welfare payments.
Lastly, among all four groups one encounters the phenomenon of differential LFP according to
marital status. Married men are more likely to be members of the LF than non-married ones
(never married, widowed, divorced) as evidenced by the following 1991 comparative LFPRs for
men of prime age: Whites 98,3 per cent vs. 87,5 per cent; Asians 97,5 per cent vs. 78,3 per cent;
Coloureds 96,1 per cent vs. 80,4 per cent and Blacks 98,0 per cent vs. 79,2 per cent. The
differentials also hold for the quinquennial age groups within the prime age category. But, as
Bowen and Finegan have pointed out in their exhaustive analysis of LFP in the United States, the
direction of causality is not clear. Married men may be compelled by their family obligations -
which unmarried males may not have - to enter the labour market in greater relative numbers; or
unmarried males eschew, or drop out of, the LF for the same reasons that they avoid marriage or
have their marriages dissolved (1969, p 45).
2.5 LF NUMBERS
After adjustments to census data, the application of past and projected LFPRs to the male
populations (past and projected) produced the LF numbers summarised in Table 2.5. The
breakdown of the annual average increments into three age categories permits us to perceive the
effects of differential and declining fertility and mortality. They are (i) the age of accession, (ii)
the prime age category, 30-49 and (iii) the mature group, 50+.
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TABLE 2.5
THE MALE LABOUR FORCE
TABLE 2.5(a)
WHITES (1985-1991 TFR = 1,81):
ANNUAL INCREMENTS BY AGE
TOTAL LF 15-29: 30-49: 50+: All Ages:
1960: 881 000
10300 7500 5200 23000
1970: 1 112000
3730 14000 1 970 19700
1985: 1 409000
450 8470 4050 12970
1991: 1 486770
1010 6320 7580 14910
1996: 1 561 310
-4710 6200 7270 8760
2001: 1605110
-5360 5900 3490 4030
2006: 1 625250
-1940 -2320 2560 -1700
2011: 1 616750
TABLE 2.5(b)
ASIANS (TFR = 2,45):
ANNUAL INCREMENTS BY AGE
TOTALLF 15-29: 30-49: 50+: All Ages:
1960: 119300
1 800 1 970 590 4360
1970: 161 400
1 080 3060 760 4900
1985: 235 100
1 100 2440 1 500 5040
1991: 265260
1160 2490 1600 5250
1996: 291 490
420 2200 1830 4450
2001: 313 750
-210 2440 1550 3780
2006: 332660
90 1400 1100 2590
2011: 345600
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TABLE 2.5(c)
COLOUREDS (TFR = 2,80):
ANNUAL INCREMENTS BY AGE
TOTALLF 15-29: 30-49: 50+: All Ages:
1960: 403400
4890 4020 1 210 10 120
1970: 501 300
6600 5700 790 13090
1985: 697600
6300 11 000 900 18200
1991: 806840
120 16010 2210 18340
1996: 898550
-900 12210 3660 14970
2001: 973390
-1490 11 330 5220 15060
2006: 1 051 680
1340 4380 6680 12400
2011: 1 113 680
TABLE 2.5( d)
BLACKS (TFR = 4,34):
ANNUAL INCREMENTS BY AGE
TOTALLF 15-29: 30-49: 50+: All Ages:
1960: 3058000
28930 34470 5660 69060
1970: 3726000
49460 45 120 13070 107650
1985: 5340000
-14700 74100 16780 76 100
1991: 5796700
70600 99 100 25700 195 400
1996: 6773700
77360 108620 33840 219 800
2001: 7872 800
70240 118 360 47360 236000
2006: 9052600
53480 130360 59680 243 500
2011: 10270200
Looking at the totals only we can identify the trends by means of the growth rates in Table 2.6.
Sources: Sadie, 1991, pp. 50, 58, 66, 74; 1994: p 25.
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TABLE 2.6
ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF THE MALE LF IN PER CENT
1960-91 1991-2011 1960-70 1985-91 1991-96 2006-2011
Whites 1,70 0,40 2,4 0,9 1,0 -0,1
Asians 2,60 1,33 3,2 2,0 1,9 0,8
Coloureds 2,34 1,62 2,3 2,5 2,2 1,2
Blacks 2,08 2,90 2,0 1,4 3,2 2,6
Deviations from trend were caused by immigration in the case of Whites during 1980-85 which
raised their growth rate, and, among Blacks by significantly increased school attendance since
1980 and by socio-economic and political conditions during 1985-91, both forces reducing the
growth rate. But for these interventions the Blacks' rate would have been upwards until the
beginning of the 1990's as it was in the case of the Coloured male LF, as a result of declining
mortality not matched by a comparable diminution in the fertility rate. The effect of the
deviation-inducing circumstances having stabilised, the Blacks' growth rate can be expected to
be higher over the twenty-year period (2,9 per cent per annum) than during the preceding 31 year
period 1960-1991 which contrasts with those of the other three groups. However, all four will be
experiencing a slowing down or, among Whites and Asians, a continuation of the historical
deceleration after 1991 or 1996. At the end of our projection period Blacks are expected to
register a growth rate more than twice that of Coloureds and more than three times that of
Asians, as a result of a delayed response to family planning programmes and urbanisation, while
the ranks of the White LF will be reduced in the absolute sense, after decades of diminishing
additions, from 23 000 per annum during 1960-70 to -1 700 in 2006-2011.
The divergent growth rates gave, and will give, rise to the following contributions by the four
groups to the annual net increments in the LF:
1960-70 1991-96 2006-2011
Number 0/0 Number 0/0 Number 0/0
Whites 23000 21,6 14910 6,4 -1 700 -0,6
Asians 4360 4,1 5250 2,2 2590 1,0
Coloureds 10 120 9,5 18340 7,9 12400 4,8
Blacks 69060 64,8 195400 83,5 243 500 94,8
106540 100,0 233900 100,0 256790 100,0
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The numerical preponderance of the Black population in the growth of the LF is manifest. Over
the period of 31 years their contribution increased from 64,8 per cent to 83,5 per cent and it is
very likely to increase to 94,8 per cent by the end of the projection period, by which time the
predominant provider of entrepreneurial initiative (the White group) will be shrinking in size.
The age compositions of the annual increments, as set out in Tables 2.5(a), (b), (c) and (d),
reflect the above differential growth rates and the forces shaping them. The White population,
with a TFR below replacement level, after uninterrupted declines from its 1955-60 value of 3,
50, is the demographically oldest of the four population groups with accessions declining to the
extent of engendering negative values in respect of the annual LF increments for the 15-29 age
group after 1996, and for the prime age group as well as the all-ages total after the year 2006. By
then this LF will be in the tertiary phase of the ageing process, the share of the 50+ age category
increasing faster than the 15-29 portion is contracting, to induce a decrease in the relative size of
the prime age group. The Asian and Coloured labour forces are following in the footsteps of the
Whites, with shrinking numbers being added to the 15-29 age category. They are, however, still
very much in the beneficial secondary phase of ageing while the relative size of their prime age
group is expanding. The Black LF has entered this phase during the first half of the eighties only,
and remains the most youthful of the four with additions to the 15-29 age category still on the
increase. They, like the Coloured LF, have actually experienced some juvenescence over the
1960-1980 period as the result of declining mortality not neutralised by diminishing fertility.
The longrun effects of the movements detailed in Tables 2.5(a) to (d) are reflected in the point-
of-time age structures for select dates in Table 2.7, which require no comment.
TABLE 2.7
AGE STRUCTURES OF THE MALE LF
15-29 30-49 50+ Total
WHITES 1960: 30,8 44,9 24,3 100,0
1991: 29,2 49,2 21,6 100,0
2011: 23,4 50,3 26,3 100,0
ASIANS 1960: 46,2 40,7 13,1 100,0
1991: 36,0 48,5 15,5 100,0
2011: 29,8 49,6 20,6 100,0
COLOUREDS 1960: 45,7 38,2 16,1 100,0
1991: 45,6 42,7 11,7 100,0
2011: 32,9 50,7 16,4 100,0
BLACKS 1960: 45,6 37,4 17;0 100,0
1991: 40,2 44,8 15,0 100,0
2011: 35,9 47,5 16,6 100,0
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2.6 ACCESSIONS TO AND DEPARTURES FROM THE LF
The increments in the LF discussed above are, of course, net additions, which are the outcome of
the difference between entries into, and exits from, the LF. Attention to the two components is
required not only for the insights they provide us with, but also because of the common flawed
equation of the probability of a school-leaver or graduate obtaining a job with the net number of
new jobs created. Even, as in the stationary labour market, the economy fails to create new job
opportunities, but does not reduce the existing number of jobs, some accessions to the LF will be
able to enter the jobs vacated by reason of the death and retirement of the incumbents, assuming
similarity between skills required and offered. In Table 2.8 the ratios of departures to accessions
(DIA) tell us the probability of acquiring a job in a stationary labour market with no intergroup
mobility and no unemployment, the level of the latter determining the number of departures
which emanate from males who do not have paid jobs and thus do not generate vacancies to
which new accessions can aspire.
Below we ignore the discount for unemployment which would reduce the DIA ratio as an
employment probability index in a stationary labour market, that of the Blacks diminishing by
almost one-half if only the formal sector is taken into account.
TABLE2.8
GROSS ANNUAL ACCESSIONS TO AND DEPARTURES FROM THE LF
1991-1996 2006-2011
ACC. DEP D/A% ACC. DEP D/A%
WHITES: 41 590 26680 64% 35950 37650 105%
ASIANS: 9310 4070 44% 9 160 6570 72%
COLOUREDS: 28800 10450 36% 31270 18870 60%
BLACKS: 272 340 76940 28% 363 800 120300 33%
These data inform us that a White male entering the labour market has a 64 per cent chance of
obtaining a job according to the 1991-1996 conditions, and this probability rises to over 100 per
cent at the end of the twenty-year period as exits begin to exceed entries. At the other end of the
spectrum, Black males have a 28 per cent chance only, and the prospects do not improve
meaningfully over the projection period. Of course, any new jobs created are tantamount to the
strengthening of the numerator to raise the probability, while an increase in unemployment will
reduce it. To equal the White males' probability in a stationary labour market, a dynamic
economy is required to create new jobs for Blacks at a rate of 2,3 times the latter's LF departure
rate.
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The probabilities of Asian and Coloured males securing a job range between those of the Whites
and Blacks, and will increase significantly to end up on 72 per cent and 60 per cent respectively,
as a result of relatively low and diminishing fertility.
The inverse of the employment probability furnishes us with the coefficient of LF replacement as
follows (Accessions per 100 Departures):
1991-1996 2006-2011
Whites 156 96
Asians 229 139
Coloureds 276 166
Blacks 354 302
Because of the stagnation in the economy and job creation since 1982 - and at least up to the
time of writing in 1998 - the theoretical beneficence, as discussed under Potential Manpower, of
the demographic mobility inhering in such high values for the co-efficient as 276 and 354 among
Coloureds and Blacks, respectively, is inoperative, and only the prejudicial attribute of having to
provide for the 176 and 254 respectively, who cannot be accommodated in the 100 vacancies
arising from departures through death and retirement, remains. While the co-efficient will be
down to reasonable proportions for the three non-Black groups by 2006-2011, that of the Blacks
will, at above 300, remain at a problem-ridden high value.
2.7 AGEING AND LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY
It may be maintained that as long as the prime age group in the LF is growing in relative size, the
economically beneficial effect of ageing predominates and is therefore not a cause for concern.
For example, at the opposing ends of the demographic spectrum we have a White prime age
group which embodies on average 5,1 more years of learning and working experience than the
Black group does, i.e. 26,2 vs. 21,1 years, and this should conduce, ceteris paribus, to some 24
per cent greater competence or productivity on the part of the former. But it is possible that the
superiority in performance attaching to the greater number of years of experience may gradually
disappear as the individual advances in age and is subjected to a biological process of involution.
Again, even before the tertiary stage of demographic ageing has been reached there will have
been a steady accumulation of numbers, in absolute and relative terms, who may experience
some difficulties in the labour market because of the chronological age factor, which, in the eye
of the employer, could conceivably be considered a proxy for biological age.
A possible link between productivity and biological ageing may be embodied in the age-earnings
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FIGURE 2.5
EARNINGS BY AGE AND LEVEL OF EDUCATION
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profiles diagrammed in Figure 2.5, which portray South African experience (Terblanche, 1973, p
12) but may be representative of many other countries (Hartog, 1976, pp 61-74; Blaug, 1976, p
837). The graphs are concave from below with the better educated and trained workers
registering a steeper initial phase to reach a maximum level somewhere between age 45 and 55
after which they decline or level out. Based as they are on cross-sectional data there is some
doubt about their validity at the upper end of the age scale, inasmuch as we are interested in the
life-time earnings of a cohort as they proceed to the end of their LF career and not in the point-
of-time earnings of a conglomerate of successive cohorts. Lacking the required longitudinal data
these earnings have been simulated by means of a series of cross-sectional studies, which purport
to show that the profiles should not dip at middle age but continue to rise until age 65. However,
it is not inconceivable that if age-related earnings could be standardised for growth in the
national product (or per capita national income) over time, it may be found that our age profiles
above are representative of lifetime earnings as well (Clark, 1976, p 929). The learning curve
may be cited as basis for this expectation. This curve, applied to the individual worker, describes
his performance in routine tasks which are repeated (Corlett & Morcombe, 1970, pp 14-19),
registers the decrease in time required as a result of repetition, and is convex in appearance.
Inverted into a curve which regresses output on experience (represented by repetition), it will
manifest some similarity with those in the Figure above in approaching some maximum level
asymptotically.
The phenomenon may be linked to biological ageing in which the evolutionary process of the
regeneration of the vital properties inhering in tissues and cells is being overtaken by involution
or atrophy. Starting hislher LF career, endowed with innate ability and, perhaps, human capital
and subject to training and learning-by-doing, the worker will experience evolution
predominating at decelerating rates over time. During the period of senescence involution
becomes the predominant force which can affect hislher productivity. Borrowing from the results
of extensive psychological research some of the elements involved can be featured. (Welford,
1958; Ruhlen, 1945; Gintis, 1971; Suzuki, 1976; Guilford, 1967; Giniger, et al., 1983; McEvoy
& Cascio, 1989).
With regard to the sensory functions of man it is a well established fact that visual and auditory
acuity diminishes with age. On the other hand it is maintained that what is perceived is more
fully comprehended. It stands to reason, however, that the impediments must in many instances
diminish their effectiveness as workers. Glasses and hearing aids can improve their visual and
auditory accommodation. But perceptual activity includes an element of speed, and the lack of
rapid response cannot be offset by means of such technical aids, although experience and
persistence may to some extent effect a certain degree of compensation.
The progressive impairment of the homeostatic mechanism retards the regulatory response to
changes in external environment such as would be induced by changes of temperature, or to
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minor disturbances caused by muscular activity. This narrowing of the range of adaptation is
responsible for a diminution in motor ability as expressed in skilled hand and foot movements,
strength of grip or pull, etc. It is evident whenever the accent is on speed, and inasmuch as
psychomotor ability involves a speed element, the majority of older people do not escape the
decline wrought by the involutionary process. Persistence and practice or continued use of skill
will, however, prevent a marked deterioration, or may compensate, even if not fully, for the
original lack of promptness of response. Older persons have a more rigid approach than younger
ones to tasks set to them, with the result that they require more time per task. When working at
their own speed the decrement in their standard of performance over time is less. Where they
have to work according to a time schedule they evidently tire sooner and the margin of
superiority of the younger workers increases with the duration of the task. This superiority is also
the greater the more complicated the tasks. In those not making unusual demands the older
subjects do comparatively well. In so far as they are cautious, afraid of making mistakes, they are
more deliberate and accurate. Less effort is wasted. This is, of course, an advantage where
expensive material and machinery are involved.
Because of the impairment of the memory faculty older people need more time in committing
something to memory, but they tend to make fewer mistakes than younger people who memorise
more easily. A distinction is to be recognised between rote memory, which does not show any
sudden deterioration before the eighties, and the process of assimilation, the decline in which
renders the older subject less able to cope with the memorising of facts.
Although it would appear from various experiments with intelligence tests that there is a decline
in intelligence after a youthful age, no irrefutable conclusion is to be drawn. Older people seem
to retain some intellectual abilities while undergoing a deterioration in others. Some experiments
have shown a retardation in verbal fluency, while in others no or no significant decline has been
found. The results are apparently also dependent on the type of test. It is being contended that the
tests may not be evaluating the same mental ability at different ages. The root of the problem is
probably to be found in the difficulty of giving precise meaning to the term "intelligence". A.
person, as he grows older, may become wiser and in this sense more intelligent, though he may
have less ability than he once had. Also, one has to distinguish between capacity and ability. A
person may lose the latter while retaining the former, or vice versa. These tests, however, do
show that where speed constitutes an important element, older people display a similar
decrement in performance as in motor ability. They are more circumspect in their intellectual
operations, and have greatest difficulty where they have to break away from established mental
habits and to adapt themselves to new situations.
The ability to learn is a function not only, nor even primarily, of age per sé but also of a person's
inherent capacity, his training, the way his abilities have been utilised over the years, his
experience and habits and his attitude toward his work. Disentangling the effects of each factor is
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not always possible, especially since some of the other factors mentioned usually reinforce the
degenerative effect of ageing. Thus a person may have fallen into a mental rut because of
specialisation, having worked at one particular task the greater part of his life. The full range of
his potentialities never becomes exercised; and ability deteriorates as a result of disuse, even
though the capacity is retained. If in addition the older person lacks interest or enthusiasm for his
work, because the attribute of curiosity, which characterises youth and which evokes
investigative behaviour, has waned, or because he is subjected to less economic and social
pressure, it is to be expected that his learning ability will be, or will appear to be, inferior when
compared to that of younger persons.
Performance in learning task experiments falls continuously with age. At first there is a slowing
down, then the standard of accuracy declines, after which both speed and accuracy decline.
Variability increases with age; which means that the deviation from the mean, or average,
performance is greatest in the upper age brackets. Some older persons show ability equal to that
of their younger colleagues, while others perform much worse. The diminution in learning ability
is correlated with the degree of reorganisation required of existing habit patterns. Whereas
younger workers would allow a learning task to dictate their method of approach, older persons
are inclined to approach it with certain preconceptions. Their inability or unwillingness to
accommodate new situations is demonstrated by, amongst others, the difficulty experienced in
unlearning something. They tend to be more conservative and traditional in their beliefs and to
resist changing their beliefs. Flexibility is reduced. Inasmuch as the mobility of the LF between
sectors of the economy is reduced, the economy will lose some of its flexibility, and growth may
diminish. Costs will rise as the returns to the retraining of labour decline with age. The
downward mobility of labour - the relegation to lower status jobs as age increases - can act as a
countervailing factor, but this would require a destigmatisation of such relegation.
As a compensatory factor their greater experience and wider range of habits which can be
brought to bear upon a problem can be pointed out. It is also to be added that whether or not the
learning ability of an employee remains functional will depend to a great extent on the growth of
the firm in which he works. If the latter is continually developing, changing the variety of its
products and its methods of production or venturing into new fields, so will the employee grow
and develop with it. If it stagnates, the worker will lose his adaptability.
Judgement and reasoning ability are the two characteristics which offer the greatest resistance to
deterioration, and they reach their peak latest of all abilities, and it may be that the greatest
intellectual maturity is reached when those physiological functions which determine motor
ability have reached an advanced stage in the involutionary process. This is to be expected in
view of the fact that judgement and reasoning are based on experience and knowledge which
accumulate over the years, while the deterioration is the smaller the more complex the
psychological function. This points to the conclusion, borne out in practice, that work requiring
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great skill can be effectively performed at an advanced age if it is unconstricted by demands of
speed or amount. Thus it is also that creative ability knows no age, although the outstanding
performances by geniuses at high ages cannot be held up as examples in this connection since
they are by no means representative of the average older person.
Most of the age-related decrements noted above seem to be located in the receptor mechanism
which deals with the organisation of incoming data, and not in the effector mechanism which is
responsible for the transition from perception or assimilation to action. The former can be
associated with the cognitive characteristics, and the latter with the affective characteristics (the
propensity to respond to demands). If the latter is accorded priority rating it is learning-by-doing
and experience that come into their own, particularly when coupled with the attribute of loyalty
and devotion to duty. While older workers are accordingly most deficient when the execution of
a task conflicts with established habits, and especially if the latter are required to be unlearned,
they are, on the other hand, at their best whenever time-stress is absent, and they are working
within well-defined limits, when they can use their accumulated experience and problemsolving
ability and when a minimum of motor ability is required.
If the above analysis is valid it may offer an explanation for the perceived or discovered curvi-
linear association between productive performance and age (unfortunately, invariably, on the
basis of cross-sectional and not longitudinal data) and, among a family of age profiles, the
dipping or flattening out of those of manual workers at an earlier age than the profiles of white
collar workers and, among the latter, those of the lesser educated sooner than of the more highly
educated. The contrast could, at least in part, relate to manual dexterity (deteriorating after a
certain age) versus increasing wisdom. However, two researchers found that among the 65
studies, with 96 independent samples, identified by them, 56 reported a positive correlation, 38 a
negative correlation and 2 a zero correlation between age and performance. Their own meta-
analysis of these studies led them to the conclusion that age and performance appeared to be
generally unrelated (McEvoy & Cascio, 1989, pp 11-19; also Clark & Menefee, 1980). They do
sound some caveats though: the relationship may be curvilinear and not linear as assumed in
their meta-analysis; the performance of older workers may reflect the effect of selective
retention of older workers; and the data are cross-sectional (instead of longitudinal) in character.
Uncertainty prevails.
Juxtaposing psychomotor abilities and wisdom (judgement, reasoning, experience) the former
can be said to be required pre-eminently by lesser developed communities (LDCs with smoke-
stack industries, blue collar jobs), while the more developed economies (MDCs) where advanced
technology and the knowledge industry prevail, the latter attribute may be the more appropriate.
And, to this extent, demographic forces and requirements of economies appear to be
synchronised. However, this does not necessarily confer a comparative advantage on LDCs,
because of the substitutability of technology and capital for labour.
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In the absence of direct statistical evidence on morbidity by age as a measure of physiological
retrogression, we can have recourse to the age incidence of disability on which information has
been collected in the 1996 census, after having been omitted in the 1955 and 1991 censuses.
Statistics South Africa's 1996 graphic portrayal is reproduced in Figure 2.6.
FIGURE 2.6
PERCENT AGE OF DISABLED IN EACH AGE CATEGORY BY POPULATION
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Even while the intergroup picture appears to be slightly distorted (cf. CSS, 1980, pp 305-311) by
the exclusion of institutions, the overall message is clear: the incidence of disability is positively
correlated with age. The probability of disablement among the age group 55-64 is on average
(for the four groups together on a weighted basis) three times as high as that of age group 20-24.
The data on work disability gathered by the United States National Health Survey reveal a
progressive upward movement of rates by age, with those of the 68-70 age group two to four
times higher than those of the 50-52 year olds, depending upon the physical demands made by
the jobs (Feldman, 1986, eh XVII). The duration of work disability also increases with age,
being twice as long for those aged 55-64 than those 18 to 44 years old (Metropolitan Life,
various issues).
The fragmentary data available on morbidity underscore the tendencies inhering in the above
statistics (Caldwell, et al., 1990, Vol I). While older workers are less likely to get injured in the
work place, they experience proportionately more permanent impairments than younger ones,
and healing periods in the case of temporary disablement are longer.
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The adverse attributes associated with ageing as discussed above provide grounds for
differentiating between young and elderly workers. But the latter have, in addition, to contend
with discrimination i.e. treatment based on prejudice or stereotyping. This is particularly true of
individuals who do not conform to the mould in which they have been cast in the thinking of
employers. In the mid-twentieth century the chairman of the New York State Joint Legislative
Committee on Problems of the Ageing elicited information from fifty-nine countries about the
treatment meted out to older workers, and found: "In seeking a job the older person finds himself
at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the younger person, whether he be in the Orient or the West - whether
in a statist economy or free enterprise economy or mixed economy, whether .... There is no
evidence available that indicates that anywhere in the world employers generally are free from
prejudice against the hiring of older workers" (Abrams, 1952, p 70). Since then discrimination
has diminished in intensity but has not disappeared (Clark, 1980), a pointer to which is the 1978
Act of Congress which raised to 70 the minimum age at which the discharge of a worker on the
basis solely of chronological age was permitted.
The outcome of this situation in the labour market is the discouraged worker.
2.8 IN RECAPITULATION
The demographic mobility of a LF inhering in a high fertility, rapidly growing population, or
population group, imparts economic adaptability to it which can facilitate economic change and
growth. However, an economy lacking in vitality, and particularly when it is hamstrung by trade
union action - as has been the situation in South Africa since the beginning of the 1980s - does
not convert this potentially beneficial attribute into actual economic performance. In
consequence, in the LF context, there is no economic merit in the rapid growth and the size of
the numerically predominant, and youthful, Black population group in South Africa. A 354
coefficient of LF replacement (accessions per 100 departures), compared to 156 for Whites,
spells an impediment to the attainment of reasonable levels of employment.
The observed declines in LFP reduces the statistic which measures numbers of employed, but
brings no relief to the problem of providing sustenance to the population at large.
While all four ethnic groups will be experiencing the secondary, theoretically beneficial, stage of
ageing (i.e. the LF component of the population is expanding) the White group because of its
history of low fertility levels, is due to enter the tertiary stage during the first decade of the
twenty-first century, in which the LF component will shrink. Since 1996 the accessions have
been in absolute decline, and after the year 2006 only the 50 years and older section of their LF
is likely to expand. Insofar as manufacturing processes require manual dexterity, visual and
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auditory acuity, this ageing will have an adverse effect on productivity. This is not likely to
happen, though, if the white collar professional service sector, in which experience, expertise and
judgement are required, becomes or remains a leading GDP generator.
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APPENDIX A
1991 WORKING LIFE TABLE - BLACK MALES
Lx 0 0 0
x Wx (10=1000) Lw1 + Tw1x Iw1 ewx ex ex-ewxx x
15-19 ,323 4466 4211 36577 836 43,8 49,3 5,5
20-24 ,674 4406 4 155 32366 822 39,4 44,9 5,5
25-29 ,875 4316 4070 28211 803 35,1 40,6 5,5
30-34 ,932 4207 3967 24 141 781 30,9 36,5 5,6
35-39 ,943 4074 3842 20174 753 26,8 32,5 5,7
40-44 ,941 3919 3688 16332 718 22,7 28,5 5,8
45-40 ,940 3,712 3489 12644 672 18,8 24,7 5,9
50-54 ,920 3441 3 166 9 155 603 15,2 21,2 6,0
55-59 ,878 3 106 2727 5989 508 11,8 17,9 6,1
60-64 ,689 2681 1 847 3262 336 9,7 14,9 5,2
65-69 ,420 2 194 921 1 415 177 8,0 12,2 4,2
70-74 ,303 1 631 494 494 77 6,4 9,8 3,4
+ To obviate the statistical probability of a rise in working life expectancy emanating from
the increase in LFP between age 15 and age of maximum participation, the LFPR of the
latter is assumed to apply to the lower ages as well.
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APPENDIX B
1991MALE LFPRs (%)
WHITES ASIANS COLOUREDS BLACKS
1960 1991 1960 1991 1960 1991 1960 1991
15-19 36,7 24,5 51,4 28,1 82,9 36,8 79,3 32,3
20-24 91,9 80,0 92,5 85,4 97,5 84,2 96,5 67,4
25-29 98,4 96,5 97,2 95,5 98,6 91,6 98,9 87,5
30-34 99,3 97,6 99,2 96,1 98,9 92,3 99,4 93,2
35-39 99,4 97,9 99,4 96,4 98,6 92,6 99,4 94,3
40-44 99,1 96,8 98,5 95,4 98,3 91,2 99,3 94,1
45-49 98,7 96,6 98,0 94,0 97,9 89,5 99,2 94,0
50-54 96,8 93,2 94,5 89,7 95,2 84,3 98,2 92,0
55-59 92,5 83,6 88,1 82,3 90,9 78,0 95,1 87,8
60-64 86,0 58,7 76,7 64,0 81,6 51,2 91,5 68,9
65-69 71,7 35,8 65,3 38,0 68,9 26,8 85,4 42,0
70- 47,0 28,2 55,5 28,8 56,6 15,9 74,4 30,3
Gross Yrs of
EA Life 50,9 44,5 50,8 44,7 53,3 41,7 55,8 44,1
Net Yrs of
EA Life 43,3 39,9 42,4 38,4 42,6 34,1 42,1 36,4
Difference 7,6 4,6 8,4 6,3 10,7 7,6 13,7 7,7
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CHAPTER 3
THE FEMALE LABOUR FORCE
3.1 LF PARTICIPATION
While there are several reasons why the female LF should be separately treated of, the
outstanding one is that most females, at one time or other stage of their lives, assume the
homemaking function, more often than not accompanied by the exercise of the reproductive
function, which adds an extra dimension to the choice between LFP and non-participation. The
frequency of reproduction is a determinant of the amount of time that can and/or will be spent in
the wage labour market. That participation in family formation tends to be an impediment to LFP
- even if not universally - is, or has been, manifested in the levels and age profiles of female
LFPRs, as portrayed in Figures 3.1(a), (b), (c) and (d). Their content can be felicitously
interpreted in conjunction with the longitudinal LFPRs by birth cohort, as detailed in Table 3.1.
TABLE 3.1
LABOUR FORCE PARTICIP ATION RATES OF COHORTS OF WOMEN
ADVANCING IN AGE, BY POPULATION AND AGE GROUP, 1925-1959
Age Group
Birth 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54
Cohort % % % % .% % % %
Whites
1925-1929 46,3 28,9 27,6 32,8 38,8 41,5 39,0
1930-1934 42,0 48,3 30,5 31,2 36,5 42,9 46,2 42,9
1935-1939 37,6 50,3 34,6 34,7 41,8 46,9 49,5
1940-1944 33,1 54,1 38,7 40,8 47,1 53,5 58,0
1945-1949 33,0 58,0 45,3 46,9 53,4 62,2
1950-1954 33,0 59,9 51,8 53,4 63,2
1955-1959 29,6 61,8 59,1 64,3
Asians
1925-1929 8,5 7,7 8,5 11,8 13,6 15,3 11,3
1930-1934 8,7 11,3 10,2 12,5 15,4 18,8 20,0 17,1
1935-1939 10,3 14,0 15,6 16,4 20,9 23,9 23,3
1940-1944 11,8 13,6 21,0 23,0 26,4 28,7 26,7
1945-1949 17,7 27,2 26,6 29,6 33,1 37,9
1950-1954 23,5 34,7 32,2 36,0 41,3
1955-1959 24,8 42.2 41,1 45,7
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Age Group
Birth 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54
Cohort % % % % % % % %
Coloureds
1925-1929 55,6 40,6 36,8 37,9 38,1 39,3 35,5
1930-1934 64,8 56,6 42,7 39,4 40,5 41,7 41,5 35,9
1935-1939 65,9 57,5 44,9 42,0 44,9 45,3 42,2
1940-1944 67,0 58,8 47,0 46,2 49,3 49,3 48.,9
1945-1949 63,6 60,1 52,0 50,3 53,0 56,1
1950-1954 60,1 62,8 57,0 58,0 62,7
1955-1959 48,7 65,4 66,3 67,7
Blacks
1925-1929 31,6 26,7 25,4 28,1 30,1 35,8 38,4
1930-1934 29,0 32,2 26,2 29,8 32,0 36,5 42,2 38,4
1935-1939 30,0 31,7 31,3 34,1 37,7 42,8 42,4
1940-1944 32,2 37,1 36,3 40,0 43,4 47,3 50,3
1945-1949 32,6 42,5 41,8 45,9 48,9 55,0
1950-1954 33,0 42,1 47,2 50,0 58,2
1955-1959 26,7 41,8 49,0 59,1
Source: Inferred from Sadie, 1991, 1994.
We can broadly distinguish three types of age patterns of LFP as reflected by the 1991 data:
(i) The Black females' domelike profile, rather similar to that of males, in which changes in
marital conditions with advancing age do not seem to feature. Starting from a somewhat
shapeless, gradually downward moving curve in 1960, the prime age category's values
moved up to form a fairly broad peak. The intra-generational LFPRs in Table 3.1 reveal a
slight depression at age 25-29 for the birth cohorts of 1945-49 and earlier years. The later
generations show a seemingly uninterrupted work career to peak at around age 50. The
remarkable rise in LFP is associated with increasing urbanisation and the border
industries policy of the pre-1944 government.
(ii) The Asian and Coloured female LFPRs trace out similar patterns, with a peak at age 25-
29 followed by a steep slope. The latter's level is the higher, having a much longer
tradition of participation in the wage labour market, as can be observed by comparing the
1960 curves. This comparison demonstrates the effect of differences in social customs
and the waning of their influence. The longitudinal LFPRs of Coloured women have been
registering a diminution of the dip at age 30-34, and for the birth-cohorts of 1950-54 and
later years the movement has been uninterruptedly upward from age 15-19 to beyond age
30-34. Those of the Asian women showed a depression at age 25-29 for the 1925-29 and
1930-34 birth cohorts, no break in the upward movement for the next two birth cohorts,
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FIGURE 3.1
FEMALE LF PARTICIPATION
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80 (c) COLOURED FEMALES 80 (d) BLACK FEMALES
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FIGURE3.2
LFPRs OF MARRIED AND UNMARRIED WOMEN
(a) 1991 White Female LF (b) 1991 Asian Female LF
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after which the break reappears and increases in size over the lives of the next two
cohorts, while the 1955-59 cohort registered a reduction in the degree of interruption of
the labour market career. The rise, between 1960 and 1991, in their LFP is remarkable.
(iii) The White females' profile differs from those of the previous two groups in that the
LFPRs exhibit a deceleration between ages 35 and 45 in the downward movement; after a
peak at age 20-24 (or 20-29) and an abrupt decline between age 25-29 and 30-34. In 1960
this deceleration had induced a decided secondary peak at age 35-39, but which had all
but disappeared by the time of the 1985 census. The intragenerational LFPRs show a
gradual reduction over time in the intensity of the break in a cohort's LF career, the
reduction in the LFPR between age 20-24 and 25-29 having declined from 17,8
percentage points for the 1930-34 birth cohort to 2,7 for the 1955-60 cohort. This may be
the prelude to a transition to a positive difference in the successive rates.
The above trends demonstrate that (a) there has been a phenomenal increase in the LFP on the
part of women. The number of years spent by the average woman in the LF increased as follows
between 1960 and 1991: Whites from 15,5 to 27,5 years; Coloureds from 20,5 to 25,9; Asians
from 4,9 to 17,1; and Blacks from 14,7 to 22,6. (b) The degree of intermittence in their LFP,
associated with homemaking (marriage, childbearing, childrearing, house work). has attenuated
appreciably.
3.2 MARITAL STATUS AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
To identify the origin of the intermittence we have to enquire into the LFP according to marital
status.
In Figures 3.2 (a), (b), (c) and (d) the age patterns ofLFP of married and nonmarried women are
compared. Those of the latter are affected by the composition of the nonmarried, made up of
never married, cohabitating, widowed and divorced women. As a majority in this category, and
exhibiting higher LFP than the other three components - after the analogy of American,
Canadian, British and German experience (Killingsworth & Heckman, 1986, pp 106-109) in the
absence of data for South Africa - the never married dominate the scene. Our diagrams
demonstrate a higher propensity to participate in the LF by non-married than by married women.
The latter, however, start off (15-19) at a level considerably higher than those of unmarried
women, whose age profiles are a narrower version of the males' pattern, in that their rates after
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the peak taper off more rapidly, indicating earlier retirement than males.
The percentages of married women among those 15 to 74 years old have been changing as
follows:
1960 1970 1980 1985 1991
% % % % %
Whites 66,7 66,7 65,1 60,8 62,8
Asians 56,6 55,9 59,7 59,2 58,2
Coloureds 54,8 45,2 45,3 42,3 40,9
Blacks 62,9 54,1 38,9
The Asians excepted, it would seem that the propensity to marry has been on the decline, even
while a caveat has to be sounded that the somewhat drastic diminution after 1980 in percentages
married could contain an element of a statistical aberration. Nevertheless, accepting that some
diminution has occurred, this would have raised the LFPRs of the total female population since
the higher participators have increased in relative size. However, the contribution of this factor
has been a good deal less than that of the rise in LFP on the part of married women.
Unfortunately, except for the 1991 data diagrammed in Figures 3.2 above, our historic data on
married women's participation are confined to White women for 1960, 1970, 1985 and Coloured
women for 1980, 1985. The average gross years of EA life of the latter group increased by 5,4
(from 17,0 to 22,4) between 1980 and 1991 compared to 2,6 years for the unmarried section. The
comparable magnitudes with regard to White females are as follows:
Married 9,8 14,7
Non-married 33,6 34,9
19,0
32,2
21,0
34,0
24,7
35,1
Increase
1960-91
14,9
i.s
While there is no real trend to be observed in the series for the nonmarried, and the difference
between the first and last Figure is 1,5 only, the average EA life of White married women rose
by 14,9 years (or 152%). The historic data allow us to extract LFPRs for consecutive generations
(represented by birth cohorts) as in Table 3.2.
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FIGURE3.3
LFPRs OF WHITE MARRIED WOMEN
BY BIRTH COHORT
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TABLE 3.2
LFPRs FOR WHITE WOMEN BY BIRTH COHORT
Married Nonmarried
Birth cohort Birth cohort
At age 1940- 1945- 1950- 1955- 1940- 1945- 1950- 1955-
44 49 54 59 44 49 54 59
15-19 18,9 25,0 31,1 33,4 34,3 33,9 33,1 27,8
20-24 32,9 39,6 44,4 49,1 85,3 84,5 79,2 73,8
25-29 30,1 37,4 44,7 52,2 88,0 84,0 80.2 83,2
30-34 35,0 40,5 45,3 56,7 85,0 84,7 94,1 90,3
35-39 41,9 46,9 55,4 82,0 89,6 96,8
40-44 48,2 57,0 80,7 84,0
45-49 53,7 70,5
Figure 3.3 confirms that, as quantified in Table 3.2, the depression described by the LFP of the
married women born in 1940-44 and 1945-49 at age 25-29, to induce a second peak higher than
that at age 20-24, gave way to a sideways movement (slightly upwards) among the 1950-54
generation and was replaced by an uninterrupted upward movement as from the initial age of
entry in the case of the 1955-59 (and probably also later) birth cohort. The 1991 (point-of-time)
dip and second peak displayed by the diagram for married White women are the outcome of
differential movements in LFP by successive generations of women. The incomplete data for
Coloured married women show only upward movements for those 15 to 34 years old in 1980,
but slight declines in 1985 for age groups 35-39 and 40-44 when they become five and ten years
older. For them, as for Asian and Black women, the age profiles of LFP among married and
nonmarried females are very similar, and in time to come this would probably also be true of
White women.
While we cannot declare that intermittence of female LF careers has disappeared in the case of
individual married women, the aggregate picture is that of uninterrupted labour market activity.
It is possible that increasing first- and second-time accessions to the labour force outnumber
departures from the LF, apart from an increasing non-interruption of married women's
professional careers. In the United States it was found that "increasingly, mothers with younger
and younger children are entering the labour force" (Da Vanzo & Rahman, 1993, p 362).
A comparison of the average gross years of EA life of married and nonmarried women indicates
that marital status has the greatest effect among White females and the least among Blacks, as
follows:
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GROSS AVERAGE YEARS OF EA LIFE, 1991
Whites
Asians
Coloureds
Blacks
Married
24,7
14,0
22,4
21,9
Nonmarried
35,1
22,7
29,0
27,2
Difference
10,4
8,7
6,6
5,3
Also, only among Whites does marital status make a difference to the age of peak participation,
unmarried females reaching it sooner than married women, when judged in intragenerational
terms. (Point-af-time intergenerational data show the first peak for married women to be reached
at a lower age.)
3.3 NUMBERS
In Table 3.3 are assembled the data on size of the female LF for the years in which the
population censuses were conducted as well as projected numbers for 2006 and 2011 - derived
by multiplying the LFPRs with the number of females per age group - and the average
increments per intereensal year for each of three age categories. The latter differ from those of
males in that the prime age category starts and ends five years (of age) earlier.
TABLE3.3
SIZE AND GROWTH OF THE FEMALE LF
Year Size Annual increments by age category
15-24 25-44 45+ Total Growth
p.a. p.a.%
Whites
1960 300960
1970 460050 4790 7 150 4520 16460 4,3
1980 643 880 1 920 12850 3580 18350 3,4
1985 773 830 3510 17 190 5290 25990 3,7
1991 956400 2070 17940 10420 30430 3.6
1960-1991 l,2
2006 1 097410
2011 1 110660 -3300 920 5030 2650 0,24
Asians
1960 13240
1970 35920 1 190 980 180 2350 10,9
1980 69120 990 1980 350 3320 6,8
1985 91 430 990 2750 720 4460 5,8
1991 124080 1 130 3210 1 100 5440 U
1960-1991 12
2006 190660
2011 210460 -170 2650 1 480 3960 2,0
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Year Size Annual increments by age category
15-24 25-44 45+ Total Growth
p.a. p.a.%
Coloureds
1960 181 230
1970 258790 3610 3360 1 050 8020 3,6
1980 370 130 2730 6880 1 520 11 130 3,6
1985 471 350 6750 12220 1 270 20240 5,0
1991 602 120 1 720 16880 3 190 21 790 ti
1960-1991 3.95
2006 802520
2011 845240 -2650 4810 6380 8540 1,1
Blacks
1960 868890
1970 1 360570 20950 26840 3070 50860 4,7
1980 2 163 870 9440 49900 20990 80330 4,7
1985 2681360 23990 65610 13900 103 500 4,4
1991 3 560600 21430 98430 26670 146530 ~
1960-1991 12
2006 6453 100
2011 7609500 32320 135400 63560 231 280 3,3
Sources: Inferred from Sadie, 1991 and 1994.
The data in Table 3.3 bear out the remarkable growth that has taken place in female LFP. At
rates varying from 3,9 per cent (Whites) to 7,5 per cent (Asians) per annum for the 1960-1991
period, the increase in LF members was greatly in excess of population growth. The relative
shares of the two magnitudes in the expansion of the LF for females, emphasised by juxtaposing
the experience among males, are as follows:
Males 1960-91 Females 1960-91
Change in
LFP+
%
Population
Growth
%
Whites
Asians
Coloureds
Blacks
-19,7
-15,4
-29,4
-36,7
100
100
100
100
Change in Population
LFP Growth
% %
+63,2 36,8
+82,2 17,8
+28,5 71,5
+53,8 46,2
+ Loss due to decline in LFP expressed as a percentage of what the LF size would have been in
the absence of the reduction in LFPRs.
It is evident that only in the case of Coloured women, who started the thirty-one year period with
a high level of participation, has population growth (inclusive of age composition changes) been
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of greater significance than the rise in LFP. For Asian women its contribution has been as little
as 17,8%, the increase in LFP registering a share of 82,2 per cent in the growth of numbers. By
contrast, among males population growth has been responsible for the total LF growth, the
decline in LFP having caused losses ranging from 15,4 per cent among Asians to 36,7 per cent
among Blacks.
Another prominent feature is the very pronounced change, as between 1960-91 and the expected
1991-2011 situation, in the relative size of the Black and Non-Black female LF increments, as
follows:
Non-Blacks
Blacks
1960-1991
1 187 170
2691 710
1991-2011
483760
4048900
For the first period it was 2,3 to 1. It is projected to increase to 8,4 to 1, to register a 89 per cent
share in the female LF growth. This is not surprising bearing in mind the results of the analysis
of the male LF.
Our projected 1991-2001 LFPRs provide for a continuation of LF losses due to this magnitude
on the part of males - ranging from -0,6 per cent for Blacks to -3,8 per cent for Whites - and of
gains in the case of females amounting to 44 per cent for Whites, 61 per cent for Asians, 10 per
cent for Coloureds and 35 per cent for Blacks. Accordingly, the share of females in the total
South African LF, which has increased from 23,4 per cent in 1960 to 38,6 per cent in 1991, will
continue to do so to reach 42,3 per cent by the year 2011. This is evident from the data in Table
3.4.
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TABLE3.4
TOTAL (M + F) LABOUR FORCE
Non-Blacks Blacks Total
Males
1960 1 404000 3058000 4462000
1985 2341 700 5340000 7681 700
1991 2558870 5796700 8355570
1996 2751 350 6773700 9525050
2001 2892250 7872 800 10765050
2006 3 009590 9052600 12062 190
2011 3 076030 10270200 13 346230
Females
1960 495000 869000 1 364000
1985 1336610 2681 360 4017970
1991 1 682600 3 560600 5243200
1996 1 845730 4423200 6268930
2001 1 971 550 5382200 7 353 750
2006 2090590 6453900 8544490
2011 2 166360 7609500 9775 860
Males and Females
1960 1 899000 3927000 5 826000
1985 3678000 8021 800 11 699800
1991 4241 470 9357300 13598770
1996 4597080 11 196-400 15793480
2001 4863 800 13255 000 18 118800
2006 5 100 180 15506500 20606680
2011 5242390 17 879700 23 122090
At 4,4 per cent during 1960-1991 the female LF has been growing at more than twice the rate of
males (2,1 per cent per annum), leading to a growth rate of 2,8 per cent for the (M + F) total. The
male LF is set to expand by 2,4 per cent per annum during 1991-2011, while the females'
participation, growing at 3,1 per cent per annum, will raise the average (M + F) to 2,7 per cent
per annum. A net aggregate number of 9 523 000 persons will be seeking new jobs, of which
4533 000 (48 per cent) will be women. The annual average is a formidable 476 000 men and
women.
A study of the age distribution of the female LF increments will reveal that the rising LFP, while
it caused some irregular fluctuations - particularly among the 15-24 age category - has not
obscured the influence of the differential demographic ageing process so that there is similarity
to the male LF. The White female LF shows the attributes of the oldest and the Black LF those
of the most youthful population. The former's youthful LF category has trended downwards and
the increments will continue to do so (with fluctuations) to end up with a negative number. The
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incremental numbers for the prime age category have been increasing - ageing reinforced by
rising LFP - but must now be expected to follow a downward path. This is even true of the oldest
category concomitant with an overall growth rate that will decline to almost zero during the first
decade of the twenty-first century. The Asian women are moving along the phase where the
prime and older age categories, after having expanded up to 1991 by way of rising increments,
will not experience significant changes in the annual level of increments. For the 15-24 age
category the increments have been trending downwards as in the case of White and Coloured
women. The latter's prime age category, after expanding by rapidly rising numbers per annum up
to 1991, will in future be strengthened by diminishing additions each year, but the oldest
category will have increasing numbers added to it. Among Black women only the 15-24
category's increments will be showing some decline. Both the prime and the oldest age groups
will receive ever increasing additions to their ranks. And the growth in their numbers of all ages
will, at 3,3 per cent per annum by 2006-2011, still be very sizeable compared to 2,0 per cent for
Asian women 1,1 per cent for Coloureds and 0,24 per cent for Whites, and will then add 231 280
per annum to the workforce compared to 15 150 by non-Black women; a share of 94 per cent.
3.4 CAUSAL FACTORS INVOLVED
3.4.1 The substitution and income effects
In the analysis of individual labour supply on the part of primary workers - in whose case it is
taken for granted that, barring mental or physical incapacity, they will offer their services on the
labour market after completing their educational preparation for an occupation - the magnitude
dealt with is the number of hours (H) of leisure sacrificed in response to different wage rates.
The aggregate labour supply would then be represented by LFP X H (average hours per week,
month or year). In the case of secondary workers, LFP decisions are taken in a household context
involving a three-dimensional instead of a two-dimensional choice, to wit, wage labour (market
production), leisure and homemaking (home production), with the third as a second alternative to
the first. Entry into the labour market is not a matter of course, so that it is the levels of LFP that
have to be explained given the prevailing hours of work required by employers. These latter can
be, and have been, adjusted, to suit the convenience of secondary workers, and thus to elicit the
necessary supplies. These adjustments might have been different from those secured by trade
unions for primary workers so that the LFPRs of the two categories may not be directly
comparable. This difference, however, has an insignificant role in the very conspicuous
divergence, in the movements of the LFP over time, of primary and secondary - mostly married
female - workers. This divergence occurred in the face of a common experience of similar
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upward movements in wage levels and of cross-sectional evidence of inverse relationships
between females' LFP and males' wage rates, and between wives' LFP and their husbands'
incomes. (Killingsworth & Heckman, 1986, pp 144/5). In the case of the RSA it has been
estimated that real wage increases have been responsible for more than half of the growth in
female employment between 1950 and 1982 (Council of Economic Advisers, 1987, pp 72-77).
With the response to wage movements being customarily analysed into a substitution and an
income effect, the issue is why the former seemed to have been dominant among married
females, while the latter appeared to have been more potent among males. The substitution effect
would induce increased LFP when wages rise because the alternative to economic effort in the
labour market (leisure or home production) has logically become more costly. The increased
earnings will, at the same time, have a negative income effect on the labour supplied since more
leisure can now be afforded and "bought". Implicit is the assumption that leisure or home
production is not in the nature of an inferior good whose income elasticity of demand is negative,
and that working time does not fall in the same category as goods comprised in the Giffen
paradox whose quantity demanded decreases as price (effort price) decreases.
Within the above analytical framework it is necessary to remember that the magnitude whose
rise is to be explained, LFP, is an all or nothing affair, i.e. the transition from non-participation to
participation. Accordingly, the income effect which may counteract the substitution effect in the
event of rising wages among males cannot materialise without further ado among married
females. Working time (in the labour market, that is) which does not exist (zero LFP) cannot be
given up in a process of buying more leisure when wages rise. It can only be relinquished when
it does exist (positive LFP) but then in toto; but this would be contrary to the common-sense
premise that an increase in wages may reduce economic effort but not to the extent of lowering
earnings. When wages decline, the income effect, which now requires a sacrifice of leisure in
favour of working time, can manifest itself only in the acceptance of LF membership. But since
this means that the person must have been outside the LF before, and thus without own-wage
earnings to buy leisure, the income effect appears as a non sequitur in the life of the secondary
worker when she is considered in isolation.
The income effect can be resurrected by assummg that the woman in question, taking her
decisions in a household context, has at her disposal some non-labour income (non-awn-wage
earnings) contributed by some other working member(s) of the family, invariably the head or
main breadwinner. Loss of this non-awn-wage income by reason of, for example, the husband's
unemployment, will have the income effect operating in the usual manner: entry into the labour
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market, referred to as the additional worker effect. In the normal course of events such cross-
substitution of economic effort would be of a temporary nature. However, the loss or absence of
the non-own-wage is of a long-term nature when the economy stagnates and job creation comes
to a standstill. The abrupt increase in female LFP between 1985 and 1991 in South Africa is
associated with just such conditions. Either a continuance or a repeated short-term (cyclical)
recurrence of the conditions, coupled with a ratchet effect, can stretch the additional worker
effect into a long-run phenomenon.
A similar result can be produced by the transitory wage, which is the difference between the
permanent wage, Wp (the present value of the expected stream of future incomes) and the actual
wage, Wa. An increase in Wa-Wp will prompt a rise in LFP for two reasons: (i) The
opportunity cost of time at home will increase, engendering its substitution by labour market
time, while the income effect will be inoperative in the presence of an unchanged Wp. The
outcome can qualify for the description of opportunity effect. (ii) Over time Wa enters into the
denominator as part of the desired level of living to which the family has been accustomed and
which is to be maintained, resulting in a diminution of the ratio Wa/Wp which generates an LFP-
enhancing effect on the part of secondary worker aggregates when successive generations of
them are subject to this influence. Similarly the target worker can be said to arise from a threat to
the family's living standards occasioned by events such as financing a child through university,
replacing an old motor car or expensive household appliances, etc. Over time this category of
workers can increase in relative numbers to augment the level of the aggregate LFP.
3.4.2 Married women as semi-autonomous workers
In the discussion above women's LF performance has been associated with one of the two
aspects involved, viz. the supplemental function in the family's income. However, the married
woman can be a wage-earner in her own right regardless of family circumstances; but because
the latter can impose some constraints on her actions we can designate her as a semi-autonomous
worker. Instead of explaining LFP in terms of a transition to LF membership (and back), the
exposition can proceed according to the usual continuous trade-off between earnings in the
wage-labour market (WLM) and hours of activity in the home as housewife (HW), that is,
between the production of wage goods and the production of home goods. The latter consists of
the processing of raw materials and semi-finished goods into final goods ready for use by the
family and other services pertinent to family life including some which are very specialised, such
as giving birth to children and nurturing them.
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FIGURE 3.4
DIFFERENTIAL TASTES FOR MARKET WORK AMONG MARRIED WOMEN
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Given the family income contributed by a chief breadwinner, there are three proximate
determinants of married women's LF performance: (i) The relative strength of the taste for WLM
earnings vis-a-vis HW duty; (ii) the rate of exchange (RlE) between the two, (the wage rate, or
the terms on which the market is prepared to exchange income for leisure sacrificed, not being as
appropriate as in the customary earnings-leisure dichotomy). HW has an own value which
leisure cannot have; if it is performed in somebody else's home it fetches a price; (iii) the
efficiency of home production.
In terms of Figure 3.4, in which the LF behaviour of married women is superimposed on a given
amount of other family income, Hm represents the maximum number of hours occupied at home,
presumed to be spent in HW activity, that can be exchanged for market production. If, from this
position, circumstances permit of a reduction of hours required for HW purposes, leisure time
ensues which provides increased latitude to opt for the WLM. The positions and shapes of the
indifference or iso-utility curves II, 12 and 13 in Figure 3.4 describe differences in tastes for work
in the WLM. The points of tangency of the RlE line (EHm) to the iso-utility curves define the
equilibrium conditions. The rectangle IoHm (a corner solution) expresses an absolute preference
for HW, whether voluntary or obliged by circumstances. Il permits of HmH 1 hours of market
work at the rate of exchange EHm, but its steep slope is indicative of a limited substitutability of
WLM work for HW duty, signifying that a considerable rise in market earnings is required to
elicit the exchange of an extra hour of HW for WLM activity. At the same exchange rate the
utility function embodied in 13 will yield HmH 3 hours of market work and reflects a keener
response to a small rise in earning rate than II. The relative positions and slopes of these curves
testify to both intercommunity (contemporary) and across-time (within one and the same
community) differences. The reasons for them are linked with the emancipation of women as
weU as a host of other factors.
Inhering in the choice between market and home work there is a choice between types of goods
produced in the two places of work. The relative strength of the taste for market goods and
home-produced goods involved is a function of the family's level of income. Compared to that of
the former the income elasticity of the demand for own-home production may be low or even
negative inasmuch as it could fall in the category of inferior goods: staple products and services,
compared to luxury or prosperity goods included in the former. The income elasticity of demand
for domestic servants, outside help that is, may be high, but this attribute does not apply to the
housewife handling the chores in her own home (Cain, 1966, p 116). She could preferably
increase her earnings in the labour market to afford hired domestic service. It amounts to
producing the goods and services in the market which women would have been produced at
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home, and then buying them with the income earned in the market. The outcome is rendered
more probable by the circumstance that a market job can be a desirable alternative in the
company of co-workers who provide a pleasing social ambience, contrasting with possible
drudgery or boredom at home, and the anonymity of urban life in the residential area. Market
work in this case yields a high rent in the form of the comparative agreeableness of the job.
There is a good deal of avoidable cost involved in the acceptance of market jobs: extra or better
clothing, extra visits to the hairdresser, transportation costs, the hiring of substitute domestic
services, and the tax that has to be paid on earnings if these are joined to the husbands' as a
marginal amount for the purpose of income tax assessment in a progressive tax system. If
married women were purely marginal workers acting in a supplementary function, or motivated
by pecuniary net benefits only, the above costs would be subject to close scrutiny approximating
to a cost-benefit examination. Without evidence for a definitive conclusion it would seem, on
balance, that such scrutiny is not the norm. It would, it can be contended, accord a decided role
to progressive taxation. The role is not a simple one since it will depend very much on the
marginal tax rate applicable to the husband's income in a joint assessment of tax liability. It can
be appreciated when this is 40 per cent the wife or couple may decide that it is not worth their
while working for 60 per cent or less of the quoted gross wage or salary. If the tax rate is 20 per
cent the wife's take home pay rises to 80 per cent of gross wage, which will render it less
conspicuous, so that a diminished, or zero, disincentive effect may arise therefrom. This could
account for the differentials in the responses, in a HSRC sample survey, from White, Asian and
Coloured women who indicated taxation as a moderate to powerful deterrent in their decision to
withhold their services from the labour market. In the category of women who opted out of LFP
the percentages were 47 per cent, 25 per cent and 23 per cent respectively for the three non-
Black groups respectively. In the case of women who would have liked to participate, but did
not, the Figures were 49 per cent, 37 per cent and 20 per cent respectively (Van der Walt, 1987,
pp 93-95). The conclusion is that taxation is restraining without being preclusive and that its
impact does indeed depend on its level (as determined by income bracket). The restraint could
have been attenuated by 'economic necessity' and 'desire for a higher living standard' found in the
HSRC study to be the second most important factors in the explanation of variance in married
women's LFP (pp 60-63, 75-79).
The question now is whether the substitution effect may not be neutralised by the income effect
when market productivity, and hence the wage rate, or RJE rises. The answer, on the balance of
probabilities is in the negative. As illustrated in Figure 3.5
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FIGURE 3.5
MARRIED WOMEN AND INCREASES IN MARKET WAGE RATES
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the iso-utility curves, coinciding with iso-production curves since we are simultaneously
implying a trade-off between two types of production, move up due north. The slopes of the
wage lines E3, E2 and El increase to produce greater numbers of HW time given up, from
HmH 1 to H3Hm, in favour of market production. If the income effect were to operate it would
imply "buying" more HW, which is a non-event since it is not more leisure, but more work of a
different nature that is to be opted for. And it has already been argued that the own-income
elasticity of demand for HW is likely to be negative, the effect of which is buttressed by the
relative income elasticities of demand for market production versus home production. The
domination of the substitution effect has been confirmed by other researchers (Bowen & Finegan
1965, pp 131-136; Cain, 1966, p 116; Mincer, 1962, p 95).
The obverse to the above rise in the RIE is that which emanates from an increase in the
efficiency of home production. In the latter, as in market production, productivity can be raised
by putting more capital apparatus, embodying increasing amounts of technology, at the disposal
of the housewife which in this instance takes the form of durable goods such as electric
polishers, vacuum cleaners, washing machines, refrigerators, freezers, microwave ovens and
similar appliances. Their acquisition is tantamount to a substitution of capital for labour, so that a
given amount of domestic duties can be performed in fewer hours. The action is reinforced by
the increased availability of preserved and frozen goods, pre-cooked meals, manufactured
clothing, laundering, dry cleaning, hairdressing and other commercial services, which serve as
direct substitutes for the housewife's home produced goods and services and which create
opportunities for her to produce in the market at a wage what she has previously produced at
home without payment.
The striking changes that have occurred in the life of a housewife in the developed countries and
which have a direct bearing on her LF behaviour are succinctly summarised by Lebergott in the
following passages: " the typical married woman in the nineteenth century America made all
the children's clothes as well as her own; baked the family bread; prepared its soups and
preserves (and even the family soap through most of the century), washed clothes for six persons
without benefit of anything more than a washboard, dusted, cleaned and performed a variety of
other domestic chores ... The dazzling array of material goods now incorporated into the
American standard of living proved to be the key incentive for increased female workers' rates in
recent decades .... In recent years in the United States the consumer in "consumer durables" has
proved to be the working wife" (1964, p 66).
The increase in home production efficiency, given the taste for work - that is, given the locus of
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the iso-utility curve which is representative of an iso-production curve as well - can be
diagrammed by having the RlE line swinging tangentially along the curvature of the indifference
curve from the position of maximum involvement in HW, as indicated by Hm in Figure 3.5. The
increasing tangent gradient does not imply that a rise in wage rate is required to call forth more
market activity, but only that fewer hours in home production need to be foregone for a given
market remuneration. At a minimum the hours of market work will remain constant. At a
maximum, the entire entailed increase in leisure time can be exchanged for market production.
3.4.3 Fertility and market production
Human reproduction, being the most exclusive form of home production and therefore the most
exclusive alternative to market production has a very marked effect on participation in market
production. Home production acquires an infinitely high value during child birth and for some
time before and after the event. It means in effect that the opportunity cost of an hour of labour
market activity becomes infinitely high, so that the substitution effect in favour of home work
reigns supreme, no matter how high the wage rate may be. How long this period is going to last
will depend on conditions at the place of work and at home. If the labour contract provides for
liberal maternity benefits it will be an incentive to remain in the job until paid maternity leave is
to be had, and to return when it is terminated if conditions at home permit. The latter include the
availability of partial substitutes for the mother's attention such as household help, creches and
nursery schools. Whether they can act as full substitutes is a matter of individual predisposition
about child rearing which can differ from one mother to the next. But given the personal
predilection, the demographic determinants of the duration of the period of infinitely high value
of home production, and the degree of decline in this value thereafter, are the level of fertility,
the birth interval and the age of the children. If the intervals between the births of successive
children are very short there is very little likelihood that home work will lose its supremacy until
the expiration of the period of fecundity (in the case of uncontrolled fertility) or of family-
building. However, of greater consequence than numbers of children is the age of the youngest.
Mothers contend that their absence from home is of little importance as long as they are present
when the children were not at school. That is evidently why one author found the presence or
absence of children under 6 years among married women in the USA to describe the dividing
line between high and low LFPRs (Bowen & Finegan, 1965, p 87). The older the children the
lower the relative value of home production. Children in the house older than, say, 16 years can
even be a source of assistance which can boost the economic activity rates of married women.
The decline in fertility, coupled with some telescoping of the family formation process, and
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combined with the increase in life expectation relieved the housewife of a great deal of
household drudgery and conferred upon her many additional years of comparative freedom from
the activities involved in the reproductive and childrearing process. This freedom permits of
opting for longer attachment to the LF. A comparison of the reproductive behaviour of the 1920-
25 and 1945-50 birth cohorts of White women, for example, shows the number of years in
question to have been some 8 years.
A negative association between LFP and level of fertility has been established for at least the
urban communities of a large number of countries. United Nations' researchers who regressed
the findings on fertility in the World Fertility Survey on three types of occupations - the modem,
transitional and traditional - concluded as follows: "The relationship between fertility and work
in a modem occupation - is generally negative ... The relationship between experience in a
transitional or mixed occupation and fertility is also overwhelmingly negative, but this
relationship is somewhat weaker. The association between work in a traditional occupation and
fertility appears to be negligible in most countries" (1987, p 273). The conclusions appear to be
apposite to the South African situation in which the cross-sectional or intergroup data do not
reveal a significant relationship between the two magnitudes. A cogent reason could be the
differential incidence of extra-marital births - in 1986/7 - 7,4 per cent for Whites, 16,6 per cent
for Indians and 55,1 per cent for Coloured women - which obliges some single female parents to
support themselves and their families.
However, within each group, over time, we do find a negative association between the TFR and
the LFP as indicated by the percentage changes between 1960 and 1991:
TFR Years of EA life
% %
Whites -48 +77,4
Asians -53 +248,0
Coloureds -58 +22,4
Blacks -36 +53,7
This does not imply that declining fertility is more than a facilitating force, or a sole or most
significant determinant of female LFP. This is ostensibly underscored by our finding above that
the LFPRs of the more recent cohorts of married White women do not apparently manifest the
intermittence in LFP we would expect to be induced by the intervention of births. And we cannot
be certain of the direction of causality. In the economic theory of fertility the LFPR, in the nature
of a proxy for the opportunity cost of children, or of woman's time in general, by way of market
earnings to be sacrificed in the reproductive process, would feature as the cause. Krishnan would
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have it that "based on the available evidence, there is little reason to believe that the relationship
between female labour force participation and fertility is unidirectional; rather there exist
reciprocal effects of each variable on the other (1991, p 178). Again, taking cognisance of the
unobserved variables, or unobservables, which may be in operation, one can concur with
Montgomery and Russell when they declare that "marital status, fertility and labour supply are
more properly viewed as jointly determined, each being the product of decisions made with
respect to a common set of preferences and constraints; the set of constraints, in particular,
evolves over the life cycle as essentially irreversible decisions are taken" (1986, p 265).
3.4.4 Other determinants of LFP levels
Whatever demographic and economic forces have been in operation in the determination of
women's LFP over time, there are other factors which could have compensated for, or
strengthened, or even overridden, their influence . One is the emancipation of women or the
breaking down of the domination of an ethic that the woman's (which can include also unmarried
women) place is in her home. Since we are dealing with an impersonal market economy, social
and familial conventions must permit of her absence from home (in most cases) for part of the
day, for her to assume the dual role of housewife and wage or salary earner. "Social values and
attitudes" writes the United States National Manpower Council, "exert a pervasive influence
upon women's employment. They are reflected in changing conceptions of when and under what
circumstances it is appropriate for a women to work outside the home. They underlie judgements
about the kind of jobs and conditions of employment which are harmful to women and about the
impact of their working upon their maternal function" (1957, pp 14-15). While in general there
are now no taboos which inhibit the LFP of married women in industrialised societies, some
stereotypes remain about their mental and physical capacities and their being in positions of
authority over males, as do distinctions between "men's" and "women's" jobs, partly inspired by
fears of wage undercutting on the part of male dominated trade unions, and some reservations
and prejudices on the part of employers. In the literature of the sixties it was maintained that
cultural bias was an obstacle in Latin American countries (Sadie, 1965, p 7); in Moslem
societies, renowned for low levels of female LPP (Indonesia apart) religious attitudes would
proscribe work outside the home (Bean, 1968, pp 391-405); that purdah had a similar effect in
West Bengal (Myrdal, 1968, p 1085), that in Egypt special significance was to be attributed to an
inherited tradition of male domination, coupled with unemployment among men (Nagi, 1971);
and in India, among the lower income strata, non-participation was esteemed as a status symbol
of social superiority (Sinha, 1965, 5.5).
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One can conceive of the waning of LFP-inhibiting traditions, at least in some societies, to the
extent where "economic woman" becomes indistinguishable from "economic man". It can be
promoted by an ideological commitment in official policy as, for example, in the former USSR
and mainland China, where special measures were decreed to remove impediments, to ensure
women of equal opportunities with men in all occupations (Dodge, 1966). But the LFP of
married women can also provide its own motive power in the form of a multiplier effect in which
social resistance is increasingly broken down by the fact of entry into the labour market, once the
process has been set in motion.
In a South African sample survey of non-Black women, the HSRC found that the homemaker's
role of Asian women, and child care in particular, featured more prominently as a factor
inhibiting LFP than among Coloured and White females (Vander Walt, 1987, pp 80-82). Their
1960 LFPR age profile, as in Figure 3.4, largely bears witness to the hold of traditions in earlier
times, while the 1991 profile testifies to the waning of their influence in conjunction with other
facilitating circumstances. The HSRC finding that the perceptions of the family role of married
women were appreciably affected by the LF status of the female respondents, may testify to the
dual cause and effect roles of social conventions (pp 41, 43,54).
The changing perceptions about women's role must have facilitated the satisfaction of married
women's desire for self-fulfilment, or 'self-actualisation' which the HSRC survey found to be the
prime motivation for entering the wage labour market which permits them to enjoy the company
of colleagues in the workplace while performing a satisfying task (Van der Walt, 1987, pp 56-
62). This motivation is apparently linked to educational attainment which, apart from being,
probably, both cause and effect of women's emancipation, can also have a positive effect on the
taste for WLM participation. For some there are the intellectual satisfaction and psychic rewards
of professional competence and achievement, while others would wish to put their education and
training to profitable use, and the greater the expenditure incurred the stronger would be the
incentive to realise some returns on the investment in human capital. The positive correlation
between female LFP and level of education, which has been established in a number of studies,
seems, however, to emerge only after a certain threshold has been exceeded. (Killingsworth &
Heckman, 1986, p 123; Van der Walt 1987, p 27; Sadie, 1965, p 32; Cain, 1966, p 98; Elizaga &
Mellon, 1971; Kniesner, 1980, pp 385-389). The more highly educated women are likely to have
access to better remunerated and intellectually more satisfying jobs than those less well educated
and trained.
The most potent facilitator in increasing female LFP has been the growing number of suitable or
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agreeable job opportunities as circumscribed by the nature of women's dual career and/or social
perceptions. They will depend upon the degree of development of the economy whose structure
can be depicted by the relative significance of the three broad sectors: the primary, secondary
and tertiary industries each of which can be subdivided into the traditional and the modem or the
informal and formal sectors. In all organised communities we have, in the tertiary sector,
government and some professional services which can be neutral with respect to degree of
economic development. The suitability in question can be associated with the § factor in our Wps
formula for relative attractiveness of ajob (see Chapter 4). A value for it of close to 1 (or 100%)
will designate, among others, no significant unemployment for women to contend with in an
occupation at issue. In this context supply (in the shape of the LFPRs) is determined by demand.
In the traditional pastoral setting, with subsistence farming preponderating, women can combine
their economic activities with their domestic (or HW) obligations with facility since they are
performed in the same limited geographical area. In the South African Black homelands women
and children constitute the actual LF, particularly in the circumstances surrounding the migrant
labour system. The transition from subsistence agriculture to commercialised farming and urban
industries, makes for a reduction in LF opportunities for women because the away-from-home
employment cannot be reconciled with domestic obligations or because priority is accorded to
males if there is a scarcity of jobs. Where, as in South Africa, the first stage of development was
within the primary sector - from agriculture to mining - the opportunities for women are not
enhanced. Where dire need dictated LFP, paid domestic service became the mainstay of female
economic activity. When the development of secondary industry brought forth a number of light
industries the opportunities for women multiplied in the textile, clothing, tobacco, beverage and
food processing industries. For example, the female component of the employed LF in textile
manufacturing expanded from 21 per cent in 1967 to 48,5 per cent in 1990, while that of the
clothing industry progressed from 70 per cent to 85,2 per cent, compared to a share in the total
employed LF of the non-agricultural, non-domestic service sectors of 16 per cent in 1967 and 28
per cent twenty-three years later. In the basic metal industry, which qualifies for the heavy
category, the female component in 1990 was only 7,2 per cent.
At first pari passu with advancing industrialisation, and later at a faster tempo, the tertiary
industries, as an auxiliary to the secondary industries, and as a by-product of rising living
standards, an almost inevitable growth of the public sector and the growth of the knowledge
industry, provide increasing openings for females as sales workers, clerks, secretaries, typists,
telephonists, teachers, nurses, etc. Some of these occupations have become almost the preserves
of female workers to the extent of meriting the description of "feminisation" (Paillat, 1963, pp
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255-263) as borne out by the following female components of the LF in certain occupations
(CSS, 1990):
Correspondence, administrative clerks
Primary teachers
Cashiers
Therapists (occupational, physio)
Receptionists
Telephonists
Typists
%
64,0
69,0
81,0
86,5
93,2
95,8
97,7
The location of economic activity in the case of the informal sector (backyard, the home itself)
permits of an unencumbered combination of home and market work to the housewife and is thus
conducive to her participation in the latter. The Central Statistical Service in a 1990 sample
survey found a female component of 46 per cent among those participating in the "statistically
unrecorded economic activities", which is larger than the 38,5 per cent identified in the 1991
Census (Statistical News Release, P0315, 1991).
At the macro-economic level opportunities for the LFP of women abound when rapid economic
growth engenders a tight labour market with employers tapping less than fully exploited sources
of supply. Married women are then enticed into the WLM by means of special incentives,
particularly in the form of an adaptation of jobs to their specific needs which are associated with
their duties as housewives. In an experiment of a large Dutch enterprise these involved a
modification of "the geographical, the contractual, the economic, the organisational, the social
and the physical components of employment" (De Villebois, 1967, p 609). They include part-
time employment, flexitime or convenient shifts, worksharing (two women each doing duty for
half the time on the same job), the application of ergonomic principles, crêches at the workplace,
special transport arrangements, etc. The length of the working day and the time of day
attendance at work is required, are strategic factors. When these can be arranged so that women
can be at home when her children before and after school hours require their attention, a
significant impediment to LFP will have been removed (Haem, B & J, 1989, P 62).
3.5 THE SEGMENTED MARKET
Inasmuch as there is a marked difference in the occupational structure and rates of remuneration
of men and women, as well as some contrived impediments to women's progress in their LF
career, they may be said to operate in a segmented market. While cause and effect are not easily
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disentangled, their acceptance of the homemaking or dual role by entering into marnage,
involving the risk of having to find employment in the locality where the male breadwinners - in
whose education and training as a rule the larger investment has been made - are exercising their
occupation, and of interrupting a labour market career occasioned by pregnancy and
childrearing, is likely to induce a compatible response in their education and training. It is logical
for them to avoid costly investments in human capital that require long periods of amortisation in
economic activity, and as preparation for jobs needing many years of uninterrupted experience
and continuous practice for proper performance, and rather invest in skills which are subject to
the least degree of atrophy occasioned by interruptions and concomitant loss of seniority, and
which are transferable between industries, if not occupations. In the result they tend to gravitate
towards the feminised occupations in which the opportunity costs of marriage, childbearing and
childrearing will be least. In consequence, and because their supply of labour is growing faster
than that of men, their services command lower wages, and employers are prepared, or eager, to
employ them at these wages. If they receive a net rate of return on their investment in hwnan
capital equal to that of men, its absolute level is likely to be lower. They can, to some extent,
substitute for young men whose entry into the LF is progressively postponed as a result of longer
years of study and are not available any more for jobs filled by them in former times. Their more
modem and higher levels of education, youthfulness and relatively low wages can accord them a
comparative advantage over male workers older than, say, 50 - 60.
Employers of young women, on their part, are aware of the risk of the interruption of their career
by marriage and/or childbearing which will necessitate replacements with attendant induction
and, perhaps, training. Employers will consider this a reason for discounting the marginal
product of these employees in view of the probable extra costs involved.
It is a common complaint that, over and above wage differentiation consequent upon job
segregation, and despite the emancipation of women, there is a good deal of overt and covert sex
discrimination in the labour market. Even when old traditions and social conventions inhibitory
of female LFP have waned or disappeared, stereotypes about women's personal attributes which
qualify them for labour market roles different from those of men, still linger on. These are the
perceived or attributed intellectual and physical capability or deficiencies of women, which can
be at the root of a taste for discrimination on the part of employers who are predominantly male,
and have the power to indulge their prejudices or predilections. The circular process is in action
as well: the positions occupied by women have an inferior status because women are the
incwnbents. Accordingly, female workers may often not be treated on the basis of merit alone,
and will have difficulty getting appointed in positions of authority over males. In addition
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females are likely to be less well rewarded for their skills than males.
The incidence of sex discrimination in South Africa has been documented by Wentzel (1984)
and the Commission of Enquiry into labour legislation (1979). Until 1981 wage discrimination
between men and women in public service was officially sanctioned. In 1988 the definition of
unfair labour practices was amended to include discrimination on the basis of sex. It is
maintained that this did not spell its elimination (Budlender 1992, pp 352-356).
It is contended that even when discrimination in the labour market has been removed pre-market
discrimination can continue to place women at a disadvantage in that they are denied the same
opportunities as others to develop their capabilities. In this regard it is suggested that the
concentration of women in the feminised occupations is a function of moral pressure insidiously
brought to bear upon them by society in which males play a dominant role. The larger supplies
of the skills thus generated permit of lower wages to be offered. The so-called cumulative
discrimination, i.e. discrimination which becomes a function of its own past by way of the
depression of labour productivity, can be associated with this pre-market process. The
prevalence of a system of internal markets is likely to reinforce it.
In the last resort, given the existence of stereotypes or prejudices which reduce the wage
employers are prepared to pay women for their marginal product less the perceived discount, the
employment of women has probably been enhanced by their acquiescence. Such beneficial
attribute does not attach to the impediments to their upward mobility in the skill or
administrative hierarchy of business.
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CHAPTER 4
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MIGRATION
4.1 MIGRATION AS ADJUSTMENT TO INEQUALITIES
Barring compulsory resettlement or translocation of people and politically motivated refugee
movements, persons migrate to seek improvement in their living conditions and specifically,
to better their economic opportunities. While decisions about the location of settlement are,
for the most part taken in a household or family context, so that considerations other than
those of an economic nature will come into play, we shall deal with migration as an
economically induced phenomenon (Population Reports 1983, p 11) which revolves around
the remuneration of the family's or household's breadwinner(s), whether employee or self-
employed. The implication is that utility maximisation requires income-maximisation. It can
be argued that even migration for political reasons can be considered to be induced in part by
uncertainty about the migrants' economic future in the country of origin.
Arising from perceptions or of acquired knowledge, an individual compares the relative
economic attractiveness of a country, region, urban or rural area (denoted by subscript 1) with
that of another (subscript 2), which is made up of the following:
W Wage or rate of remuneration
p The probability of obtaining a job or a livelihood (ranging from 0,0 to 1,0)
s The status of the economic activity such as the social or economic status of the
occupation, the working conditions, etc. (ranging from 0,0 to 1,0)
C = Cost of movement.
The equilibrium condition would then be defined as WI PI SI= W2P2 S2- C and people move
from area 1 to area 2 as long as W2 P2 S2- C exceeds WI PI SI. Depending on the degree of
permanency of migration (e.g. one-year contract migrant labour versus potentially permanent
long distance movement across international borders), W can pertain to its point-of-time value
or the present value of the long-term earnings profiles in the regions (countries) of origin and
destination. The principle is valid for movement both within, and across, the borders of
countries.
In the face of the economics of distance, the equality has to be net of the cost of movement,
rationality with regard to the latter requiring that the present value of the financial advantages
expected to be gained be sufficient to cover it as well. If, thereby, the equilibrium condition
loses some verisimilitude in the case of the uneducated and illiterate, distance can be
considered a constraint on the movement of people, the impact of which is correlated with its
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cost, which, in the case of the temporary or short-term migrant, does not impose present value
computations. To give empirical content to the equilibrium condition we can hypothesise that,
within a South African context, a subsistence farmer, in a region of rapid population growth
unaccompanied by compatible economic growth, can be reasonably certain of producing an
income ofR120 per month in the agrarian community (PI = 1,0), and that he might be able to
obtain unskilled employment in the urban area at Rl 200 per month. Assuming the status
factor to be similar in the two areas, we can have the following outcome (ignoring C):
R120x 1 xl =RI200xO,1 x 1.
Here the adjustment mechanism is the probability of finding employment in the urban area,
which in our example is reduced to 0,1 or 10per cent. This, of course, implies that if the wage
differential remains unchanged, the value of P2 will in its turn determine the flow of migrants,
a low value (high unemployment) discouraging it and a high value (low unemployment)
encouraging it. This is consistent with the findings of Straubhaar (1986, pp 335-353) who
stressed the importance of controls in international migration, which controls were relaxed
and tightened depending on the incidence of unemployment in the domestic market. It is also
in keeping with the behaviour of some Black inhabitants of South African rural areas who
required a work permit to enter the urban areas for longer than 72 hours during the period of
influx control and who, when unable to obtain it, moved into towns and cities all the same.
The rationale was that if they were discovered without the necessary documentation and had
to spend ten months out of twelve in jail, the earnings during the other two months would
have been sufficient to render the risk worth their while. While both the push and the pull
factors are in operation, the former may become the overwhelmingly dominant one as the
marginal product or opportunity cost of labour in the area of origin of migrants approaches
zero, which it will be by virtue of unemployment or the reasoning that wife and children can
adequately cope with the labour demands of subsistence agriculture. A higher status of jobs in
the area of destination than in the area of origin, will further reduce the value of pj.
One would expect changes in the relative values of W to act as an adjustment mechanism as
well. Insofar as the wage differential is a function of the relative scarcity and concomitantly,
of the levels of the marginal product, a movement of labour from area 1 to area 2 would
reduce the supply in the former and raise it in the hitter to enhance W in area 1 and diminish it
in area 2. The equilibrating mechanism will be impaired by an inadequate mobility of labour
due to inertia or impediments to entry into area 2 such as restrictive immigration laws or
influx control measures, whose effect is exacerbated by a higher fertility and growth rate of
population in area 1. But the most powerful impairment can emanate from trade union action
which severs the nexus between the demographically induced supply of labour and that which
is permitted to affect and determine the level of wages. If trade unions extend their influence
across regional borders to equalise W of similar industries in areas 1 and 2, with unequal
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pressures of population, the burden of adjustment is concentrated on p in any case.
A third potential equilibrating mechanism could assume the form of the movement of factors
of production co-operant with labour towards the low wage, low income, labour abundant
area. Since natural resources cannot be so translocated, the movement of people to where
those resources are located, if inequality of income is to be reduced, is unavoidable. The
international emigration during the nineteenth century to the new areas of European
settlement (USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa) was in the nature of such
adaptation, when Europe experienced its population explosion. The potentially mobile
entrepreneurship, capital and technology exhibit a disinclination to be enticed to the sources
of surplus labour unless it is more productive and disciplined to engender low efficiency
wages in areas of concentrated human habitation representing large markets which reduce the
importance of the economics of distance in the marketing of products, and which generate the
economies of agglomeration inhering in the presence of supportive production of goods and
services required as inputs. And it would seem that senior personnel would even want to find
living conditions congenial. Agrarian and small town communities or low density settlements
do not satisfy these conditions. In South Africa the market appears to be the predominant
location factor for secondary and tertiary industries.
In the theory of international and interregional trade it is argued that the movement of goods
and services across borders can be an alternative to the movement of factors of production -
labour amongst them - for the equalisation of the remuneration of factor inputs. However, the
conditions to be fulfilled for this outcome to eventuate are evidently too exacting for its
realisation; for example: perfect competition in trade, identical and homogeneous production
functions, unique factor-intensities and no reversals, incomplete specialisation, no
transportation costs, and diminishing returns. (See, e.g. Heller, 1968, Cho 6; Staley, 1970, Cho
5). But, of course, the most basic condition is that there should be more than a modicum of
bilateral or multilateral trade in goods between labour sending and receiving countries. And if
entrepreneurship, capital and technology do not move to the former it will have few or no
goods to trade, and labour movement will continue to operate as the adjustment mechanism.
There is still the hypothesis that a change in terms of trade may play an equilibrating role. If,
as in the Lewis model (1963), the supply of labour from an agrarian community to the
industrial area is unlimited, the containment of the real wage in the latter will permit of an
accumulation of capital and a growth of its demand for the agricultural produce of the area of
origin which turns the terms of trade in the latter's favour. The resultant rise in the marginal
product of labour in the area of provenience can remove the cause of the emigration. For this
outcome to be realised, however, the rate of emigration has to exceed the rate of population
growth, a condition not satisfied with facility. And the exponents of the dependencia model
would no doubt refute such outcome.
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The actual economic effects of migration on the source and the host countries depend on the
demographic and economic characteristics of the people involved, and are thus a matter of
empirical evidence which differs according to the type of migration at issue. According to the
Population Division of the UN secretariat "there is no consensus on the impact of
international migration on aggregate measures of economic performance in the countries of
destination" (United Nations, 1997, p 54).
4.2 THE POPULATION OF INDIAN ORIGIN
While the registered immigrants entering South Africa may, in part, be only on an ostensibly
permanent basis, some of them emigrating after periods of time, we can deal with them as
permanent, to distinguish them from those involved in the temporary migratory labour
system. The overwhelmingly large majority of them hail from countries of Western cultural
orientation, and are accordingly associated with the White section of the South African
population for analytical purposes.
The only significant immigration of non-western peoples into South Africa, which gave rise
to the establishment of the community of Indian origin, occurred before 1914. A first
contingent of 341 arrived as indentured labourers at a time when the indigenous population
apparently had no need of paid work on sugar plantations in Natal. They were followed by
increasing numbers, some of them as non-indentured immigrants, to average an annual inflow
of some 1 400 between 1890 and 1914. Immigration as a significant force in the growth of the
people of Asian origin came to an end in 1913 when legislation was enacted to limit future
entry to wives and children of those already domiciled in South Africa, after the government
of India had, in 1911, prohibited the further indenturing of labourers, in protest against
measures taken by the South African government to curb the immigration of Indians. A law of
1956 ended the practice of South African men marrying women in India and Pakistan as a
means of acquiring immigration qualifications for the latter. A voluntary repatriation scheme
under the Cape Town agreement prompted an emigration of 47 000 Indians over the period
1911 to 1933, after which there was little net movement. The increase in the size of this
population group from 227 600 in 1936 to 986 600 in 1991 has been due to a high rate of
natural increase which reached a peak of 3,69 per cent during 1946-51, and declined steadily
thereafter but remaining above 2 per cent until the beginning of the eighties.
By now this population, as is to be expected, does not display the characteristics of an
immigrant community any longer, the processes of mortality and fertility having excised the
remnants of such attributes from the age structure. It can, however, still be enquired whether
the immigrants, by way of their descendants, have made a significant contribution to the
economy of the country. The only kind of assessment that can be provided in this regard is a
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comparison of the skill composition of their labour force (the four skill classes distinguished
in Chapter 6) with that of the Coloured and Black populations with whom, it can be argued,
they shared the disadvantages of discrimination. This is presented in Table 4.1.
TABLE 4.1
LABOUR FORCE COMPOSITION BY SKILL 1991
CLASS PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION RELATIVE CONTRIBUTION
TO TOTAL SOUTH AFRICAN LF
Asians Coloureds Blacks Asians Coloureds Blacks
% % % % % %
I Executives 4,6 0,7 0,2 5,1 2,7 4,4
II Highly-skilled 21,6 13,2 5,7 4,9 11,0 31,1
III Semi-skilled 58,1 44,1 30,5 4,6 12,6 58,2
IV Unskilled 15,7 42,0 63,6 Q.,2 ~ 89,8
100,0 100,0 100,0 2,9 10,3 68,8
Source: Sadie, 1991, pp 174-5
Both the skill contents of the three groups and their contributions to the South African total
numbers in each class bear witness to the superior economic performance of the Indian
community. In size their LF represents only 2,9 per cent of the total but contributes 5,1 per
cent to the entrepreneurial class and 4,9 per cent to the professional and highly skilled
category. The share in the supply of entrepreneurship among the Coloured LF is one-quarter
of their contribution to total LF numbers, and one-sixteenth in the case of the Black labour
force. Which means that the Indian community has contributed to an improvement in the
average economic quality of the South African population. They are known for their
industriousness, resourcefulness and initiative, and their scholastic achievements are a good
deal better than those of the other two groups included in Table 4.1 (Edusource, 1992, p 5;
Bot, 1997).
It would appear that South Africa has been expenencmg a low level wave of "new"
immigrants - in the sense of non-traditional sources - from Eastern countries since 1988,
particularly from the Republic of China (Taiwan) and Israel, and, to lesser extent, from Hong
Kong and India (Central Statistical Service, 1988-1997).
4.3 FIRST WORLD IMMIGRANTS
4.3.1 The historic course of immigration
During the regime of the Dutch East India Company, European immigration was more often
discouraged than encouraged. Rather, slaves were imported to compensate for a shortage of
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indigenous labour, so that by 1793 they numbered 14747, some 900 more than the Colonists
of Dutch, German and French descent (Beyers, 1930, p 249). After the capture of the Cape by
the British a government-aided scheme was launched in 1820 to bring 4 000 British settlers to
the eastern district of the Cape to develop the agricultural potential of that area and to act as
barrier to the interpenetration of Dutch and Xhosa-speaking stockfarmers. As farmers these
immigrants failed but achieved economic success when they opted for occupations of their
own choice. They were followed by some 15 000 more between 1846 and 1863, while a
German contingent of 3 500 arrived during 1857-58 (Robertson 1937, pp 384-401). In the
1891 Census of the Cape it was found that, of the 377 000 White inhabitants counted, some
50000 had been European-born (Cape Parliament Papers, 1892, par 167). With size of
completed families averaging 8,9 among 1853-75 cohorts of married couples, going down but
still 6,2 for 1890--95 cohorts, fertility was high and natural increase reigned supreme. The
offspring of the immigrants born in the Cape contributed to the predominance of fertility in
population growth (Franzsen & Sadie, 1958, p 66).
The £24 million of new capital invested in the gold mining industry during 1895-99, soon
after the discovery of gold in the Witwatersrand, was accompanied by a huge influx of
immigrants who, according to Cecil John Rhodes, outnumbered the original Transvaal
population, and who gave rise to the "Uitlander" problem which led to the 1899-1902 Anglo-
Boer War (Robertson, 1958, p 177).
When the war ended the British High Commissioner, Milner, believed that he could neutralise
the potential political and cultural influence of the Afrikaner population, as determined by
numbers, by means of a massive immigration of British settlers. After a big rush during the
first two years the flow slowed down to a trickle, and during the long period of severe
depression, over the years 1904 - 1910, emigration probably exceeded immigration. It was not
until the end of the Second World War that immigration became once more a significant
factor in the South African economy. While the United Kingdom has always occupied, and is
still occupying a premier position as country of origin, facilitated by the existence of a large
English-speaking community established long ago in this country, making for ease of
adaptation, other European countries came to the fore as significant sources of supply after
1946. Among these Portugal (to which Madeira can be added) and Germany are examples,
while Zimbabwe became a major source when political troubles erupted in that country.
Tracing the course of net immigration into South Africa (immigrants minus emigrants) since
the end of the Second World War, according to periods of ebb and flow, we arrive at the
following historic series:
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1947-48
1949-62
1963-76
1977-85
1986-87
1988-93
1994-98
83
Number of Total Annual
years average
2 49020 24510
14 52420 3740
14 423 890 30280
9 139620 15 510
2 -9940 -4970
6 33040 5510
5 -21 255 -4250
Sources: Department of Statistics, 1946-1966, 1968-1980; Central Statistical Service, 1982-
1995, P7 and Statistics SA, Statistical Release P0351.
The end of the war saw a rush of immigrants from war-ravaged Europe, actively encouraged
by the government of the day. When the new government came into power in 1948 they
accused their predecessors of using immigration as a political tool, and reversed the policy to
one of discouragement, so that over the fourteen year period 1949-62 net migration amounted
to only 3 740 per annum on average compared to the previous 24 510. The new government
gradually shifted its position in this regard, and after consulting demographers about the
maximum numbers of immigrants that could be allowed without neutralising the numerical
preponderance of Afrikaans-speakers, immigration was encouraged and aided financially.
Coinciding with a golden era of economic growth of 4,9 per cent per annum over the peak of
the Kondratieff -described as La Belle Époque, which was followed by L'Epoque de Malaise
(Kahn & Phelps, 1980, pp 9-10; Sadie, 1987, pp 4-8) - the net inflow averaged 30 280 per
annum during 1963-1976. The annual volume was almost halved during the subsequent nine
years, when the GDP grew at only 2,2 per cent per annum on the downside of the Kondratieff.
At a growth rate of 0,8 per cent per annum during the next eight years the economy and
immigration have been stagnating with emigration exceeding immigration during 1986-1987
and net immigration registering 5 SlOper annum between 1987 and 1993. During the
subsequent five years a net loss of 4 250 per annum was recorded and there was, at the same
time, a net outward balance of ostensible South African "tourists" of 2 820 per annum
(Statistics SA, 1999).
Superimposed on the long trend there are shorter term fluctuations which can be related to
political and economic events, as follows. Emigration is triggered, and immigration is
discouraged by adverse political events and civil unrest such as the 1960 Sharpeville incident,
followed by the South African exit from the Commonwealth, the assassination of Dr
Verwoerd in 1966, the eruption of the armed conflict in Rhodesia, 1971, the Soweto riots of
1976, the state of emergency during the eighties, and the high level of political uncertainty
thereafter. When memories of unfavourable events of brief duration have faded and economic
growth have taken over as the dominant factor, emigration declined and immigration
burgeoned. Since the middle of the eighties the concurrence of chronically adverse political
and economic circumstances put a damper of lengthy duration on net immigration.
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Of special interest is the role of persons with South African citizenship in the flow of
emigrants (i.e. only those recorded as emigrants). When we analyse the historical series, and
allow for a time lag between the occurrence of a major political event and the migratory
reaction, we find that the South African component until recently reached a maximum at the
end of an emigration upsurge following upon the event which sparked off such movement.
After the Soweto riots of 1976, for example, the component rose from 21 per cent to 41 per
cent in 1980. It seemed to have reached an all-time maximum in 1989, at a level of 49,8 per
cent, after which it has gone down to 39,7 per cent in 1992, which has the semblance of part
of another cycle. Looking at it over periods of high and low relative levels of aggregate
emigration the following course can be identified:
High emigration
Low emigration
Very high emigration
High emigration
1977-1980
1981-1984
1986-1987
1989-1992
28,6% of total emigrants
32,8%
45,8%
44,9%
Whatever the emigration cycles have produced, the long trend has been decidedly upward. It
is impossible to say, however, whether or not the slight attenuation of this trend represents
only a temporary improvement in the confidence in the future of the country on the part of the
White population under the new government established by universal suffrage (in which the
fastest reproducing group was bound to triumph) following upon the greater uncertainty about
this future before the elections. While during this period of efflux of South Africans the
economic stagnation might have appeared as a contributing factor, the occupational
composition of the emigrants indicated that they were the least likely to have become the
victims of unemployment or affirmative action.
In a comprehensive viewing of the migration scene, immigration into South Africa, even
while periodically interrupted by political events, can be considered demand-determined for
the most part, while emigration appears to be politically motivated to a major extent.
In the above concatenation of events migration is portrayed as an effect. But it is both cause
and effect and it is rather as a cause of economic change that it requires our attention.
4.3.2 Attributes of the migrants and their consequence
As is to be expected of economically motivated migration, persons in the EA ages (15-64) and
males preponderate, as is revealed by their age distribution and masculinity ratio compared to
those of the demographically oldest section of the South African population, the Whites,
whose ranks were swollen in the process, as follows:
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1965-70 1970 1986-91 1991
Net Immigrants SA Net Immigrants SA
Age Whites Whites
% % % %
0-14 23,1 31,0 12,3 22,1
15-64 74,8 62,5 79,8 68,5
65 + U ~ 111 M
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
MIF x 100 119,5 99,6 114,3 98,9
Over the years both the migrant and the settled White population have exhibited the effects of
declining fertility, particularly as reflected in the 0-14 age group. (The migration figures are
on a net basis but there is little difference between the gross and net magnitudes.) The
immigrants do not only register some 12 percentage points more persons - in relative terms -
in the 15-64 age group, but 69 per cent of them are concentrated at the 20 to 39 age interval
compared to 47 per cent for the settled population. Over the period 1960 - 1985, which
includes the hey-day years of migration, 1963 - 76, and the 1977-85 years of lower but still
sizeable migration, their net contribution to the growth of the White population was 22 600
per annum compared to 46 600 by natural increase, a ratio of 48 to 100. When the children
born to them in South Africa during that period are added, it can be asserted that they raised
the growth rate of the White population from 1,1 per cent per annum to 1,8 per cent per
annum; by 64 per cent, that is. Their contribution is, of course, even more impressive when
the comparison is confined to the 1963-76 period.
And all the time they were reducing the dependency ratio, a process which, ceteris paribus,
would have raised the per capita national product.
The role of immigrants emerges even more dramatically when the analysis is confined to the
White male labour force during 1963-76, when it expanded by 197 500 by way of natural
increase and by 160 900 through immigration, the latter thus adding 45 per cent to the total
increase, or in a ratio of 81: 100 compared to natural increase. When the latter is discounted
for the absorption of manpower by the obligatory military service the ratio increases to 94: 100
(Sadie, 1983, p 22).
More significantly still, the immigrants were raising the quality of the labour force as
quantitatively measured by their skill composition.
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TABLE 4.2
SKILL COMPOSITION OF THE IMMIGRANT AND
SOUTH AFRICAN LF FOR SELECTED YEARS
1965-75 1975 1975-85 1985 1985-91 1991
Immigrants SALF Immigrants SALF Immigrants SALF
White Collar 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0
Class I 3,9 2,7 6,1 2,7 17,7 2,6
Class II 26,8 5,0 32,9 6,8 1,7 7,4
Class III 22,9 12,8 26,4 15,0 39,7 15,9
Class IV M M M 12 M iJ.
53,6 23,1 65,4 26,2 59,1 31,0
Blue Collar
Class II 39,7 4,5 28,4 5,0 31,1 5,1
Class III 6,7 22,6 6,2 20,8 9,8 20,2
Class IV M 49,8 M 45,5 M 43,7
46,4 76,9 34,6 71,2 40,9 69,0
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Sources: See Table 4.1
Comparison of the immigrants and South African LF's (all four groups combined) skill
structures leaves no doubt about the superiority of the former. Among them the majority were
white collar workers and among these latter, up to 1985, the high level manpower (HLM) -
classes I & II - preponderated. Compare, for example, their 1975-85 percentage of 39 per cent
for HLM with the SA LF's 9,5 per cent. If for the sake of ease of comparison we combine
White (WC) and Blue Collar (BC) workers, and condense the skills into three categories
HLM, middle level (MLM) and lower level manpower (LLM) we have the following result
for 1975-85 whose net immigrant composition was slightly less distinguished than that of
1965-75:
Immierants Total SA LF White LF
% % %
HLM 67,4 14,5 49,9
MLM 32,6 35,8 48,9
LLM _Q,Q 497 il
100,0 100,0 100,0
It is seen that the (net) immigrant LF was not only superior in skill structure compared to the
total SA LF, but also to the White LF, the group with the best skill make-up of the four ethnic
groups. The immigrants always had relatively fewer of the executive class in their ranks than
the settled White population, but the relative strength of their WC and particularly their BC
numbers in Class II far exceeded that of the White group. And in Chapter 6 it is being
reported that some one-third of the entrepreneurial class members in South Africa are foreign-
born. But perhaps the most outstanding contribution of immigration to the SA LF was its
share of 51 per cent in the total increase of skilled BC workers during the 1963-76 period.
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While the international migration policy of the government was ethno-selective, the economy
and the skill content of the LF required skill-selectivity as well. South Africa had need of the
scarce factor of production, skilled manpower. It would have been illogical and insensible to
encourage the immigration of unskilled labour for which Africa would have been a prodigious
source of supply, but which is also the most abundant type of labour engendered locally, as
prominently evidenced by the 1991 43,7 per cent complement and the 1975 49,8 per cent
complement displayed in Table 4.2.
The data for net immigration during the six years between 1985 to 1991 reflect a deviation
from norm, in that the share of WC Class II numbers in the total net number was a negligible
1,7 per cent compared to 32,9 per cent and 26,8 per cent during the two preceding ten year
periods. This was the time of maximum emigration of foreign-born and South African citizens
alike, most of them members of the professional and technical category, and immigration was
barely sufficient to neutralise the outflow. In this regard the results of a survey among medical
students of a Cape university are revealing. Two-thirds of them were seriously considering
emigration because of "career opportunities in other countries, concern for personal safety,
fear of economic hardship in the future South Africa, concern about limited standards of
health care, fear of loss of privileges, opposition to the present direction of change in
government and the election" (Weiss, 1993, p 4). South Africa was experiencing a brain drain
in the form of human capital invested in highly skilled manpower, the cost of which was, for
the most part, borne by taxpayers at large. Quantitatively, however, it was until 1993 just
about neutralised by immigration, some of it from the rest of Africa which could least afford a
brain drain. The self-governing territories and the autonomous TBVC countries were reported
to have attracted some 7 000 African doctors, dentists, veterinarians, academics and other
professionals from the rest of Africa (Leistner, 1993, pp 219-222).
In the above analysis we have prima facie evidence of the beneficial effect of immigration on
the SA economy. However, in assessing its employment effects one has to consider the oft
repeated indictment on the part the Black LF, that immigrants were substitutes for them and,
more recently, the promise by an ANC-dominated government's spokesman that the inflow of
European immigrants who were "snapping up jobs at the expense of unemployed Black,
Coloured and Indian South Africans" was to be curbed (Morris, 1994, p 5). The argument
used to be that rather than importing workers from overseas the local population had to be
trained; which cannot be flawed as a principle of long-run policy, particularly in view of the
reluctance White trade union members used to display in the acceptance of Black apprentices.
But for practical points-of-time purposes it is not valid. The gestation period of a skill is fairly
long so that it cannot be produced at will, or not in amounts sufficient to satisfy the needs or
demand which may develop at a specific time. A practical example may be instructive. Let us
assume standard V is the cut-off point for general, undifferentiated education, and that a
population has an adequate pool of human resources with this educational background. To
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aspire to, say, the BC skilled category, a member of this pool would need at a minimum to
obtain a standard VIII certificate and three years training thereafter, a total of six years after
standard V. In the case of professionals this period could be 11 to 15 years, disregarding the
subsequent years of practical experience required for proficiency. Unless there is in the
educational and training pipeline sizeable numbers of persons ready to be released on to the
market with the necessary variety of skills, the market demand is unlikely to be met. Even if
the condition is satisfied at the beginning of an unanticipated long period of growth and
development, the human resource pool can become exhausted. When HLM is needed at time
t, the economy cannot live on a promise that the necessary indigenous supply would be
forthcoming at time t + n.
During the era of high immigration a pipeline, referred to above, of adequate dimensions did
not exist among the educationally most advanced group, the Whites, while among the Blacks
not even a pool of reasonable size of basically educated persons obtained. Intent on solving
the Poor White problem - long after it had ceased to exist - the government pursued a policy
of according preference to members of the White LF, involving legislated discrimination
against others and, particularly, Black workers. Encouragement of skill-selective immigration
in these circumstances meant that immigrants could not have been substitutes for, or
competitors of, indigenous White workers and, ipso facto, not for the rest of the LF either.
They were complementary to the existing LF, at least in the case of HLM, supplementing the
domestically engendered supply. If it is conceded that the superior performance of the
developed communities of the world is a function of the superior quality of their LF, it
follows that the enhancement of the quality of the SA LF occasioned by immigration, did not
detract from, but added to the welfare of the indigenous LF. Coming as they did from the
more developed countries of the world, the immigrants might conceivably have brought with
them more productivity-enhancing competence and experience than obtained in the host
country. They might also, as Spengler would maintain, have introduced "cultural heterosis" to
engender beneficial competitive tension and "new sets of values conducive to economic
enterprise" (1956, pp 38-40). As both cause and effect they were involved in the following
process: economic growth and development created a demand for immigrants whose influx
stimulated the economy to continued or higher levels of growth which, in tum, attracted some
more immigrants whose contribution to the economy created opportunities for workers whose
employment was dependent upon the existence of the kind of skills embodied in the foreign-
born workers.
The dimensions of these opportunities can be approximated by means of (a) multipliers and
(b) elasticities of employment in which it is presumed that lower levels of manpower in the
skill hierarchy are dependent for their employment upon higher levels of manpower in the
formal sector of the economy - from which persons in the teaching profession have been
excluded, since many of them are underqualified and therefore not quite class II members,
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and because their numbers are demographically - rather than economically - determined. We
can then distinguish the following magnitudes:
A (a) The employment multiplier (EM) of the entrepreneurial class (i.e. the average
number of workers owing their employment to it); and (b)the elasticity of employment
(EE) with respect to it, measured over time, assuming that this class is the determinant
of the employment of all others.
B (a) The EM ofWC class II; and (b) the relevant EE, assuming it to be the precondition
for and determinant of the employment of all others bar class I.
C (a) The EM of BC class II; and (b) the appropriate EE, assummg it to be the
prerequisite for the employment ofBC classes III and IV.
It is presumed that in the above regard immigrants will not differ from the aggregate
employed LF. The results are summarised in Table 4.3.
TABLE 4.3
PROBABLE MULTIPLICATIVE EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION
Employment Multiplier
1963-76 1979-91
Employment elasticity
1963-76 1979-91
A. Class I
B. WC Class II
C. BC Class II
30,3
6,1
8,6
21,0
4,5
14,2
5,1
0,8
2,1
3,7
0,6
3,1
As is to be inferred from the skill composition of the SA LF, an executive class immigrant
with an employment multiplier of 30,3 and an elasticity of 5,1 during the hey-day of
immigration (and economic growth), could have had a very beneficial effect on the
employment situation. During the period of lesser immigration and lower economic growth
these magnitudes declined to 21,0 and 3,7 respectively. The comparable values for white and
blue collar Class II are a good deal lower but still quite considerable. Even if not in the precise
ratios contained in Table 4.3, immigration boosted local employment. Comparison of these
ratios with the substantially lower ones in the more developed economies (MDC) forms the
basis for the argument that the world's economic welfare is raised by the transfer of HLM
from the MDCs to the LDCs. In the former, where there is an ample supply of it, the private
marginal product approximates to the social marginal product and the individual is
remunerated accordingly. At this rate of remuneration or its approximate level, the individual
emigrating to an LOC would probably have a social marginal product much in excess of his
private marginal product in the host country. Ergo, the world enjoys a more efficient
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allocation of resources, with the poorer communities benefiting most.
Interestingly, after 1976 and concomitantly with a large reduction in immigrants' contribution
to the BC skilled class, from 51 per cent to 11 per cent, the employment multiplier and
elasticity of employment with respect to this category rise above that of 1963-76. This must
be viewed against the following rates of increase in employed BC labour by skill, as derived
from adjusted manpower surveys by the Department of Labour (later Manpower) and the
.. Central Statistical Service:
1963-76 1977-91
Total
MFP
%p.a.
2,9
3,1
2..Q
b2
lJ.
%p.a.
1,2
2,4
U
M
Q.,J
BC Class II
III
IV
Itwould appear that in the absence of supplies of skilled BC labour from foreign sources after
1976, recourse was increasingly had to semi-skilled workers. These latter; however, to judge
by the multi factor-productivity (MFP) whose pronounced fluctuations over the years 1977 to
1991 described a 0,35 per cent per annum trend for the manufacturing industry, compared to a
more or less sustained increase of 1,1 per cent per annum before 1976, were not, or not
efficient, substitutes for skilled workers (NPI, 1997).
In light of the number of co-determinants of economic growth in South Africa, involving the
problems of multi-collenearity and the direction of causation, distinguishing econometrically
the contribution of immigration to the increase in the GDP becomes problematical. One
researcher, employing a constant elasticity of elasticity production function, suggested that,
whether skilled or unskilled, the labour introduced by immigration will raise aggregate
income of the population by more than the wages paid to them (Chiswick, 1982, pp 289-313).
Part of this augmentation can materialise via its contribution to the realisation of the
economies of scale. (Greenwood and McDowell, 1986, p 1751). A rough estimate of the
contributing of net (non-African) immigration to the South African GDP can be proffered by
weighting the various categories of labour with their approximate relative remuneration,
assuming that no displacement of indigenous labour had occurred. The relevant weights
applied were BC and WC class IV = 1; BC III = 1,5, BC II = 3,0, WC:;III = 2; WC II = 9,
WC I = 17. The results of the exercise suggest that while immigration was responsible for 5,4
per cent of the increment in total population numbers during 1963-76, and for 11,2 per cent of
the expansion in the formal sector employed LF, it added 26 per cent to the growth in the
Gross Domestic Product. During the years of meagre immigration and high emigration, 1986-
91, its share in the employed LF increment was 0,6 per cent and in the GDP growth 1,04 per
[CH4(JLS»)
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
91
cent.
The significance of this considerable premium is enhanced by the fact that the host country
does not bear the costs involved in the formation of the human capital embodied in the
immigrants. UNCTAD, defining this capital as the present value of expected future earnings
of a skilled immigrant aged between 25 and 35, puts a value of 184 000 US dollars (R650 000
at 1994 exchange rates) on it. It can also be computed by approaching it from the opposite
side by determining the end value of the series of expenditures involved in the human capital
formation from birth to the stage where a person begins his career as a skilled worker.
Premising a five year post-school period of education and training (ignoring still the extra
years of experience represented by a medium age of 28 years) and a rate of interest of 13 per
cent (the return to the national capital stock prevailing during the time of heavy immigration)
South Africa would have been made a free gift of R620 000 invested in human capital with
the entry of each immigrant in the HLM category. (The amount will, of course, vary with the
level of the rate of interest applied.)
Because of its variability, migration would have exerted a stabilising influence on the
economy by way of its effect on (i) the rate of unemployment and (ii) the rate of inflation. It
is tantamount to an adequately stocked pipeline of experienced manpower whose outflow
could be regulated, at least to some extent, in accordance with the conditions in the host's
labour market, opening it wider when the domestic supply becomes inadequate to meet the
demands of the economy and tightening it when immigrants may become competitors of
domestic workers in a situation of job scarcity. Pressure on wages is relieved during periods
of intensive demand for labour, while the rate of unemployment is contained when demand
slackens.
By the beginning of the nineteen-sixties, after two decades on the upward phase of the
Kondratieff, the domestic HLM pipeline had become drained of reserves to serve the needs of
the thriving economy, whose absorptive capacity was high. Both the demand for, and supply
of HLM had become inelastic. Any upward shifts in the demand would have meant sizeable
increases in the wage rates if they had not been compensated by comparable shifts in the
supply in the absence of immigration. Cost inflation would have been added to demand
inflation. As it was, price inflation did start to accelerate at the beginning of the seventies, but
was restricted to single digit figures until 1974.
As to the wider implications of immigration there is the possibility that foreign capital might
have been attracted. This would have been true in those cases where the HLM entering the
country was the result of direct investment by foreign companies. When the series of long-
term private capital inflows into South Africa is lagged by two years, a degree of correlation
does emerge, but the link appears too tenuous to permit of a positive inference about
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causation. For the rest, the conswnption of the immigrants and their housing needs would
have stimulated economic growth by way of the income and matrix multipliers. The stimulus
emanating from the provision of their housing, which, like other demographic investments
tends to be capital-intensive, appears to have been very substantial when considered in the
framework of the private construction market in which the upper and middle income group -
Whites for the most part - predominated. During 1963-76 immigration of 30 280 per annwn
introduced, on average, 10 100 new households into the economy per annwn - an
augmentation of 51 per cent of the demand which emanated from natural increase among the
higher income groups. Because of their manpower status one would expect them to have
raised the propensity to save of the aggregate population. This, however, could not be
statistically verified.
4.4 AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS
4.4.1 Documented immigration
For statistical data on African immigrants legally present in South Africa we are dependent
upon census enwnerations of foreign-born Blacks in South Africa. They revealed the
following nwnbers:
Male Female Total
1936 259600 71 500 331 100
1946 433700 102 100 535800
1951 482600 120 600 603200
1960 483800 102 000 585 800
1970 459700 56400 516 100
1980 303 000 39900 342900
1985 273300 44800 318 100
1991 314200 108 000 422200
1996 427800
Source: CSS, Population Censuses, 1936-1996.
Most of these figures represent under-enumerations which varied from census to census, the
degree of which most likely exceeded that of the South African born population, the illegal
immigrants among them having had more reason to conceal their presence than the latter.
Their sex composition and the changes in nwnbers over time until 1985, however, do reflect
the nature of this migration. It consists for the most part of temporary workers whose turnover
is approximately 100 per cent per annum, and whose numbers are closely linked to the
employment of foreign workers on the South African gold and coal mines. The steep rise in
the female component after 1985 represented an inflow of illegal immigrants from war-
ravaged neighbouring countries. It is generally conceded that there are many more of them
than have been included in the 1991 census.
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With 80 per cent and more of the African migrants working in the mining industry - the large
majority in gold mines - their fortunes and performance can be identified with those of this
industry. At the time of discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand the industry experienced great
difficulty attracting local labour at the level of wages offered. During the first twenty years
the industry depended almost entirely on Mozambican workers whose recruitment was
regulated by various agreements with the Portuguese authorities then in control. At one stage
recourse was even had to indentured Chinese labour in the search for adequate supplies. "In
time Natives from the Union and the High Commission territories (now called Botswana,
Lesotho and Swaziland) were persuaded to enter the mining field ... once their prejudices
against working underground had been overcome ..." (Gemmill, 1961, p 3).The Mozambicans
remained the largest component of the foreign labour force until 1975, when 144 400 of them
were engaged in South African mining (representing a quarter of the total mine LF). After the
collapse of the colonial power and commencement of civil war in Mozambique, followed
eleven years later by a South African ban on recruitment in that country, the numbers
employed by members of the Chamber of Mines dwindled to 43 100. Lesotho took over as the
premier source of foreign migrant labour, its share going up from 36,7 per cent in 1975 to
50,7 per cent in 1986 when total employment in the mining industry was at its peak, and to
56,3 per cent in 1991 when the total had diminished by 146 250 or 27 per cent, and that of
Lesotho workers by 19 270 or 17 per cent. Before Malawi imposed a ban on recruitment,
following the death of migrants in an air crash on their way home in 1974, (rescinded in 1977)
there were some 109 800 Malawians employed in the South African gold and coal mines and
another 27 900 in non-mining industries (Chamber of Mines, 1982, p 97 & Leistner, 1988, p
18). By 1991 they had all but disappeared as registered members of the mining LF. As
revealed by Table 4.4, which in this case include workers engaged in non-mining industries as
well, Botswana, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Namibia have also been, and still are,
sources of labour supply.
TABLE 4.4
FOREIGN BLACK WORKERS EMPLOYED IN SOUTH AFRICA
1975 1980 1986 1991 1992
Mozambique 150700 60500 73200 64500 65300
Lesotho 152200 136400 138200 118900 114000
Malawi 39300 31 800 31400 13600 13600
Botswana 37000 29500 28200 23600 21 800
Swaziland 16400 12000 21 900 23000 22600
Zimbabwe 8900 20500 7300 7300 7300
Zambia 900 900 2400 2400 2400
Angola 600 300 20
Namibia and others 8500 3 100 75400 79400 79400
414600 295000 378100 332700 326400
Source: Leistner, 1988, p 123; Chamber of Mines, 1991, 1992.
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The foreign component of the gold mine LF expanded steadily from 52 per cent at the
beginning of the second world war to 79 per cent during the early seventies, after which there
was a drastic reduction to 46 per cent in 1979, followed by a decade during which the
percentage share oscillated around 42 per cent (Matlosa, 1992, p 35, Chamber of Mines
Annual Reports). The expansion phase coincided with the rapid development of secondary
industry in South Africa which offered higher wages and preferred working conditions to
South Africans. The contraction phase set in when manufacturing industry was no longer the
source of a briskly increasing demand for labour. The rate of increase in its volume of
employment declined to 2,2 per cent per annum during 1975-82, down from 4 per cent per
annum during 1950-75, and showed a negative trend after 1982 while fluctuating (SA Reserve
Bank,1994(b)).
Judging by the skill content of the foreign workers - unskilled and semi-skilled - and the rapid
growth of the SA LF of similar status, one would have expected the former to have been
substitutes for the latter. But, by all accounts, that they were not, at least until the middle of
the seventies. To South African Blacks, the remuneration has evidently been insufficient to
compensate them for the marginal disutility of effort in an occupation which held little
attraction for them. In practice a segmented market obtained. When the demand for labour in
the secondary sector began to flag, which allowed less scope for the exercise of job
preferences, while the higher gold price permitted of increased wages, and strained political
relations between South Africa and its neighbours spurred greater reliance on domestic
supplies of labour, the foreign migrants emerged increasingly as substitutes. In other words
they represented a stabilising influence in the South African economy: during the expansion
phase noted above they acted as complements which did not induce, or add to,
unemployment, while inhibiting increases in wages, and in the contraction phase the reduction
in their numbers made for less unemployment among the local LF.
There cannot be any doubt that the foreign migrants were a major force in getting the gold
mining industry off the ground and keeping it alive, and in so doing contributed largely to the
growth of the South African economy. The industry has been, and is, constrained by two
forces beyond its control: (i) the quality of its natural resource, the gold content of the
available ore, that is; (ii) the international price of gold, except when relieved by declines in
the external value of the monetary unit. The industry cannot pass on cost increases, the latter
having to be countervailed by raising the grade of ore mined, which reduces the life of mines
and the total amount of the metal which can be extracted and exported to earn foreign
exchange. Its role as earner of the means of payment for indispensable imports is disclosed in
Table 4.5, as inferred from data provided by the Reserve Bank (March, 1999 and previous
issues).
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TABLE 4.5
GOLD, THE GNP AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
1946-1958
1959-1975
1981-1993
1994-1998
The Import content
of the GNP
%
30
31
26
30
Gold's share
in Exports
%
32
32
30
17
The Balance of Payments, given a zero or balanced capital account, has always been, and will
remain, the ceiling against which the very open economy is forever pushing whenever it
shows a reasonable degree of vigour. (An analysis of historic data for the years before the
great stagnation (1981-1993), which specified current account equilibrium as condition, puts
this ceiling at 2,2 per cent in terms of GDP growth). Even with an anaemic economic growth
of 0,6 per cent per annum (GNP or GDP) during 1981-1993, the average propensity to import
(goods and factor and non-factor services) was still 26 per cent after having been 32 per cent
and 39 per cent during periods of rapid growth. In individual years of rapid growth the
marginal import ratio has been 60 per cent and more. Consisting predominantly of capital
goods and intermediate inputs the imports are a necessary condition for growth, with a
relatively high income elasticity and low price elasticity. In this context it can be maintained
that the social marginal product of Rl earned in foreign exchange exceeds that of Rl of goods
sold in the local market.
Therefore, any industry that can raise or support the ceiling conduces to economic growth.
Manufacturing industry, as a net consumer of foreign exchange, does not seem to be capable
of doing this; its growth tends to lower it. The mining industry, together with agriculture, as
net earners of foreign exchange, has been fulfilling this role. Gold, with a share upward of 30
per cent in South African exports has, accordingly, been a mainstay of economic growth. A
figure of 32 per cent was recorded during the period of maximum foreign worker
participation, 1959-1975. By 1998 it had dropped to 13,5 per cent.
It has been estimated that in real terms the average cash wage of Black mineworkers remained
almost constant for six decades, 1911-1969 (Wilson, 1972, p 46). This could only have been
achieved by importing labour from neighbouring countries. Dependence upon local supplies
of labour only would have required increases in wages which might, not inconceivably, have
met with a backward sloping supply of labour, to raise the wage component of exploitation
cost. In 1961 the general manager of the Native Recruiting Corporation and the
Witwatersrand Native Labour Association attested that "gold mining on the Witwatersrand
has been built up on the basis of migrant Native labour ... If the mines had been unable to
secure unskilled Native Labourers to perform manual labour, the cost of production would
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have risen to such a degree that only the richest sections of the gold-bearing conglomerates
would have been capable of being worked at a profit. Because such labour is available,
however, the industry, from 1886 to 1959, has produced 619 474 000 million ounces of gold
worth £4 592 millions .... The early mining ventures had the greatest difficulty in finding
sufficient local inhabitants to operate these workings" (Gemmill, p 2).
During the ninety years since the discovery of gold in which foreign migrants were the major
LF component, they were instrumental (through their contributions to the national product
and foreign exchange earnings) in providing the indigenous Black LF opportunities for
progressively more highly remunerated jobs in the non-mining sectors. The preponderance
might also have rendered the legal restrictions on the upward mobility of Black workers less
onerous by virtue of the fact that their burden rested more heavily on foreigners than local
workers.
There is a health hazard for South Africa involved in the foreign labour migration in that
some of the workers may be carriers of a malaria parasite, plasmodium faleiparum, which
shows signs of resistance to· countermeasures (Marais, 1994, p 11). The World Health
Organisation, again, estimated the HIV sero-prevalence in some of the countries of origin -
Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Malawi - to be above one per cent in the adult
population which can contribute to the spread of AIDS in South Africa (United Nations, 1994,
p L). However, this is, in the main, a threat posed by the movement of illegals across South
Africa's eastern and northern borders, rather than by the efficiently administered migrant
labour system. The medical facilities of the Chamber of Mines are adequately coping with the
health problems involved.
The obverse of the benefits, recounted above, bestowed upon the SA economy by foreign
migrant labour, is the economic benefits to the sending countries. To illustrate these we have
to depend on quantitative data which cannot be considered 'hard' or comprehensive but are
not, therefore, devoid of significance. In Table 4.5 are assembled (i) estimates of foreign
gold and local mineworkers' earnings in 1991, based on the Chamber of Mines (Annual
Report, 1991, p 58) report that unskilled and semi-skilled labour was receiving R946 on
average per month in cash and R323 in kind (an addition of 34 per cent in the form of food,
accommodation, medical aid, sporting and recreational facilities); (ii) a balance of payments
transfer to neighbouring countries of R2 211 million in 1993 as remuneration of foreign
workers, who, in this case, include those engaged in the secondary and tertiary sector as well.
(Personal communication by the SA Reserve Bank.) Since this figure accounts for 97 per
cent of the amount recorded by the SA Reserve Bank as "net remuneration paid to non-
resident employees" the latter is assumed to be adequately indicative of the earnings of
workers from neighbouring countries. The amount reached a peak of R2 804 million in 1990
before slumping to Rl 569 million in 1998 (South African Reserve Bank, 1999, pp S-127).
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The 1993 amount was allocated to countries according to the relative numbers employed in
mining as the predominant employer, as in Table 4.5.
TABLE 4.5
Earnings of foreign Probable transfers to
Black Mineworkers countries of origin
(all foreign workers)
1991 1993
(R million) (R million)
Cash In kind Total
Lesotho 1 059 362 1 421 1 189
Swaziland 181 62 243 203
Botswana 152 52 204 171
Mozambique 489 167 656 389
Other 259
2524 2211
Not all of the earnings can be transferred to the countries of origin. The payment in kind is, by
its nature, consumed at or near the work place, but at the same time this reduces the necessity
of extensive purchases for the purposes of everyday life. The governments of the sending
countries understandingly prefer that a maximum be transferred: Mozambique and Lesotho
required that 60 per cent of earnings be repatriated in the form of deferred pay, Lesotho
reducing its requirement to 30 per cent in 1991. Also, during the course of the year of
employment some remittance of earnings by the individual to his household does occur, and
at the end of the contract period a portion of income is usually repatriated by way of gifts and
other goods. The Chamber of Mines would have it that "about 60 per cent of the total income
earned by these mineworkers finds its way back into economically depressed regions"(1991).
At the same time not all of these remittances are lost to the South African economy which
benefits a second time round by way of payment for imports from South Africa by the
countries of origin.
In Table 4.5 the balance of payments transfers exceed the cash wages (except for
Mozambique) because in 1993 wages were higher than in 1991. The 1993 amounts include
the remuneration of migrants working outside the mining sector, and the numbers of migrants
involved changed between 1991 and 1993. The juxtaposition of the two sets of statistics
together with the National Income Statistics published by the United Nations permits of a
reasonable judgement of the economic importance of the migrant labour system to the sending
countries. That migrant labour is the lifeline of the Lesotho nation is attested by the following
figures relating to its contribution:
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% of foreign exchange earnings Addition to GDP
1980
%
59
1985
%
66
1990
%
57
1980 1985 1990
%
72
% %
92 69
Sources: Whiteside, 1986; United Nations, 1991.
It is the major foreign exchange earner, and in 1990, when its share in the generation of the
GNP was 42 per cent (47% in 1985) it raised the GDP by 69 per cent (92% in 1985). It was
estimated that in 1981 for every 100 Basutho men employed in Lesotho in wage-paid jobs
375 were engaged in the migrating labour system across its border. (Whiteside, 1986, p 58;
Penny, 1986). This kind of quantitative relationship might have held or risen until 1987, since
when South Africa has been playing host to diminishing numbers of Basutho migrants. The
numbers of illegal entrants are unknown.
It is a moot question whether some part of the payment in kind and of cash wages spent inside
South Africa should not be credited to the GNP of the sending countries. If the migrants did
not leave their countries they would have had to be fed, clothed and otherwise cared for in any
case, even if not at the same standards as at their place of work. In the event the migrants'
earnings will feature even more prominently in their home country's economy.
The contribution of migrants' remittances to the economy of Mozambique is presented with
lesser confidence since that country's national accounts do not reveal enough, and it is
difficult to know what level of exchange rate would correctly reflect the true value of its
monetary unit. The remittance seem to have added some 19 per cent to the GDP of
Mozambique in 1991 and to have been responsible for around 46 per cent of its foreign
exchange earnings on current account. At the peak of Mozambicans' employment in South
Africa, before the end of colonial rule, the resultant addition might well have been more than
twice as high as in 1991.
By 1991 Malawi's migrant workers in South Africa have been making an almost negligible
contribution to that country's GNP. But before the 1974 ban on recruitment it would have
been quite substantial since there were 100 of them for each 310 employed in the formal
sector inside Malawi. (Extrapolated in reverse from Economist Intelligence Unit, 1986, p 28.)
Concomitantly, the remittances would have been the major foreign exchange earner.
The remittances of migrants from Botswana and Swaziland add about 4 per cent and 3,6 per
cent to the GDP of the two countries respectively. The contributions in the case of Zambia
and Zimbabwe are smaller still. Of course, for specific rural areas where the migrants hail
from, the income generated by migrant labour is not negligible.
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While the export of labour has been presented above as a blessing to the countries of origin,
relieving their labour forces of large members which their economies cannot accommodate
and making handsome contributions to their national products, the economic dependence
implied is seen as a cost. An editorial in a Lesotho newspaper phrased it as follows: "This
economic dependence on South Africa gravely undermines Lesotho's international stature as a
sovereign state. The country's socio-economic stability is largely contingent upon external
factors" (Translated by Matlosa, 1992, p 36). Having in mind the consequences of a large
scale retrenchment of foreign workers in South Africa, the Southern African Labour
Commission, founded in 1980, was given the task of trying to effect a gradual withdrawal of
the member states from the migrant labour system. In this the Commission, in the absence of
the necessary employment creation within the members' economies, was not successful. The
reduction in the number of foreign migrants operating in South Africa, which did take place,
was the result of the Chamber of Mines' policy of reducing dependence on foreign sources of
labour supply, and creating a LF of career mineworkers by re-engaging repeatedly as many
workers as are prepared to co-operate.
4.4.2 A new category of African immigrants
The political status of the former self-governing states and TBVC countries accorded their
governments the opportunity of making appointments of their own choice which had
particular significance for the high level manpower category. In many cases they opted for
Black professionals from other African countries and elsewhere in preference to persons from
the Common Area (the rest of South Africa) who, in terms of required levels of competence,
would probably have been Whites. The political situation in South Africa after 1990, and
particularly after the new government came into power in 1994, provided fresh impetus to this
non-traditional type of African immigration. The United Nations secretariat reported that "the
end of apartheid triggered a demand for qualified Black managers, technical workers,
academics and other highly skilled workers, and there were not enough educated, experienced
South African Blacks to meet the demand ... South Africa is replacing Europe and North
America as the preferred destination for skilled African labour" (United Nations, 1998, p
154). The relevant numbers are unknown, but one surmises that many hundreds, rather than
many thousands, are involved.
Even if their employment evinces the character of a substitutional process, in that they are
preferred because of their ethnic origin, as a sort of adjunct to affirmative action, they
constitute a supplementation to the category of highly skilled labour to relieve pressure
resulting from its relative scarcity in the labour market. Given that they are adequately
qualified and competent (on a par, that is, with their competitors) the outcome for the
economy is positive only.
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4.4.3 Undocumented immigration
Undocumented or illegal immigrants are aliens whose presence in South Africa, having
entered or remained in the country in contravention of the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991, is
not validated by the required documents. By their very nature, estimates of the numbers
involved cannot claim validity at, say, the 90 per cent confidence level; and a variety of them
are being bandied about, ranging from 2 to 8 million (Haldenwang, 1996, p 71). The only
reliable statistics relevant to illegal immigration pertain to the expulsion, or involuntary
repatriation, of aliens as furnished by the Ministry of Home Affairs. The numbers of
repatriated increased from 51 550 in 1989 to 96 600 in 1993, and rose at almost the same
tempo during the following four years to reach 176 350 in 1997 (Mickleburgh, 1997, p 2;
Reuters, 1998, p 8). More than 99 per cent of the individuals in question had arrived from
neighbouring countries, the bulk of them (84 per cent) from Mozambique. It is not known to
what extent stricter law enforcement contributed to the rising number of repatriations but they
also bear testimony to a swelling throng of people prepared to brave the immigration laws of
South Africa, or enter the country in ignorance of such laws.
A reasoned estimate of the dimensions of illegal immigration can be based on fragmentary
data relating to persons who entered South Africa from other African countries and departed
for these same countries (Central Statistical Service, 1992-1999, P0351). It emerges that
during the intereensal period 1991-1996 approximately 1 800 000 Africans did not return to
their countries of origin. To judge by census data on foreign-born Blacks, some 500 000 of
them could have qualified for temporary or permanent residence; most of them workers on
mines and farms and their families. This leaves 1 300000 as the (probable minimum) number
of undocumented immigrants. They are, of course, most unlikely to allow themselves to be
included in a population census as foreigners.
"The consequences of undocumented migration are still unclear". This is the verdict of the
Population Division of the UN Secretariat after examining the literature on the topic (United
Nations, 1998, p 210). The economic effects will depend on whether migrants arrive as
economically active individuals, or accompanied by dependants, whether they are employed,
self-employed or unemployed, and on the nature of their occupations. If unemployed they
function as consumers only, as do their dependants. If they are employed in occupations
avoided by indigenous workers either because of their nature or because of low levels of
marginal productivity of labour, they make a net contribution to the GDP of the host country.
The survival of their employers' enterprises may depend of the availability of such labour.
The outcome is the same if they are employed because they are valuable and docile and
therefore prepared to work for lower than trade union-determined wages; but then they could
operate as substitutes for resident workers to cause increased unemployment among the latter.
The substitutional effect will, of course, only be obtained if the employment would in fact
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have eventuated at trade umon wage levels; but trade umons themselves are averse to
contemplating the contrary probability, and regard illegal immigrants as cause of depressed
wages as well. COSATU has complained that farmers' access to such labour impeded the
formation of trade unions among farm workers and permitted the survival of employers on
marginal land that could otherwise be confiscated for redistribution to poor Black people
(Minnaar et.a!., 1995, p 34).
The Minister of Home Affairs reported to parliament in May 1998 that 195 employers (out of
110 450 investigated) had been found guilty of harbouring illegal aliens (Reuters, 1998, p 8).
The foreign workers employed by farmers in Mpumalanga and the Northern Province outside
immigration legislation - and on whose behalf 11 000 exemptions have been issued during
1994-97 (Republic of South Africa, 1997, p 23) - would also constitute illegal or para-legal
immigration. Whether or not exploitation in marginal labour productivity terms is involved
here, the jobs to the workers concerned represent a desirable alternative to jobless poverty in
their areas of origin.
Illegal immigrants who are self-employed in the Distribution sector, for the most part as street
vendors, in direct competition with indigenous traders, and adding to the phenomenon of
overtrading, in all probability only induce a redistribution of a given amount of purchasing
power, reducing the income of their South African counterparts. When the latter's resentment
turns to wrath, violence ensues. When these hawkers do generate net new demand by bringing
with them self-made artefacts, often - so it is alleged - without paying custom duties, the
effect is the same as that of imports on the Balance of Payments. The African Chamber of
Hawkers and Informal Business has claimed that 2 000 of the 15 000 hawkers in central
Johannesburg were illegal aliens (Minnaar et.a!., 1995, p 33); and in July 1994 some 300 of
its members marched to the police headquarters of that city to demand a review of
immigration laws and the immediate repatriation of these immigrants (SA Institute of Race
Relations, 1995, p 19).
Illegal immigration constitutes a drain, even if of unknown proportions, on fiscal resources,
depriving residents of a full measure of social and economic services provided by the state.
Obviously, those of them convicted of criminal offences are being jailed at the expense of
taxpayers. In 1994, for example, 12 400 were arrested for committing rape, murder and other
serious crimes (Solomon, 1996, p 9); and it has been averred that the incidence of violence,
gunrunning, drug trafficking, car theft, armed robbery and crime syndicates in South Africa is
correlated with the rising tide of illegal immigration (Financial Mail, 1994, p 22). Such events
add to the crime-infested environment in which the economy does not operate at its optimum
and which acts as a deterrent to foreign investment.
The deportation of 156 600 aliens in 1995 cost the country R12 million. Those of them who
[CH4(JLSl)
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
102
managed to acquire false passports and identity documents are entitled to assistance under the
RDP (Redistribution and Development Programme). The Central Economic Advisory Service
has suggested that the provision of housing, education, police services and medical care to the
majority group among the illegals (the Mozambicans) would have required an amount of
R270 million in 1995 (Financial Mail, 1994, p 22). At a minimum they cannot be denied
emergency medical treatment, and the task team appointed by the Department of Home
Affairs maintained that "nor their children [should] be punished for the misdeeds of their
parents by denying them access to temporary schooling" (Republic of South Africa, 1997, par.
3.2.4). Moreover, while they can be denied housing subsidies - which will only lead to
expanding squatter camps - they cannot be prevented from putting extra strain on the supply
of water, sanitation, transportation and recreational facilities. Their meagre contribution to
indirect tax revenue cannot compensate for the extra economic burden imposed.
It has been suggested that since South Africa has an interest in stemming the tide within the
countries of origin, it should assist in the economic development of the latter. That South
Africa could make a meaningful contribution in this regard - barring the discovery of rich
mineral resources in neighbouring countries - is a forlorn hope. The supply of enterprise and
capital in South Africa has already been insufficient to prevent its own private economy from
shedding more than half a million of its employees during 1989 to 1996 (National
Productivity Institute, 1997, P 9).
The implementation of the 1995 Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons in the
SADC (Southern African Development Community) would have legislated illegality of
migration out of existence, having had as its objective the progressive elimination (within 10
years) of all restrictions on the movement of people between SADC member countries and on
their economic activity in the country of their choice. The less idealistic 1997 Protocol,
overturning the 1995 Protocol, aimed at a much more modest facilitation of movement of
SADC citizens and even required members to co-operate in preventing illegal migration
(Solomon, 1997, pp 1-4). While South Africa has no need of being a star attraction under a
1995 Protocol system of migration, it does need a type of temporary immigrant who is not
adequately recognised and provided for in legislation, viz. highly skilled workers from the
global skills market to get specific projects off the ground. The Home Affairs task team
quoted above reported that "South Africa has no uniform or standardised policy or mechanism
for short term project-tied import of groups of workers. with particular skills" (Republic of
South Africa, 1997, par. 2.3.8). Foreign investors have complained that South African
officials betrayed uncertainty about the handling of this category of migrants and have, in
consequence, been responsible for delays in the establishment of projects. Such problems
entail delays in, or, at worst, the inhibition of, the generation of national income.
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4.5 CONCLUSION
Briefly, it can be concluded that the "old" (pre-1990, and primarily regulated or guided)
immigration contributed handsomely to the economic development of South Africa, by
providing human resources which were required but not available locally. Such beneficial
outcome cannot be claimed for the "new" immigration.
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CHAPTER 5
INTERNAL MIGRATION
5.1 URBANISATION
Four patterns of internal migration can be distinguished: rural-rural, urban-rural, urban-urban
and rural-urban. But, economically speaking, it is the movement from rural to urban areas and
from smaller towns (sometimes referred to as rural towns) to bigger ones and, particularly,
metropolitan areas, that excites interest and requires attention.
Urbanisation is a function of the interplay between population growth and economic growth
and development, the economic processes having been characterised historically by three
phases as delineated by the industrial structure of the economy. (To emphasise the more
recent development of information technology a quaternary phase could be added). The data
in Table 5.1 give some quantitative content to the process.
TABLE 5.1
PERCENTAGE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GDP BY
THREE ECONOMIC SECTORS (AT 1990 PRICES)
1945 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1981 1985 1993 1997 1998
A. Primary Sector
Agriculture 7,5 8,0 7,2 5,4 4,8 4,8 5,1 5, I 4,7 5,0 5,6 5,5
Mining 21,1 20,1 22,5 22,0 18,8 12,3 11,7 11,0 11,4 10,1 8,6 8,6
28,6 28,1 29,7 27,4 23,6 17,1 16,8 16,1 16,1 15,1 14,2 14,1
B. Secondary Sector
17,8 24,2 24,3 28,6 31,5 35,0 36,5 37,1 33,4 31,7 32,7 32,3
C. Tertiary Sector
53,6 47,7 46,0 44,0 44,9 47,9 46,7 46,8 50,5 53,2 53,1 53,6
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: S A Reserve Bank 1994, N/A B-8 to B-11; 1999, S-108.
Before the discovery of goldbearing ore on the Witwatersrand in 1886, and even more so
before the discovery of diamonds, the South African economy was predominantly agricultural
in nature, with a sizeable contribution by the tertiary sector in the form of traditional services -
government and domestic - not directly supportive of the main generator of income. In time,
still in the primary phase, the mining industry took over from agriculture as the predominating
economic activity, and established the nuclei of new urban settlements to add to those which
came into existence as a result of other economic bases such as harbours, railway operations,
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administrative centres, service centres for agrarian communities, etc. It also set in motion, as a
consequence of its backward linkage, the second phase of economic development in South
Africa, that of the economic leadership of the secondary sector (manufacturing, construction,
electricity, gas and water) with manufacturing, as the main component, itself waning in
relative importance after the middle of the sixties. Favoured by a most hospitable national and
international environment, the contribution of the secondary sector to the GDP (at factor
prices) surged upward after the second world war, to book a maximum in 1981 and reducing
the share of the tertiary sector until the beginning of the seventies. Since then the South
African economy - at least as represented by the formal sector - is ostensibly moving in the
third phase in which the tertiary sector preponderates, even if only by default on the part of
manufacturing which has been manifesting relative stagnation since 1981. Even while
government still features prominently in this sector, the services in the third phase are, for the
most part and unlike those in the first phase, requisite to production in modem industry.
A growing population requires for its livelihood - to maintain it or to prevent impoverishment
or to raise the level - a growing economy. The latter entails a movement away from the
primary sector to the secondary and the tertiary sectors which are spatially concentrated.
Following in their wake the population becomes increasingly urbanised with natural increase
within urban areas assuming ever-growing importance as immigrants settle down.
Both the push and the pull forces are in operation. On the supply side the capability of the
primary sector to accommodate an expanding population is limited. With natural resources as
its dominating factor of production, this sector is constrained by their supply: the non-
renewable mineral resources of given amount and quality, and a limited cultivable land area
subject to given climatic conditions. The limits are indeed being pushed outwards by means
of technological progress, in the case of agriculture by way of bio-technology, and advanced
cultivation technology, but it is not an operation that can compensate indefinitely for the
constraint imposed by the natural resource. And some of this technology act as substitute for
labour inputs which reduces the opportunities for the accommodation of an expanding labour
force, while a continual redistribution of land among increasing numbers of households
eventually reduces the returns to below subsistence level. In the case of urban industries land
is an unimportant factor of production which does not act as restraint on their development.
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On the demand side the limitations to the capability of agriculture to generate growth and
development are revealed by the low income elasticities of demand for its products. The
following values were derived from household budget studies of the four ethnic groups in the
metropolitan areas of South Africa undertaken by the Bureau of Market Research (1990
Report No 175, p 20). The incomes per capita of the four groups were used as weights to
aggregate the four separate values into single indices, as follows:
The income elasticity of the demand for food 0,53
for fruit 0,93
for clothing 0,99
for furniture and household equipment 1,30
for recreation, entertainment, sport 1,32
While the difference in the levels of the elasticities for food and fruit suggests that the
limitations can be tempered by changing the product mix, they are not removed. Moreover,
the elasticities of staple foods are a diminishing function of income per capita. The figure for
food indicates that an increase of 1° per cent in income will benefit agriculture (and food
processing) by 5,3 per cent only. And because of its spatial requirements, as well as its
demand for intermediate inputs and capital equipment, a very substantial part of the income
generated by farming "leaks" away to urban areas.
The latter have the advantage of being the location of secondary and tertiary industries with
relatively high elasticities of demand for their goods and services as exemplified by the above
values of 0,99 for clothing, 1,30 for furniture, and 1,32 for recreation. Any increase in income
will redound to their benefit more than proportionately. To this is added the matrix multiplier
effect of the proximity of interlinked business enterprises providing intermediate inputs to one
another as revealed by the technical co-efficients computed in input-output analysis. The
leakages, consisting of imports from other regions and countries, are much smaller than in the
case of the primary sector; and they are likely to be smaller the larger the area of concentrated
economic activity and, in consequence, the size of the internal market; the market potential,
that is, from the prospective businessman's point of view.
Market potential, in the experience of the United States and Western Europe, "has a lot of
power to explain the location industry ... " (Krugman, 1995, p 45). This is true of South
Africa as well. This potential can, for operational purposes, be interpreted as the gross
expenditure contra of the gross geographic income plus the expenditure on intermediate
inputs (encompassing, thus, both the vector and the matrix in the Input-Output system, but
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omitting across-border transactions). Accordingly, the geographic concentration (GC) or
polarisation, of non-agricultural economic activity -and, concomitantly urbanisation - can be
regarded as a function of the levels of household consumption (C), + government
consumption (G), + investment expenditure (I) + expenditure on intermediate inputs/outputs
(10). But these four magnitudes are, (for a specific area) again, in tum, a function of GC. (The
factor G could, of course, also be regarded, in part, as autonomous; as an impulse or catalyst,
that is, which provides the foundation for concentrated economic activity as would, for
example, a harbour or the site of mineral deposits). The process of mutual influencing
signifies the existence of circular, cumulative causation or self-reinforcing polarisation.
Population enters the equation as the number (N) by which the per capita disposable income
less savings (Ypc in brief) has to be multiplied to arrive at C (=NYpc). In this instance the
spatial distribution of population has the character of a determinant of the location of industry.
With regard to investment expenditure the central-place theory tendered as explanation of the
location of industry tells us that the trade-off between internal economies of scale and
transportation costs induces a clustering of producers. This gives rise to localised external
(agglomeration) economies which act as a centripetal force. These economies include the
facilitation of specialisation in production; the support of a large local market to suppliers, in
the intermediate neighbourhood of their clients, of intermediate inputs produced on an
efficiency-conducive scale (associated with the lO-factor); and urbanisation economies in the
shape of sophisticated infrastructures, large numbers of buyers and sellers, a diversity of
labour skills and educational and training facilities, to all of which the G factor will be
positively related.
The concatenation of forces is ably portrayed by Krugman: "Because of transportation costs,
the best locations are those with good access to markets (backward linkage) and suppliers
(forward linkage). But access to markets and suppliers will be precisely those points at which
producers have concentrated, and hence drawn mobile factors of production to their vicinity"
(1995, p 90-91).
With labour as the mobile factor of production, the spatial distribution of population features
as a determinate of the location of economic activity. Urbanisation proceeds apace as
population numbers are being attracted to the loci of such activity.
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However, contemporaneously, in the process of circular causation, population becomes a
determinant of such location as immigration and natural increase expand the market potential
at any given, or rising, level of income per capita.
The culture of cities has an important role to play in the process described above. Urbanism as
effectuated in the hustle and bustle of daily life, mass media, interpersonal contact, the clash
of minds, competitive lifestyles, innovative actions, and the challenging of conventional
wisdom, is a way of life conducive to change and development. Lewis Mumford, the author
of The Culture of Cities has this to say: "It is in the city, the city as theatre, that man's more
purposive activities are formulated and worked out, through conflicting and co-operating
personalities, events, groups, into more significant culminations" (1938, p 480). Friedman,
expounding "a general theory of polarised development", concurs: "The cumulative effect of
successive innovations is to transform the established structure of society by attracting
creative or innovative personalities into the enclaves of accelerated change; by encouraging
the formation of new values, attributes and behaviour traits consistent with the innovation; by
fomenting a social environment favourable to innovative activity ... " (1972, p 82). The
environment in the deep rural areas is not thus auspicious.
As a consequence of the economic process depicted above, people move out of agriculture,
away from the land, to centres of economic opportunity. This is the pull factor in operation.
Even in the absence of any geographical fertility differentials the inability of agriculture to
provide increasing population numbers with a livelihood will force the increments to seek
accommodation elsewhere, which invariably will be urban areas, whether or not these latter
can oblige. This is the push factor. But, in addition, fertility is higher in rural areas and so is
population growth - after allowing for differential mortality favouring urban areas;
exacerbating population pressure in rural areas. The fertility of rural Whites used to exceed
that of urban Whites (Sadie, 1954). Sample surveys of the fertility of Black women found the
following values for the Total Fertility Rates for the period 1985 - 1990 (Du Plessis, et al.,
1991):
Metropoles 4,09
Other Urban 4,28
Rural Areas 4,98
TBVC 5,33
Ceteris paribus, population pressure conduces to emigration from the rural areas.
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TABLE 5.2
PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION IN URBAN AREAS*
1936 1946 1951 1960 1970 1991
Whites 65,2 72,5 78,4 83,6 86,8 91,0
Asians 66,3 70,3 77,5 83,2 86,7 96,2
Coloureds 53,9 58,1 64,7 68,3 74,1 83,2
Blacks 17,3 21,6 27,2 31,8 33,0 35,7
* The figures for 1980 and 1985 were omitted because of the statistical problems arising
from the deviating definition of urban areas applied in the population censuses of
those two years. In other years they comprised (i) all cities and towns with some form
of local management and (ii) areas of an urban nature but without some form of local
management.
Sources: Central Statistical Service, Population Census Publications, Cilliers &
Groenewald, 1982, p 44: Sadie, 1991, pp 1-l3.
The data in Table 5.2 would indicate that the White and the Asian group have almost
completed the urbanisation process, the urban percentages being close to 100 per cent. At 83,2
per cent in 1991 the Coloured population is not far behind, their 1991 rural component
. equalling in size that of 1970. The great urbanward trek of the Whites was sparked by the
Great Depression of 1930-33 which coincided with the Great Drought, after which the
absolute numbers of rural inhabitants tended downwards to stand at 451 000 in 1991, down
from 714 000 in 1931 and 702 000 in 1936. The Asian rural community numbers only 38 000
after having been 87 000 in 1970 (sources as in Table 5.2). By contrast, the Black population
is still very much a predominantly rural society, the urban component representing 35,7 per
cent only, and some of them - the migrant labourers - still only temporary inhabitants, though
it would seem that the percentage could conceivably be raised by redefining urban to include
peri- and semi-urban areas in the erstwhile SGT and TBVC states, referred to as Homelands
until 1994, which would not qualify under the Census definition. (Graaff, 1987, p 53). This is
in large part a function of history in that by 1936, when the other three groups already had
more than half of their numbers residing in towns and cities, only one-sixth of Blacks were
thus accommodated. Actually the latter's rate of urbanisation (defined here as the rate of
acceleration of the urban percentage) was the highest of the four ethnic groups, namely 1,3
per cent per annum compared to the next highest of 0,8 per cent for the Coloured population
and the lowest of 0,6 per cent per annum for Whites.
It is very probable, however, that the urban Black percentage would have been higher had it
not been for a policy of control over their geographic mobility until 1985. The Land Act of
1913 denied them ownership of rural land outside the areas reserved for their exclusive and
[CH5(JLS)]
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
114
inalienable occupation (called Homelands for ease of reference) - the Cape Province excepted
until 1936 - without prior approval by the then governor-general, while the Native (Urban
Areas) Amendment Act of 1937 extended the prohibition to urban areas, and established the
principle of influx control. Since 1937 5 434 000 hectares of land have been added to the
reserved areas - Black Homelands - as a grant from taxpayers at a cost of Rl 220 million. It
was however, article 10(1) of the 1945 Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act which
ushered in the era of the strict application of influx control. A Black person was prohibited
from remaining in a prescribed (urban) area for longer than 72 hours without a permit issued
by a labour official unless he (i) had been living in that area uninterruptedly since birth; or
(ii) had worked uninterruptedly for one employer in that area for at least ten years; or (iii)
had been living without interruption in that area for fifteen years or longer without having
incurred a fine of more than R500 or imprisonment of more than six months, or (iv) was a
son or daughter under the age of 18, of a person qualifying in terms of section 10. In 1952 the
obligation to carry reference books (passes) was extended to Black women. In that year it was
made virtually impossible for Black squatter farmers on land owned by Whites to leave the
farms without the latter's consent. In 1968 controls were tightened to remove the right of
wives and dependants of those qualifying according to section IOta move legally into the
prescribed areas (Cilliers & Groenewald, 1982, p 30). The 1967 law on Physical Planning and
Utilisation of Resources, and the 1975 Law on Environmental Planning decreed an embargo
on the use of land for industrial development without prior approval of the Minister
concerned. Provision was made for differentiating between White-labour intensive industries
which would continue to be located in the common area, and non-locality bound enterprises
which should locate in decentralised areas, that is, away from the common area towns and
cities. For the first type of industries a maximum Black: White ratio of 2,5 to 1 was stipulated
which, in time, had to be reduced to 2 to 1. The Western Cape was decreed a "Coloured
preference area" which meant that Blacks were not to be engaged there unless it could be
certified that Coloured persons were not available to fill vacancies. To affirm those
restrictions on the entry into (prescribed) urban areas it was decided in 1967 to freeze
township development outside the Homelands. The number of businesses that could be owned
by individual Black businessmen in the prescribed areas was curtailed as well.
The removal of so-called "Black spots" involved the translocation of some 2 028 000 persons
without however changing their urban status (except for a negligibly small number). It is not
known whether the 643 000 persons endorsed out of prescribed areas found their way to
towns or rural areas in the Homelands or back to the former in due time. (Cilliers &
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Groenewald, 1982, P 29).
As is to be expected, employers - in addition to prospective Black employees - found these
restraints very irksome, and officials responsible for the implementation of the policy had to
act with circumspection to minimise possible harm to economic development. The large
majority of requests for additional Black workers were granted by way of permits for their
employment on a migratory basis. (Personal communication by the government official in
charge at the time.)
The policy was politically inspired. The White government, very conscious of the majority
status and the much higher growth rate of the Black population - considered a nation apart -
feared the political consequences of the economic integration of ever increasing numbers of
Blacks, by way of permanent settlement, in the common area, that is, outside the Homelands.
It was accepted that permanent Black residents would eventually qualify for universal
suffrage on a common roll with non-Blacks which would mean the loss of political power by
Whites in a majoritarian system of government (Tomlinson Report, 1955, Chapter 25). Such
loss of self-determination was considered inconceivable at the time. In so far as an economic
rationale for the policy was sought, recourse was had to expositions of the diseconomies of
industrial concentration in ever expanding cities and metropolises.
5.2 DECENTRALISATION
The counterpart to the policy of minimisation of permanent Black settlement in towns and
cities in the common area, was a policy of maximisation of settlement in the Homelands
(subsequently known as the SGTs and the TBVC countries). To this end a programme of
decentralisation of industries was put into action at the beginning of the 1960s as a means of
providing the necessary economic bases. This was planned to occur in "border areas" which
were identified by the Council for the Development of Natural Resources and defined as
places in which industrial development could take place "through European initiative and
control, but which are so situated that the Bantu workers can maintain their residences and
family lives in the Bantu Area (Homelands) and move readily to their places of employment"
(Palmer, 1980, p 36). The second part of the Tomlinson Commission's recommendation, viz.
that the "European initiative" referred to above - and the mainspring of economic
development - had to be put to use inside the borders of the Homelands, was rejected. When,
later on, this recommendation was grudgingly acted upon industrialists were required to
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operate on an "agency" basis.
After the Good Hope conference of 1981 at which the co-operation of the private sector was
sought, a more ambitious programme was launched in which 8 development regions were
demarcated, for each of which a Regional Development Advisory Council was established
whose activities were co-ordinated by a National RDAC. Eleven deconcentration points -
areas within the economic sphere of influence of metropolises - and 49 industrial
development points were identified. Incentives to lure industrialists away from existing
industrial centres and towards these proposed growth points, purported compensation for
short-term financing problems during initial years, and for long term cost disadvantages
attaching to these decentralised areas, such as railway rebates, rental and interest, subsidies,
substitution of tax concessions by cash payments as percentage of total wage bill, housing and
electricity subsidies. Incentives favoured labour-intensive industries (which offered
opportunities for abuse). The Development Bank of Southern Africa was established (1983)
to furnish financial and technical aid, training, and identification, evaluation and financing of
projects in less developed regions, while a Small Business Development Corporation had to
cater specifically for small enterprises.
The political support for the maximisation of Homeland settlement - and representing a form
of affirmative action - was provided by granting the right to self-determination to the ten
regions in which 52 per cent of the total Black population was exclusively domiciled, and
giving them the option of raising their political status from that of self-governing to that of
political independence if they so wished. Four of them - Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda
and Ciskei - exercised the latter option. Within these regions (states) the people could escape
the disabilities imposed upon them in the Common Area (the rest of South Africa). The power
vested in them allowed for the appointment of persons of their own choice - also those in the
Common Area prepared to move - to all ranks in their civil service, which became a major
growth industry with employment opportunities they would have lacked in the common area
in competition with the better qualified non-Blacks. And they were not constrained by the
inability of their economies to generate the required revenue, generous grants from taxpayers
in the common area having provided the necessary funds. At the time of their re-affiliation
with the rest of South Africa (after the April 1994 elections), there were 528 000 persons
employed in their public sectors. (Inferred from data provided by the Central Statistical
Service, Statistical Release P0251; and Delport, 1994, p 13). It was disclosed that in some
instances there were more officers than privates, more upper than lower rankers. By 1997 the
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fiscus was paying R3570 million per annum to retrenched civil servants who could not be
accommodated in the unified public service of the New South Africa (Sapa, 1998, pI).
Township development, to accommodate these people and commuters had been undertaken
on an extensive scale (Smit & Booysen, 1981, P 26).
The above negative and positive policy measures affected urbanisation in two ways: (i) They
slowed down the overall rate of urbanisation until influx control was lifted in 1985. After
adjustment for the under-enumeration and the deviant definition applied in the 1980 and 1985
censuses, we find that the Black population's proportions in all urban areas amounted to 31,8
percent in 1960,33,0 per cent in 1970,33,1 per cent in 1980, 32,9 per cent in 1985 and 35,7
per cent in 1991. In 1985 the President's Council, noting a positive correlation, among the
countries of the world, between levels of income and urbanisation, suggested that within this
context South Africa was "under-urbanised" in 1980 to the extent of twelve per cent. (On the
other hand, when, during the 1960's, Latin American cities were receiving large numbers of
new immigrants they could not accommodate economically, as has been the case in South
African urban areas after the termination of influx control, the situation was characterised as
"over-urbanisation"; (ii) the urbanisation within the Homelands proceeded apace, the
percentage of their populations residing in urban areas rising from 0,7 per cent in 1960 to 14,9
per cent in 1991, as indicated in Table 5.4. Their economic bases, for the most part, were
provided by the public sector and the commuter system. When the restrictive policy was
abolished in 1986 there were still some 506 600 commuters participating in the system, while
the numbers exceeded 600 000 in some preceding years (Leistner, 1988, p 127).
The combination of the policies of decentralisation and regional development, large-scale
financial aid and town development produced very substantial changes in the economies of
the Homelands, as quantified in Table 5.3.
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TABLE 5.3
HOMELANDS' GDP AND ITS COMPONENTS
Annual Average Growth:
1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-89
0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0
TBVC 8,5 6,2 7,6 10,7
SOTs 9,9 6,0 5,9
Percentage of GDP
1970 1975 1980 1985 1989
0/0 0/0 % 0/0 0/0
Non-market production
TBVC 26,9 28,9 18,1 12,9 8,9
SOTs 33,3 31,5 17,3 10,9
Agriculture
TBVC 18,8 25,9 12,4 10,0 7,1
SOTs 22,8 24,8 15,4 8,9
Community Services
TBVC 21,3 24,2 23,2 30,8 30,3
SOTs 27,8 35,2 38,3 49,3
Sources: DBSA 1989, CSS 1976, 1978, 1979, 1992.
The ODP of the Homelands increased at a very much higher rate than that of South Africa as
a whole (and, ipso facto, than that of the rest of the country). During 1970-75 the former's rate
was just more than twice that of the latter. Over the years 1985-89, when the aggregate South
African ODP growth rate (at constant 1990 factor prices) was 2 per cent per annum, that of
the SOTs was 5,9 per cent and that of the TBVC 10,7 per cent, the latter in large part due to
the extraordinary expansion of the Bophuthatswana economy. In the result the contribution of
the Homelands to the gross geographical product of South Africa rose from 2,4 per cent in
1970 to 6,4 per cent in 1988, to lift the per capita product of these regions from R253 to R497
(Ligthelm, 1993, p 60), while the 1988 South African aggregate figure (at 1985 prices) was
practically at the same level as in 1970 (SA Reserve Bank, 1994). Since 1975 the subsistence
sector (non-market production) has been dwindling in relative size to register alO per cent
share in the Homelands' ODP of 1989, compared to 30 per cent in 1975. This trend coincides
with the decline of the importance of agriculture and, obversely, the burgeoning of urban
economic activity.
The large and growing share of Community and Social Services attests to the role of the
public sector in the Homelands financed by the taxpayers from across the borders. The
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Central Statistical Service reported that in 1976 44,2 per cent of the GDP generated in the
SOTs originated in the public sector, in which year the total government expenditure in these
areas registered an amount equal to 98,5 per cent of that GDP (CSS 1979, P viii). The
expenditure on education, amongst others, spurted from R502 000 in 1985 to Rl 520 000 in
1989 (CSS 1992, P 6).
Despite the rapid growth inside the Homelands the major portion of their national income was
still generated by economic activity outside the borders. For 1976 the CSS provided the
following data for the SGTs: (1979, p viii).
ODP of the SGTs
Income of commuters
Income of migrants
460,5 million = 25,0 per cent
632,6 = 34,3
751,2 = 40,7
Net national income 1 844,3 million = 100,0
For the year 1980 it was estimated that the contribution of GDP to gross national income was
as follows for a number of Homeland states: Transkei 43%, Bophuthatswana 41%,
Gazankulu 33%, Lebowa 30% and Kwazulu 21% (Zingel, 1985, p 4). Judging by the
difference in the rates of growth of the Homelands and the Common Area, the GDP of the
former would have gained in the provision of the sustenance of their population since 1980 or
1976 but might still have been no more than 38 per cent (compared to 25 per cent in 1976) of
their national income by 1989.
The above economic developments are reflected in the changes in the spatial distribution of
the South African (aggregate) population, as presented in Table 5.4.
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TABLE5.4
SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE SA POPULATION
Homelands Common Area Total
Total Population 1960 5237 000 12245 000 17482 000
1991 18312 0001) 19426 0001) 37738 000
Growth 1960-1991 4,1% p.a. 1,5% p.a. 2,5% p.a.
Urban population 1960 38 000 7885 000 7923 000
1991 2576 000 15 822 000 18398 000
As % of totae) 1960 0,7%. 64,4% 45,3%
1991 14,9% 77.2% 48,8%
Population of largest towns
and cities as % of urban population 1960 64,1%
1991 69,0%
1) Temporary migrants were included in the Homelands' population by domicile (i.e. on
a de jure basis) and excluded from that of the common area.
2) These percentages were based on the de facto populations of the two regions (almost
all of the migrants in the common area were working in the urban areas).
Sources: Bureau of Statistics, 1968; Sadie, 1977, 1991.
As is to be expected from the above recounting of events the (Black) population of the
Homelands grew, at 4,1 per cent per annum between 1960 and 1991, much faster than that of
the common area (1,5 per cent per annum) so that, on a domicilium or de jure basis, their
share in the residential accommodation of total numbers increased from 30 per cent in 1960 to
48,5 per cent in 1991. The major augmentation occurred during 1960 - 1970 when the
Homeland ranks were swollen by a net immigration of 1 310 000 to raise the percentage of
Blacks (only) domiciled there to 52,6 per cent after a period of net out-migration which
reduced the share from 57,6 per cent in 1911 to 44,8 per cent in 1960 (Sadie, 1977, pp 37/38) .
.The aggregate urban population of the common area expanded faster than its total population,
to reduce its rural component by 756 000 between 1960 and 1991. In this the natural increase
in urban areas was the major growth force, in a ratio, compared to immigration, of 7 to 1.
While the rate of urbanisation in the Homelands was very high, its 1960 base in absolute
numbers was very small, in regions then inhabited almost exclusively by agrarian/pastoral
communities. Accordingly, its contribution to the expansion of the urban component of the
total South African population helped to raise the percentage by no more than 3,5 percentage
points, from 45,3 per cent to 48,8 per cent.
Within the urban category there has been some polarisation as shown by the percentages
working and/or living in the largest towns and cities with 100 000 or more inhabitants in
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either 1960 or 1991, which rose from 64,1 per cent to 69,0 per cent. This trend, coupled with
the movement of people from smaller to larger towns, led to what has been described as the
"small town in decline". Van der Merwe found that between 1970 and 1980, 36,5 per cent (or
97) of towns with fewer than 2 000 inhabitants had experienced an absolute decline in their
numbers, while 16,9 per cent (29) with populations in the 2 000 - 5 000 category had a similar
experience. When the analysis is confined to Whites the percentage for the under 2 000
category was 41,5 per cent (or 176) (1982, p 16). Most of these towns are service centres or
market towns for the surrounding agrarian communities. They suffer the diseconomies of
(small) scale in a cumulatively downward progression: numbers of children too small to
justify a secondary or high school, and later on even a primary school, too few parishioners to
support a minister of religion, diminishing job opportunities, increasing numbers of empty
houses and declining purchasing power which compels the closing of businesses and reduces
the status of the towns as service centres, obliging the communities to travel greater distances
for some of their purchases. In the history of towns, just as nothing succeeds like success, so
nothing fails like failure.
As indicated above, the spatial distribution of the Black population group has, in part, been
engineered by means of both coercion and incentives. Focusing on the latter component of the
policy, the question arises whether economic resources would have been more productively
applied to have led to enhanced economic growth and, particularly, employment, if industries
were allowed to be located, with their personnel and without restrictions, in existing urban
concentrations.
According to the data published in the Annual Reports of the Decentralisation Board,
overseeing the Regional Industrial Development Programme (RIDP) at the time (as quoted in
Pretorius, et.al., 1986, p 247 and Tomlinson and Addleson, 1986, p 384) the number of
manufacturing jobs created during 1960-1981 in the decentralised areas amounted to 169 000.
The estimates for 1982 onwards, however, differ according to whether or not the figures of
the Board, based on applications for participation in the programme, are discounted for
applications that had evidently not been succeeded by actual investment. If discounted, the
total employment opportunities generated during 1982/3 - 1986/7 stood at 147 000, whereas
the applications indicated 190 000 more (Dickman, 1991, p 136; Panel of Experts, 1989, P
84).
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These figures do not necessarily represent the net contribution of the RIDP and its
predecessor to job creation, since some or all of it might have been no more than a
substitutional shift of location of industrial activity. It has been contended that a
counterbalancing 100 000 jobs could have been lost as a result of the restrictions imposed by
the Physical Planning Act 1967 (later the Environmental Planning Act 1977) on the
employment of Black labour, while another 220 000 might have been averted by the
rejections of applications for the proclamation of additional industrial land in the metropolises
(Dickman, 1991, p 137). If this were true the decentralisation programmes would not have
made a net contribution to job opportunities. It is, however, not possible to gauge the
verisimilitude of these estimates which cannot but have some conjectural content. Moreover,
the relevant question in this regard is whether potential jobs lost or averted, if such there were,
should be debited against the gross number of jobs generated, since the debits were, by
inference, based upon the assumption that the coercive measures were introduced to oblige
prospective investors to move to the designated decentralisation points. When it is
contemplated that the measures in question had been in force since, at least, 1945, and would
have been continued in any case, the incentive schemes assume the nature of a compensatory
policy or gesture. In which case the gross numbers of jobs are the appropriate magnitudes at
Issue.
Another relevant question surfaces: why should the proclamation applications not be
discounted in the same manner as the decentralisation applications? In five of the eight years
1982 to 1989 (or in four of the five years 1983 to 1987) the South African economy, operating
in a hostile environment, was characterised by stagnation as reflected by both GDP growth
(SA Reserve Bank, 1994, P B-21) and formal sector employment levels (National
Productivity Institute, 1997, pp 3, 9). Given these circumstances, the probability is that the
RIDP made a reasonable net contribution to the accommodation of labour that would
otherwise have remained unemployed. This outcome can be set off against the financial cost
(to tax payers) of the incentive packages offered, which amounted to R3186 million during
1982/3 to 1986/7 (Panel of Experts, 1989, p 84).
The RIDP has been adjudged economically inefficient. A panel of experts constituted by the
Development Bank of Southern Africa in 1987 reported in 1989 that the politically motivated
policy suffered from serious structural defects: the many development points prevented the
realisation of the economies of concentration; many of these points had been established
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without due regard to the comparative cost advantages of location; and the success achieved
at some of these places had been the result of the attractive financial incentives only and not
of the economic viability of the projects (South Africa, 1991, p 71). Some of the latter owed
their existence solely to the profit that could be realised from the difference between the cash
value of the incentives and the cost of labour (Driver and Platsky , 1992, P 9).
It emerges, thus, that the decentralisation programme entailed a submarginal application of
economic resources. Partly offsetting this inimical emanation had been the contribution to the
economic welfare of the Black labour force by way of (i) the increase in the number of wage-
earners and (ii) the employment of some of its members close, or closer, to their places of
residence than would otherwise have been realised, thus reducing the intensity of the
oscillating migrant labour system. (The welfare implications, in the Pareto paradigm, of the
transfer of resources from taxpayers are ignored). This latter reduction, however, had as its
counterpart an increased incidence of the commuter system, the participation in which
involved the disutility of long travelling time and the concomitant cost, which had to be
subsidised out of tax revenue as well. The (defunct) President's Council (1985) found that 20
per cent of commuters had to travel 4~ hours, and 80 per cent 2Y2 hours daily. However, one
survey undertaken in the former self-governing Kwandebele, showed that only one-quarter of
commuters were really prepared to move across the border to townships closer to their places
of work. And in many cases the travelling times between townships and factory within the
Common Area are not significantly shorter. Naude's price tag ofR2 000 million per annum to
account for subsidies, travel time and accidents, is difficult to evaluate (1984, p 34), but it can
be asseverated that the resource cost of production would have been lower had the
decentralised urbanisation in question taken place closer to the sources of employment,
instead of by way of dormitory towns. The percentage of urban dwellers would also have
been larger if those migrant workers who wanted their families or wives with them and who
would have opted for permanent settlement in the Common Area had been permitted to do so.
Nevertheless, the conclusion that South Africa is, in consequence, "under-urbanised" is not
justified in the context of the formal sector of the economy. The value of the factor p in the
W.p.s. formula signals the contrary. The proliferation of squatter camps and land invasions,
however, provide visual evidence of over-population rather than "over-urbanisation".
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5.3 OSCILLATINGMIGRATION
5.3.1 The traditional setting!
The migration of labour from the Homelands to the Common Area, be it of a permanent or
temporary character - the latter with or without oscillation or recurrence involved - accords
with economic logic. It constitutes a movement of economically active persons from a Third
World to a First World environment, from enterprise- poor to entrepreneurship-better
endowed areas, from an underdeveloped agrarian/pastoral economy to an industrial economy,
out of areas with high-fertility fast-growing populations towards regions of low-fertility,
slower growing populations. It is a function of human numbers, born into an economically
non-modernised society, seeking a livelihood in a modem society which is perceived to
provide it. The obstacles to economic development in the former are psychological, social and
religious (or, comprehensively cultural) in nature, encompassing an entire way of life, which
does not engender an adequate supply of enterprise, or entrepreneurship, which is at the heart
of economic progress. These ultimate determinants, to be treated of in the next Chapter,
involve magnitudes the economist is not qualified to handle with sufficient profundity, but
cannot therefore be avoided, if only to demonstrate how economic and demographic forces
can almost lose their separate identity in the cultural setting of the traditional society.
The pervasive feature of the traditional setting in the Homelands is, or has been - and certainly
when the system of migrant labour was initiated - the rustic peace and quiet of an
agrarian/pastoral subsistence society in small villages where time is not money, needs are
limited, the action-eliciting acquisitive instinct is underdeveloped, and where, therefore, self-
assertion, initiative, the ability to organise, to plan and put plans into action in order to change
one's own and society's course of life are not highly esteemed. The mental horizon of the
people is limited by their allegiance to the tribe, which is the social unit based on kinship, and
whose hereditary chief need not be endowed with progressive leadership attributes. Their anti-
rationalist ancestor worshipping religion demands conformism and the honouring of
traditional usages and beliefs, and discourages a spirit of enquiry. The instruction of children
in age old customs and mores conduces to the perpetuation of cultural conservatism. Without
any formal institutions to cater for the poor, the hungry, the sick and the disabled, the security
of the individual is guaranteed by the community consciousness engendered by the social
I What with changes in economic life within the former Homelands and in government policy impinging upon
the movement of people, with 1986 as watershed year, it is difficult to know which tense to use. The historic
present is sometimes the most convenient.
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Cattle are preferably not sold for commercial purposes or slaughtered for consumption as a
regular occurrence. Their number serves as measure of the status and dignity of their owner,
permitting him to sacrifice some for ceremonial and ritual purposes to engender good
relations with the living and the dead, to dispense hospitality and generosity, and to acquire
wives; cattle being the traditional media for the settlement oflobolo (assets handed over to the
parents of the bride as confirmation of the marriage contract). For all these purposes scrawny
animals (or scrub cattle) will serve as well as any other, as it is the quantity and not the quality
that is at issue. For practical purposes, unimproved land remains the sole co-operant factor of
production with labour.
Rather than ensuring the success of a crop of maize, sorghum vulgaris or vegetables by
applying modem agricultural methods and harnessing the forces of nature, appropriate rituals
may be performed, or taboos observed.
In this setting work for its own sake, and the modem sector phenomenon of unemployment
are alien concepts, and strenuous economic activity as a daily routine, at least for men, is not
an essential ingredient of the economic scene. Economic activity is purely functional: to
extract from the land, when it was still an abundant factor of production, the accepted or
conventional living standard; or, when the amount of land per capita had shrunk to a
rmrnmum, a modicum of produce. In consideration is the marginal disutility of effort
compared to the marginal utility of returns to effort which tends to make a non-event of the
opportunity cost of labour.
5.3.2 Economic decisions in the Homelands
In interpreting the evolution, over time, of economic processes in operation as population
numbers increase on a limited, almost constant, land area, it would be incongruous to invest,
overtly or by implication, the economic subjects with the sophistication normally attributed to
decision-makers in a developed economy. They are utility maximisers and not profit
maximisers, and rather than marginalities the more blunt or robust magnitudes like aggregates
and averages, which can more easily be perceived and appreciated, are the appropriate
considerations. These are portrayed in Figure 5.1.
[CH5(JLS)]
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
127
FIGURE 5.1
RETURNS TO LABOUR INPUT
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In Figure 5.1 the total product (TP) curve relates the total returns (R) to inputs of family
labour (L). Since depreciation allowances for capital are not contemplated and intermediate
inputs do not feature prominently, TP will approximate the total amount of income considered
available to the household. (It is most convenient to use a year as the reference period.) L is
not designated in terms of hours but of numbers of workers available per year which is the
equivalent of family size, or the total population when households are summed. Numbers of
hours are elastic and can be suited to the needs of the moment. The average revenue or
income per member of the family or RL divided by OL, is the desideratum. Acting on the
assumption that every new birth can mean an addition to his labour force and since the impact
of an additional child - whose survival is also uncertain - cannot be immediately obvious to
the head of the household, it is extremely unlikely that family size will maximise per capita
income, i.e. to be at the point of maximum average on TP (at RILl) even if the size were a
function of such rational economic calculus, which it is not.
As long as the average revenue (RIL!, R2L2 etc. divided by OL!, OL2 etc.) is not less than
accepted minimum consumption, or subsistence standards the decision-maker (the head) can
still rationally desire additions to his labour force inasmuch as these are substitutes for his
own manual labour input, eventually reducing his own contribution in the production process
to the exercise of command. Whatever RL/OL may then be, the number of hours actively
spent in this function over a period of a year may be so small that the rate of remuneration to
the head would be very high. As he is the potential supplier of labour to any adjacent modem
sector until, at least, his sons have reached the labour market age of entry, when they will still
be substitutes for himself in the family enterprise, the market wage rate would have to be very
high, and not just slightly higher than RL/OL, to entice him out of the subsistence sector.
Applying the Tomlinson Report's criteria to determine the amount of land required per family
for a sustainable level of reasonably comfortable living, or "subsistence affluence", we find
that the population size of the Homelands, with labour (L) as its proxy would have produced
average returns approximated by R2L2/0L2, representative of such comfortable living, up to
the 1920s. This comparative affluence must have been at the bottom of the perennial
complaints about labour scarcity in South Africa over many decades after the genesis of the
market sector and, particularly, industrial activity. To ameliorate the situation for potential
employers the authorities were persuaded to introduce hut and poll taxes. These forced the
Homeland inhabitants into the wage labour market because they had to be paid in cash, which
the subsistence farming did not produce, or because they reduced net income to below
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acceptable standards. Thus the supply of labour to the market sector was augmented.
In time the need for such measures to secure supplies of labour was obviated by the pressure
of population. As population numbers expanded to push the labour force component beyond
L2, the difference between RL/OL (at the micro level) and the total requirements of the family
at the conventional consumption level widened, forcing the breadwinner(s) to seek restitution
in the wage labour market, temporarily on an oscillatory basis, or permanently if and when TP
for the individual family has been reduced to a negligible or zero quantity.
According to Simkins (1983) the Homelands manifested, until around 1955, a condition of
"fragile productivity maintenance", the maintenance of output per capita having required a
substantial volume of net emigration (of a permanent nature, in our context). The latter, as
reflected in the figures of Table 5.4, did not materialise.
The connection between subsistence farming and wage labour performance finds expression
in the income produced in the former serving as an alternative to wages otherwise to be
earned in the labour market (given the wage level) and, accordingly, providing some
"bargaining power" and, thus, a cushion against the acceptance of wage offers, or periods of
employment, considered unacceptable. This is graphically portrayed in Figure 5.2(a) and (b)
in which the horizontal axis represents the hours of leisure (maximum Hm) which can be
sacrificed for hours of wage labour, and the vertical axis the amount of earnings. Il, h etc. are
the usual iso-utility (indifference) curves.
In Figure 5.2(a) the preferred position of the LF member is represented by the indifference
curve II, which provides a comer solution where no wage labour is supplied, EI representing
the required conventional living standard. When subsistence income has declined to E2, the
difference between EI and E2 will have to be earned by spending HmHI hours in wage
employment. When all subsistence income has disappeared HmH2 hours of paid work will be
required. The leftward shift of the iso-utility curves in the above developments would reflect a
loss of welfare. According to Figure 5.2(b) the "reservation wage" is DH3IHmH3 when
subsistence earnings satisfy the conventional living standard. When these earnings are
reduced to Es, following upon the redistribution of land among ever increasing numbers of
households, the reservation wage, born out of necessity, is reduced to FH3IHmH3. Their
dwindling to a zero amount leaves the LF member with no individual bargaining power
against unacceptable wage levels. In the urban areas the support provided by the extended
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FIGURE 5.2
SUBSISTENCE INCOME
(a) As alternative to wage labour (b) As temporary cushion
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FIGURE 5.3
THE SUPPLY OF WAGE LABOUR
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family system can serve the same purpose as subsistence income.
5.3.3 Remuneration policy
In the early days of the mining industry the management held that their remuneration policy
should be based on the supplementation principle. In 1889 the Witwatersrand Chamber of
Mines maintained that "the high wages now paid are themselves the principal reason for the
short supply" (Annual Report, plO), a point of view also expressed by a witness before the
South African Native Affairs Commission (Annual Report 1903 - 05) in 1903. In 1925 the
Native Recruiting Corporation, giving evidence to the Economic and Wage Commission,
declared that "any increase in the level of Native wages would be followed ... by ... a shorter
period [of work] than at present ... and that, consequently, Native labour available to industry
in the Union would be reduced" (Report 1926, p 58). Subsumed in this line of reasoning was
the premise that the workers' demand for income, with respect to effort price, was completely
inelastic. This is represented by the backward-sloping labour supply curves SI, and S2 in
Figure 5.3, in the shape of rectangular hyperbolas describing an elasticity equal to -1 (WH a
constant amount). While this interpretation evokes the criticism that the workers involved
could not have been so limited in their wants, this cannot be said of conduct which is
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associated with a supply schedule of labour such as S3, the negative elasticity value of which
is less than 1 but more than zero, which is still backward-sloping, and which fits the situation
depicted in the quotations above. Rather than limited wants it describes behaviour which
allows of an improvement in living standards by way of an increase in both wages and leisure.
At the macro level, over time, the horizontal movement of the supply curve away from the
origin means lower earnings per person as long as the demand curve for labour, DDI is
sloping uninterruptedly downwards, and the short-run demand curves, intersecting the supply
curves, do not move upwards to the extent of compensating, or more than compensating, for
the supply curves' sideways course as population increases. The originally dominant industry
in the lives of the migrant labourers was gold mining, and here the compensatory action at
issue did not occur, since it was pre-empted by shifting the supply curve to the right by way
of the recruitment of foreign labour, as described in the previous Chapter. Given the
geological variability in the gold content of the ore, the life of mines has been prolonged by
means of restraining labour costs, which allowed of the mining of lower grade ore. The scarce
factor of production, the natural resource, was economised upon and the abundant factor -
more correctly, rendered abundant by recruitment in neighbouring countries - used more
liberally. The mining industry, which during the first few decades of its existence constituted
either a monopsomy in the labour market or a wage leader, did not have to face meaningful
competition. Management would no doubt have been considered very eccentric if they did not
react rationally to the backward sloping supply curve of indigenous labour, and to labour
supplies available in neighbouring countries. Moreover, as the pressure of population on the
limited agricultural land in the Homelands grew in severity, increasing numbers were left with
no option but to offer their services in the labour market without the cushion of an income, or
a meaningful income, from the land. Hence the remarkable performance of the real wage level
which, according to one author, declined between 1911 and 1931 and remained constant
thereafter until 1969 (Nattrass, 1981, p 139). In the view of the radical historians of the 1970's
this signified that the subsistence economy, by assuming a portion of the burden of
maintenance and reproductive costs of migrants and their families, was virtually subsidising
the urban economy by way of low wages and low-cost residential accommodation of single
men, instead of entire families (Nattrass & Nattrass, 1990, p 518).
It needs to be added that when the price ceiling of gold lifted as a result of the functioning of
the international free market, this was very soon reflected in the wages of Black mineworkers
which more than doubled between the beginning of 1973 and the end of 1974. This also
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improved the position of the mmmg industry to compete for indigenous labour with
Manufacturing which, as an import substitution industry protected by import control, did not
suffer the labour cost concerns of Mining.
5.3.4 The origins of oscillation
From the discussion above it emerges that the origins of the oscillatory migration of workers,
the migrant labour system that is, can be traced back to the following circumstances: the
inelasticity of the demand for income; the attachment of the Homeland Blacks to their land
which provided some security in the post-retirement stage of life for those who had or still
have it; and the sizeable landholding per capita when the number of inhabitants were still
small and, accordingly, rendered the participation in the wage labour market an activity of a
supplemental nature. With influx control until 1985 so obviously inhibitory of permanent
migration there has always been the temptation of presenting, uncritically, oscillating
migration as uniquely related to it. In fact, by the time this control was instituted the system
had already been well established, having been in operation for longer than half-a-century. By
1961 the gold mining industry was still arguing in its favour, contending that "it enables him
to earn the money he needs and at the same time allows him to retain his roots in the tribal
territories ..... To introduce the tribal Native suddenly to a complex industrialised civilisation
and at the same time to deny him the benefits of the traditional laws and social customs of his
tribe would be to do him a serious disservice". (Gemmill, 1961, pi). The preference for
temporary workers was at times supported by the argument that gold mining was a wasting
industry whose life was limited and would leave a stabilised labour force stranded when the
supply of exploitable ore was exhausted.
A sociologist found that the division of labour among the Mozambican Thonga tribe
"followed closely the general pattern common to most of the Southern Bantu. Most of the
agricultural tasks were regarded as ideally women's work. In the agricultural sphere only the
felling and burning of heavy growth was designated as a proper male activity. This division of
labour between the sexes provided the European economy with the basic ingredients for a
system of migratory labour" (Harris, 1959, p 2). Around the same time an industrial
psychologist maintained that "participation in tribal life ... [is] still the principle motivation of
the tribal labourer. When he must work he adopts the migratory work pattern by preference,
as causing the least disturbance of his traditional way of life. For this type of labourer the loss
of leisure is a major deterrent against continuous employment in White areas. Employment on
the mines is attractive to him because the work periods are limited and because all the
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problems in obtaining a job, getting to it, and finding accommodation, are taken care of ... He
lives in a protected, paternalistic society ... life is not so different from that led in the tribes"
(Biesheuvel quoted in Gemmill, 1961, p 3). Economically, it can be interpreted as a desire for
a consumption mix which contains elements of both the traditional and the modem. The
greater freedom of the migrant to spend for own gratification, when not accompanied by his
family, seems to have an attraction for him. One author's finding that the propensity to remit
(to his family at home) is a diminishing function of time, is relevant in this regard. (Penny
1986, p 300). He would be subject to the danger of forfeiture if he took his wife with him to
his place of work leaving the land (to which he is entitled as a member of a tribe) uncultivated
(Mining Survey, 1986, p 43). Clinging to the land can be interpreted as risk aversion. "If a
man were to withdraw permanently from the countryside", observed Elkan (1959, p 195) "he
would be giving up both a part of his income and also a form of insurance against
unemployment or ill-health". Again, the permanent departure of an unmarried woman would
mean the loss of lobolo (bride price) to the parents, for the payment of which, amongst others,
unmarried men join the migrant labour system, which, at the same time, is an initiation into
manhood (Schapera, 1947, p 16). The tribute payable to chieftains and headmen also meant
that they have a vested interest in the return of the migrant and would, therefore, encourage it.
Furthermore, within the Homelands where no influx control existed, men "of two worlds" -
the rural and the urban, with a family in both - are also encountered.
The feelings about the appropriateness of life in the cities for their children, as entertained by
parents, working and/or living in urban areas outside the Homelands, are conspicuously
manifested in the large numbers of pupils sent to be educated in the latter areas. The estimates
for 1985, coinciding with the census of that year, are detailed in Table 5.5.
TABLE 5.5
CHILDREN OF COMMON AREA RESIDENTS COMMITTED TO THE CARE OF
RELATIVES IN THE HOMELANDS
Age SGT TBVC Common Area
Male Female Male Female Male Female
5- 9 52400 53400 42600 43400 -95000 -96800
10-14 78000 79600 62300 63500 -140300 -143 100
15-19 52300 53700 41 800 42500 -94 100 -96200
TOTAL 182700 186700 146700 149400 -329400 -336 100
Source: Sadie, 1991, plO.
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They reveal that in that year 665 500 children had not been living with their parents in the
Common Area.
The views on the migrant labour system of (i) workers participating in the system; (ii)
former participants and (iii) the wives of migrant workers, were canvassed by the Human
Sciences Research Council in 1977. The Council sounded a caveat that it was not clear
whether the migrant believed in the system as an alternative to other possible systems of
labour performance or as the only arrangement whereby he could participate in the wage
labour market (S-N-I05, p 33). The results are summarised in Table 5.6.
TABLE 5.6
VIEWS ON THE MIGRANT LABOUR SYSTEM
POSITIVE RESPONSES PER CENT
WORKERS PARTICIPATING
System to be retained
Will continue to participate
Will recommend it to others
%
81
81
71
EX-MIGRANT WORKERS
System to be retained 76
Will recommend it to young men 73
A good thing to be away from home for a period 61
WIVES OF MIGRANT WORKERS
~~m~~~~~d ~
Wives ought to accompany their husbands 10
Sources: P A Erasmus, 1977(a) Table 21; 1977(b) Tables 4,5,6; 1979 Tables 1,8.
It is obvious that all three categories of respondents expressed themselves in favour of the
system by large majorities. In the survey among ex-migrants 75 per cent of married men and
65 per cent of non-married men stated that they would advise young men to work in the
Common Area. If we discount the significance of these results in view of the HSRC caveat,
the responses to two questions: "a good thing to be away from home for a period" 61 per
cent, and "wives ought to accompany their husbands" 10percent, do not reflect an aversion to
the system on the part of a majority of those ostensibly harmed by it. And if the psychic cost
of migration can be interpreted as "the agony of departure from family and friends", as one
writer would have it (Schwartz, 1973, pilSS), the temporariness of the absence of the
migrant worker must be a redeeming feature.
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Giliomee and Schlemmer (1985), who conducted a survey among migrants to determine their
preferences about having families within easy reach, reported the following results:
Already have families with them
Desire to have wife nearby
Non-acquiescent
grQ!!I!
%
33
29
62
Acquiescent
group
%
1
38
39
To determine the outcome for the universe we can allot a weight of 3 to the acquiescent group
(at a minimum) compared to 1 for the other - in the light of the information of Table 5.6 - to
arrive at 45 per cent for the aggregate who would have wanted, or already had, their wives
and/or families with them when influx control was lifted as from 1986. The implication was
that a maximum of 623 000 migrants or, together with their families, 3 300 000 persons,
could have been induced by the new dispensation, to become permanent urban dwellers in the
Common Area. The urban data for 1985 and 1991 would indicate that the volume of
migration as computed above had not quite been realised. Simkins' (1983) estimate of the
number that would be involved was between 1,5 and 3 million.
In 1986 Penny would have it that there was little evidence of a desire "on the part of migrants
to relocate permanently within commuting distance of their employment" (1986, p 292). In
1982 Ehlers had found that among commuters from the southern region of Kwandebele no
more than 22 to 26 per cent were prepared to move to a township house close to their places
of work (1982, p 44).
Accordingly, the abolition of influx control did not end the migrant labour system.
5.3.5 Migrant labour productivity
Manufacturing industry, which has always been in favour of settled labour and campaigned
for the demise of the oscillatory system, stressed the productivity-deficient nature of migrant
labour. At the beginning of the 1950s, before the contract system was vigorously enforced -
work contracts attested in the Homelands required for leaving home and imposing his return
when the contract period (usually a year) had elapsed - the Tomlinson Commission calculated
that during his working life, starting at age 18, the average migrant would have divided his
time between wage-earning and non-earning periods as follows (1955, p 96):
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Mine worker
Months
Worker in secondary
and tertiary sectors
% Months %
In wage earning
employment
Spent at home
Resting elsewhere
15,0
8,0
5,5
52,8
28,0
19.2
100,0
23,5
6,2
8,3
61,9
16,3
21,8
100,0
Ending his participation in the system at age 60 he would have filled 8 posts in 5 different
occupations, each new spell of wage labour representing the start of a new career, as it were.
Over time the pressure of population on the land produced freely committed migrants whose
periods of non-wage activity or rest shortened, reducing somewhat the loss of competency
occasioned by his not exercising his trade. The impermanence obliged by the need to return
home at the end of the contract period, however, remained an obstacle, it would seem, to a
commitment to the acquisition of a skill in one occupation and to one employer or industry,
which could have allowed him upward movement in the skill hierarchy of a firm. It is
possible that the system conditioned the migrant to a routine which inhibited the
contemplation of acting like a non-migrant, settled, or permanently urbanised, worker, viz.
finding a job that shows promise, acquiring experience and skill during the contract period of
a year or longer, taking, like any other employee, a holiday to which ordinary workers are
entitled to, during which he pays a visit to his area and origin, returning to the same job and
employer with a new contract, to accumulate, by repetition, the know-how and efficiency
required for production.
Of course, the employers, on their part, might equally have been conditioned to regarding the
migrant as a person in whom investment was not merited. Accordingly his potential remained
underdeveloped. The gold mining industry's spokesman stated that "with a labour force of
migrants involving a turnover of approximately 100 per cent per annum and without
knowledge of when a particular labourer will return, if at all, to mining employment, there has
been little incentive to develop such skills" (Gemmill, 1961, p 2). At one or other stage it must
have been realised that there was indeed a way of diminishing, if not overcoming, the
deleterious effect on productivity inhering in the obligation to return home at the end of the
contract period. During the 1960s the Kimberley diamond mines introduced the call-in card
system. On going home workers were handed a card which would be mailed when they
wanted to return, after which they were recalled when management could incorporate them
back into their labour force. This still left unresolved the problems of uncertainty about the
duration of the rest periods between spells of work and, accordingly, arranging their return to
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the jobs they held prior to their departure on holiday (Lipton, 1980, p 130). In the late 1970s
the Gold Mining industry improved on this scheme by granting workers paid leave of 12 to 28
days a year after a spell of 12 months of employment, keeping their jobs open and paying
them bonuses for returning on time, in order to engender a commitment to a mining career.
Records were kept of each employee's length of service, skills, remuneration and the mining
company he has been associated with; data required to operate the labour force stabilisation
project. The Chamber of Mines reported that their scheme met with success.
With such schemes in operation the productivity-inhibiting attribute of migrant labour
becomes a function of the attitude of the employee. He could, conceivably, regard his freedom
to decide on the duration of the period of rest, or economic inaction, between rounds of
migrant labour performance, as of prime importance.
It can be noted that Black workers used to be considered superior to Coloured persons in the
performance of manual labour in the Western Cape which had been declared a Coloured
Preference Area as part of the influx-control policy. It was commonly attributed to their fear
of being endorsed out if their performance was below par, or if they changed their jobs too
often.
In an economy characterised by high unemployment the migrant labour system is not without
merit: it represents a system of work sharing which provides jobs to more persons than would
be true of stabilised (permanent immigrant) labour. For example, keeping 1 000 jobs
constantly filled by migrants working spells of 12 months, would require a pool of 2 000 if
the resting period entails a regular departure rate of one quarter of the LF each 3 months.
Variability in the duration of the periods of time will increase the number of workers who will
share in the wage employment. Lipton quotes the example of a mine in Namibia employing
5250 workers who were drawn from a circulating pool of some 12500 (1980, p 150), each of
whom could therefore earn some income some time.
5.3.6 The effects on Homeland agriculture
There appears to be a temptation, not only to relate the performance of Homeland agriculture
to the migrant labour system, which is logical, but to blame it as a unique determinant. There
is, for example the uncompromising pronouncement by one author that the inner periphery
(the developed sector) "has been directly responsible for the underdevelopment of the outer
periphery, the Black Homelands, primarily by undermining their productive capacity and their
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self-sufficiency by draining them of their able-bodied labour through the encouragement of
the migrant labour system" (Bundy, 1979, quoted in Fair 1982, p 75). From Lesotho, where
the dependence of the economy on the South African mines is a byword, we have this non-
dogmatic observation: "The uni-dimensionallinkage between migration, labour shortage, low
agricultural productivity and low incomes in rural Lesotho is somewhat tenuous" (Matlosa,
1992, p 92).
There should indeed be some causal connection between migrancy and under-achieving
agriculture: that which ensued from the enforced part of the oscillatory process (less than
half), which inhibited the permanent emigration of some families and caused a subdivision of
a limited amount of agricultural land into sub-economic units among ever-increasing numbers
of families. But even in this case, what with the high incidence of voluntary migrancy, -the
extent of the impact, if any, is uncertain.
When we deflate the data on agricultural production reflected in Table 5.3 with the price
indices derived from the national income statistics for the country as a whole (SARB, 1994) -
in the absence of better information - we arrive at the following average annual rates of
growth for the period 1970/71 - 1989:
SGTs
Market production
Non-Market production
Aggregate
%p.a.
10,6
1,3
3,5
TBVC
Market production
Non-Market production
Aggregate
12,4
1,9
4,6
The rates of increase in agricultural production for the Homelands as a whole was slightly
better than that of South Africa as an entirety (3,5 per cent per annum). This was, however,
very much the result of a very rapid expansion in commercial production, which started off
from a very small base and remained the lesser component. The non-market, or subsistence,
component continued at a leisurely tempo. But more important than the growth rate of
Homeland agriculture has been its very meagre contribution to the aggregate South African
production, viz. 9,4 per cent in 1970/71 and 8,7 per cent in 1989. This can be compared to the
19,8 per cent potential of the Homelands as constituted in 1954, when this area comprised
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13,8 per cent of agricultural land, and which would have risen to 23,2 per cent after a 22 per
cent pledged addition to their surface area. The Tomlinson Commission estimated that 100
hectare in the Homelands had the same potential, on average, as 147 hectare in the rest of the
country (p 117). This was a conservative estimate. The Transkei, for example, with one
quarter of South Africa's water resources and higher than average soil fertility, should produce
enough food to become a net exporter but in fact meets only 30 per cent of its requirements,
while realising no more than 10per cent of its potential (The Africa Institute of SA, 1987, P
8). This was not for lack of effort on the part of central government to promote the
productivity of subsistence agriculture, the usual complaint about which, however, was that
they were implemented for instead of with the people. The Annual Reports of the (now
defunct) Department of Co-operation and Development are replete with examples of projects
undertaken by the department to induce advancement of this sector: the reclamation and
conservation of millions of hectares of land, more than 100 000 kilometres of fences put up
for grazing camps and farm layouts, thousands of boreholes sunk and dams built, the settling
of farmers on economic units, improvements in stock-breeding, the introduction of
fishbreeding and non-traditional crops, particularly industrial fibres (such as sisal) and sugar
cane. The results appear to be shown up preponderantly in the growth of market production of
these areas.
Theoretically, the remittances of migrant workers to their places of origin should have a
beneficial effect on the growth of agriculture in the latter; and at least one writer believes that
the "pervasive pessimistic view of the developmental role of remittances reflects misguided
theoretical thinking" (Stahl, 1986, P 915). But scholars seem to be "divided in their
judgements concerning the effect of the use of remittances in the development process"
(Appleyard, 1989, p 498). It would seem that in practice, the world over, the function of
remittances is to maintain, or perhaps raise, the consumption level of families or households
only, and not to contribute to growth by way of financing capital formation. The following
judgement of the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations is
revealing: "The analysis of long term migration dynamics shows that it is not likely that
migration transmits economic growth from urban to rural areas; that it has no appreciable
effect on the strategic variables of development; and that it may even become a drain on the
long-run economic growth in the sending areas" (United Nations, 1984, p 199). Griffith
(1986, p 392) would concur while Keely (1989, p 500) concedes that the converse of the
pessimistic view "should not be overstated".
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A survey among 1 200 South African miners in 1979 found that remittances accounted for
88,4 per cent of the average household annual income. However, there was a fairly extensive
leakage, from the point of view of the Homelands, in that 43 per cent of the earnings of the
migrant was spent in the area of the workplace, and did not therefore contribute to the GNP
available within the Homelands (Penny, 1986, pp 299-300). The leakage increases as the
migrant grows older, and in some regions of the country the leakage was found to be still
larger than the above 43 per cent. The remittances served as support for levels of
consumption, the composition of which was being changed by the availability of cash which
was channelled to the "imports" sold in shops, and away from traditional sources of food. In
those cases where portions of migrants' earnings were "invested" from their individual point
of view, it did not constitute capital formation, but an accumulation of existing assets in the
form of land and cattle and, accordingly, a redistribution of wealth among members of the
community.
A pertinent question arises: confining the argument to voluntary oscillation, is the system an
object of blame, responsible for underdeveloped agriculture, or is it an object for the bestowal
of gratitude for sustenance which would otherwise have been lacking? The weight of
evidence supports the latter view.
The argument most often used against the system was that it drained the Homelands of able-
bodied men who were, in consequence, not available to attend to the needs of agriculture.
Leaving aside the matter of the direction of causation, the relevant statistics in Table 5.7 do
not support the contention.
TABLE 5.7
1985MIGRANT LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES (MLFP)
SGTS TBVC
MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE
15-19 ,159 ,178
20-24 ,359 ,362
25-29 ,456 ,065 ,440 ,066
30-34 ,454 ,094 ,453 ,091
35-39 ,437 ,121 ,435 ,072
40-44 ,420 ,134 ,414 ,062
45-49 ,394 ,140 ,349 ,056
50-54 ,386 ,137 ,331 ,057
55-59 ,371 ,285
60-64 ,352 ,254
65-69 ,217 ,139
70-74 ,043 ,023
Gross years of MLFP 20,2 3,5 18,3 2,0
Source: Sadie, 1991, pll.
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At the height of migrancy, in 1985, fewer than one-half of the potential manpower in every
age group were engaged in migrant labour performance. The gross years of MLFP of 20, 2
years for the SGTs signify that the average male spent 36,7 per cent of his potential working-
life (55 years between age 15 and 70) in MLFP. The proportions were lower still for the
TBVC countries, and very much lower in the case of females. Table 5.8 provides us with an
historic overview of the number of absentees involved in the system on the dates of the
vanous censuses.
TABLE 5.8
Date Number of migrants % of males' working life
spent in migrancy
Male Female
1911
1936
1946
1951
1960
1970
1985
1991
193 000
444 000
478 000
528 000
507 000
757 000
1 342 000
1 261 300
194 000
209600
0/0
28,0
34,0
33,3
35,6
31,1
33,8
35,9
24,0
Source: Sadie, 1977, P 16 and 1991, pp Il, 14.
For half a century male inhabitants of the Homelands had been spending approximately one-
third of their potential working lives in oscillatory labour performance. We see a reflection of
the abolition of influx control in the lowering of the proportion between 1985 and 1991. It is
not possible to determine, for a recent date, how much of the two-thirds of potential working
life had been spent outside the Homelands or as commuter workers, but it is highly unlikely to
be extensive; and MLFP cannot be blamed for it. Given that some mutual aid is being
dispensed in the Homelands, there should have been sufficient male manpower at any point of
time to perform the duties not normally handled by women and children. Of course, it is
possible that male migrants may consider themselves entitled to a complete rest in between
spells of migrant labour, which would exclude attention to agricultural chores.
Basically it reflects a disregard for subsistence agriculture which finds itself in a no contest
situation vis-a-vis MLFP. When households have become used to its contributing no more
than 11,6 per cent of their income, as indicated above, it is reduced to the status of a not very
significant supplementary source of food which cannot lay claim to some dedication on the
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part of the landholder. In a Ciskei village it was found that fewer than one-half of allotments
were cultivated in 1980/81, and when an irrigation scheme was provided as part of a
betterment project, it took several years for all the available sites to be taken up. (De Wet,
1982, p 22). The opportunity costs of entering into such an improved venture - as represented
by the potential earnings in MLFP - were too high. One author maintained that the Homeland
inhabitant "was not economically irrational when he rejected a government plan to increase
agricultural production. He selected his more profitable opportunity when he chose to migrate
temporarily, leaving his wife and family to cultivate his land, instead of accepting the
government's offer to help him invest his time and wealth in full-time farming" (Rutman,
1974, p 29).
Perhaps the crucial judgement was delivered by the Tomlinson Commission, in their seminal
work on the development of the Homelands, which found that "the male Bantu has never been
an arable or livestock farmer in the Western meaning of the word, and because of the
historical development of this country, he has never been obliged to become a farmer. He
apparently prefers to be an employee of the European rather than a real farmer and tiller of the
soil. .... If the name 'farmer' can be applied to the Bantu, the Bantu women alone can lay
claim to it" (1955, P 73). This has been disputed by, among others, Bundy (1979) who drew
the attention to the peasants who responded more effectively to market opportunities at the
beginning of the century than White pastoralist-cultivators, and that the Land Act of 1913 was
an attempt to limit the competition, and release labour for the mines. This latter attribution
was somewhat selective since tribal chiefs, fearing the loss of their authority emanating from
the cash income of their subjects, discouraged the initiative displayed by some of them. The
progress in market production, like that of more recent years, as reflected above by the 1970 -
1989 data, was not a societal phenomenon but the result of individual and government
initiative, the core of peasantry remaining largely unchanged. At the beginning of the century
the amount of arable land per capita had been three-and-a-half times that prevailing in 1970
and eight times that of 1991. Agriculturally viable landholdings were still possible.
In the last resort, from the point of view of efficient agriculture, the communal land tenure
system is basically flawed. The one-man-one-lot principle involved ensures that the larger the
population the smaller the allotments would be, rendering it eventually impossible for the
average landholder to make a full-time living off his farming activities. The land is not a
negotiable asset which can be used for securing credit. It cannot be sold to individuals who
might want to procure viable farming units. By inference, it assumes that every breadwinner
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has the talent and desire for farming, a non-selectivity which effectively pre-empted the
development of a healthy and progressive agricultural sector. Since land belongs to everybody
it belongs to nobody: conservation is a futile exercise for individual pastoralists. Soil
degradation ensues. Agriculture is rendered a way of life instead of a way of making a living.
And the migrant labour system becomes institutionalised as part of life's routine.
Enlightening in this regard is the finding of Senghaas (amongst others): "A review of
European and extra-European development history during the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries shows a clear correlation between agricultural modernisation and successful
industrialisation, or else between the lack of agricultural modernisation and the failure of
industrialisation" ... rendering "persistent subsistence agriculture and industrialisation .,.
mutually exclusive" (1985, p 47). In the densely populated agrarian countries agricultural
modernisation was initiated by moves towards farming units of economically sensible size,
guaranteed access to land, legal security of ownership and tenure and freedom of disposition
(p 54).
Arising from their own analyses the Tomlinson Commission (1955, Chapter 3(a))
recommended that the one-man-one-lot system be abolished and replaced, wherever
practicable, by a system of freehold title to land purchased by individuals at an economic
valuation. As it happened, traditionalism and inertia triumphed while the central government
preferred not to disturb the social fabric woven around this development-inhibiting communal
system. More recently, the latter stance appears to have gained some support. One researcher,
for example, contending that there have been numerous instances of failed attempts at
individual tenure in Africa, and that wage work was likely to remain the economic base of the
great majority of rural Black Society in South Africa, concluded that full-time agriculture was
not a feasible development strategy for the latter (Cross, 1990, pp 549, 551). He argued that
"what people want from the land system is both sane and sensible '" the kind of basic
amenities that urban communities now have, without having to forgo their land-based
community and the social links that make up their survival networks" (p 551). Whether the
realisation of these wishes - which appear to require a programme of action having the
makings of a replication, or more costly variation, of the defunct decentralisation policy, or
simply an exorbitant transfer of economic resources - appertains to the realm of economic
sensibility and feasibility, from the fiscal or private enterprise point of view, is a moot
question.
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CHAPTER 6
THE ENTREPRENEUR
6.1 IDENTIFYING THE ENTREPRENEUR
In a study of economic growth and development causality can be analysed at two levels: the
proximate and the ultimate. At the former level economic phenomena are related to economic
and demographic determinants; at the latter the explanatory variables assume the nature of
social, religious, psychological and political forces. The entrepreneur occupies the centre of
the stage. When the ultimate forces have included an adequate or reasonable supply of them,
their activity permits of economic phenomena being analysed at the proximate level. The
supply of enterprise is assumed as given.
In the most general terms the entrepreneur is the executive who initiates economic activity
which adds to the GOP of his community and country. As the prime mover in economic
growth and development and as co-ordinator of the factors of production, he perceives
economic opportunities, evaluates them and invests in ventures in accordance with his
assessment. Abstracting from the State as entrepreneur - which is the rule in the command
economy, but can also occur in predominantly private enterprise systems - quite an array of
entrepreneurial types can be identified, whatever reservations one may have about the quality
status of some of them. At the lower end we have the most modest such as the peasant farmer
who is allocated a piece of land because he is a member of a tribal community, and not
because he is a farmer, and the self-employed street vendors, hawkers, petty traders,
bootblacks, self-appointed parking attendants, backyard operators, etc. in the informal sector,
most of them in occupations-of-last-resort. They do not impart dynamism to the economy. At
the upper end of the scale there are the captains-of-industry portrayed by Schumpeter (1961, P
93) as somewhat heroic characters motivated by "the dream and the will to found a private
kingdom ... the will to conquer; the impulse to fight, to prove oneself superior to others, to
succeed for the sake, not of the fruits of success, but of success itself ... and the joy of
creating, of getting things done or simply exercising one's energy and ingenuity ... our type
seeks out difficulties, changes in order to change, delights in ventures ... motives distinctly
hedonist.. .." Of these outstanding characters there are relatively few in South Africa, as in
most other societies. In between these extremes we have the large majority of entrepreneurs of
greater and lesser stature who are either self-employed in the formal sector of the economy or
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are employees responsible for the ultimate decisions and initiatives of enterprises. In
corporate business most of them have attained that status by graduating upwards in the
occupational hierarchy. These persons (modal entrepreneurs) operate at the executive level
and are responsible for generating the bulk of the GDP. In agriculture, practising commercial
farmers or their managers qualify for the description, though their attributes may differ
somewhat from those obtaining in the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy. All of
them are our dramatis personae in the process of economic growth and development.
The ensuing question, for our purposes, is then: why are some communities not as well
endowed as others with this factor of production?
In broad terms we can distinguish three categories of promotive, alternatively impedimental,
factors involved in the genesis of these strategic characters: (i) Politico-historical factors; (ii)
Cultural attributes; (iii) Some specific demographic forces. In as much as the exploration
below is conducted primarily by way of juxtaposing populations of African and European
extraction (without thereby detracting from the contribution of people of Indian origin in
South Africa) the contextualisation is handled accordingly; which entails the acceptance,
among others, of the experience of, and evidence from Africa as pertinent. In this connection
the terms "Black" and "African" can be used interchangeably when dealing with the South
African situation.
6.2 POLITICO-HISTORICAL FACTORS
6.2.1 Africa
One can conceive of historic events in the life of a community acting as antecedents to
economic growth and development. The time elapsing between the occurrence of inchoate
preconditions (whatever they may be or presumed to be) for economic modernisation and the
emergence of adequate or reasonable supplies of entrepreneurship, can be labelled a period of
gestation. It is a time-involving nurturing foundation. Contrariwise, a people may have a
history of events imposed upon them, which created an environment inhibitory of progress, in
which case the termination of the conditions in question could be considered an impulse
which could, potentially, usher in a gestation process. ''It is easy to forget" wrote Rostov
(1960, pp 258/9) "that before the Industrial Revolution came to Western Europe and the
United States it was preceded by several centuries of commercial and ... industrial
development, which had formed a class of private entrepreneurs prepared morally,
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intellectually and technically, to exploit the potentialities of the innovations that came
forward". And as Frankel (1953, p 69) observed: "What is involved is neither just another
ready-to-hand goal of action, nor the transfer of a new set of techniques, but the necessarily
slow growth of new aptitudes and new ways of doing, living and thinking".
The history of Africa has provided evidence to the exponents of the World-Systems
Perspective (WSP) on Social and Economic Development, in which the dependencia theory
can be included, for their contention that the underdevelopment of the Less Developed
Countries (LDCs) should be sought in external forces subsumed, in their view, under the
capitalist system: colonialism, racism, war, genocide and the like, all of them both effect and
cause of the disparaged system (cf. Chambua, 1994, p 40). The era of colonialism was
preceded by centuries of trans-Atlantic and across-the-Indian Ocean (Arab) slave trade. On
the African side tribal rulers waged internecine wars against one another to provide the
supplies of human beings involved in the trade. Apart from draining the continent of a
significant portion of its population and labour force - one estimate a figure to it of 20 million
(Soyinka, 1994, p 206) - it entailed a "brutalisation and demoralisation of human relations
and the implicit breakdown of fair transaction rules, and social disintegration" (Himmel strand,
1994, p 22). Obviously, this was not an environment in which development could take root.
Neither did the subsequent colonial system provide the required beneficent milieu. It was,
primarily, not calculated to benefit the colonies, which, according to the WSP exponents, in
particular, were regarded as sources of cheap raw materials, as markets for the industrial
products of the colonial powers, and as targets for profitable investments. "Indigenous
entrepreneurship", writes Ikiara (1994, pp 122/3) "was stifled to give room to the colonial
settler communities and other non-indigenous commercial and manufacturing concerns" and
accordingly, "entrepreneurship and mercantile endeavours were virtually monopolised by the
colonialists" (Himmelstrand, 1994, p 29), so that the colonised Africans, who could not
accumulate wealth through entrepreneurial activities, "became stepchildren to the foreign
innovations" (Nyang, 1994, p 433).
The colonial powers have also been accused of not having developed appropriate institutional
structures; and when political independence was granted to the colonies they had not been
adequately prepared by the departing Europeans to manage, administratively and politically, a
post-independent modem state (Mbaku, 1998, p 7). A proper foundation for indigenous
economic development would not have been laid.
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However, colonialism also allowed Africans contact with, at least, the trappings of economic
modernity, if not the soul of economic development. And the mechanics of this development
were not a closely guarded secret. That this did not, apparently - judging by decades of
stagnation - rebound to their advantage, Omotoso would attribute to the failure of African
elites and leadership to communicate the contents of Western culture and technology to their
people in their own indigenous languages (1994, pp 11617). The Japanese, the Newly
Industrialising Communities (NICs) of the Pacific Rim and the Arabs of Egypt are cited as
examples of peoples "who have encountered Western culture and benefited from it" by
deliberately rendering "Western texts into their own languages" while "there is no example ...
of Western culture and technology being absorbed through an indigenous language in any
African country South of the Sahara - apart from among the Afrikaners in South Africa" (p
117). Another African, Prah, concurs: "... mother tongue education" he declares, "is the
missing link in our development efforts on the African continent. It is the enabling factor in
the search for a workable paradigm for African development ... Written cultures have a more
precise collective memory [than the oral tradition] ... the culture of the spoken word is limited
and places a low ceiling on cultural development" (1995, pp ii, 12).
Having experienced the oppressive and exploitative attributes of capitalism, the post-indepen-
dence leaders harboured feelings of aversion to it and many opted for systems and styles of
government of a socialist nature. These, ostensibly, had to reflect or symbolise "Africanness"
or "the economy of affection", and assumed such forms as the Consciencism of Nkhrurnah,
Nyerere's Ujaama, Senghor's African Socialism and Kaunda's African humanism (Omotoso,
1994, pp 123125; Nyang, 1994, pp 429/430; Hyden, 1986, pp 57-63). But "irrespective of the
particular paradigm or school of thought that has informed the particular policies, strategies
pursued by a specific sub-Saharan LDC, the end result has been the same, i.e. the failure of
liquidate underdevelopment ... " (Chambua, 1994, p 37).
Harsh judgements have been passed on the new political elites of many African countries who
had scant regard for democracy. They were indicted of seeking wealth in "the political
systems ... into cleptocracies" (Himmel strand, 1994, p 29); and they defended "a costly and
corrupt lifestyle which contributed to stifling the productive and distributive investments
needed for economic and social development" (p 14). They tended "to view the mass of
people as ignorant, primitive, lazy, superstitious, resistant to change and backward. Thus, for
development to take place, it was necessary to defeat the working masses by concentrating the
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powers in the state and eroding the independence of the civil society" (Chachage, 1994, p 55).
The situation depicted thus brought to the fore the suggestion that the way out of under-
development was through the establishment of a broad democracy which would release the
creativity and self-organisational capabilities of the working people. Support for this inference
could have been garnered from the Italian experience. Research has, namely, revealed that the
North/South difference in economic performance was positively associated with the levels of
civic engagement which was related to active participation in public affairs in concomitance
with political equality, solidarity, trust and tolerance and social structures of co-operation.
Civics was found to have had more predictive power of present levels of socio-economic
development than had past levels of economic development (Putnam, 1994, p 53).
The Economist pointed out that while the positive association of democracy with the
promotion of growth was not incontrovertibly applicable to all societies - the East Asian
tigers cannot vaunt very democratic governments - it quotes a study by a former World Bank
official (which used an econometric technique to test the direction of causation) that
demonstrated civil and political freedoms, like economic freedom, to be promotive of
economic growth (1994, p 14-17). If, in the above context, "the whole idea of democracy and
popular empowerment is an idea which has come of age in present-day Africa" (Prah, 1994, p
ii) is auguring a new economic dawn, the 1990's and not the 1960's, would have to be
regarded as marking the beginnings of a potential period of gestation. The rather exceptional
GDP growth rates of around 4 per cent experienced by sub-Saharan Africa during 1995-1998
(IMF, 1997, P 153) engendered some optimism about its economic future. And the successor
of Mandela proffered an optimistic scenario of an African renaissance (Mbeki, 1998, p 9).
However, an American professor writing on the "bright and the dark sides of Africa" noted
that the democratisation process, which began auspiciously in the early 1990s, had gone into
reverse in some countries, many of which have democratic constitutions but only a few of
them practising true democracy (Hull, 1998, pp 8-10). Another writer, explaining how
"bureaucracy is killing business in Africa", contended that while the socialist economic
philosophy has largely been discarded, bureaucracies that have been structured to regulate and
control are still in place and are assuming that the private sector is guilty of exploitation until
proven innocent (Rauth, 1997, p 12-14). This is in sharp contrast with the East Asian NICs
where governments intervened systematically and purposefully, interacting in tandem with
businessmen, to enhance economic growth (World Bank, 1993, p 325).
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In light of the above conflicting opinions and tidings the "African renaissance" does not
appear (at the end of the second millennium) to have a solid foundation for prognostic
purposes.
The above narration forms the backdrop to the Black community of South Africa whose
African ancestors migrated southwards and confronted the eastward moving descendants of
the European colonists, on the Eastern Cape border, during the second half of the eighteenth
century. The technological content of their economic life at the time, is, perhaps, oppositely
characterised by the aphorism that "they had not yet invented the wheel".
6.2.2 South Africa
In South Africa the politico-historical factors, involved in the entrepreneurial arrearage of the
people of African extraction, have their origin in an adversative Black/White relationship
arising from a century of hostility and armed conflict, in which the technologically superior
forces were the conquerors who assumed political power. Later, the subjugation of the Orange
Free State and Transvaal republics by British Imperial forces introduced a complicating
factor. Still later, the growing awareness of a probable loss of White self-determination
inhering in the growing Black majority occasioned by economic integration (in the Common
Area), added a further dimension to the adversative relationship. The marginalisation of the
Black population ensued. What was done to them was based on the premise that they were not
an integral part of the body politic, but a people (nation) apart with different customs, habits
and ways of life. What was done for them emanated from a spirit of paternalism or
beneficence or self-interest or a mixture of these motivations, and not as acts of redistribution
prompted by claims of the needy on the prosperous by mutual consent, in an otherwise
homogeneous society. The Black population was expected to make a contribution to its own
economic salvation, in, at least, the regions reserved for them. Successive governments, or
opposition parties, after the founding of the Union of South Africa, considered that the
advancement of the interests of the poorest section of the White population required priority
attention. Differential treatment in favour of Whites was the outcome.
It can be legitimately hypothesised that policy would have been significantly different in some.
aspects, at least after 1970, had the Black population been a less fertile, slower-growing
minority, posing no or little threat to Whites' job security and self-determination and no undue
pressure on the fiscus.
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The Nationalist government which came to power in 1948, and known for its pursuit of the
apartheid policy, was responsible for enshrining in legislation (White) socio-political
conventions and traditions of long standing, to lend substance to a parody of a legal principle:
apartheid must not only be practised but be seen to be practised. Numerous laws of an
economic nature were promulgated to give effect to a policy based on the following tenets: no
White employee to be displaced by a Black worker; Black and White workers of equal
occupational rank not to operate side by side; no Black person to be engaged in a position
which accords him the prerogative of seniority over White workers; Blacks would be able to
exercise their economic, social and political democracy only in the areas reserved for them
(the Homelands) and not in the Common Area where they were accorded the status of
sojourners. Speaking in the House of Assembly in 1956 the then Minister of Native Affairs
(HF Verwoerd) pithily summarised government policy: "In terms of the government's plan for
South Africa there was no place for the Bantu in the European community above the level of
certain forms of labour. Within their own areas, however, all doors were open" (Horrell, 1968,
p 5). In his 1961 London speech he asserted that "the government's policy is not based on
people being inferior but being different" (Landman, 1968, p 82).
However, given the state of under-development of these "own areas", the open doors did not,
in practice, mean substantial opportunities in the non-agricultural private sector for the
nurturing of entrepreneurial potential. The crux of the matter was depicted by a pioneering
industrial psychologist as follows: "As long as it insisted that all capital, initiative and know-
how in the industrial development of those areas must come from Africans themselves,
nothing much will happen, resources are just not there ... White entrepreneurial skills would
have to be supplied for some time to come ... " (Biesheuvel, 1963, p 28). But Verwoerd was
not prepared to permit such supply inside the Homelands' borders, the recommendations of
the Tomlinson Commission notwithstanding. A late principal of the Natal University
maintained that "the rate of acculturation of the Bantu (that is, in acquiring the skills of
Western civilisation) varies in proportion to the frequency of his association with the Whites"
(Malherbe, 1969, p 6). And, since the work situation was the most influential instrument in
South African society, the policy of separation impaired the instrument. It was only by
participating in situations where the appropriate values and attributes of mind were
functioning could Africans be expected to assimilate them (Biesheuvel, 1963, p 25).
The policy signified that in the Common Area, where just more than one-half of the Black
population was domiciled, their vertical mobility - while not proscribed in toto - was
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officially curbed, and occurred primarily as the by-product of the upward movement of
Whites in the skill and professional hierarchies in the process of which vacancies were
created, opening up opportunities for other groups. This eventuated on a considerable scale in
the private sector before the economy entered upon its long-term stagnation phase. Inhabitants
of the Common Area could also have made use of opportunities offering in the civil service of
the Homelands, but might have been deterred by the low esteem in which they held the
traditionalists in those regions who were regarded as collaborators with the regime. In any
case, they desired the enjoyment of human dignity in, and the economic treasure of, the more
developed areas of the country where they were living.
Many of the specific stipulations of the discriminatory laws - among which the Job
Reservation Act probably acquired the maximum notoriety, though effecting fewer than 3 per
cent of the labour force and honoured more in the (officially sanctioned) breach than in the
observance - could not be enforced as a matter of practical economies. That the quotas
involved were in conflict with the ethnic composition of labour supply was repeatedly
brought to the attention of the government. And so, during the boom phase of the Kondratieff,
the damage to the public image of government policy was more obvious than its deleterious
effect on Black employment and occupational promotion. This is borne out by the magnitudes
in Table 6.1, which express the growth of the number of persons employed, in each skill
category, as multiples of the growth in the respective aggregate (all categories) numbers of
Blacks and Whites employed.
TABLE 6.1
GROWTH OF EMPLOYED NUMBERS PER SKILL CATEGORY AS
MULTIPLES OF GROWTH IN THE AGGREGATES: 1960-1980
Blacks Whites
Teachers
White Collar:
I Executive
II Professional Technical
III Semi-skilled
IV Unskilled
2,11 1,52
2,74
2,00
1,56
1,31
1,35
1,84
1,05
0,77
Blue Collar:
II Skilled 8,20 0,83
III Semi-skilled 1,02 0,62
IV Unskilled 0,78 0,11
Aggregate 1,00 1,00
Source: Adapted from Department of Manpower Utilisation, 1953 to 1981.
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It is seen that Blacks, far from stagnating in occupational ranking, have registered greater
advancement in the higher skill categories than Whites. Whatever appropriate weights are
assigned to the various categories, the outcomes reveal relatively greater progress for Blacks
on the skill ladder during the period 1960 to 1980. These results do not, of course, void the
assertion that the second component of the educational process, viz. leaming-by-doing, was
not given a free rein, nominally and in the letter of the law, to allow Blacks unhindered
opportunities to rise in the professional hierarchies for the assumption of the entrepreneurial
function. But they do suggest that much of the legislation in the economic arena was in the
nature of political rhetoric, calculated to send a message to White workers and the electorate
that - as it used to be phrased by Cabinet Ministers - "the government cared for them".
With regard to the first component of the educational process - formal primary, secondary
and tertiary education - the controversial Bantu Education Act of 1953 held sway. lts
proclaimed aims denoted it as an ingredient in the design of Grand Apartheid, or Separate
Development, which latter was destined to materialise in the Homelands. In 1953 Verwoerd
declared that "education must train and teach people in accordance with their opportunities in
life ... Education should, thus, stand with both feet in the Reserves, and have its roots in the
spirit and being of a Bantu Society" (Union of South Africa, Hansard, 1953, col. 3585). In
1959 the Minister of Bantu Education reiterated that "the basic principle of Black Education
in general ... is to keep the Bantu child a Bantu child ... [who] will not want to become an
imitator" (Union of South Africa, Hansard, 1959, cols. 8318/9). His department was resolute
that the development of the Blacks and their Homelands had to be rooted in their own cultural
institutions and customs, taking into account their right to self-determination which meant
that their schools and the products of their schools had to lead the Bantu nation(s) to
independence and self-reliance (Republic of South Africa, 1966, pI). The objective of the
separate universities established for them was to "form Bantu men and women of culture",
which could only be realised, it was contended in "a university which is intimately woven into
the fabric of the community which it serves" (VanDyk, 1966, p 8). "Developing along their
own lines" was a frequently used phrase. The Apartheid government was responsible for
increasing the number of universities catering for Blacks, in particular, from 1 to 8, while a
variety of institutions for technical and vocational education and training was provided.
Between 1984 and 1994 the number of Black students enrolled at South African universities
increased from 36 684 to 148817, or by 15 per cent per annum compared to 4,8 per cent per
annum in the case of Coloured and Indian students, and 1,1 per cent in the case of Whites
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(Edusource Data News, 1996, p 19).
The formal contents of the educational programmes were, by all appearances, not in dispute.
A critical evaluation of the system affirmed that "the syllabuses for primary schools appear to
be educationally 'sound, and, one is glad to know, have been revised in accordance with
modem approaches and methods" (Horrell, 1968, p 150), while the syllabi for the junior and
senior certificates conformed to those followed in schools for White children. Also, mother
tongue instruction and adaptation of curricula to a community's social and economic
conditions accorded with received pedagogical principles, as endorsed at an African education
conference in 1968 sponsored by UNESCO and the Organisation of African Unity (p 138). A
writer who condemned Bantu Education was nevertheless persuaded that the use of a
language of instruction other than that rooted in a community's traditions "is demonstrably
biased against the poor ... " (Serageldin, 1994, p 23).
However, research undertaken for a master's degree led its author to the conclusion that the
syllabi did not allow of an adequate acquaintance with economic life; and there was "little or
no motivation for the acceptance of the entrepreneurial role" (Van Zyl, 1970, P 238). He also
found that the prescribed Economics curriculum for standards IX and X (now grades 11 and
12) had not been taught at any school for Black children (p 234).
It would appear that the resistance to Bantu Education arose from the image projected by the
differentiation inhering in the Bantu Education Act, as a separate enactment, which was
perceived as just another weapon in the armoury of the Apartheid system. Leaders of the
Black community, who pointed out that "social realities demanded the assimilation of
Africans of Western values and techniques" were convinced "by long and bitter experience ...
that differentiation would, for them, mean the provision of inferior facilities. Among very
large numbers the term 'Bantu Education' became opprobrious" (Horrell, 1968, p 136). And
the Task Force on Education of the Signatory Association, who attended a conference on
Black education came away equally convinced "that while Apartheid remains in education, it
seems inevitable that Black suspicion and rejection of the System will continue" (1988, p 3).
At this conference parents, teachers and pupils were urged to register their rejection by means
of boycotts of classes, stay-aways and public demonstrations and to "equip people for the
liberation struggle".
At a conference on Culture and Development in Africa held at the World Bank in 1992, one
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speaker maintained that the Black Education Act fortified apartheid (Klitgaard, 1994, p 108)
while another averred that while the Act read like "a liberal call for cultural sensitivity ... it
was in fact an instrument for the perpetuation of apartheid - the separateness and subjugation
of the Black peoples of South Africa ... " (Serageldin, 1994, p 23). The opinions of these two
authors would no doubt have echoed the sentiments of the Act's detractors in South Africa.
In sum, rather than its substance, it was the shadow cast by the political system in which
Bantu Education operated that elicited rejection and resistance, often erupting in violence in
the revolutionary spirit of 'liberation before education'. Arising from their political struggles
the minds of pupils and teachers alike were focused upon matters other than education and
preparation for life. The result was generations of non-educated school children, which was
most unlikely to constitute a breeding ground for entrepreneurship.
The educational system can also be judged by way of recourse to some statistical indicators.
A simple comparison of government expenditure per pupil by ethnic group (see Chapter 12 on
government) would suggest the presence of relative inferiority. In so far as the differences in
this respect relate to the provision of physical facilities - telephones, laboratories, libraries,
water and electricity supplies, toilets and school buildings - the inference will be justified
(Education Foundation, 1997, pp 1-4). It is seemingly also justified when regard is had to the
larger number of pupils each Black teacher had to handle than hislher counterparts in schools
of the other three ethnic groups .
. For many years after the Nationalist Government had taken office the WhitelBlack ratio of
expenditure per pupil moved around 10:1, but dropped to 5,6:1 in 1984 and was down to 3,05
by 1994. This arose from the fact that the government, having inherited the problem of large
numbers of Black children of school-going age not attending school, embarked on a
programme of mass education. In 1948 there were some 2 825 000 Black school-age children
(aged 6-19), but only 692 000, or 24,5 per cent were enrolled at school (adapted from Horrell,
1968, p 147). The enrolment expanded by 5,8 per cent per annum during the period 1948-
1991 (Education Foundation 1994), which was twice the rate (2,84 per cent per annum) at
which the school-age population had been increasing, to raise the level of enrolment to 84,5
per cent in 1995, or 8 102 000 out of 9 592 000. If the Black school-age population had
increased at the rate of the White school children - given the number of teachers employed -
the pupil/teacher (P/T) ratio of the former in 1991 would have been 25,1:1 compared to 20,2:1
for Whites, and in 1994 20,2 versus 19,7. And if this had been accompanied by the same
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repeater proportions as those of Whites, their PIT ratio would even have been lower than that
of the latter.
The new (post 1994) government discovered that it had to grapple with the same problem as
its predecessor, viz. the pressure of sheer numbers on fiscal capacity. And so, instead of
reducing the PIT ratios appertaining to Black pupils to those of White or Indian or Coloured
children, the ratios - permitted for fiscal purposes - for the latter groups were raised to equal
those obtaining among the former. If PIT ratios are a significant determinant of educational
quality this policy represented retrogradation. The low PIT-ratio, (old-model C) schools had
been portrayed as 'islands of privilege' by the new government; but they had also been islands
of excellence, or, at least, achievement, as measured by scholastic success, and therefore,
more likely to have produced the type of human material accessory to the generation of
entrepreneurs.
It is conceivable that the handicap arising from the provision of physical facilities and the PIT
ratios could have been countervailed, to some extent if not in full, by major efforts on the part
of teachers and pupils. A government can impose conditions that impede the delivery of
quality education, but it cannot decree that it must be inferior. The quality is yet determined
by the behaviour of teachers subject to constraints - if such there be - inflicted by pupils.
Moreover, there is some international evidence indicating school performance levels not to be
sensitive to PIT ratios ranging between 25: 1 and 40: 1, to classroom-teacher ratios and even to
teacher qualifications (Khumalo & Wright, 1997, P 165; Education Foundation, 1993, p 4).
As it was, the programme of mass education, exacerbated by the large annual additions to the
school population, necessitated also a mass production of teachers. Since the gestation period
of cohorts of prospective well-qualified teachers - through academic studies and years of
experience - is quite long, a chronic backlog of supply of such manpower was well-nigh
inevitable. Table 6.2 permits us to compare the qualification levels of Black and White
teachers, as in 1994.
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TABLE 6.2
TEACHERS BY RANK AND QUALIFICATIONS (PERCENT AGES) 1994
Principal Dep. Principal Head of Dept. Teacher
Unqualified:
Black 9% 2% 1% 11%
White 0% 0% 0% 0%
Underqualified:
Black 54% 40% 47% 33%
White 0% 0% 0% 0%
Qualified:
Black 38% 58% 52% 56%
White 100% 100% 100% 100%
Total:
Black 100% 100% 100% 100%
White 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Education Foundation, 1995, p 18.
The data in Table 6.2 bears testimony to, in comparative terms, an academically ill-equipped
body of Black teachers, the fully qualified among them marginally above 50 per cent. Even
so, the 1994 situation reflects a considerable improvement over that of preceding years. A
more serious failing on the part of a section of this body, however, is an apparent lack of
commitment or sense of vocation. Adjured (or intimidated) over a period of decades to
participate in active opposition to the government, not required to discharge their duties
regularly because their pupils were out on the streets or demonstrating inside and outside the
classrooms, and demoralised by frequent burglaries and vandalising of their school buildings
(Ngcai, 1997, p 8), habits of mind inimical to professional discipline have been engendered.
Unprofessional conduct included absenteeism, arriving late and leaving early, attending
community events and doing private work during working hours, leaving their classrooms to
visit shebeens (some of which are operated within the school grounds), etc. (Makhari, 1995, p
17; Maree, 1996, plO; Chisholm & Valley, 1996; SA Institute of Race Relations, 199617, pp
198-200). After the new government had taken office in 1994 the academic registrar of Fort
Hare University wrote that while the previous government had treated teachers with disdain,
"teachers themselves have played a role in demeaning the status of their profession ... leaving
schools during working hours to frequent neighbouring shebeens" and stooping to sexual
harassment (Pityana, 1994, plO). In 1997 the Finance Minister censured teachers for arriving
late under the influence of liquor and leaving classes early to visit shebeens (Gumede &
Ngcai, 1997, pi). And in 1998 the (then) deputy-President (Thabo Mbeki) enjoined the SA
Democratic Teachers Union to expel from its ranks those members found drunk during school
hours (Argus Correspondent, 1998, p 4).
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It remains a moot question whether teachers, if they so wished, could have prevailed against
the tide of violent protests by pupils and students against the authorities under the banner of
the slogan 'liberation before education'. Pityana, cited above, while lauding students for their
sacrifices in challenging the system, added that "a culture of intolerance, violence and
disregard for authority was nurtured", giving rise to a naïve belief that "they can unilaterally
dismiss teachers, dictate passes, the curriculum and teaching methods (1994, plO). The 1992
Annual Report of the Department of Education and Training, recording a loss of more than
11 000000 pupil-days and 217 instances of robbery, murder, rape, arson, vandalism and
fighting in school grounds, declared that "the spirit of rebellion, disruption and, eventually
anarchy, which has been nurtured in Soweto since 1976, has led to the collapse of education
in Johannesburg". Omotoso called the slogan "one of the most unfortunate to have been
produced by the liberation struggle ... Unfortunately, even those pupils who are supposed to
be at school now, in the transitional period, spend their time toyi-toyi-ing, neither liberating
themselves nor being educated" (1994, pp 138/9).
Generations of school children, particularly after the 1976 school uprising, grew up without
having been subjected to mental discipline (and probably other forms of discipline as well). It
has been generally conceded that the regeneration of a culture of learning proved to be a very
difficult endeavour. The results are reflected in the standards of scholastic performance. The
drop-out rate was high: a mixed 1983-1984 cohort technique revealed that out of a cohort of
1000 Black pupils starting their school career 413 would have survived to standard 6 (now
grade 8) - which evidenced some improvement on the 1973 situation when the figure was 273
- and only 80 would eventually have passed their standard 10 examinations. A continuation
of the historical course would have raised the standard 6 survival rate to 524 and the
successful standard 10 number to 123. This latter figure compares with 243,626 and 719 in
the case of Coloureds, Asians and Whites respectively (Sadie, Dostal & Vergnani, 1985, p 6).
Standardising for age structure it is found that differential grade survivorship accounted for 70
per cent of the Black/White difference in primary/secondary school enrolment which means
that large numbers did not avail themselves of the opportunities offered. It is not possible to
quantify the role of each of the following three probable determinants of the differential: (i)
the poverty of parents; (ii) indifference towards education, and (iii) 'liberation before
education'. But the third factor could be held responsible for any deterioration that occurred
after the middle eighties (see Chapter 12).
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Of the Black candidates who sat the standard 10 examinations in 1993 only 39 per cent
passed, compared to 86 per cent, 93 per cent and 95 per cent in the case of Coloured, Indian
and White candidates respectively (Education Foundation, 1994, No 5, P 7). And there is
some indirect evidence that the situation had not improved during the following four years: It
is also their wont to fight shy of mathematics and science, the study of which, according to
Malherbe, would cultivate "respect for hard demonstrable facts ... to counteract his love for
arguing in the realm of subjective opinion and his predilection for talkie-talkie subjects ... "
(1969, plO). Of the Black candidates who entered for the standard 10 examinations in 1994,
27 per cent wrote mathematics and 7 per cent passed. The comparable figures for physical
science were 15 per cent and 7 per cent (Education Foundation, 1995, pp 13-14). And "few
student teachers emerging from the system", according to a Danish sponsored research report,
"could be regarded as either mathematically or scientifically literate" (Education Foundation,
1997, p 3).
In the above mise-en-scene there is little evidence of a pursuit of excellence or any other
attribute that would conduce to entrepreneurship. A keystone in the foundation for the genesis
of substantial numbers of entrepreneurs is lacking.
6.3 CULTURAL FACTORS
6.3.1 The nature and significance of culture
The cultural factors to be discussed are included in the broad definition of 'culture' emanating
from a UNESCO sponsored conference held in Mexico City in 1982: "The whole complex of
distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterise a society or
social group. It includes not only arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental
rights of human beings, value systems, traditions and beliefs (Jaycox, 1994, p 3). This
definition is concordant with the 'institutions' posited by the older generation of institutional
economists as the driving force in economic change and which, according to a reviewer of the
economic literature on 'evolutionary theorising about economic change' referred to "the
complex of socially learned and shared values, norms, beliefs, meanings, symbols, customs
and standards that delineated the range of expected and accepted behaviour in a particular
context" (Nelson, 1995, p 80; See also Roll, 1938, pp 446-455). In our discussion below those
constituents of culture, included in the definitions above, are addressed, which are
hypothesised to be promotive of; alternatively inimical to, entrepreneurship, business
enterprise and economic development.
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The significance attached to the role of culture in particular by Africans, comes to light in the
following pronouncements. At the 1992 World Bank sponsored conference on Culture and
Development in Africa - where there was consensus about the significance - one of the
speakers who had written extensively on the topic, contended that the important question was
not whether culture mattered, but how it was to be taken into account for the purposes of
development, to which end we would need "a new wave of applied cultural studies"
(Klitgaard, 1994, p 102). He cited a Cameroonian, Kabou (1991) who maintained that
"African culture and mentalities are the main obstacles to development, yet they never appear
on the 'long list of official causes of underdevelopment' ... Africans must understand the
depth of their underdevelopment which is not a matter of capital or resources, but 'inside the
heads of Africans'" (p 81). At the same conference Etounga-Manguellé asserted that "the
answer to our question: Does Africa need a cultural adjustment programme? is 'Yes'" (1994, p
223). Mjoli, writing on the role of the psychologist, claimed that the main cause of the
poverty and underdevelopment characteristic of most Black areas in South Africa "lies in
some cultural factors which militate against creativity, productivity and the like" (1987, P 17).
An associate professor of English at the university of Venda, Ramogale, believes that "a
nation's psycho-cultural wealth determines its success ... the failure of African countries ... is
evidence that current value systems are flawed ... Africa's mortal enemy lies within ... South
Africa may also be profoundly blighted by the same scourge" (1998, pp 13-14). Macozoma,
managing director of Transnet, is reported to have said that "Black South Africans needed to
undergo a cultural transformation if they wished to influence the economic transformation of
the country in any meaningful way" (Business Report, 1996, p 13).
All those statements had but one import: culture does matter. They underscore the
pronouncement by the architect of Singapore's economic miracle, president Lee Kuan Yen,
that "culture is everything" (Muller, 1994, p 16).
It is to be understood that the discourse below is cast in the image of Western civilisation.
This does in no way imply that it is unique as a seedbed of economic development. The
economically successful East Asian countries drew their inspiration from "indigenous
traditions such as Confucianism and candidly reject Western ideals of individualism, human
rights and democracy" (World Press Review, 1994, p 50). But born and bred in a society of
Western origin, the author cannot claim sufficient personal experience of, and concomitantly
insight into, these other civilisations to permit of definitive judgements of their import in
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economic behaviour. Furthermore, South Africa's economic development is a creature of
Western (or Christian/Judean) traditions, which represent the alternative way of life to which
Africans, including South African Blacks, have been exposed. Since the latter's culture is best
appreciated and portrayed by members of their own community, these members have to be
deferred to as much as possible for assessments of their cultural traits which may have a
bearing on the generation of business enterprise.
The enquiry, it should be stressed, is only concerned with the economic quality of populations
as shaped by values, beliefs, norms, etc. and not with other (admirable or not) qualities that
may inhere in these same characteristics.
Before proceeding, however, allowance has to be made for the fact that man is a product of
both hislher genes and hislher culture, or heredity an environment or nature and nurture. Even
while the two forces may be intertwined in the physical make-up of individuals, a portrayal of
the duality must admit to the probability of individuals breaching the constraints of an
economically thwarting cultural environment to achieve that which a beneficent social
environment would have nurtured. The latter smoothes the way for prospective entrepreneurs,
and treading it entails or requires no breachings. Ceteris paribus, relatively larger numbers
will emerge. In South Africa there is still the duality involved in the acculturation process
incidental to the transition, consequent upon migration, from traditionalist life in rural areas -
already noted in Chapter 5 - to the culture of towns and cities. How much of the customs,
norms, beliefs, etc. of the former persist in the new life, and for how long, are moot questions.
The emancipated mind may yet be accompanied by a subconscious which harbours traditional
mores.
While one can endorse Nelson's statements about the "still primitive state of our ability to
work with cultural evolutionary theories" and about "the limits of the power of economics or
social science theory more generally to comprehend a set of processes as complex as those
behind economic growth as we have known it" (1995, pp 83/4), there remains a need for an
attempt to impart some content to the 'how' of cultural influences in the supply of enterprise.
To this end the discourse below is linked to a profile of an entrepreneur, constructed on a
greatest likelihood basis, as delineated by the attributes which he exhibits or is most likely to
display. The attributes are considered ad seriatim.
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6.3.2 Profile of an entrepreneur
6.3.2.1 The spirit of Enterprise
Concomitantly with the definition of the entrepreneur, the spirit of enterprise will be his major
characteristic. The supply of enterprise and "entrepreneurship" are interchangeable terms. It
subsumes initiative, drive, resourcefulness, courage, a sense of purpose, commitment,
dedication, creativity, perseverance and an energetic pursuit of objectives. It implies an
adventurous disposition, and a willingness to accept challenges in which obstacles are there to
be overcome. Such spirit does not adapt to circumstances, but overcomes circumstances, or,
better still, creates circumstances which would provide the realisation of objectives.
Risk-taking is an integral part of this attribute, which is calculated action based on a
probabalist assessment of the chances of success and their dimensions in terms of returns to
investment. Assumption of risks bears testimony to self-confidence and self-reliance, coupled
with the acceptance of individual responsibility and accountability. It contrasts with the
dependency cast of mind. It is the converse of the 'indipe' syndrome, about which Dr Ntatho
Motlana, founder of the Soweto-based Get Ahead Foundation has this to say: "Our people are
developing the indipe syndrome - the word 'indipe' is the Nguni for 'give me' which signifies
having a begging bowl in one's hand. Our people seem to have the attribute of holding out a
begging bowl and believing that this will serve them for life. Making money is frowned on -
and this means we are getting away from the work ethic" (1991, P 20). In a subsequent
interview he adjured Blacks "to drop the begging bowl, set on their feet and start working
with their hands" (Betty, 1993, p 3). Qwelane wrote: " ... as Blacks we must also abandon our
dependence mentality for it is servile and destructive" (1995, p 19). Biko, the (late) intellec-
tual exponent of the Black Consciousness Movement, which had to 'conscientise' Black
people to an appreciation of their situation and develop self-reliance, contended that the
political oppression, to which the Black community had been subjected, eroded its soul to the
extent that they could not conceive of a realistic alternative, thus creating an inferiority
complex and a dependency mood (Lotter, 1992). An optimistic note, on the other hand, has
been struck by the statement of a one-time academic and later chairman of the Development
Bank of Southern Africa, the Independent Development Trust and Black Management Forum,
Professor Nkhulu: "We can actually rescue the country. I believe that the dependency
syndrome in this country is not that deep, and it can be reversed. I do not believe that we are
going to be paralysed by the dependency syndrome" (Wilhelm, 1993, p 8).
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This syndrome is reflected in an economic policy document of the ANC (1992) in which
massive redistribution programmes were envisaged, the premise being that human rights
imply the - apparently unconditional - satisfaction of every conceivable need: housing,
electricity, land, health care, ajob, education, comprehensive social security, social services, a
living wage, etc. These rights are not linked to personal effort, reward for exertion or merit, or
whether the community at large can afford them. Included is the assertion that a human rights
charter should ensure to all people a minimum of enforceable and increasing entitlements
(perhaps more appropriately identified as arrogations). There is no reference to personal
responsibility for the satisfaction of human needs - to which there is no limit - in a world
characterised by scarcity of economic resources. It extends the meaning of an inalienable
human right - that to which the individual can lay claim because of his being a member of the
human race without any quid pro quo on his part - to encompass that which must be acquired,
produced, earned through the expending of human effort by somebody else. The document,
moreover, promised the introduction - actualised immediately after the 1994 election - of
affirmative action in all areas of the economy, which appeared to be intended not only as
compensation for discrimination suffered in the past, but, in addition, as an arrogation -
confirming operation. The policies espoused by the SA Communist Party partner in the
ANC/COSATU/SACP government alliance could be interpreted as an expression of utmost
concern for the welfare of 'the worker' or common man, but may also be viewed as a denial of
entrepreneurial initiative on the part of the individual, and an endorsement of the dependency
spirit.
The above approach can bear comparison with that of the (White) Afrikaner community when
informed by the 1932 Carnegie Commission on the Poor White problem that it had a one-fifth
component of poor Whites living in miserable conditions, partly induced by a 60 per cent
destruction of Transvaal and Orange Free State agricultural wealth resulting from the
scorched earth policy of the British army during the Anglo-Boer war as a means of
subjugating the Boer republics. In view of this poverty and the absence of its members from
urban economic activity in a capacity other than that of employee, the community considered
itself underdeveloped and economically backward, its contribution in the entrepreneurial
function outside the agricultural sector measured by a meagre 6 per cent of the GDP generated
in the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy, compared to a 56 per cent share in the
aggregate White population number (Sadie, 1967, 1979). From the Ekonomiese Volkskongres
of 1939, convened because of the great concern about the welfare of the poor Whites, radiated
the clarion call: "A nation rescue itself! Not the government but all able members of society,
[CH6(JLS)]
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
169
acting in unison, had to pursue with vigour, determination and perseverance, the upliftment of
the poverty-stricken masses. To this end the Afrikaner community, traditionally an agrarian
population, had to conquer the urban industrial world by way of assuming the critical function
of the entrepreneur to create employment and wealth." Various institutions were established
to act in a supportive role and to foster a purposeful consciousness of the Afrikaners'
economic arrearage and the path of self-reliance to be followed to surmount it.
This campaign contributed greatly to the emergence of entrepreneurs among the Afrikaans
community to raise their share in the GDP generated in the private secondary and tertiary
sectors of the South African economy to some 23-24 per cent from the 6 per cent level at the
beginning of the Second World War. The share is larger when government-initiated
commercial enterprise is credited to this group. The increase is substantially reduced (but the
absolute contribution to the aggregate GDP raised) when agriculture is included (where the
Afrikaner is, and has been, the preponderant element) because of the relative waning of that
sector in the national economy.
The efforts of some individual Black businessmen such as Dr Motlana (Get Ahead
Foundation), S Alexander (Strive Foundation), the executives of FABCOS (Foundation of
African Business and Consumer Services), and the BMF (Black Management Forum founded
in 1976) appear to partake of the flavour of the Afrikaners' self-reliant, self-empowerment
campaign.
However, the great strides made in Black economic empowerment during the 1990's were not
self-reliant-based. They resulted from the transfer, on generous terms, of existing production
assets engendered by White business men, to Black leaders. By the end of 1996, according to
the deputy-president, this accorded Black control over, and/or participation in, companies
quoted on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange with a market capitalisation of R115 500
million, representing 9 to 10 per cent of the JSE's total market capitalisation at the time
(Sadie, 1998, p 43). (It took Afrikaners more than three decades after 1938 to achieve that
level of representation). With its National Empowerment Fund the new government is lending
its support to the process by founding a Unit Trust for Black investors, who would also be
entitled to loans at low interest rates for investment in the shares of privatised public
corporations - apparently at below market prices in some instances - or private sector
companies (Swart, 1998, p 15). This is backed up by politicians' pronouncements which
radiate the character of moral pressure being brought to bear upon White business to intensify
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the empowerment process. Proclaimed Mandela at the 1997 National Congress of the ANC:
"Business success can no longer be measured solely by reference to profits ... unless Black
empowerment was accelerated the country faced an enormous social and political explosion"
(Dasnois & Mabaso, 1997, pIS).
The newly Black-controlled companies will, of course, provide opportunities for the
formation of new entrepreneurial talent, but the transfer in itself did not constitute an addition
to the supply of enterprise; that had still to be created. And from the ranks of Black leaders
emanated the complaint that the persons involved in the empowerment transactions had
always been the same select few. The experience of a Community Project Manager with
regard to empowerment at the ground level may also be pertinent to the process at the top
level: "... empowerment does not necessarily lead to development. On the contrary,
empowerment often leads to empowered apathy ... " (Bell, 1997, P 16).
A moot question is whether or not the moral pressure is a manifestation of more of the
dependency spirit at issue.
6.3.2.2 The Quest for excellence
With regard to the concept of the quest for excellence, frequently used to incite achievement,
it may serve some purpose to affirm the obvious: it does not connote the attainment of a goal
called 'excellence' - since the goalposts are presumed to be forever shifting - but in the
striving towards such end. It is the process of striving that is the foundation of progress in all
spheres of life.
The success sought by the entrepreneur can be measured by levels of profits, and/or growth
and size of his/her enterprise, relative importance in the market or personal prestige. Striving
to maximise or optimise any of these goals can be considered as tantamount to being in quest
of excellence in his sphere of operations. (To those who have an aversion to profits the goals
will be interpreted as self-seeking and self-enrichment by nature. However, self-seeking
serves here as an antidote to sloth; and after a certain level of affluence - varying among
individuals - has been reached, riches as such become a non-desideratum, the marginal rate of
substitution of effort for income approaching the infinite level.) Apart from subjecting himself
to the discipline demanded by his goal, he will make use of all opportunities, within his
means, to gather relevant information and knowledge by, e.g. studying at universities and
business schools and attending seminars, special courses and the like.
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In a sample survey of chief executives in South Africa it was found that 86 per cent had
attained at least one university degree while 14 per cent had a post-graduate qualification
(FSA-CONTACT, 1990). It implies that they have been subjected to the two intrinsic
processes of education: socialisation and individuation, the former being the function of
primary and secondary education which familiarises the youth with conventional wisdom to
be accepted by them, while the latter occurs at the tertiary and post-tertiary level where the
wisdom is challenged, doubt incited and individualisation and self-creation stimulated. A
professor of Humanities at the University of Virginia (USA) is adamant that "it is not, and
never will be, the function of lower-level education to challenge the prevailing consensus
about what is true. Socialisation has to come before individuation, and education for freedom
cannot begin before some constraints have been imposed" (Rorty, 1990, pp 43-44).
These entrepreneurs had accepted the discipline of obeying their teachers, studying and
passing examinations to obtain certificates regardless of whether they liked it or not. If they
were not dedicated pupils/students, they were obliged to act as if they were. Schools were
regarded as institutions of learning, not as venues for undisciplined pupils to challenge
authority, give instructions to teachers, attend school when they consented to do so, discover
pretexts for exchanging pen and pencils for objects of remonstrance, promote themselves up
to the standard where they have to face a genuine examination for purposes of certification,
and then refuse to pay for such examination because they knew they were going to lose the
fee by reason of inevitable failure, etc. In short, the kind of educational setting pictured in
section 6.2.2. The entrepreneurs in our scenario would be products of schools staffed by
dedicated teachers with a, or some, sense of vocation. It used to be infra dig for these teachers
to organise strikes, down their chalk to demonstrate in the streets, or desert their classrooms to
join delegations lodging complaints with cabinet ministers. At the tertiary level the
prospective business leaders enjoyed the benefits of the individuation process uninterrupted
by campus-trashing, lecture room-damaging demonstrators who believed that they were
entitled to a university or technikon education without prescribed academic qualifications or
the payment of tuition fees.
Passing judgement (in 1998) on the post-1994 government, after it has been in office for 4\12
years only, could be considered premature. But during this period policies have been
formulated and action taken that do not reflect a quest for excellence in educational, political
and economic matters which, according to Ramogale, is entailed in "the concept of the
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African renaissance" (1998, p 14).
In its White Paper on Draft Assessment Policy in the General Education and Training Phase
(Republic of South Africa, 1998) the government expounded a new approach to the
evaluation of a pupil's (now called a learner's) progress and success at school. It is referred to
as an outcomes based educational system (curriculum 2005) which "focuses on the
achievement of clearly depicted outcomes, rather than teacher input in terms of syllabus
content" (par. 4.1). The White Paper likens this outcomes based assessment to driving tests,
among others: "If in any particular batch of candidates, if no-one is competent, no-one passes.
If all are competent all pass ... This approach contrasts with systems which rely overwhel-
minglyon norm referencing (in contrast to criterion referencing) where the primary purpose is
selection" (par. 4.1). The emphasis is on peer group assessment (par. 5.1). On p 28 the
document reads: "It is expected that learners will progress with their age cohort", but in the
introductory Draft Policy statements (p 7) it is declared that "learners will progress with their
age cohorts". Such statements are reminiscent of the 'pass one pass all' slogan current among
demonstrators at one time. It would appear that significant external control over standards of
education (examination in traditional terminology) would only be exercised at the end of the
period of compulsory school attendance (grade 9)(Cf. Berkhout et.al, 1998; Smit, 1998).
The word 'examination' is assiduously avoided, and so, it would seem, is the selective process
which distinguishes between the good, the bad and the indifferent. In this scheme of things
individual achievement does not occupy a central position. It has the flavour of contentment
with mediocrity. It is reminiscent of a Minister of Sport's insistence that South Africa's
participation in international sport must be democratised by selecting teams which have a
maximum demographic representation of athletes even when their performance is below par.
The goal is participation, not winning. (The Olympic creed, in this regard, refers to
participation in an effort to win, and is not an invitation to perform indifferently).
The British experience, where a system similar to Curriculum 2005 has been in vogue since
the 1960s, may provide a lesson in this regard. The Economist reported that the
progressionism which stressed egalitarianism and learning by discovery is being replaced
with a 'new' orthodoxy - vigorously promoted by ministers and their advisors - which
"believes in the power of competition and comparison - so, more tests, more league tables
and no more 'non-competitive sports days'" (1998, p 42). Learning by being taught is in,
learning by discovery is out; mental arithmetic and times-tables are in, calculators are out;
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Curriculum 2005 has the appearance of aiming at the production of literate masses who might
function satisfactorily as followers, but not as leaders who could form the nucleus for the
genesis of entrepreneurs. The quality of human material emerging from the implementation of
the system depends heavily on the quality of the teachers, that is, level of qualification and
dedication or sense of vocation. The findings in section 6.2.2 above do not inspire confidence
in this regard. In the circumstances greater, not lesser, reliance on textbooks would have been
indicated. But in practice the opposite is encountered. Government expenditure on textbooks
declined from R895 million in 1995/6 to R425 million in 1996/7 and to R170 million in
1997/8; and of the latter still less than 80 per cent reached pupils in the form of textbooks, the
remainder having found its way into fraudulent transactions (McCallum, 1998, p 11). The
retrenchment of teachers resulting from the raising of the PIT ratios, in concert with the
application of affirmative action, entailed a loss of the better qualified teachers and favoured
treatment for the lesser qualified in the filling of new vacancies by assigning priority status to
period of service. There is a direct correlation between the latter and the degree of no- and
under-qualification (Hartshorne, 1996, p 20).
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spelling and grammar are in; self-expression is out; etc.
A quest for excellence does not radiate from the following official actions and
pronouncements either: The Council for Scientific Research announced in 1997 that to qualify
for government bursaries, for the purpose of Honours degree studies, White students should
have attained 75 per cent during their undergraduate years while others needed only 60 per
cent, and the number available to the latter would be two to three times that of the former
(Giliomee, 1997, pIS); the Minister of Health exhorted medical schools to provide for an
intake of first year students, preferably from the beginning of 1999, in accordance with the
ethnic composition of the population, even while the deans of these institutions described the
quotas involved (some 76 per cent to Black students), in the absence of the appropriate
student material, as ridiculous (Bot, 1998, pIS; Du Toit, 1997, p 4; 1998, p 4). Ministers
reacting to the loss of highly qualified professionals through emigration, thought it was just as
well that they left (Karsten, 1998, p 16) and that it might be a blessing in disguise (Coetzee,
1998, p 4). And all the time the proficiency of the civil service and parastatals was being
curbed, if not eroded, by affirmative action appointments, while the Employment Equity Bill
was posing a similar threat to the private sector. Affirmative Action can, in fact, be considered
a repudiation of the principle of meritocracy or, at best, a game of chance in which the odds
are stacked against the achievement of eminence.
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An important issue is how much of the above 'transformation' is featuring the Africanism or
'Africanness' the new elite is expressing a yearning for, Africanisation being, arguably, the
antithesis of westemisation. At a conference convened to search for an African identity, and
attended by academics, a coherent philosophy of education was sought as foundation for "a
new body of knowledge" steeped in the "forgotten traditions of African scholarship and
knowledge". The delegates decried the domination of Whites over cultural and educational
resources and considered that Africanisation was a necessity, not a luxury (McMagh, 1996, p
13). The Minister of Education vented the idea that "in Africa you go African - curriculum
and all" (Vosloo, 1996, p 19). An African who was in the running for the Witwatersrand
University's vice-chancellorship thought that the faculty members who accused him of
embellishing his CV were trying to obstruct the Africanisation of the university (Ester, 1996,
p 32). The president of the ANC Women's League, Ms Madikizela-Mandela, asseverated that
the second revolution - the 1994 change in government was the first - would be characterised
by Africanism, African humanism and a pronounced African identity (1998, p 3). And the
successor of Mandela (as president of South Africa) affirmed that he is an African (Mbeki,
1998, p 9).
In the evidence above one cannot discover a desire for the rule of meritocracy or a quest for
excellence. This attribute, in our profile of an entrepreneur, is not nurtured. If post-1994
election events are indeed representative of Africanness, Africanisation is unlikely to provide
a solid foundation for economic development and prosperity, by way of the generation of
entrepreneurs.
6.3.2.3 The Work ethic
The large majority of South African entrepreneurs manifest an attitude towards work which
can be associated with the Christian-Judean work ethic as reflected by adjurations in the
Scriptures, and verses extolling the virtues of work such as "go to the ant, sluggard; consider
her ways and be wise" (Proverbs 6:6); "whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with all thy
might" (Ecclesiastes 5:12); "in all labour there is profit" (Proverbs 14:23); etc. According to
Max Weber (1958, p 163) Calvinism, in particular, was conducive to an inner worldly
asceticism which made for a propensity toward continual and restless labour. The executives
in our profile exhibit a powerful work ethic which means that work has some moral content
according gratification beyond the financial benefits involved, so that the balancing of the
marginal utility of remuneration against the marginal disutility of effort as a determinant of
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hours worked is inoperable. Long hours are the rule. One sample survey found an average of
1112hours per day (Coetzee, 1985). They become engrossed in their work, preferring it to
leisure or carried along by the inexorable demands of their enterprise, to the extent of
qualifying as workaholics.
Contrariwise, it is maintained that "labour does not have the same existential and moral values
for the Black man as it has for us ... labour mainly consists in supporting nature's willingness
to give" (Rauche, 1968, p 164). A German-born theologian observed the following about the
Sotho: "Die Arbeit steht im Dienst des Ritus. Sie produziert nicht den Reichturn; sie offnet
nur die Sehlenzen, damit er hereinstromen kann" (NUrnberger, 1987, P 165). Muthwadini
writes about his community's world view: "It sometimes happens that a person is very
industrious, and works hard in his field ... and because of his hard work God blesses him and
he gets a good harvest, far more than his less industrious neighbours. In that case, his
neighbours will often be jealous of him and they won't believe that he received this blessing
of the good harvest because of his hard work. They will say: he has zombies working for him"
(1990, p 3). Another African suggested the existence of "a cargo-cult mentality in which
Nigerians believe that one day, without any great effort on their part, all the good things of the
world can and will be theirs". And the doctor working in Africa and reporting this, maintained
that "in one form or another, this mentality is present throughout Africa" (Daniels, 1987, P 9).
There is, in the environmental determinism tradition, still the argument, to be taken
cognisance of, that geography and climate are not to be overlooked as probable determinants.
Disparaging the 'so-called' superiority of Europe, Himmelstrand maintained that "the greater
European inclination for trade and business ... was a matter of survival due to climatic
conditions which made it impossible to grow crops for subsistence all the year round ...
whereas in Africa hunting and gathering, and later sedentary agriculture, could supply enough
food for most of the time ... " (1994, p 26). While it is true that tropical and sub-tropical
climates, with their humid heat, are not conducive to great exertion, the effects can be
counteracted by means of modem technology. Again, the experience of some of the NICs
during the past few decades does not support a hypothesis which would accord a definitive
role to climate or geography in the determination of the work ethic.
6.3.2.4 Commitment
A powerful work ethic will be accompanied by commitment, dedication, a sense of duty and
the strict observance of the obligations implied in the executive function which can be
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considered as one of the obvious 'rules of the game'. (Clock-watching will have as sole
purpose punctuality in keeping appointments). It entails a great deal of disutility in the form
of long, sometimes irregular, hours of work spending much time in travelling, away from
home very often, 'living out of a suitcase', agonising, stress, fatigue, etc. Its acceptance
testifies to dedication and self-discipline. In a field survey a researcher found a prevalence of
occupational obsession with dire results, as follows: "Die nastrewing van beroepsukses en
loopbaanontwikkeling vind met ontstellende ywer en oorgawe ten alle koste in die moderne
bydryfsituasie plaas. 'n Ongekende beroepsbeheptheid onder dinamies-kompeterende
bestuurslui geskied met so 'n mate van slaafsheid dat die instandhouding van ander primêre
verpligtinge (huwelik en gesin) totaal verwaarloos word" (Coetzee, 1985, p 2). The price paid
for the assumption of the entrepreneurial function is also echoed in the study of the
characteristics and performance of the modern manager by two researchers of the
Potchefstroom Graduate School of Business. They found that many South African executives
occupy their posts at too youthful an age, do not have the necessary experience or exposure to
the demands of the job, are promoted to positions above their level of competence - all of
which bears testimony to the scarcity of this kind of manpower in South Africa which is
highlighted by the fact that one-third of the numbers involved have been born overseas - and
experience a great deal of stress. They also spend most of their time at work, the dedication to
which, as a first priority, relegates wives and children to a secondary status (Uys & Coetzee,
1990). The incidence of psychosomatic disorders among them is accordingly higher than
average. It attests to conscientiousness.
This is a price - and a seemingly unavoidable one - to be paid for the generation of economic
development and growth. There are straws in the wind suggesting a lack of enthusiasm for
honouring the rules of the game (the demands of the entrepreneurial function) among Black
circles. A leading public relations consultant who attended a Black Management Forum in
Johannesburg reports that a female executive - a product of a superior educational institution -
could not understand "why in an African country with a black majority, black people had to
be the ones to conform to the minority, so-called corporate culture .... She felt it was time that
the majority protested strongly against this cultural colonisation, and began to assert African
culture in the corporate world." The reporting consultant's illuminating response to this
"tirade" (as he called it) is best recorded in his own words: "In the pursuit of profits the
corporate world has devised certain ways of doing things, certain norms and regulations that
have to be obeyed by all who want to be taken seriously in business. These norms are
sometimes referred to as 'corporate culture' and finds expression in ... education and job skills,
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certain standards of behaviour such as mature language skills, attention to detail, punctuality,
a high degree of social polish, business etiquette and a smart but conservative dress style. It is
only by obeying these rules that one can hope to climb up the corporate ladder" (Leoka,
1992).
In the array of disutilities involved in the execution of the entrepreneurial function the above
rules are still minor ones. An unwillingness to accept them constitutes a rejection of
entrepreneurship. The female executive was echoing the teachings of the late intellectual
exponent of the Black Consciousness Movement who resented the domination of Western
values, and urged Blacks to rid themselves of the shackles of subservience, to innovate
without recourse to these values and "to reduce the triumph of technology over man and the
materialistic element that is slowly creeping into our society" (Biko, 1973, p 45). The
statement sounds like an articulation of romanticism rather than economic realism. If the
features of entrepreneurship recounted above are to be subsumed in the offending values, can
there be economic innovation in their absence?
At a conference of the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Industry
(NAFCOC) in 1990, Black advancement was projected to achieve the following targets by the
end of the century: 30 per cent of board members in stock exchange listed companies;
ownership of 40 per cent of listed shares; 50 per cent of all services and supplies to large
industrial companies; and 60 per cent of all managers to be Black (The Bilateralism Review,
1993, p 38). If one is not to discount the target-setting as wishful thinking or a staking out of
an entitlement claim, it does radiate a singular lack of comprehension of the realities of the
entrepreneurial/managerial function on the part of businessmen (presumably wised to the
demands of modem business) who are members of a community whose LF features a less
than one per cent component to execute this function.
Office bearers of the new government often do not act as role models in the manifestation of
the sense of duty and conscientiousness expected of executives. Sometimes they do not arrive
on time for appointments or do not arrive at all. Africa time (see below) may be involved
here. One example, recorded in a scientific journal, reads as follows: A Cabinet Minister
accepted an invitation to deliver an address at a symposium on World Environment, long
before the event was to take place. "The symposium, however, suffered from a growing
annoyance - the no-show by the Minister of Education, professor Bengu. No forewarning, no
apologies, no contact whatsoever. The organisers were left with no option but to improvise
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... " (Reay, 1997, p I). This is not an isolated incident. Ministers do not seem to take their
obligations to parliament too seriously either. At the end of the 1997 parliamentary session
just short of 400 questions put to them in the National Assembly had not been answered
(Sawyer, 1997, plO).
6.3.2.5 The competitive spirit
The relevance of competition in the life of the entrepreneur was fittingly formulated by a
speaker at the Conference on Culture and Development in Africa: "The entrepreneur is right
in the middle of the turbulent stream of competitive individualism, where success comes to
those who boldly and skilfully accept the risks - the opportunities - that present themselves
there" (Waldavsky, 1994, p 157).
Enterprise entails and requires competition with others who may also be in the market. In the
formal sector this invariably takes place in a peaceful manner, at the micro level by way of
price, service or product differentiation or, at the macro level by competing for the
consumer's or user's Rand (e.g. by advertising), or both. Some of it is of the creative
destruction type, in Schumpeterian terms, with the triumph and survival of the more efficient
and innovative, pushing the economy to higher levels of progress.
The antithesis is clearly delineated by the following statement by the former president of
Zimbabwe: "Our own African way of life, our traditions and our cultural values have always
emphasised our interdependence, co-operation and mutual solidarity. The tendency towards
individualism and cut-throat competition is foreign to us. We are by upbringing adverse to
individual progress and individual advancement at the expense of, and to the detriment of, the
other people in the collective" (Anon, 1986, p 36). This pronouncement is affirmed by the
following: "Because personal relationships are so important in Africa the ideal man is
regarded as a man who can get along well with other people, is not fond of quarrelling, who
can compromise, who does not think much of himself, who does not try to compete with other
people, and try to be better than they, or to have more than they, also does not try to collect
for himself more wealth than other people have ... " (Muthwadini, 1990, p 32).
The absence of the competitive spirit is associated with egalitarianism - one person, one vote,
but great disparity in contributions - which entails the problem of the free rider who is more
interested in redistribution than economic development. When, as in South Africa, the free
riders are in the majority demanding the satisfaction of the human rights and entitlements
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(arrogations) mentioned in 6.3.2.1, the economy is not well served. A modest amount of the
culture of egalitarianism is indispensable, says Waldavsky , "but a large amount is antithetical
to democracy and development ... insistent demands for equality of condition exacerbate
racial and ethnic conflict and redistribute resources before they are obtained" (1994, pISS).
The new education policy discussed above does not encourage the spirit of competition, and
the taxi violence over a period of many years may serve as a demonstration of intolerance of
competition in which rivals are eliminated through market forces (as opposed to the barrel of
a gun).
6.3.2.6 The rational approach
Since reason is the ultimate authority in decision-making it is inconceivable that the
entrepreneur would not manifest the rational approach. It is implicit in the notion that man is
master of his own destiny. His decisions are the product of calculated risk and chances of
success. He has the enquiring, inquisitive, analytical mind, which objectivises the problems
that are regarded as obstacles to be surmounted. A thinker he will undoubtedly be. His
thinking would of necessity have to be at least of the linear, or vertical, high probability type
in Edward de Bono terminology, but would often involve lateral, low probability, innovative
and creative thinking which is not limited by the confines of the high probability conditions of
the vertical process, but which, however, serves as complement to it. De Bono calls it "an
attitude and a habit of mind" (1978, pIS). In the traditional African weltanschauung human
kind would be governed by magical forces, beyond the domain of reason, which have to be
humoured and not challenged. Subjugation to forces of magic is associated with fatalism: the
belief that man can manage neither his needs nor his resources (Waldavsky, 1994, pp 155/6).
It is not compatible with development. The emancipatory influences of the urban areas induce
the acceptance of science and technology and other exterior appurtenances of modernity but
do not necessarily conduce to the predominance of rationalism as defined above: - a condition
which has been compared to that of the contextualised identity (VanNiekerk, 1992). Some of
the new elite are known to pay obeisance to, and invoke ancestral spirits for, guidance in their
decisions. A Commission of Inquiry into witchcraft, violence and ritual murders in the
Northern Province of South Africa found that most of the people interviewed still consulted
witchdoctors/traditional healers despite missionaries condemnation of such practices
(Ralushai Commission Report, 1996, p 48) and that many young people, and students in
particular, attributed unexpected illnesses to witchcraft (p 13).
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A most tragic outcome of a belief in the irrational, associated with witchcraft, was
demonstrated by the Nongqwuase incident in the Eastern Cape of the previous century, when
starvation struck the community consequent upon the deliberate destruction of crops and
livestock, which was regarded as the condition for the exaltation of Xhosa power and
prosperity - like the mythological phoenix rising out of the ashes.
6.3.2.7 The time dimension
Business leaders operate as if they comply with Benjamin Franklin's dictum that time is
money, and that procrastination is the thief of time. Time is of crucial importance in business
and government decisions at both the short and the long-term level. With many decisions, in
any enterprise, being taken on a day to day basis, time consciousness obliges the keeping of
appointments and arriving at the venues at the appointed hour, completing tasks within
specific periods, etc. Non-conformance is considered a dereliction of duty resulting in
inefficiency and concomitant economic waste. The observance of 'Africa time' represents such
non-conformance.
It is claimed that while the Westerner is task-focused, which means attention to the time
constraint, the African is people-centred, the process of human interaction, involved in the
discussion around a task, rather than its performance within a specified time, is of prime
importance (Scholtz, 1997, P 6). A researcher of the HSRC, enquiring into culture as
facilitator in development, reported that in rural and informal settlements "the development
process is bogged down by (among others) laborious consultation and negotiation processes
... " (Malan, 1996, p 47).
At the long term level there is need of a vision or time horizon stretching into the future
spanning ten, fifteen or longer years - although, it would seem, not too long or the vision may
lead to inaction. The initiation and growth of an enterprise, and of the national economy, is a
function of investment and capital formation which, by its very nature, is a future-directed
activity. It will not be engaged in unless the mental horizon allows of a consideration of the
future in concordance with the lifetime of the capital equipment in question. Providing for the
future, which does not look after itself, is the growth and development engendering force.
There appears to be consensus that the time concept, as a development-inspiring attribute in
traditional African society, is flawed. According to Omotoso "time in true oral cultures has no
specific measure. Time is mythical, it is social and it is collective ... Time spent alone in an
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oral culture is time that does not exist" (1994, P 120). Time is identified and remembered by
out-of-the ordinary events, and not the other way round and, of course, at any moment future
events have not yet come to pass. NUrnberger offered this simile "... man muBte sagen daB
die Basotho mit dem Rueken zur Zukunft durch die Zeit gehen" (1987, p 152). In similar vein
there is Biesheuvel's statement that in traditional African society people "lived in the extended
present. The past was far more important than the future for which one made little
preparation. Time is something to be enjoyed, not to be one's master or turned into money ...
the acceptance by Blacks of Western time habits is far from complete" (1980, p 23). This is
also borne out by professor GD Oosthuizen's profound analysis of Africa's social and cultural
heritage (1985). And a Kenyan-born professor of Theology has characterised his society as
follows: "Since the future does not exists beyond a few months, the future cannot be expected
to usher in a golden age or a radically different state of affairs ... African people have no
belief in progress, the idea that development of human activities and achievements move from
a low to a higher degree. The people neither plan for the distant future nor build castles in the
air" (Mbiti, 1969, p 23).
6.3.2.8 Motivation
It is hardly possible that an entrepreneur or a prospective entrepreneur, would not to some
degree at least, be animated by what the psychologist depicts as the need for achievement (or
eta (11)achievement). HA Murray defines it as the desire "to accomplish something difficult.
To master, manipulate or organise physical objects, human beings or ideas. To do this as
rapidly and as independently as possible. To overcome obstacles and attain a high standard.
To excel one's self. To rival and surpass others. To increase self-regard by the successful
exercise of talent ... To work with singleness of purpose towards a high and distant goal. To
have the determination to win ..... to enjoy competition. To exert willpower ...." (1938, P 164).
According to J W Atkinson it is "the capacity to experience pride in accomplishment" (1964,
P 214). 0 C McClelland, in his research about man's inner concerns or motives, found that
"chief among these motives was what we called the need for Achievement: a desire to do
well, not so much for the sake of social recognition or prestige; but for the sake of an inner
feeling of accomplishment .., people who were 'high' in this motive tend to work harder at
certain tasks, to learn faster, to do their best work when it counts for the record and not when
special incentives such as money prizes are introduced, to choose experts rather than friends
as working partners" (1971, p l l O). In a later publication he elucidates further: "What should
be involved in the Achievement motive is doing something for its own sake, for the intrinsic
satisfaction of doing something better" (McClelland, 1987, P 228). According to him an
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achievement-oriented ideology is an essential condition for, and a precursor to, economic
growth and development.
This characterisation seems to be consistent with the attributes already detailed above in our
portrayal of the entrepreneur.
It would appear that though persons with a strong need for affiliation (Tl Affiliation) could
display qualities similar to those high in Tl Achievement when aroused by appropriate
incentives (e.g. where congenial human relations are required), they are unlikely to succeed in
the entrepreneurial function. The latter demands unpopular decisions offending people and
engendering criticism and unpopularity. Those high in TlAffiliation prefer positive, affective
relationships with others, avoid conflict and competition and seek social approval. Since
people are very important to them they would rather have, and appoint, friends than the best
qualified outsiders as working partners. When this is manifested as nepotism in the
management of a country's economy - that is, by politicians in power - the outcome is low
productivity, corruption and little economic growth, which is a feature, with few exceptions,
of economic life in Africa (Leistner, 1989, p 28).
The pronouncements of African leaders quoted in the discussion of the competitive spirit and
the spirit of enterprise intimate that the Affiliative motive would be a prominent element in
African society. It is reflected in the following description by Muthwadini of his people's
attitude: "Even if a man is rich because he has worked hard he will still be expected to share
everything that he has with them. And if he does not do it, he will be regarded as an evil man,
even as a witch or someone who has zombies working for him. People will be jealous of him"
(Muthwadini, 1990, p 33). This passage emphasises a similar point made at an earlier stage of
his portrayal, where the character described here was considered miserly, and it was judged
that the community preferred everybody to be poor rather than some rich and some poor. The
extended family system, a high birth rate, communal land ownership and common grazing
fields fit into this picture. They provide some social security but, at the same time, a powerful
disincentive to achievement. Achievers are not appreciated and public censure would not
allow them to enjoy to the full the fruits of their success. Mazrui maintained that traditional
African societies were products of "cultures of nostalgia rather than of anticipation, cultures
that move slowly, value prestige instead of achievement ... " (1994, p 80).
The quest for "ubuntu" in South African life - 'a human being is a human being through
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human beings' - can be considered a manifestation of the Affiliative motive. In the work place
it is to be translated into joint ownership, shared responsibility, joint decision-making,
participative management, consultations, democratic values, etc. (Smit, 1998, p 15). It may
epitomise humanitarianism, but it also gives the impression that the socially desirable
objectives in question have to be pursued, primarily or only for their own sake, not as a means
of promoting the efficiency of the production process.
A third motive which may be relevant to the emergence and performance of entrepreneurs is
the need for power (" Power) i.e. for self-assertion, and establishing influence or dominance
over others. When high" Power is combined with low" Affiliation (not concerned about
being liked or not) and high in Activity Inhibition (self-controlled, serving a good cause) we
have the leadership motive syndrome (McClelland, 1957, pp 313/4) which will make for
managerial success at the stage where, not individual creative striving, but the influencing of
others is required.
However, a strong power drive is more likely not to be thus constructively channelled. When
it has been socialised (i.e. in the service of fellowmen) "it may become so strong and
determined that in the end it overrides sensitivity to whether people are getting hurt",
(McClelland, 1987, P 447) with violence ensuing. This imperial power motive syndrome
characterises the political kingdomseekers whose " Power has been raised by the stress
imposed by the discriminatory measures in South Africa, from a level depicted as "blacks'
deeply rooted striving for strength and power. The impulse-controlled personality creates,
with the striving for power and strength, a community where the law of the jungle is valid"
(Du Preez, 1980, p 3). A Zimbabwean academic would have it that "power, like a desolating
pestilence, rages in Africa and the people remain victims". (Hove, 1992, p 19).They appear to
act in accordance with the philosophy espoused by the late Ghanaian president Nkhruma who
parodied the Biblical verse, implying that all the other good things will be given unto those
who inherit the political kingdom. Since political power implies economic power, it is a
preferred route to affluence. It is a means of gaining a livelihood, even in luxurious style,
without trudging the long and arduous road of economic development. The attractions,
moreover, of the status and prestige of strutting the political scene and the opportunities for
exercising power are much greater than those of the mundane nitty-gritty of engendering
economic growth. Appealing to the emotions, as in political campaigns, is a much simpler
exercise, and has a much greater chance of success, than appealing to reason as required by
economic growth. Staging a coup d'Etat is an even more direct route to economic comfort
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than engaging in elections. And such coups have a tendency of becoming a way of life in
which the successful politicians have no, or little, incentive to promote economic
development, whose occurrence becomes a fortuitous event. Assaying "Africa's social and
cultural heritage", Oosthuizen found "that those people who utilize political power in order to
achieve success on a personal level, in fact do not display the qualities essential for economic
development ... " (1985, pp 81-82).
If power is to be attained by way of an election, it would appear that scruples are not allowed
to stand in the way, judging by the South African experience during the run-up to the 1994
election: The future of the youth is sacrificed by inciting them to demonstrate, to boycott
classes, to bundle teachers out of classrooms and by feeding them on a diet of violence. Trade
unions are requested to make ridiculous wage demands supported by stay-aways, sit-ins,
sleep-ins, down-tools, strikes, often involving violence and damage to property. Mass street
processions (rolling mass action) are used to disrupt traffic, economic and social life, and
more often than not end in violence and looting. Political rivalry provokes murder and
mayhem. International trade and financial sanctions are espoused and foreign capital
investment is frightened off, which together with all the preceding forms of action are
calculated to wreak maximum damage upon the economy, reduce the national product and
increase unemployment, poverty and hunger. It could be argued that the ends justified the
means since the actions were inspired by a liberation, in addition to a power, struggle. But it
could equally be contended that the conduct in question was uncalled for since the ANC/
COSATU/SACP alliance should have known, at least after January 1990, that victory for
them at the polls was a foregone conclusion. Success is on the side of the big battalions. All
this is anathema to the entrepreneur who is the antithesis of the political kingdomseeker.
6.3.2.9 The nurturing environment
The motivational factor explored above relates to the nature of the individual which could
inspire him to achievement regardless of his socio-economic environment. The exponents of
the behavioural explanation of human activity, however, emphasise the latter, and would deny
that there is need of an enquiry into man's inner concerns or internal state to predict his
behaviour, as posited by the above, psychodynamic approach. To them striving behaviour
rewarded by societal approbation, and thus reinforced, would be the motive force. According
to one exponent "an individual's behaviour patterns are shaped ... after they have been
performed ... certain activities judged desirable by a society or group are positively reinforced,
others are not and still others may be punished. By positively reinforcing an activity after it
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has been performed the probability of repetition is increased, and if such reinforcement is
frequent and intermittent the probability approaches certainty" (Kunkel, 1971, pp 133/4). The
following conclusion of a group of experts who gathered in Monrovia in 1981 can be
considered to be a confirmation of the behaviour model: "The prime objective of
development has to be the creation of a material and cultural environment that is conducive to
self-fulfilment and creative participation. This implies a break with the past: a break with a
number of concepts and habits ... a break with the evil of deceitful slogans and paper-thin
achievements in favour of a courageous attempt to tackle the embarrassing facts of life so as
to be able to start today to prepare for the future". (Anon, 1981, pp 15/16). This amounts to a
plea for a culture of development which will nurture the economic growth of which Africa is
in woeful need. A similar inference can be read into the title of a paper: "Economic
development is a way of life" (Sadie, 1966).
If causation is uniquely enacted in the behavioural mould it would place the burden of
responsibility for a movement out of the 'low economic equilibrium trap' in Africa on change
in the cultural environment. However, rather than viewing the psychodynamic and the
behavioural approaches as mutually exclusive alternatives, they should be regarded as
complementary. One must allow for the transformation of society by the efforts of individuals
in the face of unremitting "aversive stimulus". In the Western tradition progress in arts,
science, literature, music, business, etc. has been an elitist process; not the creation of the
masses. There are individuals to whom success - as judged by themselves, not society - in
their economic (or other) endeavours is reward enough, regardless of society's reinforcing
approval or disapprobation. Accordingly, one must allow for deviants emerging from a
traditionalist society inspired only by their own motivation, to assume the innovating - in our
case the entrepreneurial - function and conditioning the community to an acquiescence or
acceptance of the benevolence of their actions, or forming small islands in a sea of conformist
inertia. The cultural environment will then not determine whether achievers will emerge or
not, but how numerous they will be by reason of its being supportive or, conversely,
inhibiting. A crucial question surfaces: can a spirit of enterprise be successfully grafted onto
African culture? At the Conference on Culture and Development in Africa some optimistic
notes were struck. Klitgaard cited an author, Buijsrogge (1989),whose experience in the rural
areas of West Africa led him to the conclusion that it "destroys the theory which affirms that
the obstacle to development resides precisely in these structures and values of traditions"
(1994, p 78). Salim (Secretary-General, OAV) maintained that Japan's performance clearly
demonstrated that traditional cultural values and modernism were compatible (1994, P 12).
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Dia, too, thought that it would be necessary to build on the local traditional values as in Japan
and other Asian communities (1994, P 190). This inevitably raises the question whether the
values of Japan (or East Asia) and Africa are comparable in the context of nurture. The
second question is how the 'building on', or 'adaptation to', is to be accomplished. According
to Bryant cultural congruency could be achieved by means of "management approaches to
strongly held local norms and practices ... " (1994, p 447); while UNESCO also preferred the
suggestion that action in this regard should be "along lines similar to those indicated for
management development" (1994, pp 54617). To another speaker, Etounga-Manguellé, chief
executive officer of a company (SADEC) which conducts seminars on cultural adjustment,
. this implied 'deconstruction' as a first step "that is, to recognise that African cultures
sometimes do influence negatively the economic performance" (1994, p 219).
The management approach can be interpreted as the provision of the learning-by-doing
educational and training facilities for the generation of entrepreneurs. But it still begs the
question: where do the managers of the prospective managers (or trainees) hail from if not
from non-indigenous sources? The nurturing factor at issue relates in the first place to the
executives not the trainees.
It could be argued that the analysis above does not have predictive value for the performance
of the Black community of South Africa. While their contribution to the entrepreneurial class
is relatively small- 3,7 per cent compared to a 70 per cent share in the aggregate labour force,
the relevant magnitudes for the Indian community being 4,3 per cent and 2,8 per cent, and for
Whites 89,7 per cent and 17,3 per cent respectively - it has been achieved despite a contrived
inhospitable climate. During the decades before 1986 there were, in the Common Area,
restrictions on the founding and expanding of business enterprises by Black business men,
while White managers have been accused of a lack of enthusiasm for training Blacks lest they
become competitors. In addition there has been, according to an influential Black manager,
"above all a reluctance - due to political pressures - of Blacks to move into management
positions because it was seen as part of the capitalist system" (Ncube, 1993, p 23). And in the
self-governing and autonomous regions indigenous entrepreneurship did not make impressive
strides. Also to be borne in mind is that many of the antitheses instanced above, to highlight
the typical attributes of the entrepreneur, referred to traditionalist societies which, in their
mindsets and values, could differ significantly from the urbanised communities. Even so, it
would seem that the development of a new way of life, generated endogenously within the
mould of the culture of cities - which is conducive to a secularisation or emancipation
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process, freeing men and women from the fetters of tradition and conformance - is neither a
simple nor a speedy operation. "Even where urban life leads to the rejection of traditional
religion and the adoption of secular values, it is found that the world-view remains, and
continues to influence thinking" according to Oosthuizen (1985, p 81).
When a spokesman of a Black Teachers Union declares in public that they did not want White
teachers - who are much better qualified - in their schools, because they did not want a
foreign culture imposed upon their schoolchildren, does it reflect a purely pedagogical
principle, or an unwillingness - in the words of the Monrovian experts cited above - "to break
with a number of concepts and habits ... with the evil of deceitful slogans and paper thin
achievements ... " (Africa Guide, 1981, P 16).
In summary, but for the argument that by the end of the millennium not enough time had yet
been allowed for a true gestation period, the response to the crucial question posed above
cannot breathe unstinting optimism.
6.4 SOME SPECIFIC DEMOGRAPHIC FORCES
6.4.1 A quantified portrayal of the population 's economic quality
The cultural attributes dealt with in 6.3 can be regarded as constituents of the economic
quality of the population, representing, that is, its potential as a source of economic growth
and development. We can, however, also proffer a quantified portrayal of such quality,
determined in part by demographic factors, by having recourse to the skill composition of the
labour force, in which the entrepreneur features as the kingpin.
The quantification of the economic contents of the human material is carried out by
constructing population categories by socio-economic class, around the male members of the
labour force according to the skill content of their occupations, as recorded by the Central
Statistical Service in their Manpower Surveys. To this end the differential fertility, mortality,
and age and occupational structures of the four ethnic groups have been employed (Sadie,
1991, pp 128-130). (Female members were omitted because the large majority are married to
husbands who have a higher occupational status, and their inclusion would frustrate the
exercise.) Four classes or categories have been distinguished:
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III
IV
The entrepreneurial/managerial/executive class.
The professional and technical group together with other white and blue collar
skilled workers.
The Semi-skilled.
The unskilled and underemployed.
II
The unemployed have been assigned to classes III and IV only, the labour force members
with standard 8 or better school certificates having been regarded as members of the semi-
skilled male workers around whom Class III has been assembled.
For purposes of comparison and judgement a similar exercise was carried out for the USA on
the assumption that the relationship between labour force per skill and total population per
class would be similar to those obtained in South Africa. Although the result for the USA is
no more than an approximation, it is contended that any error arising from our assumption
would not be significant enough to render the comparison invalid.
The outcome of the analysis is summarised in Table 6.3 and graphically portrayed in figures
6.1 and 6.2 in which the numbers in Class I are set equal to 1 and those in the others are
expressed as a ratio to the size of I.
TABLE 6.3
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CLASS STRUCTURES
S A POPULATION USA
2011 2011 Population
1991-96 1991 Without upward With Mobility structure
Mobility
TFR Structure Structure Growth Structure Growth
%p.a. %p.a.
I 1,8 1,0 1,0 0,6 1,0 1,0 1,0
II 2,3 3,8 4,2 1,1 5,1 2,4 2,4
III 3,1 13,5 16,9 1,8 16,4 2,0 4,8
IV 4,2 17,5 23,1 2,0 19,5 1,5 1,9
3,6 35,8 45,2 1,8 42,0 1,8 10,1
The econormc problématique of South Africa, representative of the category of semi-
industrialized countries, is vividly exposed when its economic (or socio-economic) class
structure is compared with that of the United States, representative of highly developed
countries. In the former, class I has a numerical status of 1 in 35,8 or, if it is considered that I
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and II together constitute the condition for the welfare of III and IV, the status is 1 in 7,5,
according to the 1991 situation. Juxtaposing the American situation of 1 in 10, and 1 in 3
respectively, and postulating that an approximation to the American population quality is
required for reasonable rates of growth, development, employment, and thus of high or
reasonable living standards, the economic weakness of the South African population is starkly
portrayed. Figure 6.1 permits us to appreciate the huge superstructure resting and dependent
upon the slender formation of class I or I and II.
The data in Table 6.3 testify to the customary inverse correlation between class status and
fertility (and growth), that is, between the ability to create life and the capability to sustain it,
those with the least capability having the largest families. If a positive correlation between
performance in intelligence or similar tests and socio-economic status is truly representative
of differential mental ability, genetically transmitted from parents to children, the differential
fertility and growth would spell an inevitable decline in the average quality of the population.
This is represented in the 2011 class structure according to the hypothesis of no upward
mobility, where the numerical status of class I now becomes 1 in 45,2, or, of classes I & II, 1
in 8,7. However, we are reminded by geneticists that what is transmitted is not a phenotypic
attribute but a genotypic potential for the developmental response of an organism to its
environment (Birch & Gussow, 1979, eh II) which may be hospitable or inhospitable. A
rapidly expanding economy, generating many opportunities for advancement, would
constitute a hospitable environment. It is generally conceded that the I.Q. does not necessarily
measure the talent and personality qualities which can, or need be applied in occupations;
that it could evidence the effect of education which higher class parents can afford better than
the lower class ones; that it can reflect differences in motivation to perform well in the tests;
that these latter are not necessarily culturally unbiased; and that they do not make allowance
for the probability that the official discriminatory measures against the advancement of the
Black component of classes III and IV might have denied full opportunity for the
development or expression of innate ability.
Figure 6.1
SOUTH AFRICAN 1991 POPULATION BY CLASS
[CH6(JLS)]
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
190
Figure 6.2
USA POPULATION
As it is, the class structure of the South African population has exhibited upward mobility
over time and, accordingly, an historic improvement in the average quality partly as a
function of the level of economic activity. It was greatest during the golden era of the
Kondratieff cycle, slowed down from the middle of the eighties by reason of the large
majority of new accretions to the labour force having swollen the ranks of the untrained,
unemployed and underemployed. If, for the purposes of projection, we ignore the period of
stagnation and accord the 1975-85 period a one-third greater significance in occupational
progress on the preceding ten years (part of the golden era), the resulting upward mobility of
the population will produce a faster growth for classes II and III than for the other two, as
shown under the year 2011 in Table 6.3. In the event, the numerical status of class I is still
lower than in 1991, even while I and II combined now yields a 1 to 6,9 ratio, compared to 1 to
7,5 for 1991. The source of economic growth is most likely to decline in numerical strength.
The White population (projected natural increase 0,3 per cent p.a.) which (for whatever
reason) has been the predominant (89 per cent) supplier of entrepreneurship, and must for
practical reasons be expected to continue doing so for the foreseeable future, will have a share
of only 2,4 per cent in the total LF increment during the 20 years (1991-2011), compared to
15 per cent during 1960-90.
To test for the possible mobility-inhibiting effect of discrimination against Blacks, who form
the vast majority of classes III and IV, their actual LF achievements over the period 1946 -
1985 have been compared to what they would have been, (the norm), had Black numbers in
each of skill categories I, II and III grown at the rates registered by the White LF multiplied
by the ratio in which the aggregate Black LF growth exceeded that of Whites. The
comparison, whose outcome is not, of course, definitive in unconditional sense, reveals a
considerably better actual performance than the hypothesised norm. This was to be expected
in the light of the information in Table 6.1. The outcome is a manifestation of the
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entrepreneurial dynamism of the discriminators which, until the beginning of the eighties, was
potent enough to counteract the restraining effect of the discriminatory measures for the most
part, in that the Whites, in whose interest they were applied, and whose numbers were
augmented at a decelerating rate, moved rapidly upward leaving vacancies to be filled. The
experience of the years after 1986 would intimate that the dismantling of discrimination is no
substitute for entrepreneurial dynamism.
However, specifically in the case of the managerial cadre, apartheid, defined as legalised
discrimination, would have impeded the advancement of larger numbers into the senior level
by reason of their marginalisation arising from the group area restrictions. It has been
maintained that the Black managers were "poised in psychological uncertainty in no-man's
land between the White-dominated middle class managerial world and the black working
class in their company and in the Black Townships". (Watts, 1986, p 6). Functioning in the
White society during the day, they were not allowed to continue normal contact, after working
hours, with the environment in which the business norms, values, standards and world view
are nurtured, and they were not fully accepted in their residential environment either. In the
workplace itself Black managers also had (have) to contend with the process of social closure,
in which White managers wanted to optimise their own rewards by denying or limiting access
to opportunities to those not considered eligible. And eligibility was conditioned by
perceptions that Blacks lacked the necessary abilities and characteristics for upward mobility.
(Human & Icely, 1987, pp 20/22; Franks, 1987, p 32). This negative attitude has the air of
stereotyping and/or prejudice, but unfortunately the research does not include an assessment
of the verisimilitude of these perceptions.
During the hey-day of apartheid a Nuffield Research Fellow who studied the careers of a
Reeftown Black elite reported as follows: "... our educated elite felt wounded by all the small
pinpricks received in even the most benevolent interracial contact. But in their careers, our
elite had encountered only a few setbacks because of colour. On the contrary, their colour had
rather favoured their careers. In reality, and the truth should for once be told, separate
development gave them opportunities which they might not otherwise have had." (Brandel-
Syrier, 1971, p 290).
The conclusion must be that the evidence available does not permit of a definitive inference
about the influence of pre-1990 policy. We shall be traversing some firmer ground when
assessing the effect of specific demographic impulses on the economic quality of the South
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African population.
6.4.2 The home environment
It would appear, judging at least by expenence abroad, that in the absence of genetic
differentials, social barriers and overt discrimination, the tendency towards closed-group or
intra-class reproduction, i.e. class-inertia, will remain. Sons are more likely than not to enter
the occupation of their fathers or one close enough in rank order and, accordingly, the
childrens' advancement is linked with their parents' class (Brown, 1979, pp 189, 206, 233,
251). Even with a high incidence of superior ability among children of manual workers, they
were "unlikely to move out of the social class into which they were born" (Douglas, Ross,
Simpson, 1968, p 100). This is featured in the sub-title of a book, How working class kids get
working class jobs (Willis, 1977). When samples of 13 year-olds and standard 6 pupils in
South Africa were subjected to a General Scholastic Aptitude Test (a test of academic
intelligence) it was found that a large part of the variance in scores could be explained by
socio-economic status, compared to attitudinal and motivational variables (Claassen &
Schepers, 1990, pp 300/1). The crucial element is the style of upbringing in the home. Parents
will not be transmitting to their children knowledge, habits of mind, values, notions about the
value of education, verbal expression, ambitions, interest and aptitudes which they themselves
do not treasure. Again, children are likely to intemalise the expectations of their parents. In a
study which related the IQ of twelve-year old Scottish children to family background factors
including family income and size, parents' education and living space, it was found that
"much the highest correlation was with parental encouragement. But only those parents who
feel it is within their power to achieve goals that they set before themselves are likely to set
goals before their children that they encourage them to achieve. Parents with low incomes are
more likely to feel themselves helpless in the grip of circumstance". (Phelps Brown, 1979, P
221, quoting Fraser 1959). When negative correlations between intelligence and size of
family emerge from research (Douglas, 1967, pp 124-5) causality can be traced back largely
to parental encouragement, or the lack of it, or style of upbringing, which can be subsumed
under the environment or nurture. The effect of the environment on the growth of intelligence
is more pronounced when it is unfavourable than when it is favourable.
6.4.3 Reproduction, nutrition and health
Nurture can be said to start in the intra-uterine environment of the foetus which is essentially
a parasite living on the nutrients in the mother's body. Appropriate nourishment, particularly
proteins and the vitamin B complex, is required for the proper development of the child's
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central nervous system upon which intellectual activity is dependent. Severe malnutrition and
vitamin or hormone deficiency cause injury to this system which cannot be undone by
improved nourishment at a later stage (President's Council, 1984, p 120). The Neuro-
psychological Research Unit, Unisa, found that "mild to moderate under-nutrition is likely to
have a permanent effect on brain function and development". (Centre for Science
Development Bulletin, 1992). A New Zealand study of the lives, from birth to adulthood, of
more than 1 000 babies born during 1972-73 found that low birth weight in full-term babies
had an adverse effect upon intellectual growth. The research group's measures of
temperament at age 3 had powerful predictive value for behaviour up to adulthood. (However,
they concluded that the children of working women were not relatively disadvantaged).
(Louisson, 1994, p 6). Nutritional requirements for good health, vitality and mental
development continue after birth, of course, but is particularly important during the first two
post-natal years. In the high fertility community, frequent pregnancies following closely upon
one another, the short intervals may render it impossible for mothers to reconstitute adequate
reserves of nutrients, resulting not only in children lacking in economic potential but also in
mothers whose health does not allow of the competent rearing of her children. "One cannot
place too much emphasis on the close relationship between the health of the mother and the
health of the entire family", proclaims the United Nations Department of International
Economic and Social Affairs (1987, p 69). In the case of physically immature teenagers the
competition between foetus and mother for nutrients is greatest, while physiologically and
psychologically they may be less capable of coping with the exigencies of pregnancy,
childbirth and subsequent upbringing of the child. If they become pregnant while still at
school, it will mean the interruption or termination of the school career and the abandonment
of occupational aspirations. If they are married there is a greater likelihood (than for
marriages at a higher age) of the marriage ending in divorce with adverse consequences for
the children.
The Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and the World Fertility Surveys (WFS) have
brought to light that the excess risk of death before age 5 arising from poorly spaced births
can range from 35 per cent to 123 per cent, (Hob craft, 1991, p 24; Palloni, 1991, pp 25/26),
reflecting the differential health and nutritional status, and concomitantly the economic
potential, of survivors (Behrens, 1991, pp 36,38). Using well-spaced births to mothers aged
20 to 34 as reference category, the DHS's and WFS's also showed up an excess risk of 46 per
cent for first births to mothers younger than 20. The absolute number of births per mother can
also be detrimental to the health of the infant, the risks increasing steeply after the third.
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These elements in the reproductive process which exacerbate the risks of child mortality also
reduce the chances of survival of the mother, depriving the surviving children of a mother's
care, with very serious results for their development. According to the Senior Population
Adviser to the World Bank the reason for the high rate of maternal mortality in Africa is "that
many women are having children without being properly nourished themselves. Sometimes
they start too early. They may be spacing children too closely. Sometimes they are going on
for far too long, when they are too old to have children safely ... women who start having
children before they are 18 years of age are risking their lives drastically .... Compared to the
risks faced by their sisters in Europe and America the African mother faces risks a hundred or
two hundred times greater" (Sai, 1991, P 4).
The above life-impairing (length and quality)conditions of the reproductive process apply to
most of the South African population in class IV and some in class III. The incidence of
teenage motherhood of high-fertility class IV is 2,9 times that of class I (Mostert, Van Tonder,
Hofmeyr, 1988, p 86), the probability of continuing motherhood after age 35 is 6,6 times as
high; the average number of births 2,4 times that of class I, the probability of a first child
being born to a single parent is some 8 times as high. In a study of 3 000 children born in
Soweto over a six-week period during 1990, it was found that 50 per cent of the pregnancies
had been unwanted, causing stress and demoralisation among most mothers, many of them
without financial and moral support from the fathers (Centre for Social Development, 1991,
P 14). This portends a most inauspicious start to life.
The prevalence of malnutrition among children 6 to 9 years old in South Africa can be
juxtaposed. Using as conservative measure 75 per cent of the NCHS (National Centre for
Health Statistics) Standards of weight for age, it was found that 2 per cent of White, 14 per
cent of Black, 21 per cent of Coloured and 25 per cent of Asian children, in a sample of 20
000 schoolchildren, fell below this reference level (Vergnani, 1983, p 9). The differences
between the last three percentages must be a function of feeding habits or knowledge of the
preservation of life, since the economic factor would have produced a converse result. An
additional acceptable explanation would be that the sample did not contain adequate
representation of Black children since large percentages of them were not attending school
and three of the four autonomous states, viz. Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda, had not
been included. If stunting (a height for age measure), which is an adaptive response to chronic
under-nutrition, is not closely correlated with mortality, data on its incidence will provide
valuable information for the assessment of health. Such data are not available for South Africa
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except for the results obtained by Operation Hunger in measuring 401 children in 28 rural
villages which showed a 56,5 per cent incidence of a stunted condition. With an average per
capita income approximately one-sixth of the national figure these children are not, however,
representative of South Africa in the aggregate. The Committee on Value Added Tax
(VATCOM) estimated that some 2,3 million South Africans needed nutritional support for the
combating of malnutrition (VATCOM, 1991, pIS), which are approximately half-a-million
more than are actually given life-supporting supplementary food by Operation Hunger. In
neighbouring countries (around 1980-90) the percentage for children 2 to 5 years old is
reported to be 23 in Lesotho, 31 in Zimbabwe and 51 in Botswana (those whose height for
age is less than 77 per cent of the medium) (Haldenwang, 1993, p 44/5). The available daily
supply of calories per capita of the total population of these same countries in 1988 was 2307,
2232 and 2269 respectively, while that of Namibia was 1889 and of Mozambique 1632
(United Nations Development Programme, 1992, pp 150/3). The 3 035 calories average for
South Africa may mask a fairly wide dispersion of individual intakes, some of which will no
doubt not qualify as adequate.
The probable meaning of these calorific values for the economic quality of human lives can
be gauged by comparing them with the following estimated requirements of a labour force for
a 100 per cent working capacity in various sectors of the economy: White collar service
industries 2 400, secondary industry 3 000, Agriculture 3 600 and Mining 4 200. (Correa,
1963, pp 36/7). The statistics quoted above, particularly when the probable deviations around
the means are taken into consideration, must point to under-nutrition on an extensive scale
and/or large numbers of workers operating below optimum productive capacity. Children's
progress as they grow into adulthood will be impeded by their being defective repositories of
learning, knowledge and training by reason of their apathy and lack of interest. And they will
not be able to summon up the enthusiasm which, according to Walter Chrysler, "is at the
bottom of all progress. With it there is accomplishment. Without it there are only alibis"
(Ibid). Good health is necessary for the child to respond actively to the stimulation he receives
in the educational process.
6.4.4 Malnutrition, poverty and family size
Since malnutrition is closely associated with poverty, the question arises to what extent the
latter can be traced back to demographic factors. While this matter in its broader context is
argued in a later Chapter, we can here demonstrate the effect of fertility, net of mortality, on
the amount of economic resources available for the nurture of the child and, thus, on its
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economic potential. This amount will be equated with the marginal cost of children in a
representative low-income household living in Johannesburg whose male breadwinner earns
the Household Subsistence level income of R930 per month. The marginal cost calculation
involves debiting rental and transport costs to the parents only. The details at issue are as
follows: (Institute for Planning Research, 1993, p 33).
Primary cost (Rand)
Father 134
Mother 116
Rental & Transport 157
General expenses ]_Q
437
Boy 15-18 132
Girl 11-14 113
Child 7-10 94
Child 4- 6 82
Child 1- 3 64
General expenses 69 545
Available to
children 493 (= 930 - 437)
The difference between the amount available to children and the total cost of the five children
detailed above is due to the fact that the average number per sample household is taken as
four and not five, and the age composition of these children need not necessarily equal that in
our example. To the above statistics we can now apply the following data on comparative age
structures, viz.:
Fathers
Mothers
Children (0-14)
Class I
100
100
69
Class IV
100
100
147
Assuming that the breadwinners' income per month is R930 for both classes of households,
the application yields an average amount available per child of R335 for Class IV compared
to R714 for Class I, a disadvantage of 53 per cent. This latter statistic becomes 60 per cent
when the Black population is compared to the White population, and 64 per cent when the
figure is calculated on a family headship and child dependency basis. In terms of the latter it
can be maintained that if the Class I child has to compete with one sibling for the economic
resources of his father, the Class IV child has to contend with three to four. Alternatively,
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with the expenditure on education of a given amount per family the former class will face a
pupil/teacher ratio more than twice that of the latter, entailing a concomitant education of
lesser quality. If the former would want to compensate for the disadvantage by way of the
mother's entry into the labour force - assuming she could earn the same wage as the father -
some 69 per cent of those in the economically active ages would have to do so (compared to a
100 per cent non-participation for Class I mothers). In the event, the attention devoted to the
rearing of the children will be reduced.
In practice, the usual adjustment to the deficient economic condition, pointed up above, is the
early termination of school attendance, not only to reduce costs to parents but also to allow
early entry into the labour force to augment the family income. But this implies the forfeiture
of human capital formation, condemning the victims to low status, low income, jobs to
perpetuate poverty.
Even while reference to the culture of poverty is best avoided because of the implication that
it reinforces dysfunctional behaviour which exacerbates poverty (refuted by empirical
research, according to Bryant (1994, p 450)), it does not imply that chronic poverty - in the
life of successive generations, that is - does not constitute a most unpromising environment
for the attainment of an achieving society with high upward mobility to produce relatively
large numbers of entrepreneurs. Children in communities thus afflicted would seem to be
mentally and psychologically incapable to benefit from education. They have been prepared
for failure, not success, leave school as soon as possible, and are doomed to remain in
unskilled jobs for the whole of their lives in the course of which non-attendance and
absconding are regular occurrences. Reproductive prolificity ensures the perpetuation of the
vicious circle of poverty begetting poverty and economic stagnation.
6.4.5 The crucial age
The authors of The Origins of Human Competence define unequivocally the crucial age in the
process of human development. "After 20 years of research on the origins of human
competence" they attest, "we are convinced that much that shapes the final product takes
place during the first few years of life" (White, Kaban & Attanucci, 1979, p 183). This is
repeatedly emphasised in preceding paragraphs e.g. "To get to the heart of the matter, it
appears that a first-rate educational experience during the first 3 years of life is required if a
person is to develop to his or her full potential ... poor progress during the early years seems
to be remarkably difficult to overcome" (p 181). The right time to begin the stimulation of
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intellectual curiosity and the structuring of experiences as an aid to child development is not
later than 7 months, when the kinetic-mobility of the infant is increasing and he/she begins to
show an interest in the object world around himlher, such action to extend over the critical
period 7 to 36 months (p 37). Again, "we have become convinced that the experiences of the
period of life between 7 months and 3 years are of unique importance" (p 117). Still more, "It
is our belief that the experiences children have between the seventh and twenty-fourth
month's of life are of especial importance for the lifelong development process" (p 138). In
another study of the course of development of attributes such as general intelligence,
intellectuality, achievement at school, etc. it was concluded that "their is a negatively
accelerated curve of development which reaches its midpoint before age 5 (Bloom, 1964, p
214). Similar conclusions were drawn by other researchers (Taylor, 1983; President's Council,
1984, pp 117/119; Biesheuvel, 1978, pp 120 et seq).
That there are a number of countries whose political leaders or educationists underwrite the
above findings emerged at a Montreal conference on how to identify and educate an elite
(The Daily News, 1981, p 6). The outstanding example was Venezuela, whose Minister for
the Development of Intelligence (Machado) compared theories with de Bono - who developed
the concept of lateral thinking (1978) and insisted that intelligence was not sufficient but that
the skills of thinking had to be taught - and initiated 'intelligence programmes' adapted from
de Bono's theories which included the encouragement of mothers in maternity wards to
stimulate their babies' senses soon after birth (Silber, 1992, pp 24-28). In South Africa the
Human Sciences Research Council's Early Education Unit developed the "Toybox" as an
enrichment package for pre-school children to stimulate social and cognitive competence, the
application of which had a positive effect on the psychometric competence of two- and four-
year old children (Kemp, 1993, p 26-27).
It needs to be added that there may be some scepticism about the definitive importance of the
youthful age in the generation of the achievement motive in so far as a major exponent of the
latter, McClelland, in his later years, initiated short term programmes to raise the level of
achievement of mature participants (Weiner, 1980, p 220). On the other hand, it would appear
that parents who are not permissive about sexual and aggressive assertiveness, and who
discipline their children, could inhibit the development of ,., Power in their children, (a
negative force) and thus put a damper on the emergence of an attribute which is inimical to
managerial success (a positive outcome) (McClelland, 1978, pp 325, 326,456).
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Given then, that the first three to five years of life are of critical importance, the childrearing
practices during these years, apart from those factors already mentioned before, should have a
major influence on its development as a source of eventual economic growth and
development. The upbringing involves the stimulus (or lack of it) imparted by parents by way
of the interest they manifest in the child's activities, learning process, awareness and
intellectual curiosity, and the amount of encouragement provided. Using rich, well-structured
language containing abstract and general terms in communicating with the child, and
enunciating reasons and explanations, will equip him/her with a better tool of problem
solving, and an understanding of the world around him/her. Mere gestures and commands will
not be conducive to the attainment of such goals. According to White, Kaban and Attanucci
"it is not so much what an adult can do, but what the adult does do that makes the difference"
(1979, p 179).
They also found a remarkable degree of superiority in the early intellectual development of
first-born children compared to those born later, parents (in their study) having spent twice as
much time with the former and have probably been observing greater sensitivity in their
responses, with a more open-minded approach to childrearing (pp 123, 177, 179).
Understandably, when pregnancies follow one another in rapid succession, practices and
means other than regular communication and attention - such as confinement to playpens -
will be devised to deal with children previously born, who would most likely be left, to a
great extent, to their own devices. A study of outstanding achievers and very gifted children in
New York disclosed that they "were all more likely to be only children, oldest children, or
children with longer than average distance between themselves and the next older child, than
could be explained by chance" (Lip set and Bendix, 1959, p 222). It needs no great
imagination to realise that the mother of a large number of children, as in class IV and III,
cannot lavish care upon each of them with the same amount of enthusiasm, zeal and energy as
she would on one or two. Phelps Brown, commenting on 33 surveys which have shown
negative correlations between size of family and children's intelligence, remarked that "the
mother of a numerous brood is remarkable if she is not overburdened and sometimes
overwrought, unable even if she had the time to give her children the emotional support they
need ... the major factor common to large families in all classes seems likely to have been the
reduction in the interest and encouragement that each child can get as the number of children
grows" (1977, p 222).
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6.5 CONCLUSION
Since the ethno-demographic composition of the South African population, in concomitance
with differential rates of growth, is in itself a source of economic change, the net of relevance
in the discussion above has been cast rather widely, to include a variety of characteristics and
experiences which can affect the economy by way of the composition in question. However, it
would be presumptuous to try and quantify the relative significance of demographic forces in
the process of economic development, via the economic quality of the population and
entrepreneurship, in comparison with other factors such as economic status (not
demographically determined), intelligence, knowledge, values and norms of the parents.
When a culture of economic development is wholly lacking, demographic factors will still be
important, but only at a secondary level of causation, exacerbating retrogression (high
fertility, rapid increase) or, in the opposite, containing it. In our appraisal we shall exclude
such lack and assume that the above factors of a non-demographic nature will not preclude the
emergence of economic growth generators, even if not necessarily promoting it actively. We
can then offer the following compendium of the handicaps - arising from demographic
conditions only - suffered by a child (a male to obviate the necessity of repeating his/her) born
to parents in class IV compared to one born to class I (or even I & II) parents, in a possible
quest to move upward in the class hierarchy to reach the entrepreneurial/managerial/executive
status. His likelihood
of being born to parents in an agrarian society, where the culture of the city,
emancipatory of traditional inertia, has not penetrated, is five times as high;
of being the result of an unwanted pregnancy, six or more times as high;
- of being born into a (demographically induced) poverty condition, more than
twice as high;
of being born to a teenage mother, two-and-a-halftimes;
of being born to a single parent, 2,9 times;
of receiving the necessary stimulus and encouragement during the first three
years of rapid development potential, one-half to one-third;
of competing with siblings for the economic resources of his father, three
times;
of suffering from malnutrition and consequential lack of interest in the learning
process, and of ambition, three times;
of leaving school before attaining a proper foundation for occupational
advancement, three times (in practice, with the addition of all non-
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demographic influences, it becomes six times);
of finding ajob in a stationary economy, one-third that of class I.
Children being born and growing up in the environment depicted above are most unlikely to
be invested with the characteristics attributable to the entrepreneur: the spirit of enterprise,
initiative, drive, commitment, perseverance, an energetic pursuit of goals, a spirit of
independence, a strong work ethic, a competitive spirit, a strong awareness of the necessity of
providing for the future, dedication to learning, and a powerful achievement motivation. They
are more likely to stagnate on the lowest rungs of the occupational ladder, reproducing
children in a vicious circle of economically deficient human material perpetuating itself.
When the adult victims of the above conditions move into urban areas where their children
can observe the contrast between their economic situation and that of the more affluent,
chances are that these children become revolutionary material imbued with a strong power
motive syndrome, eager to attain some economic well-being by means of violent political
action, rather than of self-exertion in economic activity.
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CHAPTER 7
NATURAL RESOURCES
7.1 POPULATION AND NATURAL RESOURCE CONSUMPTION
We can identify the following components of natural resources: natural beauty of the
landscape, climate and wildlife - which can form the basis for profitable tourism; mineral
resources, which are non-renewable; renewable plant life (trees, forests, shrubs); air; water;
land. Constituent elements of the ecosystem, as they are, they are interlinked, so that damage
to anyone of them (which shall be called consumption i.e. use without restoration) will
impact upon all the others. Consumption of natural resources by way of pollution and
degradation of nature, air (atmosphere), water and land, deforestation and the mining of
mineral resources, reduces their quality and/or quantity to render economic development
unsustainable at a given level and compromise the ability of a next generation to satisfy its
needs (inducing intergenerational inequity).
Without implying the conferment of a specific relative significance to the demographic factor
in the causal process, it can be stated that mankind, harnessing natural resources to the
satisfaction of its needs, cannot but impact upon them.
In enquiring into the pressure of mankind on its natural resources, or (encompassing all of
them) the physical environment, we can relate the consumption (C) in question to the
following factors as possible determinants of its level.
N Population numbers (including composition and growth)
Y = Income per capita, the affluence factor, which in the history of
economic development is so highly correlated with technology
employed so far that it can be subsumed under Y. This does not
exclude the possibility of developing alternative technology to produce
an existing level of affluence. The distribution of income within and
between communities (Ydistr) is, of course, relevant.
P = Price, which can stand for the outcome of market forces and/or public
policy.
In short, C = f[N, Y, P, Ydistr]
This specification of the relationship reminds us that the demographic factor is not necessarily
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the only or the most significant cause of pressure on natural resources in all instances. In the
conclusion the relationship will be subjected to further analysis.
7.2 NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCES
By their very nature exhaustible resources are irretrievably lost when they are used, and
cannot be restored. One example will suffice: it took nature some one million years to
produce an amount of fossil fuel that the world uses in one year. An oil field once depleted
will not be regenerated within the next few thousand years, if ever. In the case of precious
stones and metals, bought for adornment and investment, the loss is largely confined to the
raw material producers, and does not necessarily extend to the world at large. To the former
their durability is indeed a cause for concern, arguing that it accumulates an overhang of
supply in the market which is not conducive to price and income stability. The exhaustion of
deposits of these minerals and metals, though important from the point of view of the
population of producing countries, will not have quite the same damaging effect on the world
economy as that of some other forms of non-renewable resources. To South Africa, as an
important producer of these and other non-fuel minerals the depletion of deposits is a living
standard-impairing process. Its production of gold, for example, diminished from 910 tons in
1972 to 493 tons in 1997 and around 460 tons in 1998 (based on nine months' production as
recorded by the Department of Minerals and Energy, 1998). This metal earned 26 per cent of
foreign exchange on current account of the balance of payments during the period 1980 to
1997, starting with a 45 per cent share when the price had skyrocketed to 800 dollars per
ounce, and ending on 15 per cent (SARB Quarterly Bulleting, various issues). The exhaustion
of the richest ore compelled the industry to mine progressively lower grades and this, in
combination with increasing wages and other cost items, raised the average cost of production
per ounce in South Africa to the highest in the world. Between 1987 and 1998 the number of
jobs in the gold-mining industry declined by 283 400 (CSS P0242, 1987 and 1998), affecting
the lives of more than a million persons. The industry's contribution to government revenue
from taxes on income and profits shrunk to 0,6 per cent in 1997, down from 14,6 per cent in
1985.
In terms of the number and quantities of other minerals found in South Africa the country can
be called mineral-rich (which does not thereby qualify it as a rich country). The foreign
exchange earned by them exceeded that of gold by R6700 million in 1998 and the excess is
increasing every year. In 1998 they were responsible for just over 16 per cent of the balance
of payments current account earnings. Some of the non-gold minerals are strategic materials
of which South Africa has major portions of the world's reserves (Vanadium 45%, Chrome
ore 68%, Manganese 81%, platinum group metals 56%), with platinum benefiting from
environmental degradation in that it is used in catalysts for the reduction of car exhaust
emissions (Chamber of Mines, 1997, P 4). They accorded the country a degree of bargaining
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power during the years of stockpiling by some industrialised countries, and propped up the
economy while manufacturing was declining and moving sideways in its contribution to the
GDP ever since 1981. But this dependence of the economy makes for vulnerability in light of
the depletion of reserves or, at least, of the higher grades of mineral deposits. When the
income-, matrix- and (what can be called) the "foreign exchange" multiplier of the mining
industry are taken into account its contribution to the welfare of the population is not
adequately reflected by its 1997 7,8 per cent share in the generation of the GDP (SARB,
September 1998, p 5-106). And the consumption of "nature's capital" involved in this process
is tantamount to living on the community's capital instead of only the' interest' on the capital.
The rest of the world behaves in similar fashion with potentially dire consequences for the
reserves available to future generations. As is to be expected, the rates of consumption are
positively related to the level of industrialisation, in cross-sectional country analyses. Were
current rates to be maintained, reserves of copper, for example, would have a life span of 277
years, at zero population growth. The projected 2030 world population, however, consuming
at the rate of the United States - which implies sizeable increases in those of the less
developed countries (LDCs) - will reduce the life span to 26 years. In the case of platinum the
reduction would be from 400 to 40 years (Frosch & Gallopoulas, 1989, p 149). The influence
of the affluence factor emerges from the following figures: During the thirty-seven years,
1950 - 1987, copper production increased by one-and-a-half times the rate of the world's
population growth, steel almost two times, and aluminium five times (Population Reports,
1992 May, p 19). Industrialised countries containing 20 per cent of the world's population are
consuming 80 per cent of iron and steel and 86 per cent of aluminium production. By 1989
the USA was using up virgin raw materials at a rate seventeen times that of 1900, while its
population has risen just more than three times (Population and the Planet, 1995, pp 10-11).
Since a modern economy is run on energy, the Report to the Club of Rome, The Limits to
Growth (Meadows, et al.), in 1972, followed by the raising of oil prices by the OPEC cartel,
sparked great concern about the availability of future supplies of the sources of commercial
(i.e. non-traditional) energy. In the responses elicited there was reference to the profligate use
of resources at accelerating rates, "cowboy economy", rape of the earth, etc., even while
mathematicians and economists demonstrated the sensitivity of the predictive model in the
Report to changes in parameters and assumptions. Since 1972 there has been a decline in the
rate of increase in per capita commercial energy use, to show a rise of only 13 per cent during
1970 - 1990, from 2,04 to 2,30 kilowatts, compared to a 100 per cent increase during the
preceding twenty year period, which, in turn, was preceded by a 231 per cent rise. It would
seem that over time, the course of energy consumption, presented in stylised form as a
function of the tempo of economic growth, traces out a sigmoid curve (a flattened S-curve).
The highly industrialised countries have reached the tertiary stage represented by the levelling
off of the curve, while the LDCs are moving along the secondary stage of acceleration of
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consumption intensity in which the elasticity of demand with respect to economic growth is
higher than 1 (Holdren, 1990, pp 109-115; IFR, 1993, P 5-68).
At the time of writing the First World, affluence that is, was still responsible for the bulk of
consumption of commercial energy, as can be deduced from the following modal per capita
use (in gigajoules) as furnished in the May 1992 supplement to Population Reports:
Africa
East Asia
Latin America
North America
Western Europe
Eastern Europe
0- 3
1 - 9
11 - 25
295 - 321
107 - 169
lowest 107 - highest 191 (former USSR)
Since around 1970, however, the Third World, with its proliferating population numbers, has
been assuming an increasing role in incremental consumption. Available data allow us to
draw the following inference with respect to the relative shares of population numbers (N)
and consumption per capita (C) in the increments of commercial energy used during three
twenty year periods:
N
C
1930-50
52%
48%
1950-70
34%
66%
1970-90
75%
25%
These percentages indicate that it was during the period of reconstruction and development of
the Western and Japanese economies after the second world war that the intensification of
energy use was the major factor in the growth of consumption. After 1970 population growth
has become the dominant force. Due to the expansion of thei:r share in the world's population
increments - from 77,5 per cent during 1950-70 and 88,7 per cent during 1970-90, and a
projected 92,5 per cent over the period 1990-2010 - (UN, 1993, pp 284-288), the influence of
the LDCs will probably continue to preponderate, particularly when the newly industrialising
countries (NICs) are included in this category.
The historic increase in the use of energy in the industrialised world can, in part, be traced to
the demographic changes experienced by them. As their fertility declined, and the growth of
the labour force diminished accordingly, labour became increasingly scarce and expensive. In
consequence, recourse was had to energy as a lower-cost input substitute for labour.
The South African economy apparently evinces the highest energy-intensity in the world,
requiring 0,88 kilogram of oil equivalent per unit of GNP (in 1991 US dollars) generated,
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compared to 0,33 for the USA, 0,31 for Australia, 0,22 for the United Kingdom and 0,13 for
Japan (World Bank, 1993, pp 238/9, 24617). Until 1970 South Africa's trend in energy use
coincided with that of the developed market economies (or MDCs), but has reversed since
then. The high intensity is a function of the conversion of coal into synfuels and deep level
mining.
TABLE 7.1
SOURCES OF COMMERCIAL ENERGY
The World South Africa
0/0 %
Oil 38 10
Coal 30 87
Gas 20
Nuclear and hydropower 12 _]_
100 100
Sources: Viljoen, 1991, P 19; Crews, 1987, p 7.
Table 7.1 informs us that the world, in the aggregate, depends for 88 per cent of its
commercial needs on non-renewable oil, coal and gas, with oil showing an eight percentage
point larger share than coal. In South Africa, coal with 87 per cent, occupies the dominant
position, serving as it does as the base for the production of 90 per cent of the electricity
supplied and of synfuels. SASOL produces 39 per cent of South Africa's fuel requirements
from 34 million tons (metric) of coal per annum, while the Mossel Bay gas project adds 45
000 barrels a day to Sasol's 150 000 barrels (Sunday Times, 30 May 1993). Mossgas's
estimated life is 14,5 years (evidently, if the costs to be covered do not include the interest on
the RIO 600 million sunk into the project).
The coal production of 1992, a more or less average year, was disposed of as follows
(Chamber of Mines, 1992).
Used in the generation of electricity
Exported
Synfuels and other industrial uses
Domestic, and other uses
Mill. Tons
67,8
48,8
44,4
14,0
175,0
Directly, by way of its conversion into synfuels, the production of electricity and an
intermediate input in industrial activity and, indirectly, through the earnings of foreign
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exchange (R4,4 billion in 1993) to buy the oil for the residual amount of energy required, coal
is in reality responsible for the satisfaction of the totality of South Africa's commercial energy
needs. Coal burned by households for domestic cooking and heating represents only 3,7 per
cent of total production, but the amount is rising as traditional, renewable fuel resources are
replaced by fossil fuels in the process of urbanisation.
The coal reserves of South Africa have been estimated at 55 333 million tons. While only 20
per cent of these are of higher grades, their share in annual production is almost one-third,
thus inducing a continuous decline in the quality of deposits remaining. A sizeable portion of
deposits mined consists of discard coal. The saleable portion of coal mined diminished from
87 per cent in 1981 to 77 per cent in 1995 (Grobbelaar, 1995). In the case of coal destined for
overseas markets, the discard is as much as 30-35 per cent (IFR, 1993, P 5-75). If the course
of expected production levels over time, and accordingly the life cycle of coal deposits, were
to describe a normal curve, South Africa appears to have sufficient reserves to last her well
into the twenty-second century (Cooper & Kotze, 1992).
However, proven or estimated reserves are not fixed quantities, even in the absence of new
discoveries. They are defined, in standard usage, as the amounts that can be exploited at
current levels of prices and of existing technology. These two variables can change to add to
the amount of a mineral which can be profitably produced or to the lifetime of available
resources. For example, of the 41 ton reduction, between 1993 and 1994, in the gold produced
in South Africa, 18 tons were the result of a lowering of the grade of ore mined, from 5,5 to
5,3 gram per ton of ore, which was rendered feasible by the increase in the price of the metal
(Die Burger, June 1995, p 13). Again, in the case of coal there has been a tenfold increase,
between 1907 and 1957, in services rendered by an average ton of coal by way of reductions
in the energy required for mining, transport, and electricity generation and transmission.
South Africa's coal reserves have, indeed, been raised by a factor two over the period of a
decade consequential upon an improvement in exploration and evaluation of bore hole cores.
(IFR, 1993, P 5-75). And if technology could enable more power stations to use coal with an
ash content of up to 40 per cent, reserves could be augmented by 25 per cent.
The oil reserves of the world have been estimated at 1 107 000 million barrels in 1992
(British Petroleum, 1993, p 2). The fears expressed at the beginning of the seventies about the
availability of future supplies were caused by the very remarkable rates of increase of
consumption. Between 1965 and 1970 it amounted to 49 per cent or 8,3 per cent per annum,
but declined to 3,7 per cent per annum during the next five years, and since 1980 it has been
no more than 0,4 per cent per annum concomitantly with rising prices demanded by the OPEC
countries. At the 1992 Reserves/Consumption ratio, supplies would seem to have a lifetime of
46 years. If, however, the market price of oil were to rise sufficiently tar sands and shale oils
will become sources of recoverable reserves. Their unit technical cost of exploitation is,
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however, 4 to 8 times that of oil gushing from the earth or pumped out of wells (Jennings,
1989, p 8).
In the nature of things a scarce non-renewable" résource cannot be exploited in a sustainable
manner, since its consumption cannot but reduce the residual amount available. But not to use
it, for this reason, would be economically senseless (unless, of course, the community could
derive more benefit by leaving it untouched in its original state, as in the case of, say, coal in
the Kruger national park). The theoretical solution to the problem of providing the community
with the greatest long term net benefits from its exploitation would be a price level that
adequately reflects the increased relative scarcity over time. Apart from conducing to an
optimising of the time distribution of consumption, it may also call forth the introduction of
alternative sources (such as geothermal energy, hydroelectric power, solar and wind power as
substitutes for oil, gas and coal). Failing this (or in addition), sustainability of growth, if not
development, would require investment in compensatory productive capacity financed from
the scarcity rent of the resource (ensuing from the inelastic supply) or simply from the returns
derived from exploiting the non-renewable resource,
Inasmuch as these sources of energy are a substitute for human energy, one would expect
rising prices of the former to benefit the employment of labour, which is in surplus supply in
the non-oil producing LDCs, and to reduce the pressure on their foreign accounts which tend
to record deficits. However, this substitutability may apply only in the more modem industrial
sectors of economies, which are not well-developed in the LDCs, and not in the more basic
activities of preparing food and heating. And the greater the decimation of renewable
resources - to be discussed below - the greater the dependency on imported sources of energy.
7.3 PLANT LIFE
Trees and shrubs represent renewable sources of energy, while smaller plants, grass and some
trees are sources of food for animals. The use of the former is positively correlated with the
relative share of rural communities in the total population and negatively associated with the
level of economic development. It would appear that the world's average per capita use of
renewable energy sources has remained steady at between 0,27 and 0,28 kilowatts, after
declining from 0,35 in 1890, while that of non-renewable resources has almost tripled
(Holdren, 1990, p l l l ). In some sub-Saharan African countries the dependence on traditional
fuels (wood, dung and crop wastes) is very high, reaching 86,8 per cent in the Sudan and
94,11 per cent in Malawi (Barnes, 1990, p 48). The demand for wood fuels tends to describe
a hyperbola when it is diagrammed against income classes, the middle classes forming the
peak. The President's Council (1983) has reported that some 60 per cent of the South African
population bums wood for cooking and heating purposes, consuming 14 million tons of wood
per annum in the process. A 1993 Human Sciences Research Council questionnaire survey
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revealed that some 44 per cent of the South African population (56 per cent in the case of
Blacks) did not have a supply of electricity at their disposal (Snyman & De Vos, 1994, p IJ)
and would therefore have been obliged to use other forms of energy. How these forms differ
according to the spatial location of population can be gleaned from the following data
(Source: Eberhard, 1989) on net consumption on a per capita basis:
Rural Peri-urban
% %
Wood 77,8 48,6
Dung 10,8
Coal & Paraffin _llA 51,4
100,0 100,0
In the rural areas of South Africa wood and dung account for 88,6 per cent of the energy
consumed, compared to 48,6 per cent in peri-urban areas. Even so the lower percentage is not
negligible and leads to stripped land around the human concentrations. When the lengthening
of the distance between the latter and the source of wood fuels enters into the calculation of
costs and price, by way of transport costs, wood gets converted into charcoal, incurring the
waste of 50 per cent of the energy inhering in the base.
During the times of low density occupation of land, small farmers and peasant families
established a custom, handed down from generation to generation, of harvesting trees and
shrubs from fallow land without a thought for a need of human intervention to preserve their
energy base. It became part of a traditional way of life in which nature was the provider and
regenerator of all plant life, exonerating the consumers from any obligation of replacing the
trees and shrubs cut down. In such replacement costs would be incurred while nature's
contribution is free. Planted trees would also require some years to reach maturity, thus
representing an investment demanding of a fairly long mental time horizon, which is lacking
among the traditional community interested in providing for the here and now. The trees and
shrubs at issue also suffer from the attribute of being common property, so that it is in
nobody's individual interest to practice conservation harvesting: the curse of the commons.
When increasing and high densities of land occupation no longer allowed of shifting
cultivation and pastoralism, which used to leave land areas lying fallow for the regeneration
of plant life, the self-renewing capacity of the land is exceeded and the stocks of trees and
bush are decimated. In the absence of adequate supplies of the latter, dung and crop wastes
are being used for fuel, reducing the nutrients available to, and accordingly, the productivity
of, the soil. Population pressure, unaccompanied by the expansion of factors of production
other than natural resources, becomes responsible for the total damage. The South African
Nature Foundation has reported that the country's dry forests have been reduced by 46 per
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cent and it's savannah grassland by 62 per cent (1991, pS).
The distances to be travelled to collect fuelwood for the family become longer and longer,
demanding ever increasing time to be spent in the process. Distances of 3,6 to 10 kilometres
(one-way) travelled to collect firewood in African countries have been reported which
involved travelling time ranging from six hours per week in Kenya, to fifteen in Burkina Faso
and more than forty in central Tanzania (Barnes, 1990, p 51). In a random sample survey of
subsistence communities in the Ciskei it was found that 58 per cent collected wood every
second day and 33 per cent every third day, spending from four to five hours per trip.
Supplies had, in addition, to be supplemented by the purchase of fuelwood involving
expenditure per family ofR11 to R16 per month (Steyn, 1990, pp 57-58).
The increasing manpower requirements of fuelwood collection conduces to the maintenance
of a high level of reproduction.
The numbers of people in Africa suffering and facing deficits and acute shortages of fuelwood
in 1980 have been estimated at 207 million, and were projected to reach 535 million (out of
million) by the end of the century. For Asia the numbers quoted for 1980 and 2000 were 862
million and 1 671 million respectively (People, 1983, p 37).
While the scarcity of fuelwood is, in the main, associated with the decimation of open
woodlands, the forests (rain and dry) of the earth have a few more adversative forces to
contend with: (i) logging, for the purpose of manufacturing furniture and other wooden
objects. It is sometimes argued that the high-income countries are the villains of the piece as if
they were to blame for providing a market to the Third World which, presumably, would
otherwise have had a more sustainable use for their product; (ii) forest clearing, often in the
slash and burn manner, to extend the area of cropland and pasture or to establish plantations;
(iii) "waldsterben" (or forest death), due to acid rain or other as yet unidentified, pathogens;
(iv) practices such as the repeated burning of forest land late in the season when the
vegetation, which is tinder-dry, generates very high temperatures which destroy trees
(compared to early burning). Logging which leaves large amounts of deadwood and other
combustibles on the ground has a similar effect; (v) the cutting down of trees, in Zambia at
least (Musambachive, 1992, p 20) to get at edible types of caterpillars which are evidently in
great demand among certain tribal groups as well as in urban areas.
In the result deforestation is proceeding apace as the cutting and destruction of trees exceeds
the rate of regeneration and replanting. The forest cover of the earth is shrinking by 3,7 per
cent per decade and if it continues the per capita forest area will be reduced by 30 per cent by
the year 2010 (People and the Planet, 1994, pS). The replacement rate averages 1 for every
10 removed on a world-wide basis, and 1 for every 29 in Africa. The Cote d'Ivoire had some
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14 to 16 million hectares of natural forest at the beginning of the twentieth century; there are
now only 2 million hectares left. For Ghana the comparable figures are 8,2 and 2 million
hectares (Fair, 1992, pp 24-26). In the Third World only 550 000 hectares of land are being
planted with trees annually for fuelwood purposes, while 55 million hectares are required to
meet its needs - after allowing for a 25 per cent improvement in the efficiency of kilns and
cookstoves (Postel & Heise, 1988, p 16). The Third World also appears to be suffering a
depletion of tropical forests at a rate of 1 to 1,5 per cent per annum and it may be accelerating.
The FAO had put the annual loss in 1980 at some 11 million hectares. The World Bank more
recently estimated it at between 17 and 20 million hectares (U.N., 1994, p 8). Compared to
1979 the 1989 loss of 142 200 square kilometres of tropical forests constituted a 90 per cent
increase.
Deforestation, apart from spelling the eating into the stock of "natural capital", means that
mankind is losing some of the ecological benefits derived from the plenitude of plant life.
Trees absorb carbon dioxide and release oxygen, thus counteracting the greenhouse effect.
They are very efficient users of rain and act as purifiers of water in streams. They serve as
watershed protection and regulator of the run-off of rainwater, thus preventing soil erosion,
while contributing to the quality of the topsoil through the production of mulch. It has been
alleged, for example, that the Panama canal may be drying up as a result of deforestation in
the surrounding hills (World Development Forum, 1987, p 2). They help to stabilise the
climate in their environment. Tropical forests are also storehouses of fauna and flora which
are sources of genetic materials of potentially great value to mankind. While science has
identified 1,7 million species, there may be many millions more, some of which disappear,
thus reducing the gene pool, before their beneficial attributes have been revealed (U.N., 1994,
P 9). It has been claimed that biologically derived medicines originating from forest species
comprise some 40 per cent of prescriptions world-wide, and generate about one-half of the
pharmaceutical industry's turnover of 200 billion US dollar (Populi, 1994, p 16). Biodiversity
is being reduced. It is maintained that the potato crop failure, which caused a famine in
Ireland in 1840, resulted from the narrowing of the genetic base of the strain, in the absence of
cross-breeding with disease-resistant wild species; while the maize crop failure in the USA in
1970 had a similar origin (The SA Nature Foundation, 1991, p 4). When the wheat crops of
the Swartland in South Africa were seriously threatened by leaf-rust, a wild wheat variety was
used for hybridisation with beneficial results.
Forests, woodlands and savannah-lands, together with the wild life supported by them,
constitute the base of an industry offering major sustainable benefits to a community, viz.
eco-tourism, if conservation practices are followed. It could become a major foreign exchange
earner for South Africa, and it has been suggested that for every additional foreign tourist one
new job would be created. South Africa's major environmental assets, apart from the scenic
beauty of many regions, encompass 5,8 million hectare of protected areas - nature reserves,
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national and provincial parks, wildlife sanctuaries, marine and coastal protected areas, which
attract hundreds of thousands of tourists each year. The problem in this regard is how to
enforce the protection against the encroachment by communities living on the edges of these
reserves who depend for their livelihood on the exploitation of natural resources only, and
have to be convinced, demonstratively, that eco-tourism redounds to their benefit, while their
encroachment is eroding its base. South Africa is evidently still able to manage the
stabilisation of the 164 000 indigenous forests remaining, and by extending commercial
plantations is enjoying virtual self-sufficiency in the supply of wood and timber. However,
the country has 67 of its animal species on the vulnerable list and 24 plant species in the
endangered category. The respective numbers in the case of fynbos and Karoo plants are 183
and 118 (S A Dept of Environment Affairs, 1992, p 112).
There seems to be little doubt that the demographic factor - growth and density of occupation
- is the dominant proximate cause of deforestation. It is estimated that the inroads of cropland
into tropical forests has been responsible for 90 per cent of all deforestation, population
growth accounting for 79 per cent and an increase in per capita consumption for 21 per cent of
the cropland expansion (Myers, 1994, p 59). Small scale farmers are thought to be
accountable for more than a half of the deforestation, their access to the forests having been
promoted by logging operations and cattle ranchers (UN, 1994, P 8). For 23 Latin American
and Caribbean countries a co-efficient of correlation between population density and forest
cover of -0,48 significant at the 0,02 level, was found, and if this did not sound very
convincing, the researcher wrote, it can be pointed out that at least, there was no relationship
between per capita income and forest cover (Bilsborrow, 1994, p 127).
When natural resources are the only co-operant factor of production with human labour they
have to bear the brunt of the burden of population growth. The burden is aggravated when the
latter is accompanied by ignorance of cause and effect or avarice.
7.4 THE ATMOSPHERE
7.4.1 The Greenhouse Effect
Man consumes clean air by polluting it with noxious gases and particulates (dust, smoke,
fungal spores and pollen), giving rise to three crucial environmental phenomena: the
greenhouse effect, ozone depletion and acid rain.
The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), which runs an Atmospheric
Impacts Management Programme, has produced an inventory of greenhouse gases released in
South Africa, and their shares in the greenhouse effect as measured by their global warming
potential (GWP, or heat trapping ability). This is reproduced in Table 7.2 (Van der Merwe,
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1994, p l ).
TABLE 7.2
GREENHOUSE GASES RELEASED IN SOUTH AFRICA
Gas Metric ton
per annum
GWP
Carbon Dioxide
Sources: Coal burning
290
(65,5%)
Liquid fuels
Cement manufacturing
and others
(29,0%)
( 5,5%)
Methane
Sources: Coal Mines
2,25%
(35,0%)
Ruminants
Landfills
Vehicle exhausts
Fuelwood & vegetation burning
Soils (sink)
(33,0%)
(16,5%)
(15,5%)
( 7,0%)
(-7,0%)
Nitrous oxide
Sources: Coal burning
0,47
(83,0%)
Others (17,)%)
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)
Sources: Refrigerants
,0064
(39,0%)
Aerosol propellants
Others
(31,0%)
(30,0%)
TOTAL
The 49 per cent share of carbon dioxide (C02) in the greenhouse effect seems to accord with
the world average (Myers, 1994, p 60). lts heat trapping ability per molecule released into the
air is, however, much lower than that of the other three gases: methane (1/60), nitrous oxide
(1/260) and CFCs (1/5500). From these figures it is deduced that coal - mining and burning -
accounts for 58 per cent of the greenhouse gas emissions in South Africa, which is not
surprising in light of the energy situation described in section 7.1. Vehicle exhausts in the
methane category appear to be only responsible for 3,7 per cent. Add the contribution of
liquid fuels (14,2 per cent) and we arrive at 76 per cent as the share of fossil fuels in the
greenhouse effect. (It may be slightly higher since not all oil-based fuels have been included
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in the inventory). The burning of fuelwood and vegetation contributes very little (1,7 per
cent), landfills some 4 per cent, while 7,9 per cent emanates from cows and other ruminants
(as shown in the methane category).
In addition to these gaseous pollutants, the atmosphere is also subject to particulate pollution,
which can reach very high levels where there is a concentration of population and industries.
In the Vaal Triangle it was found to exceed the international health standard by two-and-a half
times, 40 to 70 per cent of it resulting from coal burning by households and dust, and the
remainder from vehicles and industrial activity (Terblanche, 1993, p l), During a twelve hour
monitoring period in the rural areas, the exposure to total suspended particulates (TSP) in the
sleeping quarters and the cooking areas respectively, registered levels 4 and 8,6 times that of
the WHO no-effect exposure limit (Terblanche, 1992, p l ). From Cape Town it was reported
that the pollution from car vehicle exhausts had increased by 80 per cent during the ten year
period 1983 - 1993, and could double in another ten year's time (Sawyer, 1993, pI).
The wall chart supplement to the May 1992 Population Reports indicates that of the countries
of Africa, South Africa shows the highest per capita emission of carbon dioxide, viz. 8,1
metric ton per annum. For the rest, apart from the other two outlier values, viz. of Gabon, 6,9
and Libya 8,7, the amounts vary from 0,0 to 1,7. As is to be expected, the values in question
are positively correlated with the per capita amount of energy used. They are 17,3 tons per
capita in Canada and 19,7 ton in the USA, and vary between 5,9 and 11,0 in Western
European countries. The amounts are very high also in the largest of the OPEC producers:
12,8 for Saudi-Arabia, 15,8 for Kuwait and 32,9 for the United Arab Emirates.
In the literature on greenhouse gases released on a global scale, discussion is focussed mainly
upon the carbon dioxide element (responsible for half of the heat trapping pollutants) and is
conducted in the developing/developed country (or LDC/MDC) dichotomous terms, the
former representing the dominant influence of population growth and the latter the effect of
affluence. Population exerts its influence mainly by way of deforestation as a means of
procuring food and/or income for growing numbers, while affluence is associated with the
high intensity use of fossil fuels. Deforestation causes the carbon contained in the trees, and
some of it present in the soil underneath, to be exodised, adding to the carbon dioxide stored
in the atmosphere, while the stock of trees, that acts as a sink for C02, is reduced. Any
warming of the atmosphere resulting from this process may have a feedback effect if it
increases the transpiration rates of trees to the level where it exceeds the rate of
photosynthesis (in which the sun's energy induces C02 and water to combine to produce
carbohydrates). Photochemical reactions arising from the burning of trees, shrubs and other
vegetation may introduce ozone into the lower atmosphere (or troposphere) which has the
effect of a minor greenhouse gas (VanWilgen and Scholes, 1994, p 45). The C02 released by
the fires will, however, be absorbed by the regrowth if their frequency remains unchanged,
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while these fires are, in fact, a condition for the survival and reproduction of some fauna and
flora.
While the LDCs are responsible for some 95 per cent of carbon emissions due to
deforestation, their share in the global release of C02 into the air is a great deal smaller, even
while they contain 76 per cent of the world's population, since they make much less use of
fossil fuels which are responsible for the bulk of carbon emissions, adding some 6 billion tons
annually compared to 0,8 to 2,6 billion tons on account of tropical rain forest clearing (UN
Secretariat, 1994, p 29, Birdsall, 1994, p 47). A multiplication of the per capita carbon
dioxide amounts released as presented in the Population Reports wall chart, quoted above, by
the respective population numbers, results in a 28 per cent share for the LDCs. Birdsall's
estimate is 33 per cent, made up of a 20 per cent share in fossil fuel consumption and a 95 per
cent responsibility for deforestation (p 40). Inasmuch as it is the accumulated store of
emissions retained in the atmosphere which is decisive for the greenhouse outcome, the
MDCs have to be debited with rather more than the 67 per cent or 72 per cent apportioned to
them in view of the post-war spurt in their consumption of energy, and the legacy of the
Industrial Revolution. At the start of the latter the carbon dioxide concentrations measured
250 parts per million. Of the addition of 70 parts during the past hundred years, half has
occurred during the last thirty years. A continuation of this rate of increase will double the
level from pre-industrial times over the coming eight decades (Holt-Biddle, 1994, pp 31-41).
If we want to identify the influence of population in this atmospheric drama we can postulate
that the rate of increase in carbon dioxide emissions is determined by the rates of growth of
population, GDP per capita, energy intensity of the GDP and the carbon intensity of the
energy used (The Population Council in U.N., 1994, P 283). Myers would have it that of the
3,1 per cent per annum increase in C02 emissions during 1950-95, population must have been
responsible for 1,9 percentage points and the other three determinants for the remaining 1,2
(1994, P 60). This apportionment to the population factor could conceivably have been valid
for the 1970-90 period in light of our calculations, presented in section 7.1, of the relative
significance of population growth and the consumption of commercial energy per capita.
Other authors, attributing smaller current shares to the population factor, do project increasing
contributions in the future. Since the LDCs are moving increasingly into the acceleration
phase of the sigmoid curve, they are projected to double their per capita rate of emissions
from 0,8 to 1,7 billion tons per annum if they continue on their course of the past 40 years
over the ensuing 1985-2025 period, at the end of which their population growth would have
added 5,8 billion tons, compared to a current world total of 6,9 billion tons (Myers, 1994, p
60). When a response is sought to the question, how much of the emissions could possibly be
averted by feasible reductions (not zero growth) in projected population growth, the answer is,
not much: by way of the deforestation process (with an elasticity with respect to population
growth approximately 0,5) about 6 per cent, and of lesser fossil fuel emissions, some 10per
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cent (Birdsall in U.N., 1994, P 39).
These computations still leave out of account the emissions of methane, nitrous oxide and
CFCs responsible for the other half of the greenhouse effect. In South Africa coal has a share
of one-half of this one-half, but it is not known whether in the rest of the world oil would
fulfil the same role. The first two types of emissions are probably due to grow in relative
significance as the campaign against fossil fuel and CFC pollution gathers further momentum.
Recent data would indicate that, on a global scale, the burning of vegetation (biomass) could
contribute as much to the greenhouse effect as fossil fuels. When we apply the heat trapping
capacities of C02, methane, nitrous oxide and CFCs, as derived from Table 7.2, to the data
published in World Resources, 1992-93 (pp 248/9, 350), the result shows that the effect
produced by C02 emissions from land-use change and by methane from anthropogenic
sources almost equals that emanating from fossil fuel consumption and CFCs.
In respect of annual additions it would appear then, that the population factor and nature are
already responsible for a larger share than affluence, or would become so on an increasing
scale in future.
The concern about the greenhouse gases arises from their potential effect upon the earth's
climate and as a health hazard and, accordingly, upon the economic well-being of inhabitants.
Their accumulation in the troposphere traps low-energy, long wave (infrared) radiation,
preventing some of the heat of the earth's surface (received from the sun) which would
otherwise have been radiated back into the stratosphere, from doing so. The result is a
warming of the earth. There is the possibility of a feedback effect emanating from the
transpiration of trees, already explained above, and from the oceans which could become net
sources of carbon dioxide emissions instead of sinks, since the rising temperatures will cause
them to release carbon to add to the warming of the earth.
Mathematical models, constructed in attempts to quantify likely changes in average
temperatures, arising from a doubling of the C02 content of the atmosphere, have predicted
increases varying from 1 to 4 degrees centigrade. While this appears insignificant compared
to day-ta-day and day-night changes in temperatures, it can, on a global scale, be critical. The
degree of warming and its effects will differ greatly from region to region. Greatly feared is
the possibility of the melting of polar ice, one per cent of which could raise sea levels by 75
centimetres, inundating large tracts of low lying, coastal areas and necessitating the
transmigration of perhaps millions of people (lFR, 1990, p 6-140/1). It has been suggested
that the Cape Flats may be flooded within eighty years' time which would destroy the bread
basket of the area (Du Plessis, 1988, pi). Salinity levels and the distribution of plankton will
be affected; plants will grow faster as a result of C02 enrichment, but will require more
fertiliser; the location of the main food producing regions will shift.
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Application of some of the models to the South African situation indicated a modest increase
in precipitation in the summer rainfall areas, greater summer precipitation in the winter
rainfall areas, and a desiccation in the latter and in the Karoo. The frequency of floods and
droughts may increase. Dryland maize production may be reduced due to moisture stress; in
the winter rainfall area wheat production will be adversely affected, while there may be a
change in the cultivars of grapes and deciduous fruit most suited to the new climatic
conditions. Subtropical crops may flourish (du Pisani & Partridge, 1990, pp 307-309). Other
findings on the effect of a doubling of the C02 concentrations were that "Southern Africa
may be subject to increases in mean temperature ranging from 3 to 6 degrees centigrade, and
decreases in available soil moisture ranging from 11 to 19 per cent. At the same time the sea-
level may rise by up to 1,5 metre" (Brink, et al., 1990, p 434).
In the face of such alarmist projections, particularly when they are presented as predictions,
responses counselling healthy scepticism are almost inevitable. Critical observers can point
out that the earth always had, and has to have, a greenhouse mechanism, a blanket of
atmosphere consisting of greenhouse gases, to moderate its surface temperature and prevent
its fluctuating between unbearably cold and hot. And since nature has been generating the
greenhouse gases since times immemorial it may claim a share equal to that of man. Nature
must be debited with the responsibility of volcanic eruptions which have spewed forth huge
quantities of noxious gases and particulates, infinitely larger than any man could have
produced (Maduro & Schauerhammer, 1992; Ray, 1989; Lave, 1988). Climatologists are
puzzled by the difference between quantities of gases released and the amounts arriving in the
atmosphere. (The Economist, 1994, p 17). There is great uncertainty about the possible
changes in climate that may be caused by the gases, while better statistical techniques are
required to distinguish natural climate variability from man-induced change (Fernau, et al.,
1993; Joubert, 1990). There is also uncertainty about the speed with which ecosystems can
adapt to climatic change.
At the close of the Rio Summit 425 members of the scientific and intellectual community
signed the Heidelberg Appeal which stated, amongst others, that while they subscribed to the
objective of preserving resources, this should be "founded on scientific criteria and not on
irrational pre-conceptions" and that "the greatest evils which stalk our earth are ignorance and
oppression, and not Science, Technology and Industry whose instruments, when adequately
managed, are indispensable tools ... for overcoming major problems like overpopulation,
starvation and world-wide diseases" (Handbill: Heidelberg Appeal to Heads of States and
Government, 1992, circularised by M Salomon, co-ordinator, Heidelberg).
However, when an executive of Sasol, an enterprise responsible for carbon dioxide emissions,
maintained that it was not a serious threat to the environment and that the theories of global
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warming remained unproven, his pronouncements were decried by an ecologist as disgraceful
(Yeld, 1990, p 6).
There is consensus, though, that air pollution is a health hazard. There was the well-known
1953 London smog which killed almost 6 000 persons, especially the sick and infirm.
Between 12 and 17 October 1993 the notorious Nefos (from vehicle exhausts) of Athens was
responsible for the hospitalisation of 730 persons suffering from cardiac and breathing
problems or spells of dizziness (Interchange, 1994, p 6). In San Francisco photochemical
smogs can bring traffic to a halt. The WHO found that in 20 megacities (ten million or more
inhabitants by the year 2000) at least one major pollutant exceeded the level deemed healthy,
and is implicated in the rise in the incidence of allergies such as asthma (The Economist,
1994, pp 89-91). It is estimated that in South Africa 20 to 25 million people inhale air
inimical to health because of the use of cheap but dirty and energy-inefficient household fuels,
such as wood, dung and crop residues in the rural areas and coal in towns. Maladies can range
from acute eye irritations to upper respiratory tract infections to cancer (Terblanche, 1993, p
6). Living in shacks and cooking on open fires involve much higher health risks than living
and using stoves in a formal structure. Compared to electricity the use of coal can raise the
risk of respiratory illness by a factor 9,3, and the lower one moves down the energy spectrum
- which in practice invariably means the lower the p.c. income - the higher the health risk
(National Electrification Forum, 1994, p 2). In the 1995 October Household Survey one-third
of those interviewed reported that pollution in winter was rendering their breathing difficult
(eSS, 1996, p 78).
7.4.2 Ozone Depletion
Ozone is the three-atom form of oxygen forming a stratospheric layer which shields the earth
from the sun's potential excess and harmful ultra-violet radiation (UVR). Compounds
containing chlorine and bromine, when released into the air, are broken down into their
constituent elements by the UVR, which elements are responsible for the destruction of the
ozone. A complex chain reaction is set into motion which causes one chlorine atom to lead to
the destruction of 100 000 ozone molecules before the chain-reaction, in which molecules of
ozone are converted into ordinary oxygen, is halted. The most serious threat to the ozone is
said to originate in the CFCs, already identified as greenhouse gases in Table 7.2. Bromine is
a less serious threat than the Cf'Cs but per atom it is 40 times as effective as chlorine
emanating from the latter. lts origin is in the halons used in fire extinguishers. In the same
category we have methyl bromide produced by natural fires in wood- and grasslands, the
quantities equalling those generated by marine plankton and pesticides (New Scientist, 1994,
p 11). An insidious attribute of these trace gases is their long average lifetime in the
atmosphere: 75 to 110 years for the Cf'Cs and 110 for the halons. Nitrous oxide, among the
lesser ozone-affecting trace gases, which include carbon monoxide and dioxide and methane,
has a lifetime of 150 years (UN Environment Programme, 1987). Which means that the effect
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of these gases will linger on for many decades even if the 1987 Montreal Protocol, which
called for a 35 per cent reduction in CFC production by the end of the century, were
observed.' South Africa, a signatory, has already fulfilled more than the obligations agreed
to. In 1984 British scientists measured a hole in the ozone layer of the Antarctic, the size of
the USA. lts size and depth varied from season to season. In more recent years it was
discovered that ozone concentrations have diminished to record levels over large parts of the
planet. Trace gas molecules are blown by winds and pushed by updrafts of warm air to all
corners of the stratosphere. Air samples from Cape Point have shown the concentration levels
of a widely used CFC (F-Il) to have risen from 160 to 240 parts between 1980 and 1988
(Macdonald, 1993, p 6).
With UV-radiation increasing by two per cent for each percentage diminution in ozone
concentration, the holes in the ozone layer (or reductions in its concentration) can cause
extensive damage to plant, animal and human life, by way of the effect of UV -b on DNA
molecules and proteins. It has been demonstrated that UV-b interferes with photosynthesis to
reduce plant productivity. Microscopic plants in the surface waters of the oceans, the
beginning of the aquatic food chain, are particularly sensitive to increased intensities of UV -b.
Exposure to UV-b impairs the human body's immune system which combats infections and
the growth of cancer cells. The incidence of skin cancer is estimated to increase by 3 to 6 per
cent for every 2 per cent increase in UV-b, while bilharzia may have easier access through the
human skin. Eye cataracts may be generated.
While most of the scepticism which greeted the initial presentations of the ozone depletion
theory has been dispelled, there is still some difference of opinion, particularly in the matter
of causation. Maduro's and Schauerharnmer's research (1992) led them to the conclusion that
if chlorine is the culprit, CFCs as a source fade into insignificance. The Antarctic volcano
Erebus releases a thousand tons of chlorine into the air each day, and in one week's time more
than a year's production of CFCs. The latter would contain 0,75 tons of chlorine compared to
some 649,4 million tons which would originate in natural causes: the oceans, volcanoes, fires
and sea life such as plankton and algae. And, moreover, the results shown by measurements
of depletion are a function of the time period selected. It was suggested that manufacturers of
CFCs might have promoted the campaign against their use, since profit was to be made out of
the development of substitutes such as HCFC-22 which have comparatively short atmospheric
lifetimes (Spaarwater, 1993, p 5).
Another writer believes that in the ozone saga propaganda has prevailed over scientific fact
because of the financial and bureaucratic vested interests involved. Roberts points out that the
inventor of the satellite ozone monitor has noted that no global reduction in ozone levels has
I International conferences of more recent times advanced the phasing out dates.
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been detected and that historical readings of Antarctic levels - influenced by exceedingly cold
polar nights that freeze nitrogen oxides out of the stratosphere during some months of the year
- are inconsistent with the CFC build-up theory (1994, P 9). Pearce (1994, P 7) reports that a
geophysicist from the University of Virginia, Fred Singer, told a meeting that the main device-
used to measure levels of ozone, is confusing the latter with sulphur dioxide. But other
scientists, admitting the possibility of such confusion, maintained that they have been aware
of this since the early 1960s. A South African scientist (Kies, 1993, p 7) points out that the
amount of ozone is a matter of equilibrium in a never ending process in which UV rays
collide with oxygen molecules to release free oxygen atoms, which combine with oxygen
molecules to form (three-atom) ozone. If this scepticism is well-founded, the attribution of an
84 per cent responsibility for the ozone depletion to the developed countries and,
concomitantly, to the affluence factor, becomes less than relevant.
7.4.3 Acid rain
Sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and non-methane hydrocarbons and related products,
introduced into the air by the burning of fossil fuels, car exhausts and by other industrial
activities, combine in the atmosphere with moisture to produce sulphuric and nitric acid
which lowers the pH value of rainfall. The result is the so-called acid rain. High sulphur
dioxide emissions are associated with poor quality fossil fuels with a high sulphur content in
areas of human and industrial concentration. In the Eastern Transvaal Highveld, where
electricity is generated in coal-fired power stations, emission densities reach 30 to 40 tons per
square kilometre - equalling the worst conditions in the USA and Europe - while the total
quantity released in South Africa as a whole is 2,8 million tons per annum (IFR, 1993, P 5-
110).
Since S02 is co-existent with other air pollutants and since factors other than pollution might
have an effect on health, distinguishing its effect is problematical. The Economic Commission
for Europe, investigating the impact of environmental degradation on health in Central and
Eastern Europe (UN, 1994, pp 225-234), found that while no incontrovertible causal
connection between air pollution and specific health problems could be established, the
episodic evidence indicated a significant negative relationship. High sulphur dioxide levels
are associated with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and acute respiratory infections
(increased asthma and bronchitis). This gas forms part of the air pollutants which were
depicted as health hazards in section 7.4.1 (greenhouse gases).
The CSIR Forest Science and Technology Division found that tree nutrition can be impaired
by acid rain through the acidification of the soil which could inhibit root growth, and in
consequence of resulting losses of nutrients from the foliage (Olbrich, 1993, p 2). The long
term fertility of the soil can be reduced. Without apportioning blame to power station and
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vehicle emissions in the Eastern Transvaal Highveld, the CSIR reported damage to trees in
that area which could have been caused by acid rain or sulphur pollution.
In Europe almost 50 million hectares of forests, or 35 per cent, have been subject to
waldsterben, while the health and vigour of major species of conifers and broad-leafed trees
and, perhaps, the forest ecosystems themselves, are threatened (Brown, et al., 1990, 1994).
Without posing it as incontrovertible fact the phenomenon is being linked by writers to acid
rain or its source. It has also extensively damaged lakes in many parts of the world, rendering
them incapable of supporting sensitive aquatic life, reducing their fish population, or simply
leaving them devoid offish (IFR, 1990, P 6-124).
Sulphuric acid from the air also reacts with the calcium carbonate present in buildings,
monuments and statues to cause decay, while motorways can suffer concrete rot. Repairing
the damage can absorb large amounts of economic resources.
There appears to be little doubt that industrialisation, responsible for higher levels of living
but, which, of course, could also be required just to keep people alive (with living standards
constant), is the major source of the affliction discussed above.
7.5 WATER
7.5.1 Water quantity
If available water is defined as the amount of non-evaporated precipitation, there is enough on
a global scale to satisfy the needs of a population twice the size of the present number of
inhabitants. However, from the point of view of economic welfare water scarcity or
abundance cannot be defined thus, regardless of time, place and quality. The rainfall can vary
from year to year, or over longer cyclical periods, its location need not coincide with that of
human settlements, and its quality, even before it reaches the ground (e.g. acid rain) but
particularly when it has been collected or stored in rivers, acquifers, pools, lakes and
reservoirs, may not meet the requirements of plant, animal and human life, and may be
inimical to it.
While nature constitutes the ultimate supply constraint, man's handling of the free gift of
nature determines its life-supporting potential.
The spatial distribution of precipitation is very uneven: As between countries the annual
water resources per capita available (for the year 1990) varies from a maximum of 140 000
cubic metre in Gabon, 117 500 in New Zealand, 109 400 in Canada, down to zero for Egypt
and Kuwait. The percentages of population without safe drinking water vary from 0 in many
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industrialised countries to more than 80 in fifteen other countries in the same continent.
Percentages of people without sanitation services (in 1988) exhibit an even greater variance:
there are 13 African countries in the 80-96 percentage bracket while in Afghanistan it is one
per cent short of 100. In the richer countries it is 0 or close enough to zero (Population
Reports, 1992). Defining water-scarce regions as those where there are more than 600 persons
per million cubic metres available water, 26 countries (300 million people) have been
classified within that category in 1990; and the number is expected to rise to 65 (3 000 million
persons) by the year 2025 (Falkenmark, 1993, plO). Another professor of hydrological
science has put the water-shortage countries for the latter year at 96 (6 400 million persons)
(Golubev, 1993, p 34). Other researchers have predicted that, over the next half-century,
water scarcity will be replacing oil as a source of international conflict (The Futurist, 1994).
Country aggregates, however, do not tell the whole story, since within the same national
borders regions may experience widely different meteorological conditions.
South Africa, with an annual rainfall of 497 millimetres in the aggregate against a world
average of 860 millimetres, rates as a semi-arid country. Its average annual per capita runoff,
at 1 400 cubic metre, is slightly more than one-sixth of the world's average. Some 65 per cent
of the country receives less than the average - which is considered the minimum requirement
for dry land farming - and one-third of this area registers even less than 200 mm. per annum.
Some of the former Black Homelands, incorporating the erstwhile independent TBVC
countries and six self-governing territories, are rather better served with precipitation than the
rest of the country. Covering, in the aggregate, 13,6 per cent of the South African surface area
they receive 26,8 per cent of the rainfall (Kriel, 1983, p 27).
The effective use that can be made of available water is influenced by the intermittence of wet
and dry seasons and the time distribution of rainfall during the wet season, which is during the
summer in the northern parts and during winter in the south-western parts of the country.
When rains do not arrive at planting time and the growing season, crops will not be produced
at all or will fail. Because of this climatic deficiency and repeated droughts, crop failures are
frequent occurrences in South Africa. Maize production, for example, has varied between a
high of 14 million tons and a low of 4 million tons between 1951 and 1984. The latter event is
a twofold disaster: the GDP is reduced by around R5 000 million, and some Rl 000 million
has to be expended in scarce foreign exchange on the importation of maize to satisfy domestic
needs. Even bounteous crops were not an unmixed blessing since taxpayers had to bear the
burden of the difference between the guaranteed domestic price and the lower price fetched
on overseas markets.
With regard to industry, the Chamber of Mines has calculated that a cut in electricity supply
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of 20 per cent due to water shortages over a period of some months would result in a loss of
Rl 329 million in foreign exchange, of R503 million in tax revenue and of 50 000 jobs (IFR,
1990, P 6-46).
To minimise the effect of rainfall variability on the supply of water, and to provide urban
communities with a steady flow of water, dams and reservoirs are, and have been,
constructed. If such construction were to make provision for the extremes in runoffs - from
floodwaters in some years to severe droughts in others - it would constitute an inefficient use
of resources, since much of the stored water would be wasted through evaporation. There are
very few areas in South Africa where the average annual potential evaporation is less than the
average rainfall (Waterwese, 1986, p 1.6). The advice proffered by a hydrologist in this regard
is: "Use water lavishly during times of plenty otherwise it will merely evaporate, but be
prepared to reduce demand when storage drops to reserve levels". To this end the pricing
system has to be employed (Midgly , 1984, P 61). As it is, South African urban dwellers are
paying less for their potable water than those in some countries with larger volumes of per
capita water resources: R1,68 per kiloliter compared to R2,13 in Sweden, R2,45 in Canada,
R2,82 in the United Kingdom and R3,41 in France (Pansegrouw, 1994, p 47).
The high rate of evaporation in South Africa, in combination with the variability, reduces the
effective volume of water available from an annual runoff of 53 500 million cubic metres to
33 million, or 62 per cent. To this 5 400 million cubic metres from underground sources can
be added (Waterwese, 1986, p 1.3). This renders dryland farming a hazardous occupation in
the greater part of the country (with a non-temperate climate), while irrigation farming is not
risk-free.
While storage capacity is increased by the construction of new dams, that of existing ones is
being reduced by the silting up process resulting from soil erosion. The reduction is almost 10
per cent per decade in regions subject to high risks of erosion, concomitantly with the release
of more than 120 million tons of silt into the river system each year (Waterwese, 1986, p 38).
The construction of dams in itself can be a controversial issue. In its wake there is flooding of
land which might have been used for agricultural purposes and which involves the
translocation of people, or could be prejudicial to the interests of communities downstream, in
the case of rivers, or interfere with the eco-system. Compensating for meteorological
deficiencies is not a costless activity, apart still from the fact that the stored water has to be
transported, over long distances, in some cases, to the locations where the need exists. The
Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (the Gauteng province) region is a case in point. It
developed into the major industrial area in South Africa responsible for 77 per cent of mining
production (and 58 per cent of overall industrial production) and accommodating 32 per cent
of the country's urban population, as a result of the impulse originating from the discovery of
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gold, and, accordingly, without reference to surface water supplies. Its runoff is only 8 per
cent of the South African total. lts main source of supply is the Vaal Dam, located some
seventy kilometres from Johannesburg and still further from Pretoria, the water level of which
drops to 14 - 16 per cent at times, and compels rationing and has to be fed from catchment
areas some of them hundreds of kilometres away. It has been decided that the Lesotho
Highlands project, 350 kilometres from the Vaaldam, is the only viable and affordable source
of future supply.
Of the ten largest dams only the Vaaldam and the Theewaterskloof scheme in the South
Western Cape, are intended to cater primarily for household needs. The others provide water
predominantly for agriculture, which is indeed responsible for consuming a major portion
from both surface and ground water sources. The latter are used for irrigation to the extent of
78 per cent, for stock-watering 6 per cent, mining and quarrying 5 per cent and households 11
per cent (Rapport, 1995, pIS). Of the water used from the two types of sources agriculture
has a two-thirds share.
TABLE 7.3
WATER DEMAND BY ECONOMIC SECTOR IN PER CENT
1980 1990 2010
Households & municipalities 12,4 15,4 20,9
Mining & industry 14,5 16,2 21,0
Irrigation & stock-watering 71,6 67,2 57,2
Nature conservation 1,5 1,2 0,9
100,0 100,0 100,0
Source: Dept. Waterwese, 1986, p 24. The percentages were based on the total of direct
use of water, and not on total direct plus indirect use as the department of
Water Affairs has done.
The proportions demanded by industry and mining and by households, at projected 1990
levels of 16,2 per cent and 15,4 per cent respectively are very much smaller. The demand
originating in all the sectors is expected to increase, but more rapidly in the latter two sectors
than in the others, so that the share of agriculture is due to decrease from 67,2 per cent in 1990
to 57,2 per cent by the year 2010. If the post-1994 government's promises about the
accessibility of all South Africans to safe water are to be realised, the supply to households
will have to increase faster than envisaged in the above projection, and provision will have to
be made for a considerable expansion of water storage capacity. It has been estimated that of
the urban population 20 per cent, or 4 million, persons have minimal water supply provision
and 30 per cent, or 7 million, have minimal sanitation (Van Ryneveld, 1994, p TOê). The
Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) found that of the 16 500 000 persons living in
the rural areas only 53 per cent had access to safe water and 14 per cent to proper sanitation
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(1992, P 28). According to the Water Research Commission some 9 million people in the
country as a whole do not have access to safe water while twice as many do not have proper
sanitation services at their disposal (Brand, 1992, p 9). The mushrooming of squatter camps
exacerbate the problem. In the 1995 October Household Survey 11,5 per cent of those
interviewed reported an inadequate water supply, while 41,4 per cent did not have flush toilets
at their disposal (CSS, 1996, pp 59, 69). Arising from this situation and the declaration in the
Bill of Rights, Constitution of South Africa Section 27(1)(b), that "everyone has the right to
have access to sufficient water", the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry formulated a
new national water policy in its 1997 White Paper, the essence of which is that "all water in
the water cycle whether on land, underground or in surface channels, falling on, flowing
through or infiltrating between such systems, will be treated as part of the common resource
... " (p 4). This envisaged comprehensive state control over water earned the policy the title of
"the nationalisation of water". All water use will be subject to a catchment management
charge and a resource conservation charge, the latter where there are competing beneficial
uses. Some or all of the charges may be waived in the case of disadvantaged groups, in the
interests, so it is claimed, of equity. The economic problem is that the waiver would probably
have to apply where the cost of water supply would be highest, that is, where rural
communities are thinly scattered over large areas (and the economies of concentration cannot
be realised).
Considered as an ultimate constraint to the proliferation of human numbers the availability of
water in South Africa would allow, according to the (now defunct) President's Council, of a
population of 80 million, after which the volume demanded will exceed the volume supplied
(1983, pp 161-164). This is double the 1994 population size. The numbers that can be
supported will depend, of course, on the future levels of per capita consumption, the use of
technology in the economising of water and the control of forces impacting upon its quality.
But the 80 million population size is not an optimum - as the Council would have had it - but
one of crisis dimensions.
Population growth, by way of its demands upon water supplies for household purposes and
for the production of food for its sustenance, is the chief assailant upon limited water
resources. Using the initial and the most recent peak agricultural years, or five-year averages
around them, as reference, it is found that South African agricultural production (in terms of
value added) increased at exactly the same rate as the population, though the production of the
staple foods - grain, vegetables and meat - lagged. There is no sense in insinuating
disapprobation or censure by pointing to large per capita volumes of water used in countries,
or regions of a country, which have high levels of precipitation and perennial rivers,
compared to arid and semi-arid regions, as long as the former do not deprive others of water
by actions which are not market-related. Neither is it economically sensible to suggest, for
example, that water in the Western Cape should be used to produce staple food instead of
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wine and fruit, when the latter can earn foreign exchange with which more food can be bought
in foreign markets than would have been produced in the Western Cape.
At the international level two examples can be noted where the conversion of availability of
water into accessibility courted disaster. Hinrichsen writes a "requiem for a dying sea" when
he tells the story of the Aral Sea which used to be the fourth largest lake in the world (1995,
pp 10-13). To irrigate cotton fields and rice paddies canals were constructed which diverted
water from one of the river systems which replenish the lake. Between 1960 and 1995 the
water front had receded 70 kilometres from the former seaport, reducing the surface area of
the lake by more than one half and causing a salinity level too high to sustain fisheries. From
3 000 in the late sixties, the number of fishermen in the seaport dropped to 250 to harvest the
four species, surviving in the delta's polluted waters, out of an original 22. Stretching across
the continent the Sahel in northern Africa has a harsh climate with rains concentrated mainly
between the end of June and early October followed by scorching heat. The grazing in any
specific locality does not last long enough to support livestock during all the months between
rainy seasons, which, in some areas, produce as little as 50 millimetres of precipitation.
Accordingly, the nomads moved around to seek pastures for their herds guided by knowledge
handed down from generation to generation. Long run equilibrium between man and nature
has been maintained over successive periods of normal rainfall and drought by concomitant
variation in the size of herds as well as in human survival. International aid changed this. To
lift the water constraint imposed by the climate the logical step was to access the underground
water. And so thousands of boreholes were sunk which also lifted the constraint on the
proliferation of livestock numbers, and herds expanded in accordance with the stock-watering
capacity of the boreholes. The long drought which started when the rains failed in 1968 did
not affect this capacity but left the livestock with nothing to eat except sand (which was found
in the stomachs of the majority of animals brought to the abattoirs). Millions of them died. A
journalist described the scene as follows: "enormous herds, converging upon the new
boreholes from hundreds of kilometres away, so ravaged the surrounding land by tramping
and overgrazing the limited forage that each borehole quickly became the centre of its own
little desert 100 to 130 kilometres square" (Sterling, 1974, p 30).
7.5.2 Water quality
Given the quantity of water available and accessible its effective utility to humankind will be
reduced by the degree to which it has been polluted or otherwise defiled and the produce, to
which it is host, has been abused. As water circulates in the atmosphere-land-atmosphere
hydrological cycle it is subjected to pollution from many sources. Raindrops and snow may
return to the earth the gases and particulates mentioned in section 7.4. As the rain permeates,
or flows over, the soil it may absorb or transport a number of pollutants such as organic and
radioactive wastes, organic micropollutants, metals, nitrates and other agricultural and
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industrial chemical residues. The Department of Environment Affairs has identified dozens of
types of these pollutants and their physical impact ranging from the aesthetically
objectionable effect to genetic damage and health hazard (1991). The sources of pollution,
basically, are sewage, municipal solid wastes, industrial wastes and use practices. The first
three are particularly relevant in respect of groundwater.
Groundwater pollution is attenuated by the natural environment where land is sparsely
populated and the wastes are organic in nature and naturally biodegradable. In urban
concentrations the natural environment's capacity for attenuation is exceeded, necessitating
waste disposal and treatment facilities. When these are lacking or inadequate, garbage (solid
wastes) is left uncollected, as happens in the case of 30 to 50 per cent of that generated in
LDC urban centres (UN, 1994, pp 32/33), or in South Africa when there is violence in the
townships or inhabitants refuse to pay for services rendered. This is fertile breeding ground
for water- and foodbome infections. Where the refuse is collected it is usually dumped in
open landfills which can be the origin of leaches which are formed when water infiltrates
decomposing waste and which is a more potent pollutant than direct contact between
groundwater and wastes. Waste disposal can produce high ammonia concentrations, as a
result of the decomposition of aquatic life. In the absence of water-borne sewage disposal the
use of bucket or pit latrines can raise the nitrate concentration which is especially harmful to
infants. Concentrations higher than the critical level (in health terms) have frequently been
found in the borehole water of informal settlements (Brink, et al., 1990, p 435).
Benneh (UN, 1994, P 159) phrased the problem of cities in this connection succinctly as
follows: "Just as nature cannot concentrate the resources needed to support urban life, neither
can it dispense the waste produced in cities". South Africa handles about 48 million tons of
domestic garbage each year at a cost of from 10 to 20 Rand per ton (Betty, 1991, P 7).
The most important aquifer in South Africa, the dolomitic rock strata of the Transvaal, is
located in, or close to, the largest Witwatersrand mining operations, which latter require the
removal of large volumes of high quality water, thus depleting the groundwater-table. Side
effects take the form of subsidence and sinkholes which can have catastrophic results. Since
1962 thirty--nine people have lost their lives in sinkholes which have caused damage
exceeding R70 million (Brink, et al., 1990, p 435). The water pumped from the Free State
gold mines has a salinity level which precludes its use for household and agricultural
purposes, while the pans in which it is collected render large areas of agricultural land
unproductive. The disposal of mining wastes into slurry ponds can lead to the seepage of
pollutants into groundwater. The process is a slow one, and by the time the pollution becomes
evident, the accumulation will have assumed dangerous proportions. Of the two million tons
of hazardous waste produced in South Africa every year, the gold mining industry is
responsible for one-half. This is only a small portion of the 460 million tons per annum solid
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wastes generated (Noble, 1992, pi).
Ground water can be affected in its quantity and quality by the way in which the soil has been
manipulated by humankind to meet his needs. Agricultural practices such as land clearing and
overgrazing reduce the permeability of the soil which is then exposed to the ravages of hard
rain. Downpours result in overland flows, if not floods, which do not infiltrate into aquifers to
recharge the groundwater. A similar result arises, of course, from impermeability caused by
urbanisation. Fertilisers, pesticides and herbicides, used in the growing and protection of
crops, are transported by surface runoffs into streams, rivers, reservoirs and dams thus
reducing the quality of the surface water. The fertilisers, as well as detergents originating in
urban areas induces entrophication or overenrichment of the water as a result of high
concentrations of phosphates and nitrates. The salinity levels of some South African dams
have reached dangerous proportions. The maximum level tolerated by crops like maize,
potatoes and fruit is 660 milligrams (of total dissolved solids) per litre. Four and eight out of
13 dams have concentrations higher than this for fifty per cent and ten per cent of the time
respectively.
Equally, where human wastes generated in urban areas are dumped into rivers and coastal
waters in untreated form, surface waters are polluted with synthetic organic chemicals, heavy
metal solutions, pathogens and nutrients. In formal urban settlements these wastes are usually
conveyed in effluent form to sewage works where they are treated before being released into
rivers and coastal waters. Such facilities do not as a rule exist in squatter camps or similar
informal settlements which are located, where possible, and convenient with respect to places
of employment, on the banks of rivers, with dire results for the consumers of their contents. A
case in point is the Umsinduzi river in Natal's Umgeni catchment area, as evidenced by its
effect on the 1991 Duzi river Marathon canoeists, seventy per cent of whom were afflicted
with colic (Vander Walt, 1991, p 19). On the banks of this river squatters had been
accumulating huge piles of tins, rags, plastic materials and other debris and tossing bucketsful
of dirty water down the slopes. Heavy rains washed these pollutants and human faeces from
overflowing pit latrines into the river to infest it with E. coli and other bacteria in
concentrations greatly in excess of acceptable levels as laid down by the WHO. Arising from
the contaminated water are water-borne diseases such as cholera, typhoid and a range of
infections responsible for gastro-enteritis, amoebic dysentery and polio (Fair, 1995, p 49).
(Rivers in many Third World countries have been likened to large pen sewers (Benneh, in
UN, 1994, P 162) and three quarters of the diseases in the LDCs in the ESCAP region could
be traced to unsafe drinking water. The US Agency for International Development estimated
that world-wide, improvements in water supply and sanitation could bring about the following
reductions in the incidence of mortality: from diarrhoea 22%, from roundworm infection
28%, from schistosomiasis 73% (UN 1994, P 32). When, as in some rural areas, contaminated
water and fuelwood shortage co-exist, the cost of boiling water to render it safer may become
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prohibitive.
Industry and Mining, on their part, introduce synthetic organic chemicals and heavy metals
into freshwater as a result of manufacturing processes such as smelting, plating, galvanising
and the manufacture of batteries and plastics. It has also been averred that there is a gradual
build-up of toxic metals such as cadmium and mercury, the toxicity of which is magnified as
they rise through the food chain, with humans as the ultimate consumer (Hamza in UN, 1994,
P 154). Toxic material is discharged on occasion into South African streams with disastrous
results for fish life. In 1989 it was reported that acid water from old mines in the Witbank
(Transvaal) area had been seeping into the Olifantsriver and destroyed aquatic life including
crocodiles and fish eagles in sections of it. It had evidently been the result of old mine shafts
and tunnels filling up with water from underground sources and becoming polluted with iron,
manganese and sulphur. Rising to the surface, the water eventually entered the river (Die
Burger, 1989, p 3).
The Department of Environment Affairs (1992) has estimated that apart from 780 000 tons of
effluent released annually into rivers and dams in South Africa, 466 400 tons of waste are
discharged into our coastal waters and estuaries, consisting of 196 300 tons offshore
pollution, 53 000 tons of surfzone pollution, 22 500 tons into estuaries and 194 600 tons of
storm water runoff. Some 235 million tons of river sediment runoffs are also carried into the
sea, which has received more than a million tons of shipwreck material since the end of the
second world war as a result of the foundering of ships. Surface trawls have revealed the
presence of some 3 500 fragments of plastic material per square kilometre in our coastal
waters, which is still a much lower prevalence than in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. (This
relative advantage may arise from the small number of perennial rivers and streams.)
However, there was an increase of 190 per cent in plastic pollution from the Kei river to Cape
Point during the five years 1984--89 (Anon, 1995, p l ). Of the estuaries around the Southern
coast - on which 81 species of fish are dependent during some phase of their life cycles - only
24-28 per cent have been rated as in good condition. Further away from the coast passing
ships regularly dispose of their wastes into the sea. And when tankers founder close enough to
the coast, beaches and seabirds get covered in oil, necessitating costly clean-up operations.
The Koeberg nuclear power station pumps heated water into the sea, creating risks for aquatic
life.
While about two-thirds of the world's population are living along the world's coasts, South
Africa has only 13 per cent of its population settled thus, as a result of the inland location of
the major industrial and mining areas. Accordingly, the stress on coastal waters by human
habitation is considerably less than in the rest of the world, in parts of which, such as around
the Mediterranean sea, pollution has attained alarming proportions (New Scientist, 1995, pp
26-31).
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But this does not mean lesser stress on the seawater around the South African coast in its
function as host to an important source of proteins in human diet. On a global scale the marine
fish catch has reached its peak in 1989 at 86 million tons. (Inclusion of freshwater harvests
raised the aggregate to 100 million tons.) Since then it has been on the decline, after having
increased almost fivefold during the four decades 1950 - 1989 (The Economist, 1994, pp 15-
16). According to the UN Secretariat (1994, pp 34/5) global harvesting is proceeding at the
critical level of 85 per cent of maximum yield, and is exceeding it in some regions, spelling
non-sustainability. To maintain catches, smaller fish and species previously ignored are being
caught; governments have increased their subsidies to the industry; fishing fleets or harvest
capacities have been expanded and fishermen have been venturing ever further away from
their bases to tap sources not yet over-exploited. International incidents ensue. The exercise
becomes self-defeating.
The abuse of marine life exemplifies the curse of the commonage inflicted upon a limited
natural resource to create a reinforcing environmental discontinuity. The produce of the high
seas belongs to everybody and therefore to nobody who could otherwise be interested in
conservation. The process is illustrated in Figure 7.1 in which the population curve represents
numbers at constant consumption per capita.
After the point of intersection C, the resource base (the breeding stock) becomes decimated
and efforts to maintain per capita, or even the aggregate catch, entail further inroads into
nature's capital, reducing cumulatively the returns per unit of effort and of future effort. After
the global average per capita catch had increased from 8 to 18 kilogram between 1950 and
1970 optimistic projections envisioned harvests of up to 200 - 400 million tons annually. By
the middle of the 1980's eleven major marine fishery areas had been over-exploited "to the
point of collapse" (IFR 1991, P 6-56). The situation has been aptly depicted by Myers (in UN,
1994, P 57): "... environmental discontinuity or a threshold effect of irreversible injury ...
occurs when ecosystems have absorbed stresses over long periods without much outward sign
of damage and then eventually reach a disruption level at which the cumulative consequences
of stress appear in critical proportions".
What with the inclusion of catches off the Namibian coast in South African statistics until
1979 it is unclear to what extent South African marine resources have been over-exploited.
Total catches of pelagic fish have been fluctuating from year to year since 1965. After
exhibiting a peak of 509 000 tons in 1967, secondary peaks were registered in 1973, 451 000
tons, in 1979, 380 000 tons and in 1989, 403 200 tons - if we ignore the outlier values for
anchovies in the year 1987 and 1988 (IFR, 1991, P 6-57). Describing irregular cycles, the
slope of the trend curve is slightly downward. At half the 1967 level the 1990 catch reflected
the imposition of quotas following upon over-fishing, (at least as perceived by the
[CH7(JLS)]
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
242
authorities). Between 1960 and 1983 the catch per standard boat day declined from 117,5 to
25,7 tons, raising the cost of supply, and reducing the catch per head of the population from
29,6 kilograms per annum during the sixties to 18,4 kilograms in the 1980's (IFR, 1991, p 6-
61). Increasing recourse to mussel and oyster farming is supplementing marine production,
while inland waters are used increasingly for the production of freshwater fish.
Figure 7.1
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To increase productivity in sea harvesting and thus, presumably, to compensate for declining
resource bases as well, resort is had to gill or drift nets. Described as walls of death they
constitute a most destructive method of fishing. One estimate has it that up to 40 per cent of
the target fish may be killed and/or injured and discarded, while unwanted non-target species
are also killed (The Dolphin Action and Protection Group, 1991, p I), While these nets have
been outlawed by South Africa, they may still adversely affect this country's sea harvest in
light of the fact that foreign fishermen have been arrested and fined for using gill (or drift)
nets, some more than 20 kilometres long, off the South African coast.
7.6 LAND
7.6.1 Land Use
There is some discrepancy between two sources of data with regard to the total surface area of
South Africa to be apportioned among the various uses to which it is put. The pattern of land
use in Table 7.4 is an adaptation of the President Council's data (1991, pp 13-14, total area
107 million hectares) to those of World Resources (1992, pp 262-263), 122 million hectares).
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TABLE 7.4
LAND IN USE IN SOUTH AFRICA
Million hectares %
Residential and industrial areas
Roads and Railways
Mining
Parks, forests, woodlands
Cropland
Permanent pasture
Other
6,0
2,1
1,1
6,2
13,1
81,0
12,5
122,0
4,9
1,7
0,9
5,1
10,7
66,4
10,3
100,0
Inasmuch as humankind needs living space in the form of residential accommodation, there is
an obvious and direct link between population size and growth and land appropriated for
residential structures (houses, cottages, hovels). While affluence may make for larger per
capita sites being occupied in the suburbs, the vertical construction within towns and cities
may act in compensating manner. Poverty is more likely to be associated with space-
demanding horizontal construction, particularly when it leads to squatting and land invasions.
In the latter event they could occupy land better suited to the production of vegetables, as on
the Cape Flats, or they become such a nuisance to owners of adjacent vegetable growers as a
result of repeated thieving that the latter have to resort to shooting at the thieves and/or
abandoning their farms (Peacock, 1995, p 6). The aesthetically objectionable squatter camps
constitutes no more than survival accommodation in which environmental conservation is not
esteemed. Open spaces between shacks, or planned open spaces in informal settlements,
become recipients of human wastes. The landfills on the edges of formal settlements have the
same function and a similar effect on the land.
The apportionment of 4,9 per cent of land use to Residential and Industrial Areas does not
adequately measure the significance of man's encroachment on the land, since much better
than average quality areas are involved, and requiring the costly infrastructure of urban living,
as well as the means of communication between settlements: roads, railways, bridges,
telephones.
Of more importance than the need for living space are the demands upon land for the
purposes of producing the food requirements of the population: directly, by providing all the
ingredients of the diet or, indirectly, by producing exportables, the foreign exchange earnings
of which can be used to buy the necessary imports. The less the level of development of the
industrial sector and the greater the desire for self-sufficiency in food supplies, the greater are
the demands upon land and nature.
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More than three-quarters of the South African surface area is being used for agricultural
purposes, encompassing 10,7 per cent cropland and 66,4 per cent permanent pasture (l per
cent of the latter as cultivated pasture). Of the latter, 10 per cent is of high, 30 per cent of
reasonable and 60 per cent of poor quality. Of the 31,1 million hectares of cropland some 9
per cent (1,2 million hectare, responsible for 25 - 30 per cent of agriculture production) is
under irrigation, with meagre prospects of an extension except in the former Homelands
(which are also the Homelands of subsistence agriculture), extension being thwarted by the
competing demand for water by expanding industry and population in addition to the silting
process. Between 1936 and 1996 the per capita agriculture land shrank from 9,4 hectare to
2,24, and by the year 2011, when population is projected to grow to 53 854000 compared to
42 052 000 in 1996, the figure could be 1,7 hectare. The comparable figures for cropland are
1,3 (1936),0,31 (1996) and 0,24 (2011) hectares respectively. Which means that to maintain
production per capita the productivity per unit of agricultural land has to be raised by 29 per
cent over the fifteen year period 1996 - 20 Il.
7.6.2 Pressure of population on land
To simulate the pressure of population on land we can have recourse to some data pertaining
to the system of traditional (subsistence) farming in the Homelands where land -
"synonymous with womb" according to a spokesman for the traditionalists - is perceived as
the unique co-operant factor of production: witness the "land hunger". Except for the
development inputs by government, dependence upon nature is almost complete in the
absence of a pari passu accumulation of man--made capital and technology. Capital formation
insofar as it does occur, mostly assumes the form of increases in quantities of livestock,
quality constant, which is dependent upon the carrying capacity of grazing-land, nature, that
is. The situation can be diagrammed as in Figure 7.2. It is not to be inferred that the available
land was available to every family. The Homelands surface area was extended by only Il per
cent since 1951 while the population expanded by 336 per cent. This did not allow for an
unlimited subdivision to give every family a stake in the land, leaving increasing numbers
landless. But dividing the available land area by the total population yields a per capita
average of 0,86 hectare in 1991 (5,2 hectare per family) compared to 6,17 in 1911 (37 hectare
per family), and when the averages are based on cropland only, the figures have to be divided
by 7.
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When, at the beginning of the century, limited supplies of human factors of production
(highly or perfectly correlated with population) were applied to the given land area an
increase in these amounts could possibly have raised the returns per capita, as represented by
the marginal and average product curves up to point B, spelling increasing returns to scale.
Thereafter, as population increased, and land and grazing rights were being allotted to them -
by headmen and chieftains as trustees - the production generated by the additions to the
human factors - the marginal product - declined, to be followed by a diminution in the average
product as well. With numbers proliferating, a stage can be reached when not only the
average, but also the total, product may diminish in the absence of rescue operations, as
indicated by the stage beyond point M on the curve, when marginal returns become negative.
The situation is analogous to that at point C in Figure 7.1. Land, which permitted the
enjoyment of subsistence affluence (as explained in Chapter 5.2.2) up to the 1920's, obliged
ever increasing numbers of inhabitants to seek economic refuge in the migrant and commuter
labour system, which, together with government rehabilitation and aid projects, relieved some
pressure on nature. In 1955 the Tomlinson Commission (1955, p 99) reported that the net
income produced by the traditional economy (at constant prices) remained almost constant
over the period 1936 - 1951, which meant a decline in per capita income. This latter
magnitude, in index form, diminished from 100 in 1946 to 61 in 1960 and 54 in 1970 (Sadie,
1978, p 19). In one location which was surveyed in 1937 and again in 1969 it was found that
the agricultural yield per person had dropped, between the two dates, from 2 bags of grain and
beans to 0,4 bag (Hattingh, 1970). If it is true that this was the outcome, in part, of an
increasing orientation towards competing opportunities in the labour market outside the
Homelands, and therefore of the neglect of agriculture, it is also true that the diminishing size
of plots rendered the optimum exploitation of their capacity an exercise that was not worth
while.
Food crops suffered as a result of the destruction of trees and shrubs to satisfy fuelwood
needs, since harvest residues and cattle dung served as substitute fuel, instead of being used
for compost purposes. But it is particularly as livestock owners whose increasing numbers,
"without personal or communal responsibility for the maintenance of soil fertility or of the
carrying capacity of the grazing ... robbed the soil" (Tomlinson Commission, 1955, p 74) that
subsistence farmers have been damaging the environment and its ability to provide
sustainable levels of living. Almost inevitable is overgrazing, a stripping of the vegetation
cover and the degradation of the land. The nature-engendered capital is decimated. It is
conceivable that, where at least flatlands are involved, a cyclic process could ensue if the
decimation is sufficient to oblige of a regeneration of the vegetation. On the escarpments a
permanent loss of soil fertility is more likely. In an Expert Group Meeting on Population,
Environment and Development in January 1992 (UN, 1992, pp 7/8), poverty was proffered as
a cause of land degradation "most notably - apart from population growth - since
impoverished people could not afford the conservation measures needed to protect soil
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cover". This dichotomy in imputation has the flavour of otioseness, in that the shrinking
acreage per person - in the present context at least - defines impoverishment, and the meagre
amount of assets, confined to natural and nature-engendered resources, is poverty.
However, subsistence farming is practised on less than one-sixth of South Africa's agricultural
land, and commercial farming is no less responsible for land degradation. A 1991 survey of
the South African Agricultural Extension Service found that 19,2 per cent of cattle farmers
overestimated the long run grazing capacity of their farms by 6 to 25 per cent, 18,1 per cent
by 26 to 50 per cent and 24,1 per cent by more than 50 per cent. Comparable proportions for
sheep farmers were 11,5, 11,1 and 18,5 per cent respectively (Die Burger, 1991). This
overestimation spells overstocking, which removes the, or some, indigenous vegetation cover,
exposing the bared soil to the erosive force of raindrops and wind and leaving behind parent
soil which has lost its water-retention capacity, and is much poorer in nutrients than the
eroded material - one-third to one-fifth of the latter (Scotney & Dijkhuis, 1990, P 397). South
Africa has been losing approximately 300 tons of topsoil through erosion every year, that is,
at a rate of 3 tons per hectare, which is ten times that of soil formation. This would have
deprived the country of a quarter of its original soil reserves (Soutter, 1988, p 11). The
Department of Water Affairs suggested that the observed reduction in deposits of eroded soil
into the South African rivers could reflect a diminution of the soil left to be eroded
(Waterwese, 1986, pp 38/9). To compensate for the loss of soil fertility thus brought about
would need an annual fertiliser application costing more than one billion Rand (Soutter, 1988,
p l l ),
For Africa as a whole the percentages of human-induced degraded soil, at three levels of
intensity, have been estimated at 8 per cent slight, 9 per cent moderate and 6 per cent severe
(World Resources, 1992-93, p 290).
Even in the absence of erosion the continuous use of land can cause deterioration. Fertile soils
are rich in organic matter of which nitrogen is an important element, and while soils devoid of
organic matter can still achieve reasonable yields, more costly compensating inputs are
required. Studies in the USA and Canada suggest losses of 40-45 per cent of organic matter to
result from long term cultivation, while the rate of deterioration could be higher in Southern
Africa (Scotney & Dijkhuis, 1990, P 396). The process starts immediately after virgin soil has
been broken up.
When the cultivated area is extended by encroachment upon rain forest environments the
process takes place at a much more destructive pace. The forests' nutrients are not stored in
the soil but in the biomass, and are lost when the tree and plant cover is removed. This fragile
soil may produce respectable yields for a year or two, after which they fall off drastically
when the nutrients have been used up. Only shifting cultivation on the basis of 20-30 years'
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fallow periods is feasible, and population pressure does not permit of it, nor of adequate
fallow periods for other croplands, the marginal proportions of which are ever extended by the
poorest communities. When this extension encroaches upon nature reserves, water resources
and eco-tourism can be the losers.
To the degradation caused by rain and wind must be added physical degradation, which is
waterlogging, compaction and subsidence of organic soils, and chemical degradation
associated with salination, acidification and pollution arising from the intensification of land
use in attempts to compensate for limitations imposed by its size.
All the problems narrated above are exacerbated by recurring droughts which stretch the
endurance of natural resources beyond the limit. Farmers tend to be optimistic and stock their
land in accordance with its perceived carrying capacity during good years, thus initiating or
hastening a process of desertification when droughts lasting three or more years occur, which
process has been defined as "the diminution or destruction of the biological potential of the
land, which ultimately leads to desert-like conditions" (Thiam in UN, 1994, p 175). The
President's Council maintained that 55 per cent of the total surface area of South Africa was
threatened with desertification including "the entire Karoo (36,2%), sensitive areas (10,9%)
and a transitional area of some 31 million hectares (8,5%)" (1991, p 16). It is claimed that the
Karoo system is insidiously creeping northwards. The people driven off their land by the
conditions portrayed above and seeking refuge elsewhere have been dubbed environmental or
eco-refugees. There may be 12 million of them in Sub-Saharan Africa (Myers, 1994, p 7),
displaced within, and across, their own countries' borders. It is difficult to know how many of
the refugees in South Africa would qualify for this label.
7.6.3 Food Supplies
Without any doubt the rain-fed lands of the earth can, in concert with the necessary
technology, capital and entrepreneurial initiative, produce enough food to provide the world's
population now, and in the foreseeable future, with an adequate diet. The FAO, in co-
operation with the International Institute of Applied Analysis estimated the potential
population-supporting capacity (PPSC) of 117 LDCs taking into consideration the soil
productivity, rainfall, climatic variability, natural erosion and the per capita energy and
protein requirements of each, while distinguishing three levels of agronomic inputs: 1. Low
level, with no fertiliser, pesticide application, improved strains of crop material, soil
conservation measures or mechanisation; II. Intermediate level, in between the low and the
III High level which assumes full mechanisation, optimum amounts of fertiliser, pesticides,
genetic material and soil conservation plus the most nutritious crops (FAO in UN, 1994, P
256, Higgins et al., 1982). Itwas found that by the year 2000 64 of the countries would not be
able to produce enough to meet their food needs under level I conditions, typical of
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subsistence farming in Sub-Saharan Africa, where 26 countries out of 46 were unlikely to
sustain their populations. Some 14 of them could not have met the requirements of their 1975
population even. The PPSC of Africa as a whole, expressed as a multiple of their projected
2000 population, came to 1,6, signifying that within two decades after the turn of the century
the productive capacity of the region would be overhauled by their population size. The
multiple rises to 16,5 if agricultural practices were consistent with the level III technological
inputs (World Resources, 1986, p 46).
Operation at the third, or even the intermediate level, makes the following demands upon
practitioners: Knowledge of the ways and means of raising productivity; initiative to engage
upon the mode of production involved; financial means to purchase and afford the required
inputs; using the land to earn a living and not as a way of life; adequate acreage to sustain a
family, which means that increases in population numbers should not be allowed to
overcrowd agricultural land, but, instead, be economically accommodated in non-agricultural
pursuits. In predominantly agrarian societies and traditionalist agriculture these conditions
are, for the most part, not satisfied. Accordingly, whatever the PPSC of the earth may be - and
Gillis et al. (1992, p 49) believe that the planet is not remotely close to the biological limit -
there is still a non-coincidence of the location of people and food supplies at the level of
individual communities. That the problem is thus one of distribution does not necessarily
render it more easily resolvable than any other problem of Third World countries.
Barring international food aid and gifts from the food-surplus to the food-deficit countries, the
latter still have to afford the requisite imports, which, invariably - a few industrialised
countries aside - they can not, since they are also manufactures-deficit countries. Of the 26
sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries unable to feed their projected populations of the year
2000, only 6 have the ability to afford food imports by means of the exportation of
manufactures and fuel minerals (FAO, 1984). During years of favourable weather conditions
in the deficit countries, the "marginal" imports of food involved can still be handled with
reasonable facility. However, when severe droughts are experienced, the transportation and
distributional networks of these countries tend to be inadequate to pre-empt famine. The
larger the population the greater the vulnerability to natural disasters.
This vulnerability is also the more acute the greater the dependence on natural resources as
reflected by the share of agriculture in the generation of the GDP or GNP, and the percentage
of the labour force engaged in it.
Given the land area and the level of non-labour inputs, the mverse correlation between
population size and food production per capita is close to unity.
The rapid growth of the SSA population changed the region from a food exporter to an
[CH7(JLS)]
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
250
importer of considerable volumes of food. In 1995 the Worldwatch Institute reported that
populous China became a net importer of grain; but opinions differed about whether it
presaged a long-term situation (Briscoe, 1995, p 8). Brown and Kane, reassessing the earth's
population carrying capacity projected the grain production of the four largest food-producing
countries to the year 2030. While the USA will show a surplus of 83 million tons, the other
three will experience deficits of 25 million tons (the former Soviet Union), of 45 million tons
(India) and of 216 million tons (China). In addition nine other countries with large
populations will not be able to satisfy their own needs (1995, pp 6/7). In South Africa the per
capita food production has been declining since the middle of the 1970s (by 9 per cent during
the period 1977-1989), concomitantly with a 1,3 per cent decrease in cropland and an increase
of 34 per cent in the population, and the trend seemed likely to continue (lFR, 1993, pp 5-
10/11). Whether the country is able to feed itself at existing levels of consumption depends
very much on weather conditions in the summer rainfall area where the maize crop can vary
from 4 to 14 million tons. Severe droughts compel the importation of maize, wheat, meat and
dairy products.
The levels and growth of production in the food surplus and self-sufficient countries have
been achieved by exacting high and increasing yields per hectare, requiring the
technologically most advanced Level III inputs (to be discussed in the next Chapter), which
are destructive of environmental integrity which, in turn, can have a rebound effect on
agricultural productivity. Myers (in UN, 1994, P 55) has estimated the covert cost involved at
almost half the gains in production achieved by means of increased hi-tech inputs. Over the
period 1955 - 2010 soil erosion alone, in this case evidently regardless of level of inputs -
could be responsible for a (gross) reduction in food production of 19 to 29 per cent from rain-
fed croplands (UN, 1994, p 7). While the world's production of grain is increasing at a rate of
less than 1 per cent per annum, its population is growing by 1,8 per cent per annum (2,1% in
LDCs), millions of them already in need of an enhancement in diet to combat, or reduce, the
incidence of malnutrition. The proportion of people in SSA expected to have less than 1 520
calories at their disposal by the end of the century was estimated at some 29 per cent (UN,
1990, P 251).
7.7 APPORTIONING RESPONSIBILITY
At various stages of the discussion above the role of population in the environmental drama
has been touched upon, but apportioning relative significance, at the global, or aggregate,
level to the probable determinants of consumption of natural resources is problematical, since
the damage inflicted upon them is manifested in many ways, stemming from a diversity of
economic activities. In their attempts at imputation writers tend to resort to the First
WorldlThird World (or DevelopedlDeveloping countries) dichotomy, the former representing
predominantly the affluence factor and the latter the influence of population size and growth.
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When the matter is raised at international conferences a preference is shown for highlighting
the pollution caused by the former. The discussion at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit constrained
onewriter to declare that "population hardly made it into the agenda - and as soon as it did it
was promptly knocked off again by a combination of the Vatican and its allies" (Myers, 1993,
p 31). However, in the papers submitted at the Expert Group Meeting preparatory to the
International Conference on Population and Development two years later the demographic
factor was accorded adequate exposure.
The affluence factor is being associated with dietary and technological richness, usually with
an accusatory slant to it. "Always I end up with the same conclusion" asseverated the
president of the People-Centred Development Forum uncompromisingly, "it is the ever
growing demand of the wealthy for more and more resources that depletes our environment
and pushes the poor to ever greater social and ecological desperation" (The Hunger Project,
1991, p 2). The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) would
have it that economic development "and the demand of the consumption patterns of
developed countries and developed sectors of developing countries are largely responsible for
the environmental degradation which has taken place throughout the world" (in UN, 1994, p
235). The rich diets and high levels of living of the Developed World make greater demands
per capita upon the earth's potential to deliver. While 50 litres of water per person per day
would provide a reasonable quality of life, the United States' figure approximates 500 litres,
and that of India 25 litres (Crews, 1987, p 3). While a daily intake of 2 400 calories per
average person would suffice for well-being, First World persons average 3 300 calories
compared to 2 200 in the LDCs. Proteins derived from the ingestion of red meat require
seven-and-a-half times as much grain as a vegetarian diet. If the more than one billion
Chinese were to seek their protein requirements from meat instead of from the consumption
of soy, the hundreds of millions of animals entailed would devastate their economy (The
Hunger Project, 1987, p 3). According to the Hunger Project the earth could support 5,5
billion people assuming vegetarian diets, current bio-technology and all lands devoted to the
production of food only. A Western European and American diet, by comparison, with a 25
per cent animal protein content, brings down the number to 2,8 billion (Myers in UN, 1994, P
56). To this can be added that the developed countries have a greater capacity to abuse the
global commons - the oceans - and do, in fact, inflict greater damage upon the marine
breeding stock than the developing countries (LDCs) when catches in their own coastal waters
shrink.
It is however, particularly in the realm of the mode of production, in combination with their
way of life, that the higher income countries are called to account for their despoliation and
consumption of natural resources. North Americans use energy at the rate of 45 barrels of oil
equivalent per person per annum, compared to 2 in Africa. The US, the European Union and
Japan are responsible for 40 per cent of the world's carbon dioxide emissions by burning
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fossil fuels (Pearce, 1995, p 4). (As pointed out in the discussion of the greenhouse gases, this
is only half the story.) The demographic centre of ECLAC, quoting the UN Population Fund
as their source of information, claims that "although they account for scarcely 25 per cent of
the world population, the developed countries consume 75 per cent of all energy produced, 79
per cent of the fuels that are marketed, 85 per cent of articles made of wood and 72 per cent of
the steel produced". We have on the one hand a statement that in the matter of global warming
and ozone layer depletion the ways of the 1,2 billion Northerners are more damaging than
those of the 4,3 billion Southerners (Toeba, et al., 1992). On the other hand Harrison argues
that the reduction in population growth, by virtue of its share in deforestation, can make a
dramatic contribution to the slowing down of global warming (1994, pp 8/9).
The argumentation would be incomplete if mention is not made of the Malthusian thesis.
Thomas R Malthus (1798) - arguably the father of demography - laid unique stress on
population which would tend to outrun food supplies unless restrained by preventive checks.
He wrote his Essay before the industrial revolution had raised living standards of significant
proportions of populations. However, preceding the report to the Club of Rome by Meadows,
et al. (1972), Forrester's model-building led him to the conclusion that the Malthusian
principle was in action all the time (1971).
Our quest, formulated at the beginning of this section might meet with success if we could
give quantitative content to all three factors on the right-hand side of the identity (Ehrlich &
Ehrlich, 1990, Commoner 1990) which defines the environmental impact (I) as
I=PAT
where P represents population numbers (N, for numbers, in this author's notation), A,
affluence (Yp.c. or income per capita) and T, technology. As it stands the identity should
furnish us with the point of time intensity of impact, the influence of anyone of the three
determinants being compounded by the level of the other two. To distinguish between the
significance of the three we have to have recourse to the time derivatives or rates of change,
indicated here by small letters:
i=p+a+t
[or for a specific time period I + ~I = (P + ~P) x (A + ~A) x (T + ~T)]
Commoner (in UN, 1994" pp 64-77) quantifies the magnitudes involved to test for the distinct
significance of each of the three determinants in the pollution represented by carbon
monoxide and nitrogen oxide emissions, pesticide usage and nitrogen fertilizer as experienced
in 10 to 18 selected developed countries. Denying functionality to the PollutionIPopulation
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relationship ("This is evident from the mathematics of the PAT equation", p 76) he comes to
the conclusion that" ... the technology of production ... is the major determinant that governs
the impact of population and economic development on the environment" (p 76). Unqualified,
such conclusion has too wide a range of meaning for the narrowness of its base.
Instead of this identity use can be made of the functional relationship specified at the start of
this Chapter viz.
C = f(N,Y, Ydist., P).
Technology is not included in this equation since it is considered to be the means whereby the
desire for higher income was turned into reality, and being, therefore, a function of Y, it
would introduce multicollinearity. It assumes the character of a proximate determinant while
the others are of an ultimate nature. When governments step in to check the consumption (C)
of natural resources, when the most advanced stage of technology and of living standards has
been reached, technology enters as an element in the constraint variable P (price and/or
policy, not population which is represented by N) which will have a negative sign.
Differentiating with respect to time, and omitting Ydistr.. which cannot be handled in the
same manner as the other variables, we have
with the e values referring to the elasticities with respect to population, income and price
respectively, and r standing for the rates of increase or decrease. In a practical example the
use of the relationship can be illustrated in which eprp is neglected but Ydistr. is brought into
play. For the purposes of our exercise the South African population is divided into four
income groups whose numbers are projected from 1991 to 2001 to yield rn for each group;
and the ry values are probabilistic estimates subject to the constraint that the aggregate value
should be zero, the assumption being that the economy will grow no faster than population
numbers. This does not prevent some groups from improving their economic position.
Though the population elasticity of consumption is influenced by the age structure, and
ageing is positively associated with income per capita in our example, it will be premised that
en wiU not deviate meaningfully from 1,0 (for all income groups). The ey values have been
based on a cross-reference of income per ethnic group, social accounting matrix data, and
income elasticities per ethnic group for the various items of household expenditure on non-
essentials (or "prosperity" goods). (Eckert & Mullins, 1989; Whiteford & McGrath, 1994;
Loubser, 1990, p 20.)
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Group
TABLE 7.5(a)
INPUTS IN THE CONSUMPTION EQUATION
Population Income per capita
1991 2001 rn 1991 2001 ry ey
% % R R
Rich (A) 10,8 9,6 0,8 2594026450 0,3 1,0
Middle Income (B) 39,6 38,5 1,7 5490 607O 1,1 1,1
Poor (C) 22,0 22,8 2,3 2250 251O 1,2 1,3
Very Poor (D) 27,6 29,1 2,5 920 920 0,0 1,3
Aggregate 100,0 100,0 2,0 5725 5725 0,0
TABLE 7.5 (b)
1991-2001 CONSUMPTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES PER ANNUM
Weighted
enrn + eyry enrn eyry Aggregate
A 0,8 0,30 0,086 0,147 0,233
B 1,7 1,21 0,673 0,460 1,133
C 2,3 1,56 0,506 0,136 0,642
D 2,5 0,0 0,690 0,0 0,690
2,0 0,0 1,955 0,743 2,698
To determine the contributions of each income group (the horizontal aggregate) enrn values
were weighted with relative population numbers, and eyry with the relative shares in the total
personal income.
The statistical exercise presented in Table 7.5 suggests that natural resources are being
consumed at a rate of 2,7 per cent per annum, of which population growth would be
responsible for 2,0 per cent, which is 2,6 times the rate arising from the income factor. If the
latter had been judged by the presumed aggregate no-change in the per capita average, its
contribution would have been zero. However, the presumed (probable) redistribution towards
the higher income groups, average constant, is responsible for according it a positive value of
0,743 per cent per annum. (This seemingly statistical oddity which would indicate that groups
A, B and C will be better off and group D not worse off in 2001 than in 1991, while the per
capita amount in the aggregate remains constant, is purely a function of the relative numbers
receiving incomes below and above the average and of the distribution, among the groups, of
the expansion in the absolute amount of the GDP.) If the total increment in personal income,
1991-2001, is for the account of the very poor, groups A, Band C not gaining in income per
capita, the rate of natural resource consumption increases slightly to 2,8 per cent (by way of
the influence of eyry), and group D would then be the chief contributor while in the above
exercise the middle income group emerges as the major performer. Naturally, the higher the
[CH7(JLS)]
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
255
increase in the rate of per capita income growth, the greater will be the influence of the
affluence factor.
The course of natural resource depletion in terms of n, y and p at the generalised, or aggregate
level, can be traced by stylising it in the sigmoid curve (Figure 7.3) as a community
progresses on the development path. At the undeveloped phase I, with only natural resources
in productive co-operation, n is the unique determinant.
Figure 7.3 NATURAL RESOURCE DEPLETION
IV
y
II
n+y
Time
In phase II, aspmng to higher standards of living, entrepreneurs emerge and invest in
technology and capital (man-made), to add y to n as depleting forces. If this coincides with
the explosive phase of the demographic cycle, the effect of n is enhanced. Depletion is
occurring at an accelerating rate. When economic development has attained a level of
maturity producing high average incomes per capita, consciousness about the despoliation of
nature is awakened and government is exhorted to combat it, the taxpayers now able to
finance such action represented by p. The latter can take the form of pricing, a system of
quotas, the internalisation of external costs and/or compulsory adjustments to technologies in
use. Marginal private cost, which is raised by government intervention (in the case of oil by
cartel intervention), is brought closer to marginal social cost. The effect of y is attenuated, n
might at this stage approximate zero, and p emerges as the predominant force. The asymptotic
phase III portion of the sigmoid curve has been reached, which can end up with a downward
slope if measures are vigorously applied (phase IV).
The sequence of predominating forces is, therefore, successively n, n + y, y, p.
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Commoner's (1994) statistical exercises pertain to phase III and IV in which n has become
insignificant, in terms of natural increase, and the level of Y, and therefore of y, is not an
important obstacle, so that p is the logical object to which attention is to be devoted.
However, the juxtaposition exemplified in his statement that the 41,8 per cent reduction in CO
emissions, accomplished by the catalytic converter in car exhausts in the US during 1970-87,
could only be equalled by a 51 per cent decline in vehicle/kilometres per capita or a 60 per
cent diminution of population, is less than apposite. Reducing population (N) is not an option,
only n is, and in the circumstances in which his model is operating, restraining y, insofar as it
is implied in policy measures, is not a major problem. Nevertheless, directing attention to
alternative or new technology has the merit of avoiding a direct attack upon the level of Y
which has little chance of meeting with acceptance or acquiescence.
Obliging the installation of pollution-inhibiting mechanisms, like the catalytic converter,
represents one version of the intemalisation of costs. The other is a direct attack upon the
price mechanism by taxing the guilty parties by means, for example, of a carbon tax. The
reasoning is that the unimpeded market is not geared to reflect externalities and to anticipate
supply conditions a decade or longer ahead, so that prices will be too low to induce the
optimal use of particularly non-renewable resources. If, in addition, ep has a low value, the
market, left to itself, will fail to effect the desired restraint.
In this regard Birdsall (in UN, 1994, P 49/50) presents an example of the comparative costs of
effecting aIO per cent reduction in carbon emissions by means of (i) a carbon tax, or (ii) a
family planning programme (FPP). Assuming the cost of averting a birth to be 220 US
dollars, she finds that per ton of carbon emissions avoided, the cost of the FPP, at between 4
and 11 dollars, compares favourably with the 20 dollar marginal cost of the tax.
UNCTAD has proposed the establishment of a special institution through which the price
mechanism could fulfil its role. The US, Japan and the European Union, which are required to
reduce their carbon emissions to the 1990 levels by the year 2000 under the climate change
convention, should set up a pollution exchange to allow pollution entitlements to be traded,
the parties guilty of exceeding their entitlements buying permits from the innocent or
pollution-preventing companies (Pearce, 1995, p 4).
It is, of course, possible for the price mechanism to act perversely in terms of conservation. In
the absence of government intervention, rising prices of fish, for instance, due to increasing
scarcity, are quite likely to act as an incentive to suppliers (fishing companies) to deplete still
further the breeding stocks since the price elasticity of demand is unlikely to be high enough
to reduce demand significantly. Physical controls become unavoidable. However, the quotas
involved could still be subjected to the price mechanism by putting them out to tender; a
procedure which, again, will have the small individual commercial fishermen up in arms.
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While the price mechanism can be the appropriate tool for curbing natural resource depletion
where it stems from the generation of affluence, it would hardly be contemplated where
shortages of life's essentials are the problem. In some MDCs the policy of subsidising farmers
does seem to be the antithesis of appropriate action, since it stimulates production - the unsold
portions of which are put in storage - and in the process induces the consumption of more of
the earth's non-renewable resources than would otherwise have occurred. And the blame
could no doubt be laid at the door of avarice, or the maintenance of comfortable living
standards. At the same time it is to be considered that it has the role of supplying food-deficit
countries, and preventing deaths on a large scale caused by frequently recurring droughts in
the latter. And so we have a compounded effect: in the LDCs, as a result of their populations
outstripping the carrying capacity of their natural resources, the environment is being abused,
while the MDCs, in relieving the resulting shortages, are equally responsible for natural
resource depletion.
By virtue of the higher average value of the income elasticity of consumption compared to the
population elasticity, each increment in Y should have a greater effect on the environment
than a similar relative increment in N. Theoretically, this suggests that income per capita, and
accordingly economic growth, is a potential candidate for restraint, and the logical question is
then whether this is a feasible policy for South Africa, as for the large majority of the world's
population. The response must unqualifiedly be in the negative. According to Table 7.4
almost one half of the South African population is either poor or very poor, many of them
living in squatter camps and shanty towns amidst squalor, malnutrition or hunger and
generally distressing circumstances. Their material standards are not to be maintained only,
but raised. While this is not true of the rich and middle income groups, many of the latter still
aspire to higher standards of living. And rising incomes for them - as in the case of the MDCs
vis-a-vis the LDCs - facilitates the continuation of the redistribution of income to the poor and
very poor. Stagnating incomes will intensify the burden of taxation for the higher income -
but particularly middle income - classes, since the poorer groups are growing faster in
number, and this will engender increasing resistance to taxation.
While the poor cannot afford the destruction of natural resources if they have to prevent
further impoverishment, they cannot afford to conserve them either, so that poverty,
originating in population growth, becomes a major source of inevitable resource depletion,
population numbers increasing as they do. When it means malnutrition or, worse still, hunger,
we have apathetic human beings concerned about material needs only and lacking in
consideration for the environment or the conservation of natural resources. A reasonable
degree of material well-being is required for conservation. The Hunger Project (1988, p L),
referring to most Asian countries, stated categorically that "environmental protection simply
costs too much". There is here a type of catch 22 situation: the prevention of poverty-induced
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destruction requires economic growth which entails affluence- or income-induced depletion.
The latter, however, has the advantage of permitting conservation activities. If despoliation of
the environment cannot but occur it should preferably arise from economic development
which results in reasonable standards of living. When this has been achieved it becomes
possible to combat the consumption of the environment by intemalising the cost involved or
having taxpayers in general bear the cost of conservation. As it is, the proliferating poor will
want to move on to the acceleration portion of the sigmoid curve of natural resource
consumption, whether by means of self-development or income redistribution. If it were to be
accomplished via the former process they can be expected to use the existing environment-
depleting technologies for their purpose, and if via the latter process, they will reduce the
ability of the higher income classes to combat depletion.
As to the developed communities of the world, it is scarcely conceivable that they would
contemplate a deliberate termination of economic growth and development. Their economies
are, in any case, not geared to handling such a situation without incurring unacceptable
unemployment levels and retrogression. It would also seem to be unnecessary in that new
emerging technologies seem to be able to keep the development "green" and to economise on
natural resources.
In the post-war course of events in South Africa the affluence factor has been the major
source of natural resource consumption up to 1976. Since then population growth has been
the major actor. Between 1981 and 1994 the per capita GDP has dwindled by 18 per cent, or
Rl 516 at 1990 prices, yielding the following values for the two variables in Table 7.4.
enrn = 2,3% p.a.
eyry = -1,9% p.a.
Barring new pollution-exacerbating technologies, population stands out as the villain of the
piece. It is the much more compelling force in that even if there is no increase in average
levels of living, population growth would still demand economic growth in the aggregate to
prevent impoverishment below subsistence levels.
7.8 CONCLUSION
The inevitable conclusion follows: population growth is the force to be counteracted.
It is claimed, with theoretically unimpeachable logic, that "development is the best pill".
Poverty begets poverty and children. The development referred to entails the breaking down
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of fertility-promoting traditions by way of education; literacy; a rational approach to life; the
emancipation of women and increasing participation in the modem sector labour force which
competes with their traditional function of housewife; the emergence of children as a social
burden in the urban environment; the breakdown of the extended family system, coupled with
rising aspirations towards higher material living standards, which render children an
economic burden instead of a real or imagined economic asset. The required development
involves an acceleration of economic activity and Y. In terms of the onslaught on natural
resources it implies increasing resource-consuming economic growth to reduce resource-
destroying population growth. This underscores the catch 22 situation already mentioned
above. Of greater importance still is the fact that rapid population growth - as will be
demonstrated in the Chapters to follow - is an obstacle to development. Among the
communities in question proliferating numbers inhibit the development purported to be the
prerequisite for the pill to fulfil its function.
Therefore, a direct attack upon proliferation, even while wrapping it in politically correct
verbiage, is indicated; focussing on birth control by persuading couples of the iniquity of
improvident parenthood. Declaring that couples shall have the right to decide for themselves
how few or how many children they would like to have - beloved of international conferences
- has a pleasant, persuasive and moralistically correct sound about it. But it can also be said to
be tantamount to asserting that they have the right to promote the depletion of natural
resources, and to exact restitution for their improvidence from the practitioners of responsible
parenthood.
Whatever theoretical truth may inhere in the slogan: development is the best pill, reality
demands that, in South Africa, as in most of the LDCs, policy, for practical purposes, be
founded in the inverse: the pill is the best development.
Paul Harrison's statistical analysis leads him to the conclusion that "the figures knock on the
head of the old theory that economic growth is the best contraceptive" (1994, p 8). Having
analysed the data furnished by the World Fertility Survey (WFS) Robey et.al. disputed "the
notion that development is the best contraceptive" (1993, p 34); while Brackett et.al.
maintained that the "WFS data on women who want no more children do not support the
classical theories about socio-economic determinants of fertility" (1978, p 317). And the
president of the International Parenthood Federation stressed that the Programme of Action
agreed upon at the 1994 Cairo International Conference on Population (CIPD) "should not be
taken as a de-emphasising of the importance of fertility reduction activities" (Sai, 1997, p 4).
The government of the New South Africa, however, in its White Paper on a Population Policy
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(Republic of South Africa, 1998), not only de-emphasised it but deliberately and assiduously
fought shy of the words 'family planning' except in one bracketed aside ("such as family
planning"), and as a peg to hang on a disparagement of the reasonably successful Population
Development Programme of the previous government in which fertility reduction featured
prominently. It may be a politically correct social agenda but not an economically and
demographically inspired population policy to grapple with the problem of natural resource
consumption at its roots. It avoids a direct attack on forces inimical to the realisation of the
guarantee, in the constitution, (to the present and future generation) of a protected and clean
environment.
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CHAPTER 8
TECHNOLOGY
8.1 GENERAL
In the previous Chapter technology has already featured quite prominently, but then in its
adversative role. But much more important than its function as a force hostile to the
environment, is its role as a productivity-enhancing and resource-sparing factor of production.
The history of economic progress is closely connected with the advancement of technology as
a complementary factor of production. As a substitutional factor it is particularly associated
with increasing relative scarcity and cost oflabour in the developed countries. Usually the two
attributes are being manifested contemporaneously; with complementarity the dominant one
in communities where limited natural resources constitute the constraint to economic growth.
The technological "entity" being made up of hardware, software, human skills and
organisational knowledge (creative capability), we have embodied and disembodied
technology. It is the former that we are, in the main, concerned with in this Chapter, the two
main branches of which are industrial and bio-technology, the former embodied in capital
equipment and intermediate inputs, and the latter in intermediate inputs.
Given the demographic characteristics of a community confronted by a limited amount of
natural resources, and having in mind that the object of economic activity is purportedly to
maximise economic welfare by way of an optimum combination of factors of production, the
discussion is bound to revolve around the question of the appropriateness of the technology
and capital in use, or to be used, whether as complements or as substitutes.
8.2 AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY
8.2.1 Its economic function
In a study of the grain outputs in 46 countries around the world (Hyami & Ruttan, 1971, P 7)
it was found that the role of technology (T) tended to depend upon the relative scarcity of
labour and land. Where (a) land was relatively plentiful and the rural population small and
shrinking, agricultural output per male worker was maximised (e.g. New Zealand, Australia,
United States, Canada); and (b) where the rural populations were large and growing, and the
arable land area per capita small, the output per hectare was promoted (e.g. Taiwan, Japan,
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Mauritius, Suriname, Ceylon) by means of technology. A (c) third category of countries was
encountered (LDCs) where neither of the two output ratios reflected a distinct influence of
technology.
This appropriateness is measured by the degree to which it is adapted to the economic/
demographic environment in which it operates. To generate the optimal economic outcome it
should be concordant with the conditions of demand and supply, among which the two
population-related determinants feature prominently, namely, (i) the size of the labour force
and its skill composition, particularly in relation to the availability and cost of capital, and (ii)
the effective size of the market, that is, population numbers times per capita income.
Obviously, when the size of the market is not defined by the purchasing power of the local
population but by international demand, the second of the two determinants will be reduced in
importance, but no necessarily rendered out of contention, if and when the domestic market
serves as a foundation in the exploration of foreign markets (which latter aspect is dealt with
in Chapter 14). Since, in respect of both the above determinants the South African population
has, in broad terms, a First and a Third World, or developed and developing, component,
appropriateness does not signal a one-dimensional magnitude, particularly when the
distribution of land resources is allowed for as a third determinant.
Assuming commercial - as opposed to subsistence - farming, supported by the necessary
disembodied technology, (b) and (c) category countries can attain a high degree of efficiency
in their production of food, by embodied technology in the form of intermediate inputs which
are the products of biotechnology research. They allow labour to reach high levels of
productivity without necessarily requiring the aid of costly capital equipment which involves
long term financing. Inasmuch as they have been generated through research and development
(R&D) not paid for by the users, and had become part of public domain, they are also
comparatively inexpensive, and the cost involved can be defrayed out of the proceeds of
current production. There is a danger that this advantage might be threatened if industrialised
countries and multinational corporations were to succeed in acquiring patent controls
(copyright) over their biotechnology products, which will accord them monopoly power and
which is likely to be reflected in the prices for the innovations and discoveries in question.
Indian farmers are said to have been demonstrating vigorously against such patenting (Bryant,
1994, p 38).
In addition to the inputs of biotechnological nature there is yet a role for industrial technology
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embodied in both intermediate inputs and capital equipment, amidst plentiful labour supplies.
These latter can become inadequate during seasonal peaks of intense agricultural activity.
Labour demand peaks during land preparation and sowing and planting in dry climates, and
during harvesting in more humid climates to prevent damage to crops caused by humidity.
Where multiple cropping in rapid succession is practised, a great deal of activity has to be
crammed within short periods of time: a first crop harvested and transported to the market,
the soil prepared for the next crop after which the new planting season is to be completed. In
these circumstances recourse is to be had to mechanical technology appropriate to the needs
and financial capacity of the small farmer, i.e. to satisfy the efficiency-maximising conditions
of production factor application. In this regard the movement of intermediate technology
supporters, founded by the author of Small is Beautiful, the late E.F. Schumacher (1994),
presented "one hundred innovations for development", appropriate to the economic
circumstances of developing communities. These include such equipment as treadle pumps
(foot operated), miniaturised hand tractors and planters.
In South Africa, with a super-abundance of unemployed lesser-skilled labour, there are two
agricultures: the subsistence type - where economic welfare might conceivably be enhanced
by equalising the marginal disutility of effort and the marginal utility of income - involving
few attempts at maximising the marginal product of any factor of production; and the
commercial sector where units are, as a rule, large and increasing in size, and labour is being
substituted by the most advanced technology. From a total of 120 000 at the beginning of the
1950s the number of farms fell to fewer than 60 000 in the middle nineties, raising the
average size by just on 100 per cent (eSS, 1990; SSA, 1999).Where possible, and encouraged
by the desire to realise the economies scale and by taxation policy, the planting and harvesting
processes have been mechanised. In maize farming the use of combines reduced the labour
requirements during harvesting and threshing by some 70 per cent, while the latest weeding
techniques lowered the seasonal labour force requirements by 60 per cent (Wilson, 1984, p
80). In the case of permanent workers the degree of substitution was a good deal lower, but
still substantial, involving approximately 230 000 during 1970-1995. The process is bound to
be continued and intensified by the new labour legislation which allows for legal strikes in
agriculture at the height of the season, making it potentially possible for trade union action to
deprive a farmer of his year's income in a labour-preponderant production process.
8.2.2 Achievements and effects of biotechnology
What can be called the classical or first generation biotechnology research, which was
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responsible for the Green Revolution, was based on the writings of Darwin and the Mendelian
laws of inheritance. The cornerstones of the experimentation in plant breeding were,
according to the Nobel Prize winning agricultural scientist, N.E. Borlaug (1983, pp 61/62)
"the conscious introduction of genetic diversity into populations by intererossing or mating
selected germ plasm with outstanding characters that complement one another and the
selection of superior plants with genes for desired traits until higher levels of improved
adaptation (reproductive fitness), genetic uniformity, and agronomic stability are reached".
Selecting the superior parent types, possessing the desired characteristics, in repeated
hybridisation programmes, high yielding varieties of plants and seeds, which can withstand
the rigours of different climatic environments and disease, have been produced. And so were
born the short stalk hybrid maize, the dwarf wheat and the miracle rice which are the staple
ingredients of the world population's diet, and which ushered in the Green Revolution. In the
USA the yield per hectare of maize increased from 1,80 tons in 1938/40 to 6,32 tons in
1978/80 and of wheat from 0,96 to 2,22 tons, that is, by a factor 3,5 and 2,3 respectively
(Borlaug, p 65). Between 1950 and 1984 the world's grain output increased 2,6 fold or almost
3 per cent per annum, which signified an increase in per capita production. During 1984-91,
however, production seems to have reached a plateau despite a lavish application of fertiliser
(Myers in UN 1994, P 56, Brown, et al., 1992, p 25). The latter has been experiencing
diminishing returns. From 22,19 tons in 1950 the amount used per ton of grain produced rose
to 80,19 in 1991 - raising the marginal rate of application per ton from 60 kilo during 1950-60
to 219 during 1985-1991 - while the energy consumed increased from 0,44 barrels of oil
equivalent to 1,14 tons in 1985 (Brown, et al., p 41). Which means that as long as population
is growing, mankind, in his search for new technological frontiers has to run fast to remain in
the same place, and faster to remain slightly ahead, having to contend also with the
productivity-reducing environmental depletion following in the wake of the new technologies.
Accordingly, the battle is continuing to improve upon improvements, developing new fast-
growing varieties increasingly resistant to drought, inhospitable soils, pests, etc., and
engendering higher yields, which, in addition, have to compensate for the conversion of grain
into meat arising from higher living standards.
To derive the maximum, or some, benefit from the Green Revolution certain conditions have
to be satisfied, assuming that more than just a modicum of farming expertise exists. A very
generous application of fertiliser is required, as has already been demonstrated above. For the
fertiliser to be effective a good deal of water, at the right time and in the right amount, is
required which, if the precipitation is not regular and adequate, as in South Africa, irrigation
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has to provide. Agriculture in South Africa is already the largest single user of water, and the
extensibility of irrigation is very limited. Since weeds and pests are likely to thrive as well as
beneficial plant life, herbicides, insecticides and fungicides have to be resorted to. To save 16
billion dollars' worth of food and fibre crops, which would otherwise be destroyed, US
farmers are spending 4,1 billion dollars on pesticides each year. In South-East Asia, where
early maturing rice can be cultivated on a continuous basis on irrigated land, ten to 20
applications per annum became common, while cabbage plants have to be sprayed every two
to four days (World Resources, 1987, p 46). When the animal life hostile to humankind
develops resistance to the chemicals involved, new types of pesticides have to be generated,
when intensified applications cease to have the desired effect. World Resources 1994-95 (pp
111-113) reported that more than 500 crop-destroying insects and mites were becoming
resistant to pesticides, and their control became more costly because of the need for pesticides
to be species-specific to prevent damage to the eco-system. And apparently the crop loss due
to pest damage during the past fifty years has not measurably diminished.
The implementation of the above procedures requires a concomitant financial capacity, and
this subsistence and other small farmers do not have. Communities needing the benefits of the
Green Revolution most cannot afford to realise them, particularly since the high-tech inputs
will have to be imported for which the necessary foreign exchange is lacking. Of the
developing countries, Kenya, Mexico and India have been held up as examples of success
stories. However, because of rapid population growth, rising nutritional levels, as well as the
environmental degradation consequential upon the practising of the principles of the Green
Revolution, the benefits of the latter have been overtaken by events. The covert costs of the
Green Revolution include the waterlogging and salination of the soil, the nitrification of
neighbouring waters, the spreading of water borne diseases and the poisoning of animals and
humans. Of Mexico it has been said that one-tenth of irrigated land has become severely
salinised while one-fifth was in need of rehabilitation (People and the Planet, 1994, p.14), and
the country has become a net importer of food since 1986. India's Green Revolution has been
"going brown round the edges" with a quarter of its irrigated land "in danger of being
rendered unusable by waterlogging alkalinity and increasing salinity, caused by inadequate
drainage of irrigation water" (The Population Crisis Committee, 1987, p 3). The high-yielding
plant and seed varieties do not produce expected results when inputs of fertiliser and water are
not properly controlled.
The new generation biotechnology followed in the footsteps of the molecular biologists who
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discovered how to cut and splice DNA, which is the foundation of genetic engineering.
Expectations have been raised of a second Green Revolution spawning ultra-high yield
varieties of humankind's staple crops. A major advance has been the creation of transgenic
plants, i.e. into which foreign genes have been transferred, to offer protection against pests,
diseases as well as specific pesticides. For example, to facilitate weeding by means of
herbicides without damaging the non-target species, herbicide-resistance has been cloned into
commercial tobacco cultivars by the CSIR (1992, p 29), and into strawberry plants by the
Stellenbosch Institute for Fruit Technology (Metelerkamp, 1995, plO). US scientists have
genetically engineered a tomato cultivar to endow it with a long shelf life. The Stellenbosch
Institute has been the first in Africa to isolate a gene and clone it into a plant to render it
immune to viruses.
Genetic manipulation also promises to generate new breeds of animals which have already
been improved in quality by the classical inbreeding process. Resulting from more than five
generations of selective breeding, the Mexican mini-cow was generated - starting from an
Indo-Brazilian zebra - which produced one-half to two-thirds of the milk volumes of her
progenitor while consuming only one-tenth of the latter's required grassland (World
Development Forum, 1987, p l ). The new technology has genetically manipulated bacteria to
act as a creator of a chemical which boosts milk production. A frozen embryo has been
implanted into the water buffalo - the beast of burden, and the producer of milk and meat of
Asia - to create a new breed of buffalo that would produce more food for their owners while
consuming less, attain maturity at a younger age and calve more frequently (World
Development Forum, 1990, p l).
At the same time attention is devoted to "natural technology" which refers to the harnessing of
nature without genetic intervention, to attain ecologically and humankind-friendly results.
Research into the properties of plants has uncovered halophytes which grow well in saline
water and soils, can contribute to soil reclamation and combat desertification (World
Development Forum, Sept 1990, p 3); the neem tree that can be used against such pests as
locusts and mites and bears seeds which can be crushed for making fertiliser; and hundreds of
other plants that require little moisture, bind the soil, fix nitrogen in the soil, and act as natural
insecticides (World Development Forum, 1987, July 15, September 30). The benefits of
agroforestry are publicised. Attention is drawn to the use of compost, which is organic waste
converted by heterotrophic bacteria into stabilised organic material, which is not a fertiliser
but contains trace elements such as zinc and magnesium and has the advantages of releasing
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nutrients to the soil more gradually than inorganic fertiliser; and a French company uses
earthworms to produce a high quality organic soil conditioner out of domestic refuse.
Indigenous predators are being used against common orchard pests, permitting the use of
milder chemical pesticides, and reducing the required number of applications (Du Plessis,
1994, p 12). And food supplies are being supplemented by means of mariculture in the
production of oysters, lobster, salmon, trout and other fish, thus reducing the demands made
upon the wild stock.
8.3 INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY
By now it is clear that environmental issues have become a market force so that the optimal
use of technology entails the satisfaction of two main conditions: (i) it has to be compatible
with the endowment of the other factors of production, and labour in particular - although
allowance could conceivably be made for a trade-off in its favour (for its productivity-
enhancing benefits) vis-a-vis employment in individual cases - assuming, of course, that the
combination of factors is not interfered with by inappropriate pricing, that is, which does not
reflect relative scarcities or abundance; (ii) it should support sustainable economic growth by
avoiding, as far as possible, the depletion and degradation of natural resources. It is, however,
scarcely conceivable that individual researchers with the inquisitive instinct, and desiring to
probe the unknown, will be confined by such prescriptions.
Starting with the Industrial Revolution, mechanical technology has reached a most advanced
stage at the end of the twentieth century in the micro-electronic revolution based on the
silicon chip on which millions of characters or artificial memories can be stored, and which is
incorporated in electronic equipment such as computers, word processors, communication
systems and robots (automated machinery). It is information- and knowledge-increasing and
labour-saving technology, which is, or can be, used to raise productivity. And it is foreseen
that nanotechnology - in 1998 still in its infancy - in which atoms are manipulated directly,
will provide a basis for a new industry of molecular manufacturing (IFR, 1998, pp 4-14). It
would appear that the gap between the levels of technological sophistication and the
requirements of the less knowledgeable, financially weak, small-scale industrialist in the
labour abundant economies catering for a limited domestic market, is forever widening. Even
in the highly developed countries, where labour is the relatively scarce factor, it is feared that
the latest developments have a more than average adverse effect on employment. The
optimistic argument is that the fears already expressed two centuries ago, in the form of the
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destruction of textile mills in Britain, have not been realised in the long run: technology has,
for the most part, rather been a living standard-raising force. That it turned out to be thus is a
function of the fact that while it has been incorporated in labour-saving devices, it has also
been a demand-expanding factor. By raising productivity it reduces the production cost of the
products affected which, with reasonable price elasticity, leads to increasing sales. The
portion of the higher incomes, ensuing from the higher productivity, spent on goods other
than the technologically favoured, induces increased supplies to satisfy the greater demand,
thus generating additional job opportunities. When the technological change is revolutionary
the adjustment may take a longer time, or be inadequate to absorb the displaced labour. The
problem is that the latter may not have the required skills or talents.
While compensation for the loss of income by means of a redistribution of income, through
the national budget, does not necessarily compensate all individuals for the loss of jobs which
have a moral content for the incumbents, it is a situation which can at least be economically
accommodated by the developed, affluent societies. This does not hold for the LDCs where
appropriateness has, therefore, a much greater significance than in the MDCs, since
inappropriate technology may conduce to an outcome worse than unemployment-creation
namely impoverishment. As the modern technologies are being developed in the MDCs they
are suitable to the economic circumstances prevailing there. The LDCs tend to adopt them
without regard to their own factor endowment, which is an outcome, more often than not, of
advice tendered by consultants from the MDCs, or when foreign aid is tied to the supply of
equipment manufactured by the donors' enterprises. Or the allure of the sophisticated
equipment may be so powerful that it is employed regardless of the returns that can be
expected. It has been alleged that during the 1980s South African businesses had large
amounts of information churned out by their computers which were not used to raise
efficiency (Ryan, 1994, p 11).
Assuming production for the domestic' market only - though export-led econormc
development is an option as has been observed in developing South East Asian countries -
technology in LDCs is required to be compatible with large quantities of available lesser
skilled labour, arising from rapidly growing populations. The use of equipment which
requires imported labour for its maintenance and repair, consumes scarce foreign exchange,
apart from diminishing job opportunities for local labour. Included in the generic "labour" is
the entrepreneur who, in Africa, is likely to be a peasant lacking the disembodied technology
except for some procedures in the management of his land inherited from ancestors, or a small
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trader. His financial resources, like his scale of operations, are minimal. The customary high
level technology available from the developed world is too far beyond his ken and capacities
to serve as an aid to the breeding-ground of the "infant entrepreneur". It is embodied in
capital-intensive manufacturing procedures requiring a great deal of energy, highly skilled
maintenance workers, large markets, a capital-intensive infrastructure and supporting
industries. And since it has, concomitantly, an urban bias the labour force needs to migrate to
towns and cities to make a living. The natural resource endowment of a country constitutes
another criterion: using technology to produce synthetic fabrics in countries which produce
cotton at low cost would be contra-indicated. Manufacturing shoes made of plastic in a capital
intensive process in a developing country which produces large amounts of skins and hides
which are being converted into shoes in labour-intensive enterprises (as occurred in a Latin-
American country), is economically insensible. The introduction of the latest technology to
produce food in competition with traditional foodstuffs can have an adverse effect on the poor
by providing nutritionally inferior products at higher prices, but enjoying profitable markets
because of superficial appearance and the ability of the financially strong companies to lure
the consumers by means of advertising. The size of the local market for non-staple products,
as limited by rapid population growth, imposes a constraint. This is illustrated in Figure 8.1
where FC 1 and TC 1 represent the fixed and total costs respectively - the difference reflecting
the variable costs - entailed in a sophisticated large scale production technique, and FC2 and
TC2 the comparable costs in an adapted version suitable to a smaller market. The break-even
point at a given price in the latter case requires a much smaller volume of demand, Q2,
compared to Q1.
Figure 8.1: LEVEL OF TECHNOLOGY AND MARKET SIZE
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U
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Gillis, et al., (1992, p 565), in a juxtaposition of three technology levels, low, intermediate
and high in (i) a rich and (ii) a poor country, quantifies the costs of capital and labour in
textile weaving to demonstrate superiority - in terms of costs - of the highest level of
technology in (i) and of the intermediate level in the poor country. If, for the latter, a one-third
lower wage than in the first round exercise, is assumed, the lowest level of technology would
be the cost-effective one.
If the international, and not the domestic, market is the target in a quest for export-led
economic development, entailing a first concern need for producing at internationally
competitive prices, the latest high level technology acquires priority status, the other factors of
production having to meet the demands of the technology. With their well-educated and
skilled labour force the East Asian tigers could satisfy this condition for some three decades to
attain remarkably high rates of growth until the economic setback in 1997. This growth
generated the job opportunities for the increase in the labour force (The Economist, 1998,
p 18; IFR, 1998).
How does South Africa feature in the above mise-en-scene? As emerged from the discussion
in Chapter 6 the mixture that the South African economy is, encompasses rather more than
just a gradation of enterprises on the size and scale spectrum. There is the reasonably
developed formal sector - which can be conveniently characterised as Euro-oriented - into
which only a portion of the population emerging from Third World conditions - Afro-centric
or Afro-oriented is a convenient appellation - have been drawn. This leaves around one-half
of the latter population operating within the confines of an under- or undeveloped sector.
Their technological needs, from the entrepreneurial point of view, contrasts with those of the
sophisticated sector in the same way as the needs of the LDCs contrast with those of the
MDCs. Until the mid 1980s, before it became a technology transfer organisation, the major
official research body in this regard, the CSIR, tended to have the character of "an institution
with questionable relevance to the developmental needs of the country" (Ryan, 1994, p 13).
While it had been responding positively to the individual requests for scaling down the
capacity and costs of equipment embodying the most advanced technology, it used to cater
mostly for the hi-tech requirements of a developed economy. (While he was a member of one
of their committees during the 1960s, this author's attempts at persuading the institution to
enter purposefully the field of intermediate technology, did not meet with success). lts
changed character is, perhaps, exemplified by the development of a dehuller, intended for
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small entrepreneurs who process sunflower oil and, to this end, need to remove the hulls from
the sunflower seeds (Hall, 1995, pi).
However, in light of the nature of its economy and of its endowment of natural resources,
appropriate technology in South Africa, from the national perspective, does not have an
exclusive character. The choice of technology has to fit a diversity of circumstances ranging
from those of the underdeveloped subsistence sector to those of, say, one of the most
advanced banking systems in the world. The exploitation of some of the country's natural
resources impels the application of the most sophisticated technology which, suitably, can in
some cases be combined with relatively large numbers of lesser skilled workers. The mining
of coal, gold ore and other minerals and metals, the conversion of coal into electricity, of
bauxite into aluminium, etc. necessitate the use of high cost high technology. And since their
markets are mainly overseas, the size of the local market, as a function of its population and
income per capita, is not a consideration. The ability of these industries to produce at costs
lower than the international prices is at issue. And as net foreign exchange earners they do not
constitute a drain on scarce foreign exchange reserves, and provide the necessary wherewithal
for net foreign exchange consumers. They are a source of savings for investment and creators
of some job opportunities, even though at a very high fixed cost per employee. In respect of
direct employment there is in South Africa an apparent conflict of interests emanating from
the abundant coal deposits, on the one hand, and the abundant supplies of lesser skilled
labour, on the other. The conversion of the former into petrochemical products - to economise
on foreign exchange required for oil imports - demands the highest levels of technology
embodied in large amounts of sophisticated capital equipment per worker, leading to minimal
employment of labour.
The contrasting examples of the US and Japan may have a lesson for South Africa. The
former, devoting two-thirds of its research funds on product development, allocates 88 per
cent to hi-tech, 8 per cent to intermediate-tech and 4 per cent to low-tech. In Japan, spending
two-thirds on process development, the appropriations are 21 per cent, 12 per cent and 67 per
cent respectively (Ryan, 1994, p 12).
8.4 ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY
Arising from the concerns about the consumption of natural resources, particularly as
manifested in environmental degradation, which issue has been kept in the forefront by
Greenpeace activists, Green (political) parties, Earthlife Africa, newspaper campaigns and
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international conferences, a new growth industry based on environmental technology has
sprung up. There are two branches to this industry: (i) Managing the results of humankind's
onslaught on natural resources; and (ii) Attacking the problem at its origin by changing the
technology responsible for the undesirable conditions. With regard to the former,
governments have been provoked into passing legislation requiring businesses to disclose the
amount of dangerous waste released by them, and the ensuing adverse publicity acted as
control-by-embarrassment incentive to avoid the undesired practices. In the US the
investigations for the purpose of disclosure alone cost 346 million dollars a year (Regan,
1993, p 27). International agreements as contained, for example, in the Basel Convention,
make it increasingly difficult for the developed countries to export their toxic waste to LDCs,
of which it has been said that they were still "under-polluted", and whose poverty conduces to
acquiescence because of the recompense involved. South Africa has more than 35 Acts of
parliament and provincial ordinances (IFR, 1991, P 6-153) and a Council for the Environment
encouraging the examination, by enterprises, of their manufacturing processes in the interest
of conservation.
Governments have also targeted individual sources of pollution, of which the internal
combustion engine is the obvious one in towns and cities. Stringent emissions standards for
motor vehicle manufacturers in the US could add 500 to 1 200 dollars to the price of a car
(Harrington and Walls, 1994, pp 2-6), and the installed control systems break down as they
grow older. The unleaded petrol introduced in South Africa to eliminate the environmentally
harmful lead emissions, was estimated to entail a cost to motorists of many billions of Rand
(Wang, 1993, p 4; de Lange 1995, p 12). There seems to be consensus that the benefit to the
environment would be minimal but that this new technology - which reduces the octane
content of petrol - is to be introduced to retain competitiveness for South African
. manufactures in international markets. The platinum-based catalyst in car exhaust pipes,
prescribed by some countries, reduces the carbon monoxide emissions, but it does this by
converting it into carbondioxide which, as we have seen, is a greenhouse gas and a polluter.
As a major platinum producer in the world, South Africa derives some benefit from this
control measure.
South African businesses are being persuaded or exhorted to reduce or eliminate the pollution
they are responsible for, and in a case like toxic or dangerous wastes there is no room for
compromise. Before they can start a new venture in an ecologically sensitive area (The
Kruger National Park, St. Lucia, Saldanha) they have to proffer evidence that they will not
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cause harm, or more than a minimum of damage, to the environment. While cost-benefit
analyses are supposed to provide answers, there is a problem when the preservation of
pristine, unspoilt nature becomes an absolute value and does not permit of a trade-off, in
which case the community may have to sacrifice economic growth for aesthetic gratification.
Proponents of the extension of electricity to everybody in South Africa as a means of reducing
air pollution in cities and towns tend to forget that the use of this source of energy requires
expenditure on appropriate equipment, and that using it in winter for heating purposes in the
townships would be more expensive than coal burning (which provides energy for both
cooking and heating). At the same time the substitution of electricity for coal means that the
coal-burning, and thus the pollution, is shifted from the townships to the Eastern Transvaal
Highveld, where there are, of course, fewer people living in the immediate vicinity of
Eskom's 8 coalfired power stations. When Eskom contemplates the cost of controlling the
particulates emitted, management concludes that the amount at stake would be more
beneficially spent on the electrification of Black towns. What with annual emissions in excess
of 125 million tons of carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, nitrous oxides and
sulphur dioxide, the cost of cleaning up operations will run into billions of Rand. The order of
magnitude is suggested by the capital outlay of more than R500 million, and running costs of
R100 million per annum, involved in desulphurising one 3 600 MW power station. More than
half a billion Rand has already been spent to control atmospheric pollution (Huntley, et al.,
1989, pp 63-67). Iscor, another source of pollution, had spent R65 million by 1992 to clean up
its furnaces and underground water chambers (Ryan, 1994, p 2). The mining industry, too, has
to spend large amounts each year on cleaning up operations.
With its extensive coastline South Africa cannot prevent oil spills caused by passing foreign
ships. So the CSIR's section on Earth, Marine and Atmospheric Science and Technology has
developed a predictive model which enables the authorities to plan ahead and reduce the
impact of oil spills on the coastline (Knoetze, 1994, p 2).
The re-use of materials has a significant contribution to make to the management of the
environment. While reducing the pollution by household and industrial wastes, recycling has
the beneficial attribute of saving materials, using less energy in reproduction or processing,
and providing income opportunities, particularly in poor, labour-abundant communities, to
hundreds of participants in the collection of what otherwise would be wastes. The outstanding
example in South Africa is the recycling of waste paper which forms 34 per cent of municipal
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wastes on which Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban have to spend in excess of R200
million annually to collect and dispose of in landfills (Viljoen, 1995, pS). Two companies
which have launched a War-on-Waste campaign, have established some 100 sites in Black
townships which contribute to the recycling of 607 000 tons of the 1 800 000 tons of paper
and cardboard consumed annually in South Africa, in mills which use 0,46 kilo of chlorine
per ton produced compared to 4,9 kilograms in mills using virgin fibre, and require 25 per
cent to 60 per cent less energy in production (Mestel, 1994, plO). The campaign could save
the country more than R20 million in foreign exchange spent on waste newspaper imported
from the US (Anon, 1994, p 30).
Three-quarters of a motor vehicle, consisting for the most part of steel, are recyclable. And
steel produced from steel scrap uses 60 per cent less energy than that manufactured from iron
ore. Recycled aluminium needs only 4 per cent of the energy required for the conversion of
bauxite, and is more labour-intensive than smelting. An aluminium can plant established near
Johannesburg has managed to retrieve 20 per cent of the 400 million cans produced by it for
recycling. Iscor is recycling a similar number and in addition 840 million cans made of steel,
representing 37 per cent of annual production (Iscor, 1998). A considerable portion of glass is
being recycled. A useful function has also been discovered for old car tyres: rubber shavings
are mixed with asphalt in road building, and old tyres are deposited in erosion dongas to allow
the latter to become silted up.
To attack the problem of environmental degradation at the origin will require technologies
that will radically reduce the consumption of raw materials. A German researcher has argued
that a 50 per cent reduction in materials consumption world-wide was required to create a
sustainable materials economy (Young, 1995, p 77). To this end the material- and energy-
efficiency of production has to be raised. It has the appearance of a very formidable task.
Atomic power plants have been constructed to economise on coal and oil, but their image has
been tarnished by accidents, particularly that in Chemobyl, which has been destructive of the
environment. An area of more than 3,5 million hectares beyond the 30 kilometre zone of the
Chemobyl plant has been contaminated with the discharged radio-nuclides, compelling the
removal of people from 200 settlements and exposing millions to doses of radiation, and
severely damaging the region's harvests of fruits, berries, mushrooms and hay (Rybakovsky in
UN, 1994, p 187).
Seeking less dangerous sources of energy which are also more appropriate to the needs of the
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poorer communities, thoughts have turned to the harnessing of the sun as a renewable source,
through the use of photo-voltaic panels that convert sunlight directly into electricity, solar
cookers and steam energy. This technology has made considerable headway in a number of
African countries (Bryant, 1994, pp 42/3). It is claimed that for every 24 million people who
install solar cookers 3,2 million tons of firewood is saved and 6,7 million fewer tons of carbon
dioxide are emitted (Populi, 1994, pp 12-14). Again, to economise on energy used in
sophisticated equipment, recourse is had to "pinch analysis" which ensures that heat which is
available, after it has performed its task in one part of a process, is captured, to be applied to a
next phase in the process which can be operated at lower temperatures (The Economist, 1994,
pp 20-26). Buildings can be rendered more energy-efficient by using appropriate insulating
and other relevant materials.
In the field of transportation intermediate technology has been embodied in an "Africar"
which has a chassis made of impregnated plywood, and can be profitably produced at
volumes as low as 5 000 units a year (World Development Forum, 1989, pi). Cars using
electricity as motive power are being experimented with.
To replace the CFC refrigerant gases, responsible for damaging the ozone layer, the
hydrochloro-fluoracarbon (HCFC) variant was developed, followed by Greenpeace's
resurrection of an older hydrocarbon refrigeration technology. The latter is reported to be
inexpensive and environment-friendly, and the products have been successfully marketed
(Gilman, 1994, pp 10-13).
While the new growth industry entails costs to the users, it has, apart from its environmental
benevolence, some positive economic benefits as well. It is reported to be a R600 billion-a-
year business which, accordingly, offers profitable opportunities to private enterprise
(Briscoe, 1993, p 9). While most of this amount should, in national accounts, probably be
entered as a contra-item to the cost of degradation of the environment, it has the beneficent
side-effect of providing investment opportunities to activate the savings which, in the high
income economies, may become an embarrass-de-richesse. and in the process creates
additional employment opportunities. It acts as a countervailing force to the living standards-
detracting potential of the measures to combat pollution and waste, and can compensate to an
extent for the economic impetus not provided any more by vibrant population growth in the
developed countries.
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8.5 IN SUMMARY
The function of technological progress is to push outward the frontiers of the productive
capacity of anyone or more of the other factors of production. Its optimum application
depends upon the nature of the supplier of the latter and the markets for the output promoted
by it. When required to act in purely complementary fashion, particularly when the production
involved is not circumscribed by the size of a domestic market, its optimal application
depends on its availability, regardless of the supplies of the other factors of production of
which it will be required that they conform to the demands of the technology used. (A
relevant example would be the exploitation of a mineral resource, enjoying a world wide
demand, by an LDC with a rapidly growing population in need of maximum employment
opportunities, the direct creation of which is likely to be impeded by the technology).
However, technology also operates in substitutional manner, in which case the relative
scarcity, alternatively abundance, of labour, capital and natural resources - entrepreneurship
considered non-substitutable - whose use is to be optimised, is the prime consideration. In a
MDC with little or no growth in population or labour force, high level technology will be
substituted for scarce labour. In LDCs labour (quantity) is the abundant factor whose
employment has to be promoted, in which case the (small-is-beautiful) low-level industrial
technology is to be opted for. But in these same countries the rapid population growth exerts
pressure on fixed quantities of natural resources, such as land and water, which renders them
the scarce production factor whose productivity per unit has to be maximised by the
application of high level bio-technology.
Finally, it turns out that once technology has been put in motion it has, metaphorically
speaking, to run fast to keep ahead of growing population numbers and their appetites - to
which the life-saving effects of industrial and bio-technology, in conjunction with
technological progress in medical technology, have contributed - since it is also required to
compensate for the detrimental side-effects of its success (environmental degradation, that is).
[CH8(JLS)]
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
286
REFERENCES
Anon, 1994. "Green capitalism - the meeting of the economy and the environment", Optima,
November, pp 28-28.
Borlaug, NE, 1983. "Plant breeding and World Food Production", Economic Impact, 1983/3.
Briscoe, D, 1993. "New industrial revolution to save the environment", The Argus, January
11, p 9.
Brown, et.a!., 1992. State of the World (Worldwatch Institute)
Brown, et.al., 1995. State of the World (Worldwatch Institute)
Bryant, E, 1994. "Corporate patents or global piracy?", African Farmer, April, pp 37-38.
Bryant, E, 1994. "Harnessing the sun for rural Africa - solar energy-promising alternative to
fuelwood", African Farmer No 13, Oct/Dec, pp 42-43.
Central Statistical Service (CSS), 1990. South African Labour Statistics.
Coetzee, J, et a!., 1994. "The composting of organic waste - a meaningful waste management
option for municipalities", Imiesa 19(3), March, pp 17-19.
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), 1992, Technology Impact.
De Lange, J, 1995. "Van die nadele van loodvrye petrol hoor 'n mens min", Die Burger, 6
Januarie.
Du Plessis, H, 1994. "SA fruitgrawers reduce the use of chemical pest controls", The Argus,
April15.
Gillis, M, Perkins, DH, roewer, M, Snodgrass, D, 1992. Economics of Development (Norton
& Co, New York).
Gillman, H, 1994. "Safe storage or safe environment? Ecofridge could end the dilemma",
Ceres No 14926(5), Sept/Oct, pp 10-13.
Hall, W, 1995. "New dehuller developed", Technobrief4(l1), February, p l.
Harrington, W & Walls, MA, 1994. "Shifting gears - new directions for cars and clean air".
Resources No 115, Spring, pp 2-6.
Huntley, B, Siegfried, R & Sunter, C, 1989. South African environments into the 21st Century
(Human & Rousseau, Cape Town).
Hyami, Y, & Ruttan, VW, 1971. Agricultural development: An International Perspective
(Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore).
Institute for Futures Research (IFR), 1998. Business Futures 1998.
Institute of Futures Research, 1998. "The East-Asian meltdown: causes, lessons and future
prospects". Economic Issues, 6(4).
Iscor, 1998. "Recycling cans" (Personal Communication).
[CH8(JLS))
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
287
Knoetze, M, 1994. "Oil Spills - improved methods of reducing impacts", Technobrief 4(5),
August.
Lemonick, MD, 1995. "Future tech is now", Time 146(3), July 17.
Mestel, R, 1994. "Recycling paper goes easy on the bleach", New Scientist, Vol 143, Sept.24.
Metelerkamp, P, 1995. "Plante verander om die mens te pas", Insig, Maart.
Myers, N, 1994. "Population and Environment. The vital linkages" in UN 1994, pp 55-63.
People and the Planet, 1994. "Environmental neglect that fuels migration" 3(4).
Populi, 1994. "Notes" 21(3), March Dispatches 4.
Portney, PR, 1988. "Environmental benefits vs. costs: Achieving a balance", Economic
Impact No 4, pp 32-38.
Regan, MB, 1993. "An embarrassment of clean air", International Business Week, 3308(638),
31 May,p27.
Ryan, C, 1994. "Catalyst for change", Productivity SA ,May/June.
Rybakovsky, L, 1994. "The catastrophe in the Chernobyl atomic power station: demographic
aspects", in United Nations Population, Environment and Development, pp 186-195.
Schumacher, EF, 1974. Small is Beautiful (Sphere Books, London).
Statistics South Africa (SSA), 1999. Agricultural Surveys 1994-1996, Statistical Release
P110l.
The Economist, 1994. "Energy efficiency - feeling the pinch", Vol 332 (7877) Aug, pp 20-26.
The Economist, 1998. "Asia's new jobless", 347(8065), April 25-May 1, p 18.
The Population Crisis Committee 1987, "Food and Population: Three Country Studies",
Population No 18, April.
United Nations, 1994. Population, Environment and Development.
Van de Ven, M, 1995. "Ongebruikte Motorbande kan skop aan HOP gee", Die Burger, June
23.
Viljoen, J, 1995. "Recycling boost from paperback flighters", The Argus, May 6/7, p S.
Wang, M, 1993. "Unleaded petrol bill to hit R4 billion". Sunday Time Business Times, p 4.
Webb, J, 1994. "Can one learn to love the wind?" New Scientist 143, (1934), July 16.
Wilson, F, 1984. "The Platteland Connection", Leadership S.A. 3(3), pp 78-86.
Winter, G, 1988. Business and the Environment (McGraw Hill, Hamburg).
World Development Forum 1989. "Ever driven ajeep on Third World roads?" 7(7), April IS.
World Development Forum, 1987. "A Tree that does it all" 5(17), September 30.
World Development Forum, 1987. "Green glue" 5(13), July 15
World Development Forum, 1987. "Milk from miniatures", 5(20), November 15.
World Development Forum, 1990. "Cow number 375" 8(21), November 3.
[CH8(JLS»)
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
288
World Development Forum, 1990. "Halophytes" 8(16), September 15.
World Resources Institute, 1987. World Resources 1987.
World Resources Institute, 1994. World Resources 1994-95.
Yeld, J, 1995. "Urban foresters increase paper recovery rate by 10%", The Argus, June 5.
Young, JE & Sachs, A, 1995. "Creating a sustainable materials economy", ch 5 in Brown,
et.al. State of the World 1995.
[CH8(JLS)]
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
289
CHAPTER 9
CAPITAL
9.1 THE NATURE OF CAPITAL WITH RESPECT TO POPULATION
At the lowest level of economic development, as experienced by a community dependent
upon peasant agriculture, capital assumes the form of breeding stocks of animals. Though
amenable to improvement in quality through bio-technology, the herds - due to limits
imposed by nature - cannot be accumulated indefinitely to serve as basis for maintaining or
raising the levels of living of growing populations. For the latter to be achieved an
accumulation is required of fixed long-term capital, such as occurs as a community progresses
from peasant agriculture to commercial agriculture, to the industrial (secondary), the tertiary
and higher stages of economic development. Fixed capital, in the system of national accounts
is made up of residential, commercial and industrial buildings, construction works,
machinery, transport and other equipment, data on which are furnished by the SA Reserve
Bank (1994 Supplement; 1998 and previous issues).
As in the case of technology, capital can serve as both complement to, and substitute for,
labour and natural resources. In economically successful, but natural resource-poor, countries
(e.g. Japan) the dearth has to be compensated for by large-scale capital formation operating in
combination with efficient labour. In South Africa the beneficiation of mineral resources, with
which it is relatively well endowed, requires capital intensive methods of production, which
enhances the GDP, but raises the country's incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR, and thus
also the COR), and the capital-labour ratio. Which means that both the complementary and
the substitutional roles are in action. When new projects of this type are undertaken industry
mix-induced capital deepening occurs.
The relationship between capital and population growth is self-evident. Given the level of
technology, a fixed supply of natural resources and a constant COR, the amount of capital has
to increase pari passu with population growth to maintain the per capita supply and, ceteris
paribus, the output per capita. The volume has to expand faster if employment levels are to be
maintained while - as in South Africa - the labour force growth exceeds that of the
population at large.
In theory, the capital at issue can be split into two components: A. that which is directly
demographically induced - "demographic" capital for short and ease of reference - a function,
that is, of population size, growth, family formation, spatial distribution, etc., to provide (i)
shelter - houses and facilities associated with it such as water supplies, sanitation, light and
heat; (ii) means of communication such as streets, roads, bridges, railways, telephone links;
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(iii) government services requmng buildings, transport and other equipment and the
infrastructure mentioned in (ii); B. the remaining portions, which can be labelled as
"production" capital providing the elements of living standards not mentioned in A. In
practice, a quantified separation of the two components is not possible since, housing apart,
the infrastructure and equipment in question - in consequence of composite demand - serve
the ends involved in both A and B concurrently.
Arithmetically and functionally the two components are interdependent. While the amount of
B available can be said to determine, in the last resort, at what level the needs involved in the
A ("demographic" capital) component can be satisfied, the amount, viewed as a residual, is at
the same time circumscribed by population tendencies. The faster the population grows and
the more widely it is scattered, the greater will be the need for "demographic" capital. The
South African population is, in part, concentrated in four major industrial areas situated far
apart and, for the rest, widely scattered in rural areas and small towns. Linking the
communities by means of the usual communication mechanisms is a capital-exacting process.
These circumstances conduce to a relatively high COR but will, of course, not raise the
national average unless the shape of "demographic" capital in the national aggregate is raised
by way of either increased attention to the satisfaction of the needs in question, or the waning
of the B-type of capital formation.
Table 9.1 provides some relevant statistical information.
TABLE 9.1
COR AND CAPITAL STOCK GROWTH RATE P.A. (f1K)
BY ECONOMIC SECTOR
1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1995
Sector COR óK % COR ÓK % COR óK % COR óK %
IAgric., forestry & fishing 4,02 2,2 4,14 2,6 3,85 -0,9 2,86 -1,7
2 Mining & Quarrying 0,82 1,9 1,05 5,7 2,12 6,3 2,93 0,3
3 Manufacturing 0,94 7,7 1,06 7,7 1,47 3,0 1,70 3,4
4 Electricity, gas & water 6,99 5,5 6,68 7,8 7,76 4,7 6,28 -2,6
5 Construction 0,24 11,2 0,38 10,8 0,59 -0,4 0,58 -1,5
6 Trade, catering & accom. 0,97 5,0 0,96 5,6 0,99 2,0 1,02 1,2
7 Transport & Communie. 6,85 4,8 6,59 6,2 6,85 1,5 6,29 -0,2
8 Finance, Ins.& Bus.Serv. 3,98 4,7 4,28 5,1 4,40 3,3 4,53 1,1
9 General Government 3,72 7,2 4,99 6,7 5,33 3,0 5,97 2,0
Aggregate 2,30 5,2 2,62 6,1 3,17 2,9 3,37 0,9
Source: Prinsloo & Smith, 1996, pp 35, 41. Their Sector No 9 (Community, Social,
Personal Services) has been replaced with General Government as derived
from SARB, 1994, 1998.
The data in Table 9.1 record an increasing capital intensity of the South African production
process. From a low of 2,13 in 1964 the COR rose to a peak of 3,47 in 1992. The decline
thereafter to 3,25 in 1997 (SARB, 1998, S-145) coincided with increased use of productive
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capacity as the GDP growth rate changed from a negative -1,18 per cent per annum during
1989-92 to a positive 2,46 per cent per annum during 1992-97 (SARB, 1998, S-109). The
long term capital deepening arose from both across-the-board intra-sectoral capital
intensification and changes in the sectoral composition of the economy.
Of the 9 sectors in Table 9.1 the fluctuating COR of only number 1 - Agriculture, Forestry,
Fishing - can be said to manifest a long term declining trend, some outlier values in 1983 and
1984 notwithstanding. The COR of sector no 6 - Wholesale and Retail trade, Catering and
Accommodation, with an outlier value of 1,12 in 1979, remained on a reasonable even keel of
close to 1. The COR series of no 4 - Electricity, Gas, Water - describes a long cycle over the
period 1960-1986, with the nadir at 1975, and a monotonic decline after 1986. No 7 -
Transport, Storage, Communication - experienced a similar cycle, but its second peak
precedes that of no 4 by three years, followed by a downward movement. Deeming
manufacturing as the norm, no 2 - Mining and Quarrying - used to be a labour-intensive
industry or, perhaps more correctly, non-capital-intensive, since a production process could
yet be technology- and natural resource-intensive. But its COR has risen faster than that of
any of the other sectors to culminate in 3 at the end of the 1990's, after having been 0,74 in
1970. While Manufacturing's (no 3) COR has doubled between 1964 and 1993, it is (at 1,79
in 1993) still to be considered labour intensive, compared to the national aggregate of 3,37 for
1990-95. (Some of the individual enterprises in this category are very capital-intensive). Two
sectors, Construction (no 5) and Trade, Catering, Accommodation (no 6) are still more
labour-intensive than Manufacturing. The COR of no 5 has increased steadily until 1987,
while that of no 6 exhibited no decided trend. The COR series of no 8 - Finance, Insurance,
Real Estate, Business Sector - describes two cycles incorporating a long term slightly upward
trend ending in a peak of 4,59 in 1993 (after a nadir value of 3,73 in 1969), while that of no 9
- General Government - traced out a continuous upward movement to reach 6,26 in 1997,
after averaging 3,72 during 1960-69.
Among the sectors in Table 9.1 four stand out as the capital-intensive ones: no 8 (Finance,
etc.), no 9 (General Government), no 7 (Transport, etc.) and no 4 (electricity, etc.). When their
COR's are weighted with the respective growth rates of their capital stocks, and compared to
the weighted values for the other five sectors, they emerge as a significant source of capital
intensification to be attributed to changes in the sectoral composition of the national capital;
superimposed upon the deepening of capital within six of the nine sectors.
Since many parastatals (Transnet, Eskom, Telkom, Postal Services, Armscor, Denel,
Mossgas, Atomic Energy, Rand Water Board, Iscor (before privatisation)) are counted among
the industrial heavies and exhibit a COR, at 6,9, four times that of the private sector a shift of
capital formation in their favour raises the capital intensity of the national economy. Prinsloo
and Smith have calculated that the shift, at its peak by 1981, has been responsible for a
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forfeiture of some 15 per cent of potential output "on account of the diversion of the nation's
resources in favour of parastatals" (p 43). The distribution of the capital stock among three
types of organisations for select years, as displayed in Table 9.2, testifies to this.
TABLE 9.2
DISTRIBUTION OF CAPITAL STOCK AMONG THREE ORGANISATIONS
1960 1970 1981 1997
General Government 20,4 24,3 24,7 26,0
Public Business enterprises and
corporations 28,9 29,5 35,1 24,2
Private Sector 50,7 46,2 40,2 49,8
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Sources: SARB, 1994, 1998.
It is seen that the share of parastatals increased to 35,1 per cent in 1981, reducing that of the
private sector to 40,2 per cent, down from 50,7 per cent in 1960. (As a result of privatisation a
discontinuity in the historical series occurred between 1989 and 1990 as a result of
privatisation, so that the 1997 and 1981 figures are not commensurable).
Demographic needs, as defined above within the domain of the concept "demographic
capital", are associated with one labour-intensive sector, Construction, and three of the four
capital-intensive ones, in which parastatals are playing a major role; Finance, Insurance,
Business Services (no 8) being the outsider. If these three are considered representative
enough of demographic capital the germane COR, according to data for the years 1990 to
1997, is 6. (The addition of Construction reduces it to 5,5). Which denotes that the
satisfaction of demographically induced wants requires capital-intensive modes of production.
If such satisfaction were to be a prime consideration -for example, when it has been written
into the constitution as a human right with the implication that government has to assume
responsibility, regardless of whether or nor the beneficiaries are able to meet the cost - it
would absorb a great deal of economic resources which, otherwise, would have been available
for the formation of production capital which, of course, also has to provide for needs arising
from population tendencies. And the amount of labour that can be accommodated per unit of
capital is curtailed.
9.2 QUANTIFYING THE EFFECTS OF POPULATION TRENDS
To obviate repetitious referencing it is to be noted that the aggregated quantities presented in
the identities and equations below have been based on data provided by the SARB (1998 and
previous issues), The National Productivity Institute (1997) and Sadie (1983, 1988, 1991,
1993, 1994).
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To demonstrate the role of capital (K) in the output (Y) needed for the economic
accommodation, in its entirety, of the South African population, recourse is had to the
incremental capital-output ratio (K'OR) which defines the number of K units required to
produce one additional unit of Y. Using small letter-d to denote, for ease of typographical
presentation, all kinds of change, whether arithmetic differences or in differential calculus
(including partial differentiation), we have
dK =k (IeOR)
dY
Accordingly dK = k -dY
and dK =k. dY =k(g)
Y Y
where g stands for the rate of growth of output, and dK represents the amount of capital
Y
formed in any year, or other period, expressed as a percentage of GDP. The rate of growth in
output can be divided into two portions: one to accommodate population growth (n) at the
constant income per capita, and the other, to add to the per capita income (y).
Thus
dK
-=k(n+ y)
Y
This simple formulation gives expression to the logic that a high rate of population growth
detracts from the portion of output, generated by capital, that can raise living standards. This
effect, which is also dependent on the level of the leOR (k) can be illustrated by quantifying
the magnitudes in the above equation for three periods, selected for their intra-period
homogeneity of growth rates ofK per capita of the South African population, as follows:
1946-1976: 3,3% per annum
1976-1984: 1,93% per annum
1984-1994: -0,93% per annum
Riding on the prosperity phase and crest of the (long cycle) Kondratieff the per capita capital
endowment of the South African population expanded by 3,3 per cent per annum during
1946-1976. The rate dropped to 1,93 per cent during the first eight years of the protracted
period of Kondratieff stagnation, and ended in ten years of diminution in per capita
endowment. This downtrend could not but impact adversely on living standards, as quantified
in Table 9.3.
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TABLE 9.3
K FORMATION, THE icon AND POPULATION GROWTH
Period
dK
k g n y
y
% % % % %
1946-76 12,4 2,70 4,58 2,57 2,01
1976-84 11,1 4,19 2,65 2,50 0,15
1984-94 3,26 4,00 0,81 2,24 -1,43
Sources: Derived from SARB, 1994, 1998.
During the prosperous years 1946-76 the capital formation at a rate of 12,4 per cent of GDP,
and a low leOR of 2,70 could accommodate, with facility, the 2,57 per cent growth in
population and permit of a rise of 2,01 per cent per annum in income per capita. The latter
figure was reduced to 0,15 per cent per annum during 1976-84 when the 11,1 per cent rate of
capital formation was accompanied by more than a fifty per cent increase in the leOR, to
produce economic growth barely enough to maintain living standards. When capital formation
fell to 3,26 per cent of GDP during 1984-94, while the leOR declined slightly, income per
capita diminished at a rate of 1,43 per cent per annum. Actually the impoverishment was
almost continuous since 1981. For comparative purposes, if the growth rate of the White
group prevailed for the total population, the increase in GDP would have been just about
enough to have maintained average income.
Since the LF is directly related to the size and growth of the population, the link between k
and the population can also be established by specifying, as per tradition, that the GDP level
is determined by the harnessing of combinations of capital and labour (L); thus
Y = f(K, L)
Differentiating the function with respect to time we arrive at
where g is the rate of change of aggregate Y over time, e stands for elasticity and r for rate of
increase (decrease). While there has been a slight reduction over time in the elasticity of Y
with respect to K, it has been close enough to 0,4 to render this statistic appropriate for
illustrative purposes. The value of eL assuming constant returns to scale is, accordingly, 0,6.
(The production function involved is discussed below.) When these two values are applied to
rK and rL respectively, where L refers to the labour force in the aggregate, not the number
employed, we have the following results for g.
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Period eKrK + eLri = g
1946-76 ,4 X 5,98 ,6 X 3,3 4,37
1076-84 ,4 X 4,41 ,6 X 2,84 3,47
1984-94 ,4 X 1,15 ,6X2,9 2,2
The values of g do not agree with the actual GDP growth rate because number employed and
labour force (LF) size do not coincide. Their significance arises from a comparison with rL,
which reveals the expected outcome, namely, if capital formation occurs at a lower rate than
the increase in the LF (1,15 per cent per annum versus 2,9 per cent during 1984-94) the latter
will not be accommodated in the labour market by an adequate rate of economic growth,
unless compensated for by a lowering of the ICOR and/or the wage rate. Unemployment
ensues. The situation will be exacerbated if not constant returns to scale (eK + eL= 1) but
diminishing returns are experienced. As long as the value of eL is less than one the growth of
the LF alone cannot provide the required employment, although it is possible, particularly in a
subsistence economy, that the ensuing poverty can be distributed among a "fully employed"
labour force.
Rapid population growth, by way of an equally high or higher rate of increase of the LF,
could potentially redound to the benefit of capital formation. This can be demonstrated by
means of a single linear homogeneous production function corresponding to constant returns
to scale (with omission of an efficiency parameter), viz.:
Y = Ka Lb (with a + b = 1)
Partial differentiation with respect to K yields the marginal
product (MP)
dY K
=-'-=a
dK Y
equally the MP ofL
=b
The first of the two marginal products tells us that the larger the (effective) supply of labour
relative to that of capital, the higher will be the returns to the latter, and the greater will be the
inducement to invest (form new capital). The ICOR, being the inverse of the marginal
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product, will be correspondingly lower, each additional unit of K thus producing larger
amounts of output. Economic growth is promoted.
For this outcome to be realised a very important condition has to be satisfied, viz. that the
demographically determined supply of labour - the LF in the aggregate - is to be permitted to
have an unfettered influence on the wage level which should reflect the relative abundance of
this factor of production, while the relatively scarce capital has to have its scarcity reflected in
its price and returns. The price of capital (Pk) should be in inverse proportion to its supply
(Qk) and so should the price of labour (PL) be inversely proportionate to its supply as
represented by the LF in the aggregate (QL); that is
Capital will be allowed to act, by and large, as a complementary factor of production, raising
the GDP. This is not permitted to eventuate in South Africa at the lower end of the skill
hierarchy where large surpluses of labour obtain. Trade unions intervene to sever the nexus
between the demographically determined supplies of unskilled and semi-skilled labour and
the number affecting the wage level. They appeal, publicly, to the unemployed not to compete
with them. They campaign for a "living wage" which bears no relation to the marginal
product of L. This living wage, when enforced by strike and other action, has to be generated
by the employer who, in pursuit of maximum profits in the private enterprise (or capitalist, or
free market) system, minimises his cost by satisfying the condition.
dL MPK-=--
dK MPL
To raise the MP of L to the level of the wage demanded and procured by the trade unions, in
the absence of any improvement in labour productivity per se, he has to increase the amount
of capital in the hands of each worker, thus substituting scarce capital for abundant labour and
compensating for inefficiency instead of creating new wealth. The demographically
determined supply of labour is not allowed to have any beneficial function at all. Its only role
is to add to unemployment. Rapid growth of the LF, which was, at 2,9 per cent per annum
during 1984-94 faster than the population growth of 2,25 per cent per annum, has become
pure economic baggage, divested of any potentially beneficial attribute, at least as far as the
lesser skilled labour (classes III and IV) was concerned.
The average returns to capital stock, as measured by the net operating surplus, changed as
follows, the periods having been selected for their intra-period homogeneity of annual values:
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1946-1950 16,9%
1951-1969 14,6%
1970-1975 12,6%
1976-1981 10,1%
1982-1994 7,5%
Sources: SAJtB, 1994, 1998.
In this downward progression of the rate of return there were years during the 1970s and
1980s when the price of K was at fault in that the rates of interest, in real terms, became
negative by reason of their being exceeded by the rate of inflation, rendering K a relatively
inexpensive factor of production. This would have favoured some substitution of K for L, but
it still boosted K formation in its complementary role to raise the GDP and employment, but
at the cost of diminishing its yield because the average product of L (Y/L) did not rise pari
passu. Diagramming the Y/L and KIL time series - relating to the private economy - on a linear
scale, we find that the gradient traced out by the two magnitudes in index form, 1990 = 100)
was almost the same until the beginning of the seventies, but thereafter the average yearly
index point additions of the latter were more than twice those of the former, as follows:
1946-50 to 1970-75
1970-75 to 1982-94
d(/L)
0,94
0,95
These magnitudes, which are congruent with those of the National Productivity Institute
(1997, p 9) for the private economy, disclose that after the middle of the 1970's both Yh and
KIL have moved upwards, but the latter more so than the former. The productivity of employed
labour did not increase in proportion to the amount of capital put at its disposal. The time
series published by the SARB (December 1998, S-145), relating to the economy and the LF
(employed and unemployed) in the aggregate, on the other hand, would inform us that both
Y/L, from its peak in 1980 until 1994, and KIL, from its peak in 1983 until 1997, declined, but
the former by 2,14 and the latter by 1,21 percentage points per annum. From which it is to be
deduced that the product per member of the LF declined by more than the amount of capital
per LF member; a conclusion which is not inconsistent with that signalled by the private
economy. (The trend signs of the two sets of concurrent series differ, but the correlation is
positive in both cases). The divergence in trends should, by inference, be attributed to the
public sector and the widening gap between LF numbers and the number of employed.
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However, since the values in the SARB's KIL series diminished after 1983 they would appear,
at face value, to intimate a substitution of labour for capital. Such inference is not to be
drawn. Since KIL = K/y X Y/L the downward movement of the capital/labour series resulted
from a decline in the product per member of the LF as reflected by the Y/L - ratio.
Wright, et al., distinguishing four categories in the manufacturing sector: capital-intensive,
intermediate capital-intensive, labour-intensive and agriculturally-based industries, analysed
their respective performances in five periods with regard to value added, total factor
productivity and labour productivity. The performances differed from one period to the next
and from one category to the next. It was, however, clear that in the intermediate and the
labour-intensive categories capital deepening was the major source of increase in labour
productivity, and they exhibited negative values for all three attributes mentioned above
during 1981-1990. It was the capital-intensive category which propped up the performance of
manufacturing in the aggregate (1993, P 2).
The levels of returns to capital, since the second half of the seventies, were constrained by the
Kondratieff phase of economic malaise and stagnation (Sadie, 1989). But the burden of this
economic retrogression was borne by capital and not shared by labour in employment. At 7,5
per cent during 1982-1994 its rate of return was just about one-half of what it was during
1951-1969. The marginal returns to K between 1951-69 and 1982-94 were, in fact, only 4,7
per cent, and between 1976-81 and 1982-94 it was down to a negative rate, -1,1 per cent. Not
only does it not constitute an inducement to form capital (invest), but it invites capital
consumption. Instead of such consumption, or in addition to it, workers have been retrenched.
In a country overflowing with huge labour surpluses this has the appearance of the absurd.
Scarce capital was (is) increasingly substituted for abundant labour rendered scarce in the
labour market by trade union contrivance as part of a campaign, at the beginning, to wrest
political power from the minority government, and later, apparently, to wrest economic
control from the predominantly Euro-oriented employer group.
The economy, not allowed to make use of all its resources, suffers. Standards of living are
reduced. Unemployment proliferates, in tandem with the proliferation of human numbers.
9.3 CONCLUSION
For the South African population labour-intensive industries would be the logical economic
recipe. The considerations are the familiar ones, apart from the basic premise that factors of
production are to be used in proportion to their supply: the restricted domestic market for
some products, which means the absence of the economies of scale required by a high leOR;
the labour-intensive industries produce a quick return to investment to act as incentive for
[CH9(JLS))
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
299
modernisation; they put the lesser skilled workers in contact with modem economic activity;
capital-intensive industries can drive up wages, sending the wrong signals to the rest of the
economy, and they could require high level manpower not available in the country. However,
as in the case of technology, the principle is not an exclusive prescription. South Africa's
natural resource endowment, in combination with the world at large as a market, renders
some capital-intensive industries candidates for exploitation despite labour abundance. They
bring in foreign exchange, generate large savings for re-investment and serve as a focus for
the stimulation of modernisation. But in the last resort, the argument that the productivity of
capital equipment is not culturally neutral expresses an important consideration.
By means of a planning model based on the 1986 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) Wang
and Mullins (1988, p 27) estimated the impact of capital expansion in 24 sectors of the
economy as represented by the marginal LIK (persons per Rl million investment), and the
marginal YIK multipliers, and the decrease (increase) in the inequality of income as reflected
by the Gini-coefficient. They established the following sectoral priorities for optimising the
use of scarce capital, all of them conducive to a diminution in inequality of income:
dL dY
dK dK
1. Agriculture 35,9 0,71
2. Wearing apparel 66,0 0,53
3. Leather & Footwear 52,6 0,52
4. Wood & Furniture 52,7 0,51
5. Construction 56,9 0,51
6. Community services 96,7 0,54
It seems only logical that in capital-scarce, labour-abundant South Africa due regard be paid
to industries or sectors such as these six in an industrial strategy. The condition to be satisfied
is, of course, that relative prices of production factors permit of such strategy. When the cost
of capital rises or is raised pari passu with supply-unrelated, productivity-unrequited wage
increases, the outcome, on both counts, is economic stagnation and unemployment.
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CHAPTER 10
THE COMPONENTS OF DEMAND
The demand factors which are to be discussed in the Chapters to follow are itemised in the
national accounts of South Africa for the year 1997. The figures in Table 10.1 represent a
reconstruction of data published by the SA Reserve Bank in its December 1998 Quarterly
Bulletin (S-84, 85, 106, 109, 125).
TABLE 10.1
THE NATIONAL ACCOUNT OF S.A. 1997 IN R'OOO000 000
SOURCES OF INCOME APPROPRIATION OF
PRODUCED INCOME
(C) Consumer goods 367 (C) Household consumption 367
(G) Government expenditure 127 (T) Government revenue: 105
195 173
Less transfers -68 Less transfers -68
(I I) Fixed Investment 103 (S) Private Sector Savings 112
(12) Inventories -4
Error term -5 Error term -5
(GDE) Gross Domestic Expenditure 588
(X) Exports, non-factor 165 MI+M2 173
(GI) Gross Income generated 753 (GA) Gross Income appropriated 753
(MI) Less Imports, non-factor -158
(GDP) Gross Domestic Product 595
(M2) Less net factor Imports -15
(GNP) Gross National Product 580
Source: SA Reserve Bank, 1998. Quarterly Bulletin, December (S-84, 85, 106, 109, 125).
Arising from the interaction between the sources of gross income (GI) generated - on the left
hand side of Table 10.1 - and the manner in which the income generated is appropriated - set
out on the right hand side - we have the following four sources of demand (also called final
demand in input-output analysis):
(i) Household Consumption i.e. consumer goods produced and consumed. (The two
magnitudes are equal because whatever portion of the former is not consumed is
booked to Inventories; while excess consumption is satisfied by drawing on existing
stocks);
(ii) Goods and services produced by government (but excluding capital goods which are
included in Investment) and revenue collected by government to finance its activities;
(iii) Investment, and Savings to finance it;
(iv) Foreign Trade as reflected by the items Export and Imports.
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The equality (in the aggregate) of gross income generated and appropriated is expressed in the
definitional equation:
C+T+S+M=C+G+I+X
whence (C-C) + (T-G) + (S-I) = X-M
The amounts furnished III Table 10.1 permit of the following quantification of the
magnitudes:
o - 22 + 13 = -9 (in R billions)
which is = GNP - GDE - transfers abroad
= 580 - 588 - 0,5
= -9
This negative amount for X-M signifies that South Africa was (and usually is) a foreign
capital-needing country to balance its international accounts.
Proceeding from gross income to gross national product, denoted by Y, we have
Y=C+G+I+X-M
This identity can be converted into a functional relationship as follows:
Y = C(Y) + G(a) + lea) + X(a) - M(Y)
in which (a) indicates autonomous status with respect to the generation of Y, while the
insertion of (Y) after C and M imply that they are functions of the determinate Y. A
multiplicative economic process arising from the relationship can be demonstrated by means
of the partial differentiation of Y with respect to anyone of the three autonomous variables,
say I, the other two assumed constant, which yields a national product multiplier:
dY
=---
dl 1-c+m
1
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the lower case letters c and m referring to the marginal propensities to consume and import
respectively. Arising from the appropriation magnitudes in Table 10.1 the denominator can be
converted into t + S + m, with t and s standing for the marginal tax and savings ratios
respectively, to yield a multiplier 1 . The three items in the denominator represent the
t+s+m
"leakages" that can occur in the process of income generation in that they withdraw
purchasing power from the income stream. The higher their values the less vigorous is the
multiplicative process. This potentially dynamic can be reinforced by the matrix multiplier
arising from the backward and forward linkages in the input-output matrix, when the
intermediate inputs receive an impulse from the final demand vector.
In the heyday of Keynesian econormcs the national product multiplier was used to
demonstrate the harmful economic effects of the high savings potential of the mature
econormes. In present-day LDCs m would probably assume that role, as it has in South
Africa.
Recurring positive (negative) impulses provided by the four components of demand -
assuming that there are adequate (inadequate) supplies of entrepreneurship to provide the
impulses and to respond to the reactive stimuli - lead to economic growth (retrogression).
Demographic movements can impinge upon all four magnitudes.
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CHAPTER 11
HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION
11.1 DIET AND PRODUCTIVITY
Physical well-being is a necessary, even if not a sufficient, condition for the attainment of a
satisfactory level of labour productivity. Such well-being requires a minimum of consumption
of the means of subsistence. The most basic of the latter is food, the intake of which
determines whether enough calories become available to support economic activity. If the
minimum just to sustain life without economic exertion is 1 800 calories per person per day
while actual consumption provides 2 300 calories, 500 would be available for economic
activity. If the average at a person's disposal rises to 2 800, or by 21,7 per cent, the amount
available for economic exertion increases by 100 per cent. In this regard the experience of a
multinational cement company which established a plant in Africa, as reported by the World
Development Forum (1987, p I), is very instructive. lts production reached only 30 per cent
of capacity, labour productivity was 20 per cent of normal and its absenteeism rate 35 per
cent. After management had provided a daily high protein meal of milk, meat and vegetables,
production tripled, workers gained an average 14 kilograms in weight and the absenteeism
rate dropped to 0,5 per cent.
An inadequate diet is characterised by the prevalence of EPM (energy-protein-malnutrition)
which occurs when a part of the protein is used to compensate for a lack of energy intake,
which leaves less of it to function in support of tissue repair and growth. The absence of meat
in the diet of poor countries can be responsible for a deficiency of iron absorption resulting
from dependence on cereals and beans for their daily diet. Malnutrition can be measured by
the weight-for-age standards as laid down by the National Centre for Health Statistics. In a
sample of 20 000 schoolchildren tested during 1980 it was found that of children 6 to 9 years
old 2 per cent of Whites, 25 per cent of Asians, 21 per cent of Coloureds and 14 per cent of
Blacks registered below 75 per cent of the NCHS standards (Vergnani, 1983, p 9), which
suggest that, except for the White/other groups differential, relative income levels were not a
decisive distinguishing causal factor (as will appear from the data to follow). Dietary habits
would have some role to play. In 1993 some 9 per cent of South African schoolchildren were
found to be underweight and 13 per cent stunted in growth (Development Bank of Southern
Africa, 1995, p l ), These figures would indicate an improvement if the 1980 and 1993 testing
procedures were the same.
11.2 POPULATION GROWTH AND THE MULTIPLIER
Insofar as the per capita income of a community is an indicator of resources available for
consumption, population (N) exerts its influence as the denominator in the YIN magnitude.
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Ceteris paribus, and given that dN is not a stimulus to economic growth which compensates
for the effect of the denominator on the average income, the latter is negatively correlated
with population size and growth. The lower is Yp.c. the more limited is the ability to save,
and the higher the propensity (and marginal propensity) to consume is likely to be. This could
be the cause of an income multiplier of potentially explosive dimensions by way of the value
of c in the denominator l-c+m. However, since this would occur in immature economies
which do not have the ability to respond to sizeable expansions of demand, the latter will spill
over into foreign markets, i.e. the value of m will be so high as to obviate a positive effect on
economic growth. Again, in mature economies with slow-growing populations the relatively
low value of c (or high values oft+s) will limit the multiplier. Still, allowance has to be made
for the probability that consumption (or saving) is not a function of the level of income per
capita only.
11.3 FAMILY FORMATION AND AGE COMPOSITION
The modus operandi of the demographic forces in the course and composition of consumption
is best illustrated by means of an example of family expenditure as affected by the size of the
family which, in its turn, reflects the age composition of the population - large families, large
percentages of children in the age structure. Our example is based on the expenditure of a
two-parent family receiving a Household subsistence level income of R883 per month in
Johannesburg as in September 1994 (Potgieter, 1994, p 56).
TABLE 11.1
EXPENDITURE (E) ACCORDING TO SIZE OF FAMIL Y
Income per family member Expenditure Expenditure Distribution of Expenditure
Total per capita
Food Clothing Rest Total
R442 Husband & Wife R507 R254 40,6% 13,6% 45,8% 100,0
+ child 1-3 years R65
R294 R572 RI91 45,5% 13,5% 41,0% 100,0
+ child 4-6 years R85
R221 R657 R164 49,8% 14,1% 36,1% 100,0
+ child 7-10 years RI02
RI77 R759 RI52 54,0% 14,4% 31,6% 100,0
+ child 11-14 years RI24
RI47 R883 R147 57,4% 15,1% 27,5% 100,0
There are three forces in operation here. Naturally, as the family expands the amount of
income available per member of the family diminishes, to reduce the amount that can be spent
on household items per member. This effect is attenuated by the economies of scale
material ising as the size of the family increases, which can be associated with the "fixed cost"
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involved in the husband and wife base in the initiation of the family, which is being
distributed among larger numbers as children, representing variable cost, are being added to
the family. But at the same time, these additions reduce the resources available per member of
the family. The reduction is exacerbated when the single (parents-children) household, in the
tradition of the extended family system, is expanded by the attachment to it of more distant
relatives. A Bureau of Market Research sample survey, for example, revealed a per capita
disposable personal income (DPI) index ([% of DPI -:-% of population] x 100) of 71 for
multiple households compared to 182 in the case of single households (Loubser, 1990, p 27).
The shrinking available income per capita obliges increasing portions of expenditure to be
concentrated on life's basics. In Table 11.1 food's share, starting at 40,6 per cent, rises as each
child is added to the family, to end up on 57,4 per cent when a six-member family has been
completed. With share of clothing and footwear rising slightly it is the residual category
which registers the counterbalancing decline.
We can use the data in Table 11.1 to distribute expenditure over the whole spectrum of five-
year age groups (x) - adding realistic estimates for the over 65 age groups - and apply to these
values the age distributions of the Black (B(x)) and the White (W(x)) populations. The results
of the exercise are detailed in Table 11.2.
TABLE 11.2
Age
AGE COMPOSITION AND CONSUMPTION (C(x))
CCx) Black Population White Population
B(x) B(x) x CCx) W(x) W(x) x CCx)
R R R
860 0,146 126 0,069 59
1 200 0,135 162 0,079 95
149O 0,123 183 0,074 110
1 880 0,107 201 0,086 162
2 100 0,092 193 0,086 181
2 100 0,091 191 0,082 172
2 100 0,070 147 0,080 168
2 100 0,057 120 0,075 158
2 100 0,045 95 0,073 153
2 100 0,036 76 0,065 137
2 100 0,030 63 0,055 116
2 100 0,024 50 0,044 92
2 100 0,018 38 0,038 80
1 770 0,013 23 0,032 57
1 660 0,010 17 0,025 42
1 660 0,006 10 0,019 32
1 750 0,003 5 0,011 19
1 900 0,002 4 0,007 13
1,000 R1704 1,000 R1846
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The two ethnic groups have been assumed to have the same HSL expenditure profile by age
so that the differences in per capita consumption in the aggregate and in each age group are
reflections of differences in age composition only. Because the White population is the older
of the two its average per capita consumption is 8,3 per cent, or R142 higher than that of the
Black population, reflecting the economies of scale associated with the more youthful
population. These economies, at 8 per cent in the above example, are, however, more than
nullified by a 17 per cent lesser per capita income producing potential inhering in the smaller
productive age component. Only 14,3 per cent of the White group's expenditure is for children
under 15 compared to 27,0 per cent in the case of the Blacks. lts expenditure on maintaining
the over 65 age groups, however, would, at 8,8 per cent of the aggregate, be two-and-a-half
times that of the Black population's proportion. Between 1996 and 2006 consumption is due
to be affected by the following projected changes in the numbers of children under 15 and
pensioners, the latter considered to be males 65+ and females 60+.
Children Pensioners Total Population
increase
Blacks +1 357600 536600 7432600
= +11,1% =+37,1% = +23,6%
Non-Blacks -146920 236010 712530
- 5,8% =+27,8% = + 7,3%
(Projections by Sadie, 1993, with Blacks' fertility falling more rapidly than that of non-
Blacks.) Among non-Blacks there is an expected 5,8 per cent reduction in the absolute
numbers of children to be fed, clothed and housed, while the legacy of the past, and continued
relatively high fertility (compared to non-Blacks) will raise the consumption by Black
children by 11,1 per cent (income per capita constant). In both population categories the
influence of pensioners is going to increase - but among Blacks much more so than among
non-Blacks - their numbers being due to expand much faster than those of the total
population.
We glean information on the consumption pattern of the older generation from Table 11.3,
reporting the results of the 1995 sample surveys undertaken by the Central Statistical Service
(CSS), which distinguished a category "pensioners". As is to be expected they are less mobile
than the average member of the population and, therefore, spend relatively less on transport
and a good deal more of their budgets on food and housing. How much of it is due to income
differentials cannot be determined. Used as weights in the computation of the consumer price
index (CPI) these percentages produce, at any date, indices that may differ from the average
ePI based on the consumption pattern of the aggregate population. For example, by October
1998 their index stood at 127,9 (1995= 100) while that of the latter was recorded at 128,9
(Statistics South Africa, October 1998, pIS).
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TABLE 11.3
EXPENDITURE PATTERNS OF HOUSEHOLDS 1995
Aggregate households Pensioners
Housing
Food
Transport
Clothing & Footwear
Other items
22,5
19,5
13,7
5,1
39,2
100,0
25,4
23,6
9,3
4,9
36.8
100,0
Source; Central Statistical Service, March 1997
11.4 URBANISATION
The movement of people to urban areas and, accordingly, changes in the spatial distribution
of the population, can have a marked effect on the level and composition of consumption.
This is particularly true when it involves the drastic change from a traditional life in a
subsistence agricultural economy to a metropolitan area, where women have cash-earning
employment opportunities and where expenditure patterns are changed consequent upon new
life-styles. Differences in disposable personal income per capita would, in any case, be a
major factor. The Bureau of Market Research found an index of DPI of 103 per metropolitan
Black households compared to 27 for the pre-1994 SGT's and TBVC countries with
preponderantly rural populations (Loubser, 1990, p 27).
TABLE11.4
BLACK'S HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE ON SELECT ITEMS BY REGION
PER CENT OF TOTAL EXPENDITURE
Metropolitan Areas SGTs TBVC
Food 25,1% 37,7% 40,0%
Clothing, Footwear 10,0% 10,1% 8,0%
Housing, Electricity 6,2% 8,6% 11,6%
Fuel, light 1,8% 3,6% 2,5%
Transport 6,6% 7,9% 7,2%
Alcoholic Bev. &
Cigarettes 14,0% 6,2% 4,6%
Support of relatives 8,9% 0,6% 0,2%
Source: Martins, 1994, pp 50, 57,60.
In Table 11.4 the most conspicuous differences in percentages between the metropolitan and
the other two areas, pertain to four items in the consumer budget: (i) food; (ii) housing and
electricity; (iii) alcoholic beverages and cigarettes; and (iv) support of relatives. The
differences in the case of food and alcoholic beverages, cigarettes and tobacco are a function
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of income differentials, while there are two obvious reasons for the showing of housing and
electricity, except that electricity would be more costly in rural areas while rural owner-built
cottages could merit a higher imputed rent than shacks in urban squatter camps. The extended
family system seems to place a more onerous burden on urban dwellers as reflected in the
item support of relatives. These latter have moved from a situation of underemployment in
the rural area, but with subsistence agriculture to fall back on, to a situation of open
unemployment and no own means of support.
Urbanisation also brings about intra-item changes as well e.g. diets shift from staple foods
such as maize and sorghum to other cereals such as wheat and rice and to processed foods
(Pinstrup-Andersen, 1997, P 10), while light and heat will be provided by coal, paraffin and
electricity instead of wood.
Concomitant geographic differentials in income elasticities of demand will add to the effect of
urbanward movement of people on the composition of household-consumption. The
following are examples of such elasticities (for black multiple households):
Food
Fish
Rural Transkei
and Bophuthatswana
0,62
1,51
0,63
1,62
0,34
1,79
0,64
1,62
0,74
1,06
Metropolitan
Areas
0,75
0,81
1,51
1,22
0,94
0,66
0,12
1,25
2,47
2,23
Prepared Food
Alcoholic beverages
Non-alcoholic beverages
Housing & electricity
Fuel and light
Transport
Holidays
Support of relatives
Source: Loubser, 1990, p 20.
It is seen that for five of the above ten expenditure items the elasticities are lower in the rural
areas, and very much lower in the case of holidays and support of relatives.
11.5 DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN POPULATION AND INCOME EFFECTS
Available national consumption data reflect the effect of income levels, income distribution
and relative prices, in addition to demographic factors. Therefore, to extract the role of the
latter provision has to be made for the influence of the co-determinants. To this end, and
ignoring relative prices while income distribution is handled separately, we can revert to the
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specification of the functional relationship used In Chapter 7.5.4, and the methodology
explained in Chapter 9, and apply the equation representing the growth in consumption.
The weights applied to the two determinants, to arrive at an aggregate, when distinguishing
between the four ethnic groups, are the shares of these groups in the total South African
population and in the aggregate disposable personal income (DPI) respectively. The latter,
translated into per capita magnitudes, are presented in Table 11.5.
TABLE 11.5
DISPOSABLE PERSONAL INCOME AT 1990 PRICES IN RAND
1960 1970 1975 1980 1995 Increase 1995 in
p.a. 1995
1980-95 prices
R R R R R 0/0 R
Whites 12 114 17260 18257 17878 14992 -1,17 26086
Asians 2 171 3674 4951 5655 6231 0,64 10842
Coloureds 2000 3033 3861 3933 4156 0,37 7231
Blacks 1 033 1 430 1 835 1 903 2021 0,40 3 517
(Derived from Ne11975, Nel & Van Wyk 1984, Martins 1989, Martins, et al. 1994, Van Wyk
1995 and adjusted to the National Accounts magnitudes.)
What with the great differences in the per capita DPI among the four groups - though there is,
of course some overlapping of income distributions - the division of the population in these
groups serves the same purpose, in the present connection, as a classification into four income
categories. When the 1995 figures in the last column are expressed as multiples of the Blacks'
average DPI they feature as follows:
DPI per capita
of total population
DPI per male
15-64
Whites
Asians
Coloureds
Blacks
7,42
3,08
2,06
1,00
5,98
2,62
1,83
1,00
That there is a very large income gap is obvious, with the average White person disposing of
an income 7,42 times that of the average Black. This gap has been narrowing, particularly
after 1970, the ratio in question having been 11,7 to 1 in 1960. The penultimate column of
Table 11.5 indicates that during the period 1980-1995 the average DPI of Whites has been
shrinking at a rate of 1,17 per cent per annum compared to increases for the other three
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groups, and specifically 0,65 per cent per annum in the case of people of Asian origin and
0,40 per cent for Blacks. The quite significant reduction in the gap when the number of males
15 to 64 is used as denominator, from a 7,42 to 5,98 to 1 WhitelBlack ratio, is at the same
time an indication of the consumption arrearage imposed by demographic youthfulness (high
fertility), which has an inevitable effect upon consumption patterns. A combination of the
demographic and income effects is reflected in the patterns exhibited in Table 11.6. (Some
difference in dietary habits can be involved as well.)
TABLE 11.6
DISTRIBUTION, BY ETHNIC GROUP, OF HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE AMONG
FOUR CONSUMER ITEMS
Food Clothing Furniture Housing & Electricity
1975 1993 1975 1993 1975 1993 1975 1993
% % % % % % % %
Whites 16,2 14,7 4,8 3,8 4,3 3,3 19,8 18,9
Asians 31,1 25,8 10,0 5,6 4,6 3,7 18,2 16,0
Coloureds 35,3 29,9 11,4 5,6 4,3 3,0 12,5 15,7
Blacks 40,6 33,0 11,2 9,7 6,1 4,6 5,9 7,7
Sources: Nel1975, Martins 1994, Van Wyk 1995.
The data demonstrate three attributes: the budget intergroup portions spent on basics, food in
particular, are inversely correlated with income, and as income per capita rises, smaller
intragroup portions are spent on essentials and, correspondingly, larger percentages on non-
essentials, while the intergroup differences are also in keeping with those to be expected from
population growth and age composition differentials. (There is, however, an anomaly to be
observed in the data: the percentage of Whites' budgets spent on food diminished between
1975 and 1993 while their average per capita income had declined.)
Against this background our equation can now be employed to project, over the period 1996-
2006, the consumption of food, clothing and furniture, as representative of a non-durable
essential, a semi-durable essential and a less essential durable good respectively. The values
of the parameters used in the exercise were as follows: rn = the projected growth rates of the
four ethnic groups during 1996-2006; ry = the rates of increase in the per capita OPI of
Asians, Coloured and Blacks experienced during 1980-95, while for Whites it was assumed
that the retrogression will cease and income per capita will remain constant so that their ry =
0; ey = the income elasticities for the four ethnic groups per item of consumption as computed
by the bureau of Market Research (Loubser, 1990); en values were determined by means of
linear regression analysis assuming C to be a function of N and Y, the national accounts data
not permitting us to differentiate among the four groups. These elasticities with respect to
population were calculated at 0,92 for food, 0,77 for clothing and 0,70 for furniture. The
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exercise pertaining to food is illustrated in Table 11.7 (W represents the weights applied).
TABLE 11.7
RATE OF GROWTH IN FOOD CONSUMPTION: 1996-2006
enrn W W.enrn eyry W W.eyry Total
Whites 0,92xO,47 ,127 ,055 0,42xO ,480 ° ,055Asians 0,92xl,09 ,025 ,025 0,71x,65 ,040 ,018 ,043
Coloureds 0,92xl,17 ,085 ,091 0,73x,37 ,089 ,024 ,115
Blacks 0,92x2,16 ,763 1,516 0,80x,40 ,391 ,125 1,641
Aggregate 1,687 1,854
After repeating the exercise for clothing and furniture the share of population growth in the
projected growth in consumption emerged as follows:
Food
Clothing
Furniture
91,0%
86,1%
82,4%
The effect of population growth appears to be overwhelming. If, on the other hand, Whites
were to enjoy the same rate of increase in per capita income as the average of the other three
groups, the share of population would be reduced to 87,2%, 77,3% and 71% respectively for
the three consumer items. Again, if the Whites' income retrogression were to be continued
then income would become a negative growth generator, with population becoming
responsible for more than 100% of the increase in consumption (in this case by way of the
further redistribution of income among the four groups).
The above three examples illustrate the well-known phenomenon that as the degree of
essentiality of purchase diminishes, income elasticity increases (e.g. an aggregate above of
0,61 for food and 1,30 for furniture) to raise the effect of income levels, and to render the
consumption increasingly labile. And as income per capita rises, more discretionary income is
available for the purchase of these lesser essentials which (abstracting from services) are
usually more durable in nature. National income statistics underscore the finding that the
consumption of essentials and other non-durables is a more stable function than that of the
durables and semi-durables.
Large and rapidly growing populations, by restraining or reducing income per capita, can
therefore, be conducive to economic stability. A demographically dominated demand function
presents the entrepreneurs with a more predictable market, that is, involving lower risks, and
should be conducive to investment to satisfy the demand, compared to an income-dominated
demand function. But more likely than not this stability will be conceived in poverty, which
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does not prevent instability originating in supply, when the latter is preponderantly dependant
upon natural resources and consequently, on meteorological conditions, with alternating
periods of poverty and food shortages, or even hunger.
An exercise was carried out (de Lange, 1986) to discover what the effects would be if, starting
from a position representing the South African economy as reflected in the Social Accounting
Matrix (SAM) values, and assuming a constant GDP, the aggregate private consumption
pattern were to change to that of (i) the White and (ii) the Black population.
TABLE 11.8
PERCENTAGE CHANGE RELATIVE TO SAM VALUES
Change to White
Consumption pattern
Change to Black
Consumption pattern
Total Imports
Total employment
Black employment
Agriculture
Total consumption
Savings
Govenunentrevenue
Financial Sector
1,48
-4,50
-4,90
-14,82
-8,21
2,94
9,39
12,11
-3,52
8,41
9,09
25,70
15,39
-5,57
-18,13
-23,32
It can be seen that a switch to the Black consumption pattern can have some beneficial effects
in that imports will be reduced, employment, and particularly Black employment, will be
raised, while agriculture will experience a greater demand. It is, of course, an exercise in static
analysis, no allowance being made for the dynamics involved in the implied disturbances to
the economy. As it is, Table 11.8 indicates an adverse effect on the financial sector, a
substantial decline in govenunent revenue on which the Black population is heavily
dependent by way of the redistribution of income through the budget, and a reduction in
savings consequent upon the rise in the consumption level. Economic growth in the long run
is a function of capital formation, investment that is, which can be constrained by a dearth of
savings. Inasmuch as the higher consumption function will imply greater pressure on the food
supply, it will exacerbate the inflationary bias of the South African economy. For example,
while the consumer price index in the aggregate rose from 100 in 1990 to 169,9 by April
1995, the food index increased to 201,8 resulting from unfavourable weather conditions
amidst rapidly growing population numbers (eSS, 1997).
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11.6 THE GIST OF THE EVIDENCE
The gist of the evidence is that while a slow-growing or growth-stagnating, demographically
old, population - at least before the stage where the productive age group is diminishing in
relative numerical strength - can experience some potentially prejudicial economic defects
(within the consumption frame of reference), these latter are accompanied by compensatory
favourable effects.
The obverse applies in the case of the fast-growing youthful population: it incorporates some
potential economically favourable characteristics which are negatived by economically
detrimental attributes: It tends to have a high propensity to consume in which life's basics,
such as food and other non-durables - having as feature a high population elasticity and low
income elasticity of supply - plays a major role. The potential dynamism thus introduced into
the economy (a high value for l-e in the multiplier) tends to be neutralised by a high value for
m. There are economies of scale to be realised in the expansion of family size, but they are
accompanied by diminishing resources available per member of the family (which has as
counterpart fewer breadwinners per 100 family members or dependants). And the economic
stability imparted by the demand for goods, subject to a high population elasticity of demand,
becomes a non-desideratum when experienced as stability in stagnation and demographically
induced poverty.
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CHAPTER 12
GOVERNMENT
12.1 GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS
The role of Government in economic activity-demand is reflected in the nature of the functions
undertaken by governments, at the first, second and third tiers, as depicted in the main items of
expenditure set out in Table 12.1 (in current prices).
TABLE 12.1
EXPENDITURE OF GOVERNMENT BY FUNCTION
Increase
R Million Percentage of GDP per
annum
1992 1995/6 1991/2 1995/6
R million R million % % %
A General Administration 10248 16026 3,2 3,2 11,8
B Defence 11 399 12039 3,6 2,4 1,4
C Public Order 9770 16 187 3,1 3,3 13,5
D Social Services 48412 82441 15,2 16,5 14,2
Education 22505 38037 7,1 7,6 14,0
Health 10849 16973 3,4 3,4 11,8
Social Security 8926 17201 2,8 3,4 17,8
Housing 1 507 1 898 0,5 0,4 5,9
Other 4625 8332 U L1 15,9
E Economic Services 14954 19343 4,7 3,9 6,6
F Interest on debt 14643 30574 4,6 6,1 20,2
G Other 1479 2637 Qá Qá 15,6
AGGREGATE 110905 179247 34,9 35,9 12,8
(Gov. transfer to households) (11 900) (20945) (3,7) (4,2) (15,2)
Sources: Central Statistical Services, 1993, 1998; SA Reserve Bank, 1998.
What with 1995/96 data being the latest available (at the beginning of 1999) for purposes of
comparison with those of preceding years, the 1999/2000 national budget figures were used as a
check on whether the 1991/2 - 1995/6 period reflected a trend that might have been continued. In
the case of Housing, Table 12.1 appears to emit the wrong signal: the rate of increase would have
been higher than that recorded above, while expenditure on health has not just kept pace with
change in the GDP but has grown faster (RSA Budget Speech, 1999/2000).
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The four main categories of expenditure distinguished in Table 12.1 are: I Administrative costs
(including general administration, defence and public order); II Social Services (Education,
Health, Social Welfare and Housing); III Economic Services; IV Interest on public debt (which is
unallocable to any specific function, but whose dimensions are only surpassed by those of
education). All of them can be affected by demographic movements, particularly when the latter
permit of the acquisition of economic power through political power. Those that are most
directly affected are dealt with below. However, since there has been a discontinuity in
governance after the 1994 election, we need to enquire briefly into the demographic base of the
attainment of political power by the new government and its policy orientation, which are
determinants of its handling of governmental functions, as they were in the case of the previous
government.
12.2 POPULATION COMPOSITION AND THE NEW GOVERNMENT
Government, as the expression of political power, is closely associated with population numbers,
and probably the only economic sector where pure numbers can accord great or some financial
benefit to some, if not all, members of a community In a majoritarian system of government,
with universal suffrage, no qualification other than being 18 years or older is required. Large
numbers with a common grudge, which can include privation caused by the proliferation induced
by high fertility, represent the source of success of politicians. In a reasonably homogeneous
society, in the sense of subscribing to a more or less common lifestyle and cultural values,
political power and the concomitant economic power, is limited by the probability of changes of
government in that minority parties can become majority parties by mustering enough support to
oust the incumbents. These conditions do not obtain in South Africa. A tyranny of numbers can
ensue.
TABLE 12.2
POTENTIAL NUMBERS OF VOTERS IN SOUTH AFRICA
1946 1994 1999 2004
Whites 1 519 000 3800 000 3980 000 4 116 000
Asians 146 000 669 000 734 000 820 000
Coloureds 567 000 2 116 000 2344 000 2569 000
Non-Blacks 2232 000 6585 000 7 058 000 7505 000
Blacks 4272 000 16204 000 19231 000 22 079 000
Black majority 2 040 000 9619 000 12 173 000 14574 000
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Table 12.2 spells out the "political arithmetic" (the title of a book by Petty published more than
three centuries ago) of South Africa. The potential Black voter majority has been increasing 4,8
times during 1946-1994, and will continue to expand. In April 1994 this majority (36 per cent of
them illiterate) was allowed to assert itself in a national election. Given its cohesive forces:
common culture (though lifestyles of urban and rural dwellers differ somewhat), common skin
pigmentation, common experience of discrimination which forged apartheid into a powerful
rallying point, widespread poverty - to an extent induced by the same factor which produced the
growing majority - and the 1994 election results were a foregone conclusion. The outcome can
be veritably described as political power through the cradle .. Similarly, the growing majorities of
the National Party after the 1948 elections were, for the most part, a function of the faster growth
of the Afrikaans speaking population (Sadie, 1958, p. 8). The change in government, when it
occurred in 1994, was perceived by the losers, used to self-determination, as analogous to the
subjugation of one nation by another. Which was why political scientists had advocated a
consociational form of government, as opposed to the Westminster style.
Soon after taking office the ANC/COSATU/SACP alliance government (at that stage still called
the government of national unity) issued a White Paper on Reconstruction and Development
(RDP) which was proffered as "a vision for the fundamental transformation in our society"
(Republic of South Africa (RSA), 1994, par 1.5.2) which, according to the preamble, contributed
by the new president, would permeate every level of government, every department and every
public institution" (p (i)). The Reconstruction and Development Programme was to be seen as an
attempt to change the course of history which has been "one dominated by colonialism, racism,
apartheid, sexism and repressive labour policies" (par. 1.2.1) the result of which was "that
poverty and degradation exist side by side with modem cities ... our income distribution is
racially distorted ... rural areas were divided into underdeveloped bantustans and well-developed
white-owned commercial farming areas ... in commerce and industry, conglomerates, dominated
by whites, control large parts of the economy ... segregation in education, health, welfare,
transport and employment left scars of inequality and economic inefficiency", etc. (para. 1.2.1,
1.2.2, 1.2.3). These conditions apparently constituted "a crisis created by apartheid" which could
only be reversed by a comprehensive approach (par. 1.2.6) which encompasses the meeting of
basic needs, developing human resources, building the economy and democratising the state and
society. Wide-ranging measures were proposed including the reconstruction of the public service
- a primary instrument in the exercise of political power - in which affirmative action had to
ensure that its staffing was going to be "representative of all the people of South Africa in racial,
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gender and geographical terms" which required that "present rules governing qualifications for
positions and for salary notches are reviewed" (par. 5.6). However, "attacking poverty and
deprivation will be the first priority of the democratic government" (par. 2.7) which, for all
practical purposes, meant the amelioration of poverty among its party supporters.
To this end the main instruments of income redistribution - the national, provincial and local
budgets and fiscal policies - were brought into play. For a start, an RDP Fund was established
with an initial budget appropriation ofR2 500 million which was to be raised to R12 500 million
per annum after 1997/8, to finance projects which would have the greatest impact on the
communities. They served, by way, among others, of providing basic needs and facilitating job
creation. But of greater significance in the longer run, is the prerogative of government to use
fiscal policy and the composition of its budgets to transfer resources from one group to another,
year after year.
The RDP was followed by numbers of Green and White Papers, discussion documents, laws and
political speeches intimating, or spelling out, the specifics of fundamental transformation which,
in time, turned out to mean the establishment of dominion over all walks of life and spheres of
influence "from sports to economic activity, so that they would emit an Africa character" (Tsedu,
1999, p. 14). Transformation has also been dubbed a "public relations buzz word .. , more
appropriately viewed as a desire to monopolise the spoils of office" (Christianson, 1999, p. 20).
According to the government's chief of Communication Services, transformation comprised "the
extension of the national liberation movement's power over the defence force, the police, the
bureaucracy, the intelligence structures, the judiciary, parastatals, the public broadcaster, the
central bank, etc., etc." (Du Toit, 1998(b), p. 14). Asked in an interview what he wished to
transform, the ANC Secretary-General replied: "Everything. We still have judges appointed by
the National Party" (Retief, 1998, p. 10; Paton & Schmidt, 1998). And in a policy document the
non-elected alliance partner, COSATU, pleaded for a socialist orientation in economic policy and
significant state ownership (Du Toit, 1998(b), p. 17).
Running like a thread through all expressions and implementations of government policy is the
premise of a unique (uni-dimensional) causality founded in the aetiology of apartheid as the root
of all ills of South Africa; which renders nugatory any further enquiry into justification or
legitimacy.
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Accordingly, government action after the 1994 election can be viewed as attempts to fulfil their
election promises to their supporters, seeking restitution for disabilities they were subjected to in
the past, political patronage, nepotism, and maximising their political power. The result of such
action on the magnitudes identified in Table 12.1 are superimposed on those emanating from
demographic forces, thus heightening their effect.
12.3 ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
One can conceive of a potential curvilinear relationship between administrative costs per capita
and population size, the diagrammed regression tracing out a U curve, manifesting economies
followed by diseconomies of scale. Dao, analysing the cross-sectional data of 105 countries,
found the size of government as measured by the share of government consumption (which is
much more comprehensive than administrative costs) in GDP, to be negatively correlated with
population size (economies of scale) though for one group of 64 countries the coefficient was not
significantly different from zero. His analysis also indicated a positive relationship between the
degree of urbanisation (where externalities may be in action) and size of government (1994, pp
8-11). In South Africa the situation has been dominated by political policy which created new
government structures by granting ten Black Homelands self-governing status, starting with the
Transkei in 1963, to relieve the perceived political pressure exerted by the growing numerical
preponderance of Blacks on the non-Black community. (Four of them later requested, and were
granted, political independence). The new governments set about, diligently, creating their own
civil services partly as a means of generating jobs in the absence of alternative opportunities in
the private sector. This did not prevent the government sector in the rest of the country (the
"Common Area") from expanding further.
TABLE 12.3
NUMBER OF CIVIL SERV ANTS
1970 Per 1000 1984 Per 1000 1994 Per 1000
of of of
Popula- Popula- Popula-
tion tion tion
Self-governing 126850 18 259780 28
territories
TBVC 126200 21 258500 34
countries
Common Area 890 100 47 985530 43
Aggregate 649500 29 1 143 150 35 1 503 810 37
Sources: Adapted from CSS 1986, 1994, March 1995; SSA Oct. 1998.
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Table 12.3 informs us that the number of civil servants at central, provincial, regional and local
level increased from 29 per 1 000 of the population in 1970 to 35 in 1984 and 36 in 1998. (The
last figure means that there was one civil servant for each 28 persons in the population.)
Between 1984 and 1994 the government sector of the Common Area expanded somewhat more
slowly than the population, while in the self-governing territories and the four TBVC countries it
more than doubled in size, to raise the numbers of civil servants per 1 000 of the population from
18 to 28 in the SGTs and from 21 to 34 in the TBVC countries. In addition, the governments of
the latter, according to the Auditor-General (RSA, RP14111997, p. 34), had been overpaying
their employees to the extent of Rl 469 million over the period 1 July 1991 to 31 March 1995.
The cost of government for South Africa as a whole, as measured by government consumption's
share in the GDP, after having been contained within narrow limits up to the beginning of the
1960s, increased rapidly thereafter; from R656 per capita in 1961 to Rl 431 in 1994 (at 1990
prices). (SARB 1994(a)). These figures, however, encompass much more than administration as
defined at the beginning of this Chapter. But administrative costs per capita too, rose drastically;
from an estimated R151 in 1960 to R322 in 1984 and R431 in 1994 at 1990 prices (SARB,
1994(a) and (b)). Some 90 per cent of the 1984-1994 increase is attributable to violence, the
expenditure on public order and safety having risen by 120 per cent at constant prices.
To identify the probable role of population in government, as represented by government
consumption per capita, an exercise in multiple regression was carried out' by way of an
adaptation of Dao's specification of the determinants, in a functional relationship: log Cg = al +
a2 log Yp.c. + a3 log U + a4 log N in which al 'is the intercept, Yp.c. the GDP per capita, U the
percentage of population urbanised, N population numbers and Cg government consumption per
capita. To provide for possible autocorrelation inhering in the relationship both OLS and
Cochrane-Orcutt procedures were employed. For two of the periods distinguished the D-W
values were actually higher in the case of the OLS procedures. The data series revealed two
transitions or "structural" changes: the G series remained trendless until 1961 after which it
moved monotonically upwards, and the Yp.c. series was moving ever upwards until 1981 after
which the trend was reversed. It was accordingly considered appropriate to distinguish the
following periods for analytical purposes: the period 1947-1994 in toto, 1962-1994, 1947-1961,
[CH12(JLS)]
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
322
1962-1981 and 1982-1991. For the aggregate period 1947-1994 the following equation emerged,
with t values in brackets:
log Cg = -2,921 + 0,578 Yp.c. = 1,124U + 0,895N
(7,19) (7,69) (5,32) (22,17)
D-W = 1,765
The 1947-1961 regression produced no significant coefficients at the 5 per cent confidence level.
The elasticity of Cg with respect to the three independent variables (at the 1 per cent level)
emerged as follows:
Period Y U N
1947-1994 0,578 -1,124 0,895
1962-1994 0,555 -0,614 0,847
1962-1981 1,004
1982-1994 0,451 0,520
The negative elasticities of the U factor of -1,124 for the 1947-1994 period and -0,614 for the
shorter period 1962-1994 would indicate the presence of economies of scale in the urbanisation
process. Ignoring the 1982-1994 period, government, in per capita terms, expanded at almost the
same rate as population, the relevant elasticity ranging between 0,847 and 1,004, and was
boosted, until 1981, by rising incomes per capita exhibiting coefficients of higher than 0,5. This
is in keeping with our preceding observations of an exploratory nature.
12.4 EDUCATION
As is evident from Table 12.1 education represents the largest single item of government
expenditure under the heading of social services, and has been allocated an amount equalling 7,6
per cent of the 1995/6 GDP. It is the domain where quantity and economic quality of human
beings are in direct, immediate and explicit conflict: economic resources used to accommodate
the former detract from the amount available to enhance the latter.
There are a number of reasons why government intervenes in the provision of education:
I The technical aid provided by Professor B W Smit of the University of Stellenbosch, Department of Economics, is
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- It is considered a human right which some members of the community cannot afford to
exercise. The new government is, in a sense, providing free schooling by proxy: no child may
be refused admission because of hislher family's inability to contribute financially. This
constitutes income redistribution at a secondary level. Parents who desire the maintenance or
raising of standards at schools, attended by their children, contribute to school funds for,
among others, the appointment of teachers not paid for by the state in terms of the 35 to 1 and
40 to 1 pupil/teacher ratios. Which means that they subsidise the non-contributants a second
time; the first being by way of taxation. Demands of periodically demonstrating Black
students on university and technikon campuses have the flavour of attempts to secure a
similar dispensation at tertiary institutions, which, furthermore, should apparently cease to
operate as meritocracies, governed by a majority of representatives of past and present
achievers - alumni, students and faculty functioning as a praesidium meriti, institutions of
academic excellence seeking after objective truth in the Eurocentric (or Western) tradition.
Instead, their governance should be in the hands of the majority group in the population,
faculty membership should reflect this majority, and standards should mean "meeting the
needs of the people" which would imply the non-refusal of admission to students on grounds
of inadequate academic qualifications and the incapacity and/or unwillingness to afford
tuition fees.
- Education is an aid in the engendering of an enlightened citizenry who can exercise reasoned
and reasonable choices which promote social order. Literacy and enlightenment can, among
others, render the citizens more amenable to persuasion to change their reproductive
behaviour in favour of small families. The inverse correlation between education level and
fertility is well established, although a curvilinear association at the lowest levels has been
observed in some countries (Martin, 1995, pp 187-202). Raising the level of literacy has also
been found to be much more cost effective in reducing mortality than spending on
unstructured economic change (Preston, 1978, Sommers, 1992, p. 10). Even so, direct
spending on family planning programmes is yet cost effectively superior to expenditure on
education as a means of reducing population growth (Population Reports, 1985, p. J-762).
gratefully acknowledged.
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- Regarded as human capital formation which can raise the national product, education can
engender beneficent externalities in that the social marginal product of the educated (and
trained) may exceed their private marginal product (as manifested by their remuneration in
the market). The market rate of return (r) to education is determined by comparing the
present value (PV) of the series of incomes or wages (W) over a working lifetime (n years) of
two individuals or groups of persons, one of whom received t years of effective education
more than the other, but incurred the costs involved in those t years, which equal the direct
expenditure plus wages foregone (E).
Thus PV for group 1
-I E(t) 11-1 Wi (n - t)-I I +I . /I
I (l+r) 1+1 (l+r)
PV for group 2 =
x W2 (n)
~ (1+ r)"
We assume that the probabilities of surviving by age are the same for the two groups, and that
they are all beneficially employed during their working life. The internal rate of return is
determined by hypothesising that PV (l) = PV (2). But there is no simple relationship, with a
minimal standard deviation, between education and income and between these and differential
marginal productivity. Some of the differentials may be a function of conventions, historically
established. To cite an extreme example, an illiterate receives a much higher salary as a member
of parliament than a specialist physician in the civil service. Then again, trade unions can use
monopoly power to exact wages which have no relation to marginal productivity, and none at all
to demographically determined supply of labour. And the educated unemployed produce no
return.
Moreover, education is not a homogeneous entity, but encompasses a wide spectrum of quality
which would, concomitantly, fetch different prices in the labour market, even though the title of
the certificate, diploma or degree may be the same.
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TABLE 12.4
EDUCATIONAL INDICATORS BY ETHNIC GROUP
Government Expenditure Pupil/ Qualified Primary/
per pupil Teacher Teachers Secondary
ratio % pupil ratio
1990 1995 1990 1990
4478 5473 19,0 98 1,5 to 1
3012 4710 21,7 98 1,7 to 1
2 180 3829 23,3 59 2,8 to 1
926 2 173 40,2 37 2,7 to 1
Sources: Adapted from IFR 1994 October, The Education Foundation 1992, 1993, 1994.
Table 12.4 furnishes us with transparent indicators and proximate determinants of differential
qualities of education. Going down the columns from White to Black we have decreasing
expenditure per pupil - though the maximum differential has diminished from 4,8:1 to 2,5:1
between 1990 and projected 1995 - increasing pupil/teacher and primary/secondary pupil ratios
and decreasing quality of teachers as manifested by the percentages of teachers qualified (Std 10
plus at least 3 years of appropriate training). It was estimated that by 1995 the percentage of
under- and unqualified Black teachers had declined from 63 per cent to just under 50 per cent.
Equally important are the qualifications of the Black school-leaving population, as represented
by the following 1993 Std 10 examination results:
Mathematics
% writing % passing
Whites 64 61
Asians 72 58
Coloureds 43 33
Blacks 26 7
Science
% writing % passing
44
40
22
15
43
39
21
8
Source: The Education Foundation 1994
It is clear that 92 - 93 per cent of Black schoolchildren leave school without the passport to
scientific degrees at tertiary educational institutions, the professions and highly skilled jobs. Of
those writing the Std. I0 examinations, 39 per cent passed in 1991, one-fifth of them obtaining
matriculation exemption. The pass rate peaked in 1994 at 48,5 per cent, but dropped back to
43,4 per cent in 1995 (Editorial Staff, 1995, p. 2).
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The productivity of the Black school system can also be judged by the performance of a
complete annual cohort of schoolchildren. In 1991 18 per cent of the 1990 school population
were reported to be repeating their standard (The Education Foundation, 1994), and the annual
rate seems to vary between 17 and 18 per cent compared to 6 per cent Coloured and less than 3
per cent for Asian and White children. It does not, however, tell us how many times a cohort of
children starting their school career would repeat their school grade (standard). For an indirect
estimate of the importance of failed candidates who repeat, we apply the principles of the
mortality table to the 1990 and 1991 statistics on school attendance by grade. The results of the
computation reveal that the expected successful years of school life, as indicated by non-
repetition, at the start of the school career, of the average Black pupil, are 4,5. In the absence of
failures the expected years would number 6,45. Which means that repetition of school grades is
responsible for loading the school population by 43 per cent (6,45/4,5 = 1,43), in the absence of
which, given the total amount spent by government, expenditure per pupil would have been
Rl 323 instead of R926 in 1990 and, if the same proportions held in 1995, R3 107 instead of
R2 173. Or, given the amount spent by government per pupil, R2 130 million would have been
added to the cost of education in 1990 and R5 834 million in 1995.
Apportionment, among the proximate determinants of the difference in government expenditure
per pupil, as between Black and White school children, yields the following result for 1994:
Proximate determinant %
Non-teacher costs 17,0
Excess repeaters 10,8
Lower qualifications of teachers 22,8
Higher natural increase 36,7
Residual 12,7
100,0
It is seen that more than a third of the expenditure-per-pupil differential was due to the higher
level of natural increase among the Black population. In the absence of such excess their PIT
ratio could have been very close to that of Whites, given the number of teachers actually
employed in 1994. The higher incidence of grade repetition among Black pupils and the lower
qualifications of their teachers (therefore lower salaries) were responsible for a third of the
differential, while non-teacher costs (facilities in and around the schools) together with the
residual accounted for the remaining (almost) one-third.
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TABLE 12.5
POTENTIAL SCHOOL POPULATION AS % OF POPULATION
AGED 20 - 64
Primary Education Secondary Education
Aged 6-13 Aged 14 -19
1991 2001 1991 2001
% % % %
Whites 20,4 16,9 17,1 14,2
Asians 29,6 23,5 22,5 18,8
Coloureds 34,0 27,3 26,0 21,4
Blacks 46,8 39,1 29,3 26,8
Sources: Sadie, 1993.
The demographic forces are heavily stacked against progress and success on the part of Black
children in the field of education. Making provision for an extra year in both the primary and the
secondary school age groups, it is seen, as portrayed in Table 12.5, that the economic burden as
reflected by the dependency ratios of Black children of primary school age is 2,3 times that of
White children, and in the case of the potential secondary school population 1,7 times. Among
all ethnic groups the dependency burdens will decline but their relative positions as projected to
the year 2001 will differ very little from those of 1991. Given equality of per capita income for
those 20 to 64 years old, Black parents (pro forma) would have economic resources of only 49
per cent of those available to White parents and two-thirds of those available to Indian parents, to
support a child at primary school. In respect of children of secondary school age the proportions
are 59 per cent and 70 per cent respectively. Assuming equal percentage direct contributions by
parents to their children's education (or, of course no contribution by anybody) government's
subsidies per Black family will be twice that to be paid to a White family or 1,64 times that
expended per non-Black family. And the smaller the direct contributions by the large families
the greater the degree of cross-subsidisation will be. In 1993 the private expenditure per child
figured as follows:
Primary Pupil Secondary Pupil
Whites
Asians
Coloured
Blacks
(The Education Foundation, 1995, p. 9)
R2 164
524
578
456
R3176
1 030
692
852
These amounts testify to the secondary level of income redistribution, as mentioned above,
entailed in the obligatory admission of children whose parents cannot pay school fees.
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The projected population allows us to quantify the expected changes in the enrolled primary and
secondary school population between 1991 and 200 1 as follows with enrolment ratios (repeats
included) remaining at their 1991 levels:
Whites
Asians
Coloureds
Non-Blacks
Blacks
Primary school
-61 100
-6 100
2200
-65 000
826200
Secondary school
-45600
1 600
14 000
-30 000
909700
Total
-95000
1 735900
If, now, the proposed 40 to 1 and 35 to 1 pupil/teacher ratios in primary and secondary schools
respectively are going to be put into practice between 1996 and the year 2001 the implications
for the number of teachers required during the period 1991 to 2001 are as follows:
Whites
Asians
Coloureds
Blacks
Primary school
-10 005
-2408
-9840
36642
Secondary school
-8280
-1 916
670
8500
The required number of teachers in Black Secondary schools rises from 8500 to 61330 if
enrolment ratios were to increase to 100 per cent. These data are the most conspicuous evidence
of the differences in past and future fertility. And, as is to be expected, the educational scene is
completely dominated by the Black population, the only group of which the accommodation of
significant additional quantities will have to be catered for, detracting from the resources
available for improving the quality of education. Given limited resources and a promise of free
and "equality" of schooling for nine or ten years for all, this is the reason for raising the
pupil/teacher ratios to which the non-Black pupils will be subjected to. Also Black secondary
pupils would suffer as a result. The most likely outcome is a deterioration in the quality of
schooling. The interests of progress and achievement will not be served. And some non-Black
teachers will lose their jobs since they are unlikely to be used to accommodate the proliferating
Black pupils. The relatively privileged position of non-Blacks in pupil/teacher ratios had a
noblesse oblige element to it in that it provided achievers and the entrepreneurship responsible
for the economic progress of South Africa. By dint of differential fertility the economic burden,
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on the small-family groups, of cross-subsidisation is due to increase further, even while the
ability to do so will diminish.
Even without the downgrading of pupil/teacher ratios the demand for teachers for White and
Indian pupils would still decline, but then by 4 923 instead of 22 609 as a result of their low and
declining fertility. While they could convert the diminishing fertility into the improvement of
the quality of accommodation, the government had to spend increasing amounts of resources just
to cater for additional quantities of Black pupils. If the Black population had followed and were
to follow the same fertility path as the Coloureds, their teacher requirements by 2001 would be
66 130 and 25 460 fewer for primary and secondary schools respectively', And the number of
teachers who had to be used in 1991 for accommodating the derived "excess" quantities of pupils
could have been employed to reduce the PIT ratios in 1991 from 44,9 and 31,5 at primary and
secondary schools to 31,3 and 27,6 respectively. If, in addition failed candidates who repeated
had not raised their school population the PIT ratios could have been down to 26,8 and 21,0
respectively in 1991, given the enrolment percentages of non-repeaters.
This is a classic case of quantity reducing quality, which cannot but be reflected in the future
economic progress and national product of the country. The quantitative factor has another side-
effect. With the official promotion of English as medium of instruction, at the expense of
Afrikaans (and other indigenous languages) (Edusource Data News, July 1996, p. 8; July, 1998,
p. 7), the crowding-out process in integrated schools can potentially deprive Afrikaans speaking
pupils the opportunity to receive education in their mother tongue. If, in addition, the quality of
education prevalent in many Black schools (Makhasi, 1995, p. 17; McMagh, 1996, p. 13) were to
be transferred to the transformed schools, the minorities will be subjected to a system which will
deprive the economy of some high quality human resources.
In the economic-demographic situation South Africa finds itself, raising the PIT ratios as a means
of providing basic literacy to all children of school going age is sensible. But the situation
demands greater emphasis on elitist education, not less. What with a dearth of economic growth-
creating human material, gifted children who represent potential leaders in all spheres of life, and
especially the economic sphere, need to be selected for special attention and required financial
support in their educational careers from, say, grade 10 upwards. Economic progress is not about
2 Which implies that there would have been a reduction in absolute numbers of children of schoolgoing age.
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quantity, but quality, and specifically as portrayed by the attributes spelled out in Chapter 6. It is
not generated by proliferating numbers demanding university education as a human right without
an obligation to satisfy the required entrance qualifications and to pay tuition fees. (There used
to be an Office for gifted and talented children, chairman J.L. Ormond, which pleaded the cause
of elitist education.)
The new government could, of course, not escape the problems posed by rapidly expanding
school and university populations; problems which have been exacerbated by generations of
school children unaccustomed to discipline, and a lack of experience in governance and,
accordingly, a limited capacity to cope with them. The backlog of classrooms seems to have
remained at an almost unchanged level since 1993, causing overcrowding and a lowering of
teacher efficiency. A 15 member audit team, led by the director-general of the Department of
Public Service and Administration, reported, among others, that "the implementation of the
voluntary severance packages was ... resulting in a lack of skills and expertise ... there had been
poor management of the redeployment of teachers and this had an adverse effect on the teaching
profession ... five provinces experienced a shortage of teachers ... there was a lack of proper
procedures to ensure effective control in the acquisition of textbooks and stationery.
Consequently, theft and fraudulent practices had occurred ... although technology education is to
be part of the Curriculum 2005, some provinces have no resources for schools, no training
programmes for teachers and no strategies in place for implementation ... " (Edusource Data
News, July 1998, p. 5). One province had 5000 ghost teachers on its payroll (p 14). And at a
conference on outcomes based education (OBE) - as in Curriculum 2005 - the American
'godfather' of OBE in the United States told the delegates that the system was an ideal and "was
not working anywhere in the world" (Edusource Data News, December 1998, p. 10). To attempt
the realisation of such an ideal, when just coping with the practicalities of growing numbers in
the educational system, is already a challenge of formidable proportions, cannot be considered
sagacious transformation.
The matriculation pass rate for schools country-wide had declined from 58 per cent in 1994 to 47
per cent in 1997. In one-fifth of schools, the success rate was lower than 20 per cent, and a few
hundred schools did not produce a single successful candidate (VanZyl, 1999, p. 16).
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12.5 HEALTH
While not easily verifiable, the potential benefits of good health can at least be hypothesised. It
lengthens the working life of a person, adding to the years in which a worker can contribute to
the national product. In Chapter 2 we have learned that between 1960 and 1991 the working life
expectancy of White and Black males at age 15 was extended by 3,3 and 3,2 years respectively.
It was also indicated, however, that the potential economic benefits were more than nullified by
the decline in the duration of economically active life. It stands to reason that a healthy worker
could perform better in the workplace than one who has less energy and stamina and is troubled
by periodic absences from work because of recurring illness, or longer lasting ill-health. Apart
from the saving of days of disability by the treatment of common ailments of universal
incidence, the combating in particular of the malaria mosquito has not only saved millions of
lives but also averted millions of man-years of impaired working life. Effective treatment of
bilharziasis and trypanosomiasis (caused by the parasite carried by the tsetse fly) had similar
beneficial effects.
When ill health, particularly in the form of psychosomatic afflictions, is prevalent among the
initiators of economic growth, the managerial staff, the effects on the economy are likely to be
the most severe. The higher stress levels to which they are subject diminishes the quality of their
performance. A sample survey conducted among South African executives indicated that 85 per
cent of them were in need of measures to improve their health (Rothnie-Jones, 1996, p.7).
When the WHO defines health as "a state of physical, mental and social well-being" it represents
a type of summum bonum or supreme test which encompasses rather more than the notion shared
by a majority of people, which is the absence of ailments and infirmity, and which is adequate
for our purposes. With the paucity, or absence of morbidity statistics to contend with, we have to
rely on mortality data as proxies for assessing the health status of our population. Which
confronts us with the problem that we cannot be sure whether increased life expectancy is the
result of improvements in health status or a prolonging of impaired life by the advance in
medical technology and knowledge, i.e. without a mitigation of maladies. It seems judicious to
assume that both elements are involved.
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TABLE 12.6
MORTALITY DATA 1991-96
Life
Expectancy IMR
at Birth
Annual Deaths
Total Infants % TFR
Whites 73,2 9,0 43200 3240 7,5
Asians 68,2 11,8 6400 236 3,7
Coloureds 62,6 32,3 27500 2460 8,9
Blacks 63,2 55,0 236 100 53200 22,5
Source: Adapted from Sadie, 1993.
1,73
2,29
2,37
3,96
Table 12.6 reveals very sizeable differentials in expectation of life at birth, the maximum
stretching to 10 years. The most sensitive index of health conditions, the infant mortality rate
(IMR) features even larger differences e.g. 55 per 1 000 births for the Black population versus
9,0 among Whites, producing 22,5 per cent and 7,5 per cent respectively of the total deaths
experienced by these two population groups. The South African Demographic and Health
Survey (DHS) has found the following four factors to be the statistically significant
determinants, at the 1 per cent level, of infant mortality: age of mother at birth of child, birth
interval, mother's education and the material standard of living. The inverse association between
the IMR magnitudes in Table 12.6 and the per capita income data in Table 11.4 certainly
provides support for the finding about the fourth determinant. But purely demographic factors
involved in fertility can have an appreciable effect on the level of the IMR as well. The DHS
revealed a relative risk of mortality among children born to mothers 10 to 14 and 15 to 19 of233
and 121 respectively, with that of mothers aged 20 - 34 set equal to 100, and rises to 283 when
mothers reproduces at age 40-44. With the relative risk for births spaced two to three years taken
as 100, those associated with an interval of 1~ to under two years and with intervals shorter than
18 months are 153 and 270 respectively. After the fourth birth the IMR increases from 45 per
1000 to 158 per 1000 for the ninth and higher parities. And infant mortality was found to be 3,3
times as high among parents experiencing low standards of living than those placed in the high
standard category (Rossouw & Hofmeyr, 1990, p. 39).
To discover the effects of the above mortality-raising reproductive behaviour on the IMR we
apply the relevant ratios to the high-fertility Black community. The results are in the form of the
reduction in the IMR if the behaviour in question did not eventuate:
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(i) If the rate of births of teenage Black mothers equalled that of the Coloured community
their IMR would have been 2,2 per 1000 lower;
(ii) If reproduction did not continue beyond the third child 90 800 births would have been
averted and the IMR reduced by 6,7 per 1000;
(iii) If all births occurred at intervals of two years and longer infant mortality would have
been 12,7 per 1000 less;
(iv) If the Black population had the age structure (and thus the dependency ratio) of the
lower-fertility Coloured community, the resultant improvement in per capita income
could have reduced their IMR by 2,8 per 1000.
In sum, in the absence of the above demographic forces the IMR could have been 24,4 per 1000
lower, or 30,6 instead of 55, and some 23 600 out of 53 200 annual infant deaths averted. Or,
more simply, if Black mothers had manifested the same age-specific fertility rates as Coloured
women, 396 500 births could have been averted annually during 1991-96, conducing, at an IMR
of 55, the avoidance of 21 800 infant deaths. In this regard Hobcraft (1992, p. 29) has found that
the gains in the saving of children's lives through family planning "can never be huge, since the
population attributable risks rarely exceed 40 per cent... [but] are nevertheless worth realising".
Kintner, analysing the decline in the IMR of Germany over the period 1871-1925, found that the
"reduction in marital fertility was responsible for most of the infant mortality decline... Smaller
family size changed the allocations of food within households and reduced the number of
children per dwelling which led to reduced transmission of infectious diseases" (1994, pp 127,
129).
We observe in South Africa, essentially, an economically inefficient reproductive system. Time,
energy and money are absorbed in the creation of economically excessive life, much of it, as
indicated above, of a non-viable character. Every year almost one million Black women are
subjected to the consumption of the bodily nutrients occasioned by pregnancy, a probable
reduction in energy and the curtailment of the capacity for economic activity. This, together with
the duties imposed by the nurturing of children at home, may account for the very high rate of
absenteeism experienced by the clothing industry, in which women predominate, viz 1,81 days
per month or 21,7 days per annum on average (Gool, 1996, p. 18). (In fact, when this number of
days is added to the public holidays and an annual three-week holidays, these women will not be
working for 10 weeks (2~ months) out of a 52 week year, or almost 20 per cent of the time.)
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Since absentees are members of teams of workers, the loss of productivity and production is
compounded by the repercussions on the processes handled by co-workers.
Given that everybody has access to maternity and related medical services, the burdens imposed
on the relevant facilities by different levels of fertility are clearly portrayed in the last column of
Table 12.7.
TABLE 12.7
SHARES IN BIRTH (B) AND POPULATION (N) NUMBERS COMPARED.
ANNUAL BIRTHS 1991-96
Birth numbers B% N% B%IN% X 100
Whites 72 000 6,3 12,8 49
Asians 19980 1,8 2,6 69
Coloureds 76200 6,7 8,5 79
Blacks 967300 86,2 76,1 112
1 135480 100,0 100,0 100
The relative burden of the high fertility community IS 1,42 times that of the Coloured
community, 1,62 times that of the Asians and 2,29 times that of the group of lowest fertility.
With equal expenditure per birth, high fertility raises costs, leaving fewer resources for other
purposes, or, with the absolute amount available as constraint, quality of service has to be
sacrificed to quantity. If it is assumed that the infants who died received medical care, and we
take into account only the preventable deaths (caused, as computed above, by reproductive
behaviour) among Blacks, the economic burden imposed by the latter is 1,29 times that of the
non-Blacks (in addition to the 1,81 multiple obtaining (112/62 ) in respect of births).
For an incisive analysis of the economic demography of health care one would need to know the
incidence of illness in all its variations: according to age, cause and nature, degree of physical or
mental impairment, duration and type of treatment (ranging from simple medication to major
surgical incisions). In the absence of the relevant morbidity data recourse is to be had to
surrogate information. According to the Department of Health (1995) admissions of outpatients
occurred at a rate of 639,78 per 1000 and admissions to health facilities at a rate of 62,92 per
1000 of population in 1994. Most of the instances of treatment at home, by private doctors and
according to recommendations by pharmacists, would be excluded from these figures.
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For a provisional indication of the influence of age structures we can hypothesise that each death
was preceded by an equal amount of healthcare in any year. The magnitudes emanating from
this hypothesis are presented in Table 12.8.
TABLE 12.8
TOTAL DEATHS AND POPULATION BY AGE
1991-1996 2006 - 2011
Age Mortality Percen- Percentage Mortality Percen- Percentage D%/
rate tage of of rate tage of of N%
deaths population deaths Population
(D) (N)
0-19 ,0057 29,0 47,7 ,0029 16,4 39,8 0,41
20-44 ,0034 14,4 35,9 ,0027 14,9 38,7 0,39
45-64 ,0135 19,5 12,1 ,0103 24,0 16,1 1,49
65-74 ,0421 13,9 2,8 ,0341 17,1 3,5 4,9
75-84 ,0974 14,3 1,2 ,0745 16,4 1,5 9,1
85 + ,2559 8,9 0,3 ,2008 11,2 0,4 28,0
Aggre- ,0084 100,0 100,0 ,0071 100,0 100,0
gate
Table 12.8 reveals that a small minority of the population, those 65 years and older, 4,3 per cent
in 1991 and 5,4 per cent in 2011, would be responsible for a very substantial portion of deaths,
viz. 37,1 per cent during 1991-96 and 44,7 per cent during 2006-2011, the increase reflecting the
combined effect of the projected decline in mortality and the ageing of the population (as a result
of the decrease in both fertility and mortality). The share of the 0-19 age group, on the other
hand, diminishing in relative numerical strength from 47,7 per cent of the population in 1991-96
to 39,8 per cent in 2006-2011, is expected to decrease from 29,0 per cent to 16,4 per cent. All
this portends a relatively increasing need of geriatric health services and a diminishing need of
paediatricians' services. (The age-related incidence of mortality is strikingly expressed in the
statistic D%/N% in the last column of Table 12,8, in which the figure for the 75-84 age group is
23 times that of age group 20-44).
The above statistics do not, however, give adequate expression to the effect of age and ageing on
health care facilities required: the equal care hypothesis formulated above does not hold water
and over time a declining mortality is most likely to ensue from an increase in the use of health
facilities and medical treatment. One author has reported shares of the elderly in health
expenditure varying from 25-30 per cent in New Zealand, the USA and the Netherlands to 43 per
cent in Denmark, while chronically ill elderly persons required physician contact at a rate twice
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that of the lowest rates observed (Habib, 1988, p. 206). In Japan the incidence of medical
treatment by age ranged, in index form, from 100 per age 0-4 to 44 for age 15-19, to 140 for
those 70 years and older, the latter at a cost 4,4 times that of the youngest patients (Ogawa, 1988,
p. 263). The South African President's Council (now defunct) reported that most of the state
health care resources spent on an individual occur during the last two years of his/her life. The
percentage of persons requiring permanent and total physical care rises sharply after age 65 as
follows: 7 per cent among those 65-74,16 per cent among age group 75-84 and 30 per cent for
the 85+, and 45 to 50 per cent of provincial hospital beds are occupied by persons 65 years and
older (1988, pp 126, 135). If the inferred hospital bed occupancy rates for the 65+ and 0-64 age
groups respectively have remained at their 1987 levels, and continue to do so after 1996, the need
for provincial hospital beds would rise at a rate of 2,2 per cent per annum compared to an 1,5 per
cent per annum increase in the total population, over the 1996-2011 period. That the 2,2 per cent
per annum increase is lower than the projected 2,6 per cent per annum growth in the labour force
is comforting, but hardly significant when employment of the labour force lags far behind. The
elderly will be occupying 56 per cent of beds by the year 2011 compared to 45-50 per cent in
1996. (If the White population's degree of ageing prevailed, the former percentage would be 75
per cent by 2011.) If we make provision for inflation the R233 300 cost of provision of a bed,
inferred from the President Council's report (p 128), would have risen to R710 000 by 1996. If
the cost remains constant at this level the average annual addition to the total cost of providing
beds would be R3 210 million between 1996 and 2011. If we apply the President's Council's
percentages relating to the chronically infirm requiring constant care, their numbers will increase
at a rate of 2,74 per cent per annum over the twenty year period 1991-2011, which will be a
multiple of 1,57 of the aggregate population growth. (The absolute numbers involved are
262900 in 1991 and 450800 in 2011).
Additional useful information can be assembled by applying the British morbidity experience by
age relating to illness of more than one week (Moultrie, 1996) (which correlates highly with the
South African age incidence of disability (SSA, 1998, p. 2.23). The result shows 6 970 000 cases
of sickness for 1991 and 11 035 000 for 2011, an average annual increase of 2,3 per cent, or from
185 to 208 per 1 000 of the population; the outcome of a combination of frequency of
occurrence and chronicity associated with the ageing process. The elderly (65+) are projected to
be responsible for 43 per cent of the increase while contributing 8,7 per cent to the increment in
the aggregate population. Because of its having moved furthest in the ageing process, the White
population's share in the occurrence of illness, at 27,6 per cent, is out of proportion to its 10,2 per
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cent contribution to the 2011 total population. According to the CSS (1995(b), p.4.11) the
number of patient-days spent in hospitals remained at just over 37 million per annum for a long
period, but after 1983 the number of out-patient and casualty treatments increased from just
under 24 million to 30,3 million in 1990. The 1994 October Household Survey (CSS, 1994(b),
p. 121) revealed that 12,3 per cent of the population had been ill (duration unspecified) during
that month, which, assuming October to be representative, constitutes a case load on an annual
basis of 1,48 times the population number. Persons discharged from hospitals numbered 2,3 per
cent, or 28 per cent annually. The latter figure would be reduced by demographic ageing which
causes an increased duration of hospital bed occupation per average person. Further information
provided by the Survey is that the numbers of consultations with doctors, specialists and nurses
(annualised) per 1 000 of the population were: Whites 3068, Asians 2838, Coloureds 1 564 and
Blacks 1 678; while consultations with traditional and spiritual healers numbered, in the same
order: 250, 151,244 and 938 (CSS, 1994(b), p. 123).
Notifiable diseases apart, our only source of intelligence concerning the nature of illness suffered
is the statistics on causes of death. However, deaths among Blacks have been underreported to
such an extent, and manifesting such annual fluctuations in underreporting that they are useless,
except if we assume that the degree of underreporting is invariable with respect to age of the
deceased and the cause of death, which is indeed what we shall hypothesise even if very
tentatively. Of the notifiable diseases, tuberculosis stands out, registering, in 1992, an incidence
of 212 per 100 000 of population, followed by measles (22 717 cases compared to 82 338 for
TB) at 58 per 100 000. During the two year period, 1990-91, III 207 new cases of cancer or
152 per day, have been recorded (Dept. of Health and Population Development, 1994, pp 34, 44;
SA Institute for Medical Research, 1996). The notified numbers of cases of all other diseases
have all been fewer than 3 000 in 1992. It is worthy of note that the incidence of TB among the
Coloured population is way above that of the other three groups: in 1980, 335 per 100 000
versus 216 among Blacks and in 1992, 662 against 198. It is evidently not only a simple poverty
disease. According to the old Department of Health and Population Development (1994) 78 - 79
per cent of TB patients are being cured, while the fatality rate is around 6 per cent, which spelled
some 7 500 deaths in 1993 (CSS, 1995, p. 3.19). The number of cases is on the increase, and in
the USA a new W mutant drug-resistant strain has been identified.
A disease very much in the limelight since the 1980s is the Acquired Immunodeficiency
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) caused by the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), particularly
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since it is linked with Tuberculosis. According to the medical adviser to the South African TB
Association HIV permits dormant TB bacilli to become active while TB turns HIV infection into
AIDS. The virus weakens the human body's ability to withstand the onslaught of TB, as of other
maladies (Bassett, 1997, p. 22). In 1998 the United Nations Population Division came up with
startling projected figures for the number of deaths ensuing from AIDS in South Africa
(UNAIDS, 1998, p. 17). The difference between mortality without and with AIDS shows up as
follows in annual numbers of fatalities:
Annual Additions
Period Without AIDS With AIDS Number %
1985-90 332 000 333 000 1400 0,3
1990-95 337 000 349 000 12200 3,6
1995-2000 336 000 476 000 140 000 41,7
2000-2005 337 000 746 000 409 000 121,4
2005-2010 345 000 854 000 509 000 147,5
2010-2015 358 000 775 000 417 000 116,5
The vexing question is what to make of these statistics. Do they have the status of projections of
greatest or moderate likelihood or of a scenario? By the end of 1998 there has been no overt or
conspicuous statistical evidence that South Africa had been experiencing a rise in the death toll
of 41,7 per cent involving 140 000 lives per annum. And a 147,5 excess in ten years' time,
raising the annual number of deaths by 509 000, seemed even more remote. When the course of
the disease is assumed to describe a sigmoid, or s-shaped gamma curve as UNAIDS would have
it, the inputs in the model are as much a cause for agonising as are the outputs. The stage on the
curve assumed to have been reached by a population at the time of the projections and the
infected population base are of crucial importance. The HIV prevalence level, based as it is on
the examination of samples of women attending antenatal clinics, elicits some questions: Has
there not been a growing propensity on the part of pregnant women to visit antenatal clinics,
which could also have entailed earlier identification and thus a longer life expectancy (after
identification) for later than for earlier samples of women? Has substitutional mortality been
taken into account? How representative are the samples in question? And with regard to the
. cause of death, has increased consciousness of the disease not led to more circumspect
diagnosis?
However, we do not have enough non-conflicting data at our disposal either to refute or
corroborate the outcomes of the UNAIDS exercise. But extravagant predictions over a period of
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two decades, not supported by subsequent events in South Africa, have conduced to scepticism.
The HIV surveys 1991 to 1996 (Department of Health, 1997), would indeed convey a growth
rate in the (weighted) incidence of HIV infection of some 50 per cent per annum. But in 1996
(compared to 1995), the high incidence Kwazulu-Natal would apparently have registered a rise
of 9,2 per cent only, while the Western Cape and Mpumalanga would have experienced a slight
decline, and the national aggregate number of infections have risen by 3,6 per cent. With regard
to the AIDS fatality incidence the UNAIDS model projected an annual number of 12 200 deaths
for 1990-95, while the official records (CSS, 1993, 1994, 1995 and SSA, 1999), put it at 2 360.
When we project the latter figure at UNAIDS ratios of progression we have the following annual
average number of fatalities:
1995-2000
2000-2005
2005-2010
2010-2015
27100
79100
98500
80700
This simple scenario produces very much less alarming results than those of UNAIDS, but are
not therefore, insignificant, adding as they do 20 per cent to AIDS-free mortality. The message is
that, in the absence of alternative solutions, hospital services will have to prepare for major
additional burdens. It should be added that diagnosis is qualified by the rider that cases where
AIDS is present, but not the underlying cause of death, are not reflected in the statistics.
By 1998 no cure had been discovered, but the course of HIV can be delayed by means of anti-
retroviral therapy, and there are treatments available for opportunistic malignancies affecting
persons whose immune system has been weakened by the HIV. Meeting the costs involved is,
however, beyond the capacity of lesser developed communities (UN, 1998(b), p. 27). If the
numbers of AIDS victims assume the proportions projected by UNAIDS, then just ordinary
hospital-care for them would be beyond the fiscal capacity of South Africa. Employers of AIDS
victims may also be saddled with very sizeable costs. An AIDS consultant has claimed that for
every case a business may incur costs of around R150 000 in medical expenses, absenteeism,
death benefits and in the recruitment and training of new staff (Van Zyl, 1999, p. 16). In this
instance the high rate of unemployment has the function of containing the direct costs to the
economy.
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In Table 12.9 are presented the five numerically most important categorised causes of death,
before AIDS had become a major issue, and before the practice of differentiating among the four
population groups had been terminated.
TABLE 12.9
CAUSES OF DEATH 1989/1990
Whites Asians Coloureds Blacks
Diseases of the % % % %
circulatory system 36,1 32,0 23,7 11,8
Neoplasms 18,2 8,5 12,8 7,6
Violence, Accidents 11,2 14,6 16,6 21,6
Diseases of the respiratory system 10,7 7,1 9,7 8,1
Infectious & Parasitic diseases 2,2 3,1 10,3 11,1
Ill-defined conditions 10,2 15,2 11,3 22,0
Source: Central Statistical Service (1990, 1991).
Despite the very high percentage for the ill-defined category, which renders the data suspect, this
information and data on age incidence allow of three conclusions: parasitic and infectious
diseases are primarily associated with youth, the incidence at age 0 being exceeded only, in the
case of Whites, after age 60; deaths by violence are concentrated around ages 20-39 which put
great (preventable) pressure on hospital facilities already overburdened; neoplasms and diseases
of the circulatory system are positively associated with the biological ageing process, and their
contributions to mortality is, accordingly positively correlated with the degree of demographic
ageing exhibited by the four ethnic groups. Contrariwise, the relative importance of infectious
and parasitic diseases, usually referred to as poverty diseases, varies inversely with such ageing.
Table 12.9 shows their relative incidence among Whites to be 2,2 per cent and among Blacks
11,1 per cent. After adjusting for an estimated underrecording of deaths among the latter of 230
per cent, we find that the difference in age structure is responsible for some 60 per cent of the
difference in incidence. The provision, in the New South Africa, of free health care services to
pregnant women and breastfeeding mothers of infants up to six weeks of age, as well as to
children under six years of age, may take the share of the demographically induced incidence
differential close to 100 per cent.
While the fee for medical treatment may not be insignificant to the poor individuals, the nominal
fees paid by them in state institutions bear no relation to the real cost - borne by taxpayers - and
are tantamount to gratis treatment. Any new initiative in health policy would essentially involve
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increasing the accessibility of medical care facilities (structures, vehicles, medication, personnel)
where there is overcrowding in existing institutions, and by extending them to the remote comers
of the country. The 1994 October Household Survey (p 121) furnishes the following data on the
percentages of people at various distances from the nearest medical service:
White Asian Coloured Black Total
Less than 1 Km 32,0 51,2 50,7 25,7 29,3
1 - 4,99 Km 48,8 36,2 36,7 33,3 38,7
5+Km 19,2 12,6 12,6 41,0 32,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
These figures relate to both urban and non-urban areas. In the latter 55,9 per cent of the
population live 5 km and further away from their nearest facility. It is clear that it is the Blacks,
the poorest in the outlying districts, who are in greatest need of easier accessibility, while doctors
prefer to practise in the urban areas. Witness the importation of Cuban physicians to fill the
vacancies in the remoter areas. The accelerated urbanisation after 1985, apart from natural
increase, was responsible for the much increased pressure on hospital facilities because it
entailed greater accessibility.
In 1994, 76,4 per cent of Whites, 28,4 per cent of Asians, 24,1 per cent of Coloureds and 9,2 per
cent of Blacks had access to medical aid schemes. The latest (1996) estimates put the number of
such schemes overall at 180, providing coverage to 2 600 000 members and 7 600 000
dependants and, representing 59 per cent of those employed in the formal labour market earning
more than R20 000 per annum (Hudson, 1998, p. 19). The new Act on Medical Schemes
stipulates that an applicant cannot be refused membership because of age, race, sex, marital
status, ethnic or social origin, sexual orientation, disability or health status, and the premium
would be based on his income, number of dependants and average morbidity risk (i.e. of all
members). Already in the "closed" schemes, where participation is compulsory for all members
of an enterprise or institution, the healthier members are subsidising the less healthy, and the
younger members the older ones. Compliance with the new law's requirements will necessitate
increases in the contributions of the members in "open" schemes (which differentiated among
applicants) which, if large enough, may drive them out of business, and thus add to the numbers
who have to be cared for by the State.
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The new government has been responsible for a major shift in health services since 1994. The
emphasis has been on primary health care: 686 clinics had been built or upgraded during 1994-
1998, and a school feeding scheme provided 5 million children with one free meal per day (RSA,
1999). Because of fiscal constraints this entailed a shift of resources away from hospital
medicine and academic hospital complexes. In the Western Cape, for example the health
personnel has been targeted for a scaling down from 33300 in 1995 to 21 000 in 1998, while the
number of hospital beds had already been reduced by 2 580 between 1995 and 1997 (Benatar,
1997, p. 9). This constitutes, as in the case of education, redistribution in favour of high fertility
households. The policy had been decried by medical school academics who, in the nature of their
profession, are interested in advancing medical science and fear "an intention of gradually
restructuring medical schools into centres for training only primary care practitioners" and that
"sophisticated skills built up with dedication over many decades are being devalued ... "
(Benatar, Chief Physician at Groote Schuur Hospital, 1997).
It is worthy of note that in previous decades, when fertility levels were at their highest and the
more appropriate focus would have been on primary, health care, secondary and tertiary health
services were promoted. In the 1990s, when the expected demographic future indicated increased
attention to be paid to the latter, it was the former, presented as reparation for neglect in the past,
that was accorded priority.
In the absence of the appropriate detailed data it is not possible to put a price tag to the projected
health trends. (Which latter had to serve, in consequence, as demographic proxies for monetary
magnitudes). There is, however, no doubt that, given the current official health policy, while
every patient might claim entitlement to received the implied medicine, the surgical services and
hospital accommodation as a matter of a human right, to be effectuated by government, it will
not be able to pick up the bill. Already by 1998, many hospitals were suffering from a critical
inadequacy: an inability to pay their electricity bills and personnel salaries on time, to protect
patients against criminals trying to set free their comrades, to prevent large scale theft of
medicines, to provide adequate ambulance services, to cope with the case load because of
understaffing, even, in one instance, to provide food for their patients, etc. (Badenhorst, 1999).
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12.6 SOCIAL WELF ARE AND SECURITY
Included under the heading of Social Security and Welfare we have the following items of
government expenditure: old age (or social) pensions, children's maintenance and foster-parent's
grants, pensions for the blind, war veterans and the disabled, military pensions and benefits
awarded to sufferers from compensatable diseases. In terms of the amounts involved only the
first two items assume significant proportions, with old age pensions (OAP) as the
predominating item involving an expenditure of R7 114 million in 1994 compared to R938
million for maintenance and foster parent grants (MFPG). The latter encompass grants for
children in the care of a natural parent (normally unwed mothers) and grants to adults who take
children into foster care. Some of the relevant data appear in Table 12.10.
TABLE 12.10
SOCIAL WELFARE PAYMENTS 1994
OAP MFPG
Benefi- Amount Benefi- Amount
ciaries R mill. ciaries R mill.
Whites 126458 561,5 39 090 90,9
Asians 34465 153,0 41 732 104,3
Coloureds 130 000 574,0 238375 550,3
Blacks 1 311 966 5 825,1 84731 193,0
Total 1 602889 7113,6 403928 938,4
Source: Central Statistical Service, 1994, pp 6.2, 6.4.
It is seen that MFPG bears no relation to population size or fertility. They can act as all incentive
for deliberate or improvident reproductive behaviour, since extramarital births and foster
parenting can make a sizeable contribution to a poor family's income. And knowledge of the
way in which the system can be turned to good account must play a part, which renders it
impossible to project future demands on the fiscus. The number of beneficiaries among the
Coloured population, for instance, jumped from 66 452 in 1992 to 238 375 in 1994 and the
amount disbursed from R259,6 million to R550 million. One can surmise, on the basis of
fertility levels, that if the Black population were to measure up to the Coloured population in
their ability of exacting the maximum benefit from the system, the amount paid out to them may
skyrocket to weU over R6 000 million, compared to the R193 million mentioned in Table 12.10,
before taking any future additions to numbers of children into account. However, the system has
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been revised by the new government, and the amount granted reduced, to provide each indigent
child with a uniformly minimum financial support.
In Table 12.11 the numbers of OAP beneficiaries presented in Table 12.10 are compared to the
numbers of persons of pensionable age (males 654, females 60+) to find the proportions of the
latter who had qualified after a means test. To determine each population group's contribution to
the 1996-2006 projected total increase in beneficiaries it was assumed that the percentage of each
qualifying for the social pension of R410 (raised in subsequent budgets) would remain constant
at the 1994 level.
TABLE 12.11
PROJECTED INCREASE IN OLD AGE PENSIONERS
Percentage of
Pensionable age
persons
qualifying
1996-2006 Percentage
Of Total
Increment
Percentage
Per annumIncrement
Whites
Asians
Coloureds
Blacks
22,3
65,1
82,8
95,4
34 100
20200
43 100
511 900
5,6
3,3
7,1
84,0
2,4
4,7
2,9
3,4
74,5 609300 100,0 3,1
The relative levels of the qualifying percentages are in accordance with expectations based on
income per capita. While the OAP receivers in the Asian population will be growing fastest their
incremental numbers constitute only 3,3 per cent of the aggregate. As in most other aspects of
the economic-demographic problêmatique the Black population dominated the scene,
contributing 84 per cent to the increment in old age pensioner numbers. The group making a
maximum use of the system - as measured by the beneficiary-intensity - compounds the fiscal
burden by growing fastest in number (if we leave aside the numerically less significant Asian
community), while contributing least, per capita, to the funding of the government expenditure.
The demands for redistribution of income are ever increasing. A long-term GDP growth rate of
3,1 % or more to contain the OAP burden, should be considered a target most difficult to achieve
in South Africa.
The OAP dependency ratio of 74,5 per cent, as in Table 12.11, might appear very high in light of
the 82 per cent of formally employed persons who have been reported as members of private
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retirement funds for 1986 (Mouton Committee, 1990, p. 14). This ostensible disparity is
explained by the fact (i) that the present situation is the outcome of membership of many decades
ago when it was small (in 1970 only 33 per cent); (ii) that only a portion of the labour force
(two-thirds in 1986) is employed in the formal sector; (iii) and that there are very sizeable pre-
retirement leakages from retirement funds: R270 million in 1980 and Rl 550 million in 1988, on
an accumulative basis. (Mouton Committee, p. 24). When legislated preservation of pensions
was proposed by the Louw committee in 1980 it was vigorously opposed by Blacks who
considered the deductions from their wages for retirement funds as compulsory temporary
savings only. They also preferred provident funds which allowed the total benefit accrued to be
paid out in one cash amount. By the time they do reach the age of retirement there may be little
or nothing left of accumulated savings, thus transferring the burden of their continued livelihood
to the taxpayer.
If the 1994/95 and 1996/97 budgets have been correctly interpreted, the amount to be paid out in
social pensions during 1996 would have been approximately R8 300 million, which would be 17
per cent more than the R7113 ,6 million in 1994, and would raise the number of beneficiaries
from 74,5 per cent to 80,2 per cent of the persons of pensionable age. It would be difficult for
the implied 8 per cent annual increase to be sustained in the absence of inflation as a mediator.
It is agreed by social workers that the OAP has much greater significance for Black households
than for others. What with high levels of unemployment and poverty the income of R860 per
month received by an elderly couple (1995) could be a great deal more than they earned over
long periods of their economically active lives. And it is regular and assured. To them old age
would mean improvement in living standards when, among non-Blacks, it is likely to spell
financial retrogression. On the other hand, it would appear that many of these elderly couples
would not be allowed to enjoy the full benefit of the OAP since children and grandchildren
would want to share in the largesse. However, this system has the beneficial side-effect of
providing obligated family care for the aged, who would otherwise have had to be
institutionalised.
There is one great administrative drawback to the OAP scheme: it provides abundant
opportunities for fraud and theft. Table 12.1 shows that the financial burden of social welfare,
relative to the GDP, has increased over a four year period. The 1999/2000 Budget Speech,
however, suggested a levelling off of the annual incremental rate.
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12.7 HOUSING
In as much as residential construction is regarded as capital formation in the national accounts,
and can therefore be legitimately financed by means of public debt-augmenting loans, it has the
advantage of not featuring as an item which contributes to the level of dissaving when
undertaken by government. Which means that government has a greater deal of manoeuvrability
in the handling of housing than in the dispensing of social welfare, education and other activities
to be recovered from current revenue. (It is, of course, assumed that market rates of interest and
depreciation are recovered from purchasers/tenants of the dwelling units constructed). This does
not apply to the transfer payments in the form of subsidies or grants to assist needy families to
acquire homes. Even so, there are few areas of government endeavour in South Africa where the
energy spent in researching, analysing, writing, talking, conferring and recommending has met
with such scant action as in housing for the poor, since the time of Verwoerd, who did provide
adequate accommodation for the shack-dwellers of his day. During 1995/96 almost three-
quarters of the funds voted for it in the budget remained unspent. Since then, however,
performance on this front has evidently taken a tum for the better. The National Expenditure
Survey, which accompanied the 1999/2000 Budget, recorded the construction of 624449 homes
during the period 1994/1998.
The needs of the population with regard to housing - by which is meant one or other type of
formal structure, which includes traditional cottages, but not shacks, hovels and shanties - can be
estimated, as a first approximation, by applying family headship rates by age and sex - held
constant over time so that only population size and structure will be reflected - to arrive at the
number of nuclear families. These latter refer to married and cohabiting couples with or without
children and single parents. These entities differ from households, which can consist of more
than one family as well as non-family members, and from the traditional extended family which
can have distantly related members attached to it. In the volume on households in the 1991
Census series of publications (RSA, 1991) a household is defined as consisting "of a person or
group of persons (whether related or not) who usually occupy a dwelling, or a part thereof and
who provide themselves with food and other essentials for living or make provision for such
essentials". From which it follows that an average household does not necessarily comprise a
larger number of persons than a family, since the latter must consist of at least two persons, while
the share of one-person households in 1991 ranged from 2,8 per cent among Asians to 15,2 per
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cent among Whites. Application of the two definitions produced the following results for the
. projected average number of persons per unit:
per family per household
Whites 1996 3,27 2,98
2006 3,01 2,74
Asians 1996 3,77 4,14
2006 3,34 3,67
Coloureds 1996 4,37 4,37
2006 3,90 3,90
Blacks 1996 5,19 4,57
2006 4,69 4,13
The per household averages for the year 2006 were based on the changes in the average size of
families, which reflects the size and structure of population and not any changes in attachments
to the conjugal family in the make-up of the household. Both definitions were employed to
project the numbers of dwellings that would be needed to house the increase, between 1996 and
2006, in the number of familieslhouseholds. While the household definition raised the increment
by 325 500 units, it produced almost no change in the annual rates of increase. Only the figures
pertaining to families are presented in Table 12.12.
TABLE 12.12
NEW HOUSING UNITS REQUIRED BETWEEN 1996 AND 2006
Number Annual % % requiring Subsidised units
increase subsidy required
Whites 215300 1,26 19 40300
Asians 70900 2,28 59 41 600
Coloureds 206500 2,27 77 159600
Blacks 2260000 3,17 87 1 962000
Total 2 752 700 2,70 80 2203500
To satisfy all needs - not demand - some 275 000 dwelling units have to be constructed every
year. To convert the needs into market demand it would appear that 80 per cent of the units,
220 000 per year, will only materialise if their construction is subsidised by government or
provided free of charge, with or without the latter's actual involvement in the construction itself;
most probably with such involvement. If all four groups could have experienced the same rate of
family increase as the White group, the country would be in need of 156 000 or 43 per cent per
annum fewer dwellings. These figures do not include the needs generated by the depreciation of
existing housing stocks and the backlog. For 1994 the latter had been estimated at 1 300 000
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(Holm, 1994, p. 9) though there are as many estimates as there are writers on the topic. The
elimination of the backlog plus a 1 per cent replacement construction will imply a two-thirds
increase in the annual number of units, or some 458 000 per annum, compared to the 275 000
quoted above, raising the annual rate of increase from 2,7 per cent to 4,2 per cent per annum, and
the probable number of subsidised units required to 366 000 per annum.
While (net) international immigration increases housing needs, urbanward internal migration
tends to have the same outcome. The cottages or huts vacated in the Black Homelands may not
be fulfilling the needs of any additions to inhabitants of the relevant rural areas, while there is not
substitution of one cottage for another, since the materials for building a traditional dwelling are
not available in urban centres as a free gift of nature. (It is assumed that a shack, hovel or shanty
is not graced with the title of a housing unit). Any change from oscillating migration to
permanent settlements by undivided families adds to the need of formal accommodation.
Arriving in towns and cities without provision for regular living facilities by themselves or
government, in-migrants invade public and private land, and on occasion private homes and
other buildings, depriving legal owners of their possessions and cramming up to 60 persons in a
three bedroom house, the doors of which are often used as firewood (Raghaven, 1996, p. 18). At
a minimum the hovels put up by squatters are aesthetically disturbing to the citizenry, or
bourgeois, in adjacent areas who had thought that they were entitled to the orderly and attractive
environment they had created over many decades. The latter suffer financially when the value of
their properties declines as a result of the presence of squatter camps in their immediate
neighbourhood, which represents a harassment hazard.
The outcome does not, of course, differ from that of the pressure emanating from the natural
increase among the settled inhabitants of urban areas, except that they are not faced with the
more dramatic change occasioned by migration.
The rapid growth (3,1 per cent per annum) in the number of elderly persons, as quantified in the
section on social welfare, presents a special problem, in that the high incidence of frailty and
impairment obliges appropriate living arrangements for those who cannot afford to care for
themselves or are not looked after by their children or other relatives. However, because of the
proliferating numbers, the need for economising to leave more resources for other government
functions, and the fact that Whites were demographically over-represented in state-subsidised
old-age homes, the new government's policy on subsidies was calculated to force some of them
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out of these institutions and to confine the admission to the most indigent individuals only. In
1996 the subsidies to these institutions have been substantially reduced, threatening destitution to
many occupants. As it is, there are severe shortages of accommodation for the elderly, only 2 per
cent of them being housed in old-age-homes, while ideally 10 per cent would be the norm
(Pretorius, 1995, p.19).
Table 12.12 depicts a by-now-familiar situation: the communities who can least afford the
means of living, are responsible, via their rapid population growth for the fastest and largest
increase in the need for such means. The growth in Black family numbers is, at 3,17 per cent per
annum, two and a half times that of Whites and 1,4 times that of Coloureds and Asians. And
while the ratio of increase among non-Blacks decline very substantially between 1991-96 and
200 1-2006 - among Asians by as much as 41 per cent - that of the Black population remains
almost unchanged at 3,1 - 3,2 per cent per annum.
Financial aid by the government to prospective homeowners to convert needs into demand, is
made available (1998) on the following scale.
Monthly income Grants-in-aid
0-799
800 - 1499
1500 - 2499
2500 - 3500
RIS 000
R12500
R9500
R5 000
The government also grants project subsidies to members of a community waiting to erect
houses with the help of a developer, co-operative subsidies to qualifiers organising themselves
into a group for the purpose of buying or building houses, and social subsidies to charitable
institutions, like churches, and companies specially established for building homes to let to those
qualifying for grants. Pressure has been brought to bear upon banks to participate in the
provision of loans to small-income earners, but they argue that the cost and risk involved in
small loans are higher per Rand of small loans than of larger ones. The large majority of persons
in need of credit earn less than Rl500 per month. The banks countered criticism about their
hesitancy or unwillingness to enter the market by pointing out that they were already contending
with 50 000 non-performing loans and repossessed properties involving a risk exposure of more
than 700 million Rand which militated against the interests of their depositors (Gumede, 1996,
p.IO). Already (by 1998) a smaller bank had collapsed and been bailed out by government and
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another experienced severe liquidity problems. The instalment payments of the mortgages in
fifteen Black townships were reported to be R3000 million in arrears during 1996 (Makhari,
1996, p.23; Editorial, Sowetan, 1996). It is not known how much of it arose from an inability to
pay, but the tenor of reports on this matter suggests that non-payment is a deliberate decision; a
custom that was established during the years (pre-1991) of the Struggle for political power. A
National Housing Corporation was established in 1996 to provide in excess of R500 million to
relieve the liquidity problems arising from loans to the poorest.
A Western Cape minister of housing has also complained that housing development projects
were bogged down in endless discussions and consultations with prospective occupants who
refused to entertain anything less than free standing three bedroom houses whose affordability is
completely beyond their reach, but which have been conjured up by election promises interpreted
to mean that free housing was to be had for the asking.
The cost of providing residential accommodation is not, of course, confined to the expenditure
on the construction of living units. In formal housing schemes it includes the preparation of the
sites, the reticulation of water and electricity, sewerage and refuse disposal facilities,
roads/streets, telephones and public buildings. These constitute the housing related physical
infrastructure, sometimes referred to as demographic investments which are capital-intensive by
nature.
12.8 FINANCING GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
If, because of indivisibilities and external economies, the fiscus were to act in the capacity of an
entrepreneur providing publicly produced goods and services on demand (needs backed by
purchasing power) at cost-covering prices, fiscal policy and the programme of government
expenditure would have presented relatively few problems. But since there are many members of
the community who cannot afford the user cost of the goods and services in question, while a
social philosophy (as formulated by the politically powerful) would have it that they should
participate in the enjoyment thereof, the fiscus becomes a redistributing agent financing its
expenditure, or part of it, by means of compulsory levies, taxation, that is. In the result, the merit
of an expenditure programme, as in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)
(RSA, 1994) lies not in its grandiosity but in its realism as defined by its affordability. There
would probably be relatively few people who would, as a matter of principle, wish to deny others
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all the best in the best of all possible worlds. But not if they have to bear the burden of bringing it
to fruition in an economically inadequate world, a description which would fit the South African
economy vis-a-vis its demographic forces. The satisfaction of needs/wants is confounded by the
endemic clash between unlimited wants and limited resources.
The well established redistributive welfare systems are mostly found in First World countries -
many of which have had second thoughts on the affordability of their schemes - where the per
capita income is relatively high, the Gini coefficient relatively small, the community reasonably
homogeneous and most taxpayers receive a reasonable "return" in the form of the allocable
portion of government expenditure - on their contributions to the fiscus. To some extent these
conditions might have held within the White community while they disposed of political and,
consequently, fiscal power and exercised control over the transfer of resources to the poorer
sections of the population. This power had been steadily eroded before it was finally relinquished
in April 1994, in the process of which the dimensions of redistribution had been progressively
extended. What with the poorest elements growing fastest in number the redistribution would
have continued apace even in the absence of a change in government.
The government of the New South Africa (NSA) tended to present as an innovation their policy
which was only an intensification and created the impression that the NSA was regarded as
approximating a First World country in which affordability was either not an object of substance
or could be realised by transferring the existing amount of resources from the higher to the lower
income classes. The RDP is essentially a programme of redistribution which seemed to be
considered as a recipe if not proxy for" development", which later was said not to need growth to
precede it. "Meeting basic needs", not economic growth, was accorded first priority. A new
economic strategy (GEAR) presented to parliament on June 14, 1996 projected the image of a
major shift towards growth. Consultants had evidently persuaded the Minister of Finance that a
policy of resource-consumption could not be maintained in the absence of resource creation. At
the same time the deputy-president was at pains to explain that the RDP remained the "anchor"
of government policy and that spending on social services would not be jeopardised. In this
regard the presence of four members and two ex-members of the SA Communist Party in the
cabinet is not insignificant. A leading ideologist of the party declared that these ministers
appreciated that it was not possible to achieve everything at once, but that they would not be
daunted by such constraints (Du Toit, 1996, p. 11). And the new president asseverated that the
ANC would never part company with the SACP or COSATU. The 1995/96 local elections were
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calculated to reinforce, at the local level, the redistributive programme of the central and regional
administrations. Under the pre-1995 system persons qualified as voters if they were ratepayers or
tenants of ratepayers, the principle having been that representation without taxation in local
government, acting as institutions which rendered services at market prices or cost, was not less
unacceptable than taxation without representation. In the NSA dispensation the only qualification
is a minimum age of 18, permitting sheer weight of numbers to dictate the sharing of resources
among communities, as at national level, regardless of their contributions. In newspaper
advertisements before the November 1995 elections the public was informed that non-payment
of their debts to local governments for services rendered was not a disqualification and should
not deter them from registering as voters. Those who wanted to stand as candidates in the local
elections were, however, required to settle their debts. Having been elected to the local councils
in November 1995, some of them stopped paying their rates and taxes and had to be removed
from office after having been in arrears for three months or longer.
By 1996 the non-payment of debts for municipal services, rent, electricity and mortgage bond
instalments had become almost a way of life after the ANC, during the years of struggle for
political power, had adjured its supporters to act thus to render the Black townships
ungovernable by the former government. It has been suggested that these people argued that
since they did not pay the authorities which were not of their choice, there was no good reason
for doing so now that their "own" government was in power. The Masakhane campaign to end
boycotts seemed to have had no more than temporary success, even though, it is claimed
(Makhari, 1996, p.23) some R5 000 million debt arrears had been written off as an incentive to
boost its chances; after which there have been demands for more cancellations of debts. On
October 1, 1996 the Minister of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development announced
that the accumulated unpaid debt owed to local authorities for rates and service charges
amounted to R5 600 million, while Eskom was trying to recover R938 million in arrears from
these 95 authorities who did not have enough funds to pay their staff one month's salary (Argus
correspondent 1996, p. 5). By the middle of 1999 non-payment for services had been responsible
for most of the R12 500 million debt accumulated by local authorities (De Klerk, 1999, p.l 0).
This constitutes a special form of redistribution by direct coercion, the shortfalls having to be
recovered from the non-defaulters. (Non-payment by those who have no income to settle their
debts cannot, of course, be labelled coercive, but they appear to be a small minority). The
differential charges in favour of the poorer communities already contain an element of
redistribution. For example, consumers of water and water-borne sanitation in Johannesburg pay
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75 per cent of the replacement cost of their services, while in nearby Soweto they are charged
less than 25 per cent of the cost (Van Ryneveld, 1994). Some transitional municipal councils
after 1994 also operated a system of charging non-cost-related flat rates in Black townships,
which gave rise to demands on the part of other consumers to be treated in the same manner,
which posed a serious threat to the solvency of these councils.
An attempt was made to quantify the approximate extent of redistribution as revealed by the
central government budget of 1993/94 and the 1994 shares of Blacks and non-Blacks in the
payment of direct and indirect taxes. A few caveats have to be sounded: differential benefits
accruing to Blacks at the local level have not been estimated; realised expenditure has invariably
been higher than budgeted amounts; some of the ratios used in the calculations pertaining to
ethnic shares relate to 1990 and 1991 (the last years for which they were available) and are likely
to understate the resources channelled to Blacks; the personal income distribution by ethnic
group computed by the Bureau of Market Research (BMR) had been used because it contained
some more of the information required than the calculations of Whiteford and McGrath (1995);
and the BMR's figures had to be adjusted to reflect the national accounts data levels as published
by the SA Reserve Bank. (These latter are usually subject to revision, so that calculations carried
out in any year may not produce exactly the same results as those based on data published in the
preceding year). The results are assembled in Table 12.13.
TABLE 12.13(A)
TAX CONTRIBUTION PER POPULATION GROUP (R 000000) 1994
Direct Tax Indirect Tax Total 0/0
Whites 37346 28 120 65466 66,0
Asians 1 480 2058 3538 3,6
Coloureds 2 110 4605 6715 6,8
Blacks 4050 19350 23400 23,6
44986 54133 99 119 100,0
Company Tax 14488 Total tax revenue R113 607 million
59474
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TABLE 12.13(B)
1993/94 ALLOCABLE GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON BLACKS
R'OOO 000
Social Welfare
Education
Health
Housing
9880
14340
7530
1 850
33600
23400
10200
Tax contribution
Net transfer
Derived from: Van Wyk, 1989, 1995; Martins et.al. 1994; Lund, 1992; SA Reserve Bank,
1994(a) & (b), 1995, 1996; Central Statistical Services 1994,1995.
Confining the calculations to allocable government expenditure - which implies that Blacks as in
Table 12.13(b), need not be debited with a portion of the cost of general government
administration and interest on public debt - the results show a net transfer of resources to them of
RIO 200 million during 1993/94 yielding them a net return of 44 per cent and a gross return of
144 per cent on their contribution to the fiscus. If it is assumed that they received a benefit from
general administration and interest equal to their share in the aggregate personal income of South
Africa, they should be debited with R22 260 million; or with R16 440 million if the ratio of their
personal income to the GDP is used as reference. Which accounts for a major portion of their tax
contributions and which, (the GDP based R16 440 million) when added to their allocable
resource receipts, entails gross and net returns of214 per cent and 114 per cent respectively. For
non-Blacks the comparable percentages are 88 per cent and -12 per cent. The implication is that
the Black population as a group (intragroup transfers being abstracted from) contributes at a
maximum, 21 per cent of the cost of allocable fiscal resources apportioned to them. Because of
the disparity in numbers the R364 per capita benefit to the Black population of the transfer of
resources imposes a burden of Rl159 per person on the non-Black population. Assuming the
benefit in 1994 prices to remain the same, the burden will rise to R1447 by the year 2011. In
reality, the levels of both the benefit and the burden are increasing as the heightened
redistribution of the post-1994 NSA progresses'.
) After the 1999 revision of the national accounts - which significantly raised the levels of previously published
GOP and related magnitudes - the SA Reserve Bank (June 1999, p. S-131) reported transfers from general
government to households of Rl7 357 million in cash and R43 084 million in kind for 1994. By 1998 these amounts
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Additional evidence of the subsidisation of the Black population can be gleaned from the budgets
of the erstwhile TBVCs and self-governing territories. In 1993 they collected R5 185 million in
tax revenue within their own borders and received grants from the central RSA-government
totalling R23 213 million (SARB, 1994(b), S-97). The latter amount absorbed just about the
aggregate amount of tax revenue collected from the whole of this population within and outside
the borders of the autonomous and self-governing areas, and is R4 900 million more than
collected from this group outside the borders by the central government. In addition the former
Homelands left a legacy of a R 14 100 million debt to the taxpayers after reincorporation into the
NSA.
That the redistributive process has been one of long standing is intimated by McGrath's
(University of Natal) finding that the 1975/76 budget reduced the personal income of Whites by
6,9 per cent while raising that of Indians by 3,4 per cent, of Coloureds by 19,2 per cent and of
Blacks by 10,6 per cent (Terreblanche, 1980, p. 14).
While at the end of the pre-1994 government's tenure of office South Africa might still have been
"near the head of the world inequality league" (Simkins, 1979, p. 9), it had gone a long way
towards mitigating the inequality. If it had remained in office, with socio-economic policy
unchanged, the demographic forces would have impelled a continuation of the process.
The situation as explained above, coupled with the economically antithetic differential
population growth, portends severe problems for the fiscus in financing future programmes of
expenditure, even if there were no attempts to intensify the transfer of resources to the lesser
endowed. The contention can be demonstrated by projecting government expenditure and tax
revenue from 1993/94 to the year 2004 on the following problem-simplifying assumptions: (i)
that the per capita allocable expenditure will continue at its 1993/94 level for all four groups; (ii)
that general administrative and public debt cost will increase pari passu with population; (iii)
that per capita personal income, intragroup income distribution and tax rates will remain
unchanged; and that (iv) company tax revenue will rise at the same rate as personal income tax
revenue. The outcome is presented in Table 12.14.
had risen to R22395 million and R69097 million respectively, in current prices, representing an increase at
constant prices (GDP deflator) equal to that of the GDP.
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TABLE 12.14
T AX CONTRIBUTIONS PROJECTED TO THE YEAR 2004
R'OOO000
Whites
Asians
Coloureds
Blacks
Direct Tax
39240
1 660
2380
5040
48320
Indirect Tax
29560
2300
5 190
24060
61 110
Company Tax
Aggregate
Total
68800
3960
7570
29 100
109430
15560
124990
ALLOCABLE GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE (R'OOO000)
Blacks
Non-Blacks
General administration and interest
41 780
33300
78940 Tax Revenue
154020 124990
129750 1136101994
Shortfall
29030
16 140
It is clear that the shortfall in tax revenue is due to increase very substantially (by 80 per cent,
from R16 140 million to R29 000 million), as a result of such revenue advancing by just less
than 1 per cent per annum, compared to 1,7 per cent in the case of expenditure (all magnitudes in
1993/94 prices) and 1,9 per cent per annum in population growth. This is caused by the fact that
the group most heavily subsidised preponderates in number and grows fastest. Their contribution
to indirect tax revenue is commensurate with their numbers and is, at 39 per cent, somewhat
higher than their 34 per cent share in personal income (because of a higher consumption
coefficient) but their payments on account of income tax lag far behind (10 per cent) as a result
of their relatively low per capita income. In fact, because of its progressive nature personal
income tax contributions in the aggregate are more unequally distributed than the inequality in
income. According to data furnished by the Commissioner ofInland Revenue 3,9 per cent of the
aggregate population were registered as income tax payers in 1992/93, while 2,1 per cent were
responsible for 90 per cent of income tax revenue collected by the IR department. The latter
percentage may be raised somewhat by the addition to the ranks of the upper income class by
way of Black Empowerment and the political patronage of the new government, which are
exacerbating the inequality of income among Blacks, who already manifest the highest Gini
coefficient of the four groups. According to Whiteford and McGrath inequality of income within
population groups has, by 1991, been responsible for 75 per cent of overall inequality and has
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been increasing since 1975 by 28 per cent and 32 per cent among Whites and Blacks respectively.
(1995, pp 56-57).
The new government has been intensifying redistribution of income between Blacks and non-
Blacks by according increasing importance to government services which favour the high
fertility section of the population: primary health care at the expense of secondary and tertiary
health services; scaling down subsidies to old age homes and frail care centres; shifting teachers
from schools of the slow-growing population groups to those of the fastest growing; increasing
the emphasis on housing subsidies, etc. The policy is in accordance with the comprehensive list
of human rights written into the constitution, the realisation of many of which, in terms of the
RDP, implies claims upon the resources of persons other than the beneficiaries. These persons
perceive the human rights as entitlements or arrogations. They also interpret the Municipal
Structures Act, which confers the power to create megacities on the Minister of Provincial
Affairs and Constitutional Development, as a means of adding to the redistributive process at the
local government level by incorporating squatter camp and similarly poverty-stricken
communities into the administrative jurisdiction of the better-off areas. This will oblige
municipalities, which are already responsible for financing some 90 per cent of their costs out of
own resources - compared to around 70 per cent in the USA and 30 per cent in Brazil - to raise
property taxes to finance the subsidies to the newly incorporated communities. In addition the
government was going to change its financial support formula to increase its subsidies to the
poorer towns and reduce those of the higher income communities (Coetzee, 1999; Robinson,
1999; Swart-H, 1999). Many township dwellers have also been exercising their own version of
redistribution by refusing payment for services provided by municipalities. The Masakhane
campaign initiated to bring an end to this confounding of the cost/price system had uneven and,
often, temporary success.
In rural areas redistribution is due to be intensified, if the recommendations of the National Land
Committee are going to be implemented by way of the transfer of land. It was recommended that
vacant land must be gifted to Black persons; that labour tenants should not only have right of
residence on farms, but have to be granted full ownership; that "unutilised, under-utilised and
indebted parcels of land should be identified and expropriated by the state and redistributed to
Black rural people, with priority given to farm workers and labour tenants" (Swart, P., 1999).
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In his 1999/2000 budget speech the Minister of Finance emphatically drew the attention of his
audience to the fact that "the budget now embodies the RDP" (RSA, 1999), seemingly to dispel
the fear that the government might have strayed from the path of redistributive righteousness
because of a competing commitment to the market-friendly approach reflected in the GEAR
programme.
In 1998 an economist of a group of companies carried out an exercise, at the micro level, to
discover the rate of return, on their contributions to government revenue, in the form of
government services received by each of three families - all three consisting of four members -
with incomes of R300 000, R60 000 and R19 000 respectively. The relevant amounts, per Rand
contributed, were found to be 9 cents, 89 cents and 192 cents in the above order. Had allowance
been made, as a matter of high probability, that the lowest income family would consist of six
members, instead of four, the differentials would have been considerably larger (Roodt, 1998).
The government action reviewed above had to be reconciled with an avowed commitment to
fiscal discipline and a goal of income tax relief while avoiding politically unpopular additions to
the value added tax (VAT). The severity of the task was mitigated to some extent by the
elbowroom permitted by the Defence budget vote which had been reduced by 1,8 per cent per
annum between 1995 and 1998. But, as intimated by Table 12.1, economic services became a
victim of reprioritising in favour of social services, which meant that the economic infrastructure
was not being maintained, thus jeopardising the future growth of the economy. If, as is claimed
by the National Expenditure Survey (RSA, 1999), government intervention in Water Affairs and
Forestry led to the creation of 100 000 jobs each year between 1994 and 1998, this would be a
very substantial positive contribution. However, when almost all sectors of the economy have
been registering absolute declines in employment, it is difficult to check how much decline has
been averted by government action.
The reprioritising above could not prevent a continuation of the preceding government's practice
of having recourse to finance part of current expenditure by means of loans, which, according to
the SA Institute of Race Relations, was for the purpose of eradicating "racial discrepancies in
government expenditure priorities before 1994" (Finance Week, 1999, p. 7). The resultant levels
of dissaving, after having been a modest Rl 805 million in 1990 and R4 799 million in 1991,
averaged R20 850 million per annum during the three year period 1992-1994 before the new
government took charge of the budget and R19 300 million per annum during 1995-1998
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(SARB, 1999, p. S-129). When measured against the GDP the latter amount, at 3,4 per cent,
represents better performance than the preceding one, at 5,4 per cent. Even so, an annual addition
of R19 000 million to the public debt means that each year an additional R2 150 million of
government revenue is being pre-empted (by the payment of interest) and not available for social
or economic services".
If a continuation of the accumulation of such dead weight debt is undesirable, its discontinuation
would make demands upon taxpayers which would undoubtedly be considered unacceptable as
well. With recourse to higher rates of VAT apparently ruled out, unless accompanied by very
substantial additions to exempt or zero-rated items - COSATU, by means of mass action
condoned by the ANC, had effectively blocked the raising of VAT in the 1996/97 budget - direct
tax (predominantly personal income tax) would have to bear the brunt of the burden of any
adjustments to increase government revenue. At 1994 ratios the closing of a R19 000 million
revenue gap would have had to depend on a Rl 700 million contribution by the Black population
and R17 300 million by non-Blacks, and would have constituted a 45 per cent increase on the
amounts actually paid in 1994. As it is, direct taxes enacted a 77,5 per cent increase in payments
between 1994 and 1998, at current prices, or 31,5 per cent at 1994 prices (GDP deflator, SARB,
1998). The comparable figures for indirect taxation were 49,2 per cent and 10,5 per cent
respectively. The system of taxation had become substantially more progressive, which meant
that the redistributive effect of expenditure was reinforced by the mode of financing it. But this
did not prevent the 1998 dissaving from attaining a level of R19 960 million in 1998, after
turning down from R24 271 million at the end of the third quarter (SARB, March 1999, p. S-
129).
A by-product of the degree of fiscal discipline embodied in the course of action after 1994
discussed above has been a considerable amount of dislocation and unsettlement, and disarray in
many institutions financed or subsidised by government whose personnel had to adapt to the
reprioritising under trying conditions.
The economic effects identified have been the outcome of policy changes superimposed upon
demographic variables. Disentangling the role of the latter quantitatively would be a topic
4 The 1999 national accounts revision raised the average annual levels of dissaving for the 1992-94 and 1995-98
periods to R28 060 million and R28 870 million respectively (SARB, June 1999, p. S-130). The amount of interest
in question would have to be raised concomitantly to R3 190 million.
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worthy of research. An illustrative proxy may act as a pointer to the problématique. To this end
the question is posed: how much redistribution is actually emanating from "improvident"
reproductive behaviour, by defining "provident" behaviour as that which would have produced
the course of fertility of the Coloured population since 1970, with "excess" births, in
consequence, equalling the numbers over and above those that would have resulted from such
"socially responsible" behaviour. An intimation of the answer, in part, would read as follows. In
respect of primary and secondary education 25 per cent of expenditure on Black pupils would
have been averted in 1991, which percentage rises to 37 per cent by the year 2001. At constant
1995 expenditure per pupil the excess of2 788 000 pupils in 1996, rising to 3 535 000 by 2001,
would demand a contribution by income tax payers of R35 153 million during the period 1996-
2001, detracting from the economic resources available for increasing the quality of human
material. By contrast, provident parenthood would have reduced either a reduction in government
expenditure on schooling or an increase in quality of education; and primary health care for
infants younger than 6 years would have cost 36 per cent less in 1991, which saving would have
risen to 45 per cent by 2001.
Viewed thus, a considerable portion of redistribution, involving as it does a shift of the burden
issuing from reproductive behaviour from parent to government (tax payers), emerges as an
avertible dissipation of economic resources.
12.9 SOME FURTHER ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF POLITICAL POWER
The president of the New South Africa has stated that his party "virtually came out of the bush to
lead the country". The logical sequence of such acknowledgement, one would have thought,
would have been gradualism in political appointments and substantial reliance on the members of
the existing professional public service which is regarded as the stabilising influence in
democracies with political powershifting from one party to the next, and which embodies
decades of experience and expertise. This did not eventuate. Persons in positions of authority
were expeditiously replaced with Blacks and other ANC/COSA TU/SACP supporters. This facet
of transformation was carried out in the name of affirmative action (AA), a concept whose
implementation has had a history of controversy in the United States. The concept has been
entrenched in the constitution and reaffirmed in subsequent White Papers and legal documents
relating to economic matters.
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The official publication of the Constitutional Assembly (1995) asseverated that while the new
constitution would protect people from discrimination on grounds of colour, gender, religion,
age, language, sexual orientation, etc. "the draft Bill of Rights also allows the state to make laws
and to take other measures that will protect and advance those who were unfairly disadvantaged
in the past. This is commonly called affirmative action" (p 3). The disadvantaged were
subsequently designated as Blacks - the government's generic term for African/Blacks,
Coloureds and Indians - women and people with disabilities. According to the White Paper on
Affirmative Action in the Public Service these three designated groups had to be targeted in AA
employment to render the public service representative of "the make up of the population within
all occupational classes and at all post levels of the public service" (RSA, 1998, April 23, p. 51).
The over-arching precondition for employment is thus founded in demographic conditions, and is
tantamount to allowing persons to benefit from their community's high levels of fertility (as a
cause of large population numbers). Membership of such communities becomes an employment-
meriting attribute.
The principle of equal employment opportunity is endorsed, that is, "the formal right to be
treated equally in employment irrespective of race, gender and disability"; But apparently this
does not inhibit the practising of "fair" discrimination, since "unfair discrimination refers to
measures, attitudes and behaviour that obstruct the enjoyment of equal rights and opportunities in
employment for Black people, women and people with disabilities" (p 51). And the Employment
Equity Bill section 6(1) states: "It is not unfair discrimination to take affirmative action measures
consistent with the purpose of this Act" (RSA, 1998, B 60B-98). By inference, measures,
attitudes and behaviours which discriminate against the non-designated groups, and particularly
Whites who were, or were considered to have been, the beneficiaries of apartheid, would be fair
or legitimate or non-discriminatory, and "equal opportunity" in their case is only a formal right
which is not relevant for operational purposes. This permits the government to champion a legal
fiction which reconciles equal opportunity and AA in advertisements inviting applications for the
filling of vacancies in the civil service, accompanied, on occasion, by a note that members of the
non-designated group(s) would be considered as a last resort.
But since pigmentation, gender and physical disability could not, on their own, qualify as norms
for determining the suitability of a candidate for a job, some further criteria, or yardstick, had to
be devised. In the traditional Western view, suitability, for employment in jobs in which
dexterity in manual manipulations is not the primary skill or qualification required, would be
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measured - talent already exhibited apart - by the extent to which a candidate had been educated
(not trained) for it in the broad sense of having acquired appropriate academic qualifications,
experience and expertise and attained acceptable levels of professional efficiency. The 1995
White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service paved the way for a movement away
from this kind of norm by recommending "the introduction of new recruitment and promotion
procedures based on non-discriminatory criteria of competency and performance rather than on
formal qualifications and experience" (Chapter 10.7). And the S A Institute of Race Relations
reported that "the ANC has said it wishes 'to get rid of merit as overriding principle in the
appointment of public servants'" (1997, p. 22).
In pursuit of a norm that would pass muster for the purposes of AA the following stages have
been passed through. A minister who was asked, by members of the personnel of a department of
which he was in charge, how important he regarded standards in the appointment to Il 000
newly created AA jobs in the public service, he responded as follows: "Well, I think standards
are important. Competency is important, but competency doesn't mean you have to have a set of
degrees behind your name. Because I don't have that, but I've talked to presidents, I've talked to
prime ministers, I've talked to kings and queens, I've talked to professors, and I feel confident to
be able to handle any subject I talk to them about. I have matric. So I mean when we talk of
competence it's very different from the standards ... When you put people into positions of
authority, we must be prepared to come in with the type of training they may lack ... So it is
useless saying we are going to put someone into a job and then we don't provide any backup of
support and that person fails and therefore we say that person is incompetent". (Central
Statistical Service, June 1994(a), p.8). But a sub-committee of the Constitutional Committee
considered that "competency" would be too severe a requirement as it would "exclude people
without specific qualifications and experience" (August, 1995, p. 2). So "ability" was substituted
for "competency". But this was apparently regarded as still too demanding as a norm. In the
Employment Equity Bill it was proclaimed that "a person may be suitably qualified for a job as a
result of anyone of, or any combination of, that person's (a) formal qualifications (b) prior
learning (c) relevant experience, or (d) capacity to acquire, within a reasonable time, the ability
to do the job" (RSA, 1998, Section 20). And the White Paper or Affirmative Action in the Public
Service came up with a, seemingly final, definition of suitability when it prescribed that
"selection panels are appropriately trained in selection and interviewing techniques especially for
identifying potential" (1998, par 3.33). The SA Airways soon underscored this modus operandi
by making public that it was applying the criterion of potential for admission of trainees, which
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did not mean proven potential as revealed by some preceding success in education or
occupational performance. The president of the Black Management Forum thought that this
represented an improvement on the performance of the previous government: "In the past a chief
factor for employment was race. However, in this bill [Employment Equity Bill] potential is an
added requirement over and above being Black" (Ndlovu, 1998, p. 1). Perhaps most revealing of
the esteem in which the principle of excellence is held, is the Minister of Sport's Commission
which is empowered by law to enforce demographic "representativity" in all sports' teams, lack
of superior performance notwithstanding (Perreira, 1999, p. 10).
The metamorphoses of the norm from standards to competence, to ability and to potential, in
concurrence with political patronage, permitted the creation of instant directors-general, deputy
DGs and other heads of departments, executives of parastatals, instant generals, instant
diplomats, etc. Inability to handle a job for which a designated person was appointed could be
accommodated by means of a period of apprenticeship during which he/she would enjoy the full
financial benefits of the appointment, or through the services of consultants. (By the end of 1997
the government had already paid out R898 million in consultants' fees (Sawyer, 1997, p. 8)).
The AA targets to be achieved were formulated as follows in the 1995 White Paper on the
Transformation of the Public Service: "Within four years all departmental establishments must
endeavour to be at least 50 per cent black at management level. During the same period at least
30 per cent of new recruits to the middle and senior management echelons should be women.
Within ten years, people with disabilities should comprise 2 per cent of public service personnel"
(Chapter 10.6). Officials responsible for implementation who did not achieve set quotas would
be subject to punitive measures. The 1998 White paper on AA was emphatic that "the Public
Service cannot and will not entertain an apologist stance to affirmative action nor should any
individual from the historically disadvantaged feel apologetic about benefiting directly from this
programme" (RSA, 1998, par. 1.18). And Mandela, in his 1998 State of the Nation address to
parliament, proclaimed that "we shall not be discouraged by the sirens of self-interest that are
being sounded in defence of privilege, and the insults that equate women, Africans, Indians,
Coloureds and the disabled with a lowering of standards" (Government Communications, 1998,
p. 4). (There is some misinterpretation here. Critics - at least those who air their views in public
- are not defending privilege but the rule of meritocracy, and it is not the groups mentioned that
are equated with a lowering of standards, but the individuals appointed on the strength of
pigmentation and potential rather than on proven merit in the eurocentric tradition. And since
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individuals, and not groups, are appointed, the moot question is: are those who are benefiting
from AA really the ones who have been disadvantaged by previous governments? And to what
extent is AA a euphemism for political patronage, the professed goal of which is the
establishment of dominion over a maximum, if not all, spheres of public life, for which purpose a
deployment committee, under the direction of the deputy president of the ANC, has been
established?)
The ANC has been going enthusiastically about its business of transforming the civil service. It
is not possible to present an unequivocal picture of the overall course of employment by ethnic
group in the public service since it is impossible to know what to make of the category
"unspecified", in Central Statistical Service's Statistical Release P0251, after June 1997, which
includes 67 per cent of the personnel of national departments and provinces. The data in the
March 1998 Bulletin of Statistics, moreover, differ from those in P0251, while there is a serious
discontinuity between the series published in P0251 of June 1997 and that of December 1997.
The number of Whites employed in the first and second tier governments seem to have
diminished by 45 800 between June 1994 and December 1997, their share in the total declining
from 22,3 to 17,5 per cent. However, the important issue is not the absolute number of
replacements, but their professional status in the civil service. Of the non-executive 11 000 jobs
specially created for AA purposes - which required some specific know-how - only some one-
third had been filled, despite a massive number of applications. The target has been, and is, the
top echelons in the bureaucratic hierarchy where the maximum influence could be exerted.
To accord, presumably, with the new president's assurance that Whites did not have to fear
dismissal, "vacancies" were advertised to serve as notice of superannuation to the incumbents.
Their right to re-apply was meaningless, the advertisements having signalled that the government
wanted them replaced by Blacks or persons of known ANC sympathies. Within four years after
taking office, the ANC-in-government had appointed 28 of the 35 directors-general and
departmental chiefs of similar states, while only one the nine provinces had a D.G. who served
under the previous government. Of the 65 deputy D.G. 's at national level, 47 owed their
appointment to the ANC (Capraro, 1998). The national director of public prosecutions and the
new president of the Reserve Bank have been ANC politicians, while the appointment of the new
chief justice was publicly favoured by Mandela, ahead of the decision by the Judicial Services
Commission (JDC). And afterwards this judge told the JDC that before they appointed judicial
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officers they should consider "whether the appointment reflected the racial and gender
composition of South Africa" (Democratic Party, 1998).
ANC supporters were put in control of the most important electronic news medium, the SABC,
and within two years its chief executive described it as the most transformed institution in South
Africa. The Minister of Health, within one year after taking office, announced that her
department's top management had been changed from a 100 per cent white male occupation to a
70 per cent black and 30 per cent female incumbency (Duvenhage, 1995). Seven Blacks who
served in the armed wing of the ANC, UmKhonto weSwizwe, and one ex-member of the
erstwhile independent Transkei were appointed generals in the new Defence Force, but
manifestly not fulfilling the appropriate functions until they had undergone some years of
training. More than 60 per cent of experienced career diplomats have been replaced with political
appointees. A journalist disclosed that the Minister of Foreign Affairs had submitted the names
of 30 persons to the Minister of Public Service and Administration for appointment to posts in
the diplomatic service; for most of which a baccalaureate plus ten years of experience was the
customary prerequisite. In the case of eight there was no mention of a previous employer or
experience. For a further nine of the recommended candidates no CVswere furnished. One of
them was appointed to a senior post in Norway and another became high commissioner in
Pakistan (Gunning, 1997). The response of the DG of Foreign Affairs to this disclosure was the
following (freely translated): "It is true that some of the new members of the department possess
other qualifications and skills than those required (by the previous government) of White
officials who had enjoyed the benefit of White education and post-school training. This does not
mean that the new members are inferior or less capable. In a new establishment it was essential,
in the interests of justice, to use new yardsticks" (Evans, 1997).
AA approaches its zenith when it enters the portals of institutions traditionally regarded as
meritocracies. According to a research document of the Democratic Party, UNISA informed its
personnel that promotion for Whites was out; the Vaal Triangle Technikon put on record that no
more Whites were going to be appointed and Whites in strategic positions were going to be
removed; the University of Cape Town let it be known that applications from Whites would be
considered as a last resort only; and the Minister of Health insisted that medical schools, in their
1999 intake of first year students, attain demographic representivity, and threatened that
government funding would be in proportion to the number of Black students enrolled, regardless
of the composition of the academic human material available (1999).
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Parallels have been drawn between the ANC's affirmative action and the pre-1994 NP
government's policy of discrimination in favour of Whites, and particularly White Afrikaans
speaking persons, suggesting that the former was doing no more than emulating its predecessors.
There is, of course, a similarity in that both regimes subscribed to the principle of
pigmentocracy. But there have been significant differences in the implementation of the
respective policies and their outcomes. The NP government observed, by and large, the rule of
meritocracy. The aggrieved parties were, in the main, equi-merit, politically incorrect Whites, not
Blacks who, until the newly established separate tertiary educational facilities had borne fruit,
had little chance of competing successfully even in the absence of apartheid's impediments. The
apartheid government did not create the relatively lesser developed status, or arrearage, of the
Black population, but inherited the situation, and attempted to attenuate it, discrimination not
withstanding.
As a rule the NP government's executives took office after having been educated for it (as
defined above), having risen through the ranks in an experience-accumulating process, and
complying with the bilingualism requisite. This is in contrast with the belief or assumption that a
short period of training will invest persons with the necessary qualities, an assumption that
wreaks maximum economic damage when the AA's target group is at the executive level.
The ANC's affirmative action has been a programme of employment substitution, entailing a
loss of jobs of another section of the labour force. The AA of the NP - if it could be depicted
thus - was employment constructive, not only for Whites, but for all population groups, and
Blacks in particular. The number of the latter employed by the first and second tiers of
government increased from 162 200 in 1960 to 778 100 in June 1994, or at a rate of 4,8 per cent
per annum compared to 3,1 per cent per annum in the case of Whites (Bureau of Statistics, 1964,
p. H-38; CSS, 1997, P02SI, p. 7). This was, moreover, accompanied by a quid pro quo for the
discrimination practised in the Common Area. By granting the former Black Homelands self-rule
in the SGT's and autonomy in the TBVC countries they were freed of the encumbrances of
apartheid and empowered to appoint Blacks to posts at all levels in the public service, at the
expense, for the most part, of White taxpayers. (There is, by contrast, on the part of the ANC, no
appetite for entertaining the Freedom Front's "volkstaat" proposal. (Afrikaner Homeland where
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self-determination would prevail)). The right of association is enshrined and enforced; the right
to dissociation is anathema.
The new government's intervention in favour of Black business (empowerment) could be
considered as the obverse to the previous regime's policy of putting impediments in their way.
The Bill relating to the National Empowerment fund for the "historically disadvantaged persons"
provided for its capital expenditure and operating costs to be funded by means of parliamentary
appropriations in addition to income generated by the Fund itself. Only Black South Africans or
companies run by them could become shareholders who would benefit from the concessions that
the Fund could acquire shares in state-owned enterprises at prices "less than the market related
price of the share" (RSA, B-121 D 98; Sect. 23(b)). The Competition Bill, which prohibits
restrictive practices such as price fixing, collusive tendering and abuses arising from dominant
positions, allowed for exemption from these regulations in the case of Black firms (RSA, B-128-
98, Sect. 10). And the Deployment Committee of the ANC sees to it that these businesses are
headed by Blacks and ANC supporters who could be called upon to support government policy
and initiatives when the need arises. It has been dubbed crony-capitalism (Sono, 1999, p. 21;
Coetzee, 1999, p.l8). Black control over formerly White-controlled businesses was facilitated
and accomplished with a minimum of cash investment and a maximum of borrowing, N shares,
rights issues, redeemable preference shares, instalment buying of shares and business pyramids.
The White Afrikaners' economic battle cry of the 1930s would, in end-of-century jargon, read "a
nation empower itself'. The post -1994 approach has the semblance of "a nation is owed
empowerment". There has been no parallel between the trials and pace of self-empowerment and
those of the asset-transfer empowerment.
Under the previous regime AA or discrimination was practised in favour of a minority; under the
new one it is carried out in the interests of a large majority. Given the yardstick for assessing the
suitability of candidates for jobs, the potential for injury to the economy is much greater under
the present régime than the previous one, by reason of relative population or labour force
numbers. Since the values of the majority in power prevail, and the minority groups in South
Africa have little or no hope of becoming a political majority in the foreseeable future, there is no
external check on the degree of injury which can be inflicted upon the economy. It is exacerbated
if it is accompanied by corruption, which includes fraud, theft, nepotism, bribery and all forms of
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wilful maladministration, i.e. which do not stem from sheer ignorance or incompetence (though
this latter attribute does not render it any the less regrettable).
Since some corruption appears to be a universal phenomenon, it is not the simple fact of its
existence that is important, but its incidence (per 1000 or 10 000 of the labour force or man years
for example) or intensity of occurrence. The true extent of corruption under the previous
government is not known, but it seems to have ensued from political power maintained over a
number of decades. The frequency of reported incidents among the ranks of the new regime
gives it the appearance of not being an exception to the rule, and it is occurring at the inception
of the new government's term of office, not after decades of wielding absolute power.
The findings of the auditor-general, the Heath Commission, some other Commissions,
individuals appointed to investigate alleged irregularities, researchers of political parties, and
writers practising investigative journalism, or reporting from parliament, have the complexion of
a litany of transgressions. The New National Party in its Corruption Barometer 1994-1998
reported 911 cases of fraud and theft, and maladministration for personal gain which occurred
since the new government had taken office, and involved an amount of more than R21 000
million, for which top officials at both first and second tier government levels were responsible
(Vorster, 1998). A few examples will have to suffice. On the margin of wilful maladministration
are the unauthorised expenditures by fourteen national departments amounting to Rl 014 million
during the fiscal year 1996/7, as disclosed by the Auditor-General (1998; Phahlane, 1998). In one
province six members of the executive council had to vacate their posts because of
misdemeanours such as illegally signing away game parks as collateral for overseas loans worth
Rl 300 million; spending a R20 million "slush fund" on 300 supporters illegally employed by
one MEC; issuing a fraudulent driver's licence to the National Parliament's deputy-speaker;
having been found guilty of wife-battery; handing out 10 new luxury cars as Christmas presents
for his fellow Cabinet ministers; breaking most of the regulations in the housing procedure book;
the speaker of the provincial government allowing his deputy to embezzle more than a million
Rand; the deputy-speaker caught filling shopping trolleys on state account; the chief executive
officer of the Development Corporation faking vehicle claims; a consultant having himself hired
at a rate ofR15 000 a day after which he had to repay R700 000 to the province, etc. (Arenstein,
1998, p. 4). In another province the Auditor-General found that in four years' time, since 1994,
some R700 million had been lost as a result of unlawful promotions and of salaries paid to
between 26 000 and 30 000 ghost officials (1998); other officials stole R5 million from the
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province's department of nature conservation; another official filled the tank of an official car
every eight minutes (Vorster, 1998, p. 114). In a third province 69 officials unlawfully stayed in
hotels at a cost of R2 million to the legislature. The South African Revenue Service discovered
that some members of its personnel were cashing cheques from taxpayers for their own use. Five
councillors of the Independent Broadcasting Authority had to resign after using official credit
cards to pay for personal purchases (Swart, 1998). Six AA managing directors of a parastatal
were dismissed for abusing, from the start of their career, their positions for personal gain (Van
der Kooy, 1996, p. 184). A one-time partner of the Minister of Justice who had been disbarred
for the misappropriation of trust funds, was appointed as consul-general in India (Braid, 1999, p.
3). (A public outcry caused him to turn down the offer). Some ANC representatives in public
organisations remained in office and received their regular salaries/allowances while charged
with, or found guilty of, misdemeanours such as drunken driving on the wrong side of a national
road and attempted murder (Coetzee, 1998, p. 12).
Mandela, as guest speaker on the opening of the provincial synod of the Moravian Church,
inveighed against the "freedom fighters who had become corrupt after becoming members of the
government ... stealing money intended for our children ... " (Sadovsky , 1998). The deputy-
president promised in 1997 that the Cabinet was going to launch an attack on corruption.
But in parliament a Cabinet minister attempted to cast a slur on the integrity of the Auditor-
General. And, when the chairman of the Heath Commission, who described the theft of public
funds as a national crisis, complained that his investigations were being hampered by the
tardiness of provincial premiers to issue the required proclamations (to authorise investigations)
(Braid, 1998; Finance Week, 1999) the Minister of Justice accused him of acting like a
politician, while the Minister of Finance called him a Don Quixote (Gunning, 1999). In this
instance, however, the windmills are real impediments on the route to efficient governance and
economic growth.
The moot question is: are the above events representative of "accidental" corruption, the result of
sheer cupidity on the part of some individuals, and of being unaccustomed to handling large
sums of money which do not belong to them; or is it "entrenched" (systematic, pervasive)
corruption (Institute of Futures Research, 1998, p. 3) which has become part of a tradition or
culture? The frequency of transgressions supports the latter point of view. If "it is perfectly
correct to assert that all of this was spawned by apartheid" as Mandela would have it in his
[eH 12(JLS)]
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
370
valedictory address to parliament on the fifth of February 1999 (Christianson, 1999, p. 9), then it
can be termed pervasive, if not entrenched - though the link may be difficult to discover. There
is, in this regard, an episode which may be of more than incidental significance. A president of
one of the former TBVC countries, when charged in court with misappropriating mining
royalties for his own use, pleaded that in the nature of his tribe's tradition this could not
constitute theft. After he was found guilty his tribe affirmed that it was not possible for a chief to
be guilty of the crime of theft when he used tribal funds for personal purposes. The leader of the
tribe had a right to it (Moletsane, 1998). A former principal of a traditionally Black university
maintained that much of what was being seen as corruption in the Western view, is not regarded
as such by the Black community, as long as the action was decided upon by the leader. His
power is paramount (Boshoff, 1997). Could officials in authority consider themselves proxies of
chiefs and headmen? Do the "fostering conditions that lie behind high levels of governmental
corruption in African capitalist societies" have relevance for South Africa: "Unlike the early
phase of Western capitalism, which emerged within a strong cultural framework that imposed
disciplined restraint, the early phase of African capitalist development exists within a weak
cultural framework ... the capitalist consumption ideology assumed dominance before their
industrialisation" leading to "motivational pressures toward economic deviance "
(Washington, 1988, p. 215). To the extent that corruption is pervasive, whether or not it has some
cultural roots, it is the more difficult to eradicate, the cost of exposure is the higher, and damage
to the economy is the greater.
To quantify the direct cost of corruption which would require a distinction between the roles of
corruption and incompetence in the level of the amounts published in journals or reported in
parliament, is problematical. Apart from the sums mentioned in the NNP's Corruption
Barometer (Vorster, 1998), the chairman of the Heath Commission of enquiry into corruption in
South Africa reported that he had 834 cases involving some RIO 000 million, on his register and
that his Commission had already averted a loss of R848 million the state would otherwise have
forfeited (Waldner, 1998; Dommisse, 1999). Part of it was the result of recovering some of the
Rl 469 million over-payments to civil servants unlawfully promoted by a former TBVC
government (RSA, 1997, p. 7). There have been instances of foreign aid to welfare projects being
suspended or withdrawn as a result of corrupt practices, as, for example, in the Sarafina scandal,
the National Literacy Cooperation project and the Foundation for Peace and Justice (Swart,
1998).
[CH12(JLS)]
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
371
In these quantified manifestations of corruption the increased cost to the taxpayer of governance
is apparent, encompassing both the diversion of resources away from their intended effective
application and the cost of tracking down the culprits. Given the fiscal policy, poor recipients of
government grants and allowances are deprived of some economic welfare. It amounts to
unlawful redistribution in favour of the higher income classes.
But probably of greater consequence than these overt costs is the insidious indirect effect on the
economy at large. The guilty public-servants, devising ways of siphoning public funds into their
own pockets, are not devoting all their time and energy to their professional duties, this reducing
the efficiency of the public service. Their actions form part of the environment in which business
is conducted and decisions on investment or expansion are taken. A corrupt public service
constitutes an entrepreneurship-inhospitable environment, diminishing the incentive to invest and
retarding economic growth. An IMF official found in a regression analysis that if the corruption
index [0 for most, 10 for least corrupt] "improves by one standard deviation ... the investment
rate increases by more than 4 percentage points and the annual growth rate of per capita GDP
increases by over half a percentage point" (Mauro, 1997, p. 9), while "government spending on
education as a ratio to GDP is negatively and significantly correlated with corruption" (p 10). An
empirical analysis by two of his colleagues showed up that, among others, "high corruption is
associated with low operation and maintenance expenditures ... and poor quality of infrastruc-
ture" (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1998, pp 8-9). This finding is consistent with the South African data in
Table 12.1. The supporting base of future growth is being eroded.
Domestic entrepreneurs may learn to live with the aberration, since they may have little choice,
but foreign investors, who base their decisions on calculated relative country risk, increasingly
perceive corruption as integral part of that risk, a high level of which militates against positive
action. Two researchers, whose empirical analysis did not establish "either a correlation or a uni-
variate relationship between perceived corruption and investment flows into sub-Saharan Africa"
nevertheless concluded that "SSA will continue to have major problems in attracting investment
until ways are found to counter the negative perception of rife corruption which private sector
investors have of the region" (Okeahalam & Bah, 1998, p. 378). And another author contended
that "the economic crimes of African governmental officials are one of the major causes behind
Africa's development crisis" (Washington, 1988, p. 201).
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The economic cost of corruption is attenuated in a fast-growing economy with a well-educated
capable labour force. The qualifying condition is not satisfied in South Africa. Corruption here is
superimposed upon a transformed bureaucracy headed by AA appointees whose "potential" is
still to be converted into acceptable standards. The combination is economically noxious and the
malady is exacerbated by the protection of incompetence which, according to a political
philosopher, is in itself one of the more dangerous forms of corruption (Esterhuyse, 1999). Such
protection is manifested in the "redeployment" of public officials who have proved to be failures
as professionals.
In successive reports the Auditor-General has repeatedly drawn attention to the unsatisfactory
conditions prevailing in the public service. In 1997 he complained that "many shortcomings in
management measures and examples of the effects thereof, involving millions of Rand where the
taxpayer did not receive value for his money, have already been reported to Parliament and other
legislative bodies in audit reports tabled by this Office" (RSA, 1997, p. 15). "Many of the
problems are caused by a shortage of staff with the necessary experience and skills, and the
proper training for newly appointed staff' (p 8). Among others, unnecessary borrowing had
added R423 million to the interest bill. A fifteen member audit team led by the DG of the
Department of Public Service and Administration found that "most provinces had no qualified
financial managers, and unqualified finance personnel were administering budgets of billions in
the absence of proper financial management training and skills ... The implementation of the
voluntary severance package was criticised for resulting in a lack of skills and expertise"
(Shindler, 1998, p. 5). In three provinces the MEC's responsible for the portfolios of Education
had been removed from office for, respectively, "administrative-incompetence", "inefficiency"
and "in the interest of good governance" (p 5). During the 1997/98 fiscal year "civil servants in
Gauteng crashed more than six government vehicles every day" (Reeves, 1998).
A well-known member of the ANC, who resigned from her position as member of the Human
Rights Commission and of the Commission for Restitution of Land Rights described her
experience in these Commissions as "virtually a nightmare". Doing one's best, she attested, in
the company of persons not properly skilled was considered reactionary. Frustrated
Commissioners were reluctant to expose the incompetence of some Black members - who
considered themselves entitled to their jobs because of their "struggle" career - since it would
have been considered racist (Kadalie, 1999). A harsh verdict emanated from a foreign source. An
American monthly, National Review, testified to the perception of some foreigners about
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conditions in South Africa: the "foolish" application of AA is blamed for incompetent persons
landing up in positions of authority at the expense of experienced professionals, with the result
that public administration is falling apart; "everything bears the stamp of decay" (Reported in
Holzapfel, 1998, p. 28). Into this picture fits the grievance of businessmen and independent
professionals that government bodies are loath to settle their debts in due time, and that much
time and energy are wasted in attempts to wrest from officials the amounts owing.
The adversity of the milieu, described above, in which the economy has to operate, is aggravated
by a side-effect of AA which is "to fan the flames of racial hostility even more", according to
sociologist Schlemmer (Beaver, 1997, p. 25). It is not a recipe for the co-operation of diverse
population elements, or "building a nation" with a common purpose. The victims, who believed
that they owed their positions to merit and not to apartheid considered themselves unfairly
discriminated against, and the population group of which they are members has no incentive to
promote the success of government initiatives.
An exercise was carried out to quantify the implications of appointing persons (in this case
males, since they predominate in the higher skill categories; but inclusion of females will not
vitiate the conclusions), in accordance with the ethnic composition of the population. Teachers
have been excluded since their supply, quantitatively though not qualitatively, is adequate to
satisfy demand. The labour force was divided into two groups, Blacks and non-Blacks, and their
numbers by skill projected from 1995 to 2005 on condition that the trends of the 1965 to 1995
period - in which Blacks made rapid progress on the skill ladder - were to continue (Sadie, 1995,
April 18, p. 32). Assuming that the composition of the Black and non-Black aggregate would
prevail in the year 2005, it was possible to deduce the numbers of non-Black workers who were
to be replaced with Blacks to reach the target of the "correct" ethnic composition of the labour
force by that year. These could be compared with the increases by skill of the Black labour force
(LF) during 1995-2005 which could reasonably be expected (projected) in the absence of
discriminatory AA. Table 12.15 has the details.
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TABLE 12.15
MALE LF BY SKILL AND REQUIREMENTS OF AA
Non-Blacks to
1995 LF be replaced by
Blacks
1995-2005Non-Black Black
Managerial class
White collar professionals
Blue collar skilled
Semi-skilled
Unskilled
229 000
234 000
309 000
294 000
301 000
488 000
1 117 000
375 000
17 000
74 000
256 000
2776 000
4308 000
Expected
increase in
BlackLF
1995-2005
12 000
54 000
94 000
882 000
630 000
2575 000 772 0007431 000
A comparison of the last two columns of Table 12.15 reveals that the target hypothesised in the
calculations (which is less demanding than that of AA) can hardly be called feasible in the
normal course of events, which means it is not compatible with the maintenance of standards.
Enforcing the AA policy targets in respect of the higher level manpower requires recourse to
second-best or still less appropriate human material for the purposes in mind. As a matter of
elementary probability, a choice of one candidate out of a total supply of 1 is most likely to
produce less proficiency than one out of 17 or one out of 7. Already in 1995 the Auditor-General
and the DG of Finance, in evidence before a Parliamentary Select Committee, warned that the
civil service was on the point of collapse because of the AA administered by the Public Service
Commission who had no notion of the Service's priorities (Cameron, 1995). There is a net loss
of experience, know-how and efficiency as the old guard is being ousted, some vacancies remain
unfilled because candidates from the designated groups, satisfying the least exacting AA criteria,
are not available, or because of inefficiency on the part of bureaucracy or political authorities
responsible for appointments.
In the stagnant, or even labour-shedding, labour market of South Africa AA means displacement
only. A few victims have taken legal action against the authorities responsible for the
discrimination to which they were subjected. One example merits special mention because of the
tenor of the judge's verdict. Fifteen lawyers who had been identified for priority advancement
because of their work, but were ignored when thirty advertised state attorney posts had to be
filled, took the Minister of Justice to court. In his ruling the judge stated that "the facts fully
justify the conclusion that the white male applicants for the state attorney posts have been
discriminated against on those very bases - that they are white and male ... I do not read the
promotion of representivity as warranting the sacrifice of an efficient administration ... "
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(Institute of Futures Research, 1997, p. 2). There is no indication that this censure had any effect
on government policy.
The Indians of Kwazulu-Natal took private action and established a College of Medical Sciences
in Pietermaritzburg when their A-students were denied admission to universities because of AA
(Bot, 1998, p. 15).
12.10 CONCLUSION
In a democratic election a straightforward count of party supporting numbers is the determinant
of the outcome which, in the ethnically diverse population of South Africa, permits of high
fertility coming to the aid of political parties. Given the cohesive factors (e.g. common
experiences, history, culture) conducing to intra-group solidarity, the victory, at the polls in
1994, of the numerically preponderant, high fertility Black population group was a foregone
conclusion. The economically least developed section of the population, who had also suffered
under the iniquities of the previous regime, came into power. With apartheid providing a ready-
made and all-embracing recipe in aetiology - in which every conceivable phenomenon of a non-
benign nature could be attributed to apartheid - the new government set about exercising its
ruling passion for transformation, which meant change in the features and nature of every aspect
of public life. It was inspired by the need to deliver on its election promises to alleviate poverty
and economic arrearage, to accommodate elements of diverse political persuasions in the ranks
of the ANC/COSATU/SACP alliance and to extend its dominion over all seats of power.
Political power entails econormc power and a potential for vital impingements upon the
economy. The (intensified) income redistribution through the national budget represents, in part,
support to the results of high fertility. The focus on welfare services reduced the resources
available for supporting or generating growth, which spelled an ascendancy of wealth
distribution over wealth creation. The AA programme elevated relative numbers
("representivity") to a yardstick of merit for the purpose of employment in the public
administration, subsequently extended to the private sector. The new education policy has the
appearance of an attempt to create masses of literates rather than substantial numbers of
achievers. The AA-induced incompetence and inefficiency in the public service and the harm
thus inflicted upon the economy, compounded by corruption and exacerbated by a high incidence
of crime, fashioned the environment in which business had to operate. The verdict of the IMF in
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this regard is unequivocal. "Not only do weak governances and corruption tend to lower
government tax revenue and thereby both contribute to fiscal imbalance and reduce critical
public investment in areas such as health and education, but they also deter domestic and foreign
direct investment" (1997, p. 88). The casualty is economic growth.
In the wake of the elation engendered by the peaceful political transition - which testified to the
concern of the former power wielders about the damage to the economy and to their living
standards of a continuance of hostilities - the economy thrived for three years at an average GDP
growth rate of 3,2 per cent per annum (SARB, March 1999, p. 5-109). By 1997 the economy
seemed to have run out of steam, the last two quarters of 1998 having seen absolute reductions in
GDP (at constant prices). At the beginning of 1999 the Bureau for Economic Research's business
confidence index stood at a historical low (BER, 1999). At the time it appeared that the new
government had not yet generated a climate of optimism which imbued entrepreneurs with an
enduring enthusiasm for new growth-creating initiatives.
And so the enhancement of economic welfare of the poor and the disadvantaged has been
counterbalanced by an economy-debilitating socio-political environment, and did not reduce the
inequality of income within the Black community itself, but increased it. Again, such welfare-
enhancing action did not originate in 1994. By that year economic history had already registered
a multiplicity of compensatory actions, i.e. examples of restitution (Sadie, 1993, p. 13; 1995, pp
29, 32, 37, 44) by previous governments. Most importantly, the new establishment was left a
legacy of a reasonably well-developed economy and, accordingly, a lucrative source of
government revenue, which - in African terms - was a donation of major proportions. While it
might be argued that the market value of suffering arising from, e.g. violations of human dignity,
is infinitely expansible, and therefore justifies a form of retaliation, measures of an economically
less prejudicial nature than some of those adopted in the transformation process could have been
devised.
Any South African government attempting to create a welfare state will be confronted with a
basic demographic fact: it is a small enterprising minority who will have to provide the economic
means for it, and succour the large majority. A policy, simulating that of a highly developed
society, founded on a presumption that a sufficient condition is that Whites share their fortune, is
fundamentally flawed.
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CHAPTER 13
INVESTMENT AND SAVING
Since investment is the process through which capital is formed the contents of Chapter 9 are
relevant here. To focus on domestic saving and investment it is assumed that the current account
of the international balance of payments is in balance and that there are no transactions on capital
account. (The latter condition is more restrictive than a zero balance in which the inflow may be
accompanied by entrepreneurship while its outflow is not).
Accordingly I = Y-C = S, with I and S both performing as cause as well as effect. In a non-static
economy, with its leads and lags, the two magnitudes can differ before the economic process has
provided the equilibrating force. One can also conceive of a long run tendency towards a surfeit
of S vis-á-vis I, or investment opportunities (the deflationary gap) and a chronic dearth of S (the
inflationary gap). The former situation could occur in highly developed mature economies, while
the latter is likely to obtain in low income LDCs. In both situations economic growth is
restrained, which would be manifested, mainly in unemployment in the MDCs and poverty in the
LDCs.
Table 13.1 furnishes us with data on the contributions of the three sources of domestic savings in
South Africa during the most recent years.
TABLE 13.1
DOMESTIC SAVINGS AT CURRENT PRICES (R-MILLIONS)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Personal S 3613 9392 13 078 Il 114 5687 6961 3267 2 118
Corporate S 13 001 17 079 22369 23984 27902 30 295 29575 23922
Government S -4799 -18555 -23 652 -20 537 -17 594 -17746 -22 050 -19960
Net S Il 815 7916 Il 795 14561 15995 19510 io 792 6 080
Depreciation
allowances 46720 50 272 54 108 59338 65936 72 151 79348 85617
Gross S 58535 58 188 65903 73899 81 931 91 661 90 140 91 697
Source: SARB Quarterly Bulletin, March 1999. S-125.
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The outstanding features of the statistics in Table 13.1 are the volatility and low level of personal
savings and the very large amounts of government dissaving (as mentioned in Chapter 12). Total
net savings peaked at R19 510 million in 1996 (or 3,6 per cent of GDP) and diminished
precipitately to R6 080 million in 1998, which was equal to 0,9 per cent of GDP, and had the
semblance of insignificance when measured against an ICOR of 3,3 and a population growth rate
of around 1,8 per cent per annum. Even at its 1996 peak, domestic saving comprised (ceteris
paribus) only two-thirds of the amount needed for the maintenance of production per capita.
Potential relief which could emanate from a decline in the ICOR is being thwarted by organised
labour.
Until 1977 personal S used to be the major contributor to the aggregate, but has since become a
poor second to corporates, the latter exceeding it in a 2,6 to 1 ratio during 1989-1995 and in an
11,3 to 1 ratio in 1998. Up to 1980 personal S, at an unweighted average percentage of 9,1
during the twenty year period 1960-1980, constituted a sizeable portion of disposable income.
The average shrank to 3,3 per cent over the following fifteen years, signalling a precipitate,
unheralded structural change and slumped to a historic low of 0,5 per cent in 1998.
The amount or intensity of personal, or private household, saving is a function of (i) the sum
total of a variety of individual dispositions to save (thrift), (ii) the ability to save, and (iii)
possible incentives occasioned by family obligations. The second and third factors are
demographically related while the influence of the cultural component, internationally or
between groups in the same country, is not to be depreciated. In the United Sates it was, for
example, found that children approaching the age of entry into tertiary institutions tended to have
a positive effect on savings as parents probably anticipated the costs involved (Espenshade,
1975: p. 125). However, statistical evidence does not seem to permit of better than tentative
conclusions about saving behaviour, particularly among high income societies.
Demonstrating the effect of family size on the ability to save is a fairly simple exercise. We
hypothesise a family consisting initially of husband and wife and expanding to six by the
addition of four children, the breadwinner earning a HSL monthly income of R883 appropriate to
a six member family, as already presented in Table ILl of Chapter 11 (Potgieter, 1994, p 56).
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TABLE 13.2
ABILITY TO SAVE ACCORDING TO FAMIL Y SIZE
HSL Income
required for
basic needs
Discretionary
Income
HSL-Exp.
Saving at a
10% quotient
Husband & wife
+ Child 1-3 yrs
+ Child 4-6 yrs
+ Child 7-10 yrs
+ Child 11-14 yrs
R507
572
657
759
883
R376
311
226
124
o
R37,60
31,10
22,60
12,40
o
It is assumed that saving is only possible when there is some "discretionary" income, that is, an
excess of income over the minimum amount required to satisfy basic needs. Inevitably, with
every new arrival on the family scene the ability to save is being diminished until, with the sixth
addition, it is reduced to zero, the total HSL income being absorbed by consumption.
Where it is the tradition to regard children as members of the family labour force at a very early
age who do not simply substitute for some of the input of effort by the breadwinner, as in
subsistence agriculture for example, additions to the family may raise the income available. But
this does not necessarily make for an increase in savings, since from the kind of low levels of
income represented by the HSL, any increase is most likely to be used for raising living levels by
means of greater consumption. Indeed, when there is an adequate supply of natural resources,
such as land, as the unique co-operant factor of production, increasing returns may apply with
additions to the family size, but in the real world this stage has long been passed, with
diminishing returns constituting the rule. Family income totals may increase but per capita
incomes decline, as has been found in a number of surveys in Africa, which also indicated that
extended families earned more but saved less than nuclear families, probably as a result of the
former offering more security to their members (De Lancey, 1990: pp. 117-118).
Apart from representing additions to the family's labour force, children also serve as the
embodiment of savings in traditional, usually rural, societies with close family ties in which high
fertility is considered culturally laudable in any case. Male offspring are expected to provide for
their parents in their old age when these latter are not physically able to continue doing so
themselves. Daughters also represent assets in that parents have the prospect of receiving lobolo,
or "bride price", when they marry. It is, however, an inefficient form of saving. To be sure of
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having a son alive by the time of his retirement (age 60-65) a father would need to have his wife
give birth to at least four children and, of course, to nurture the survivors among them. For
certain rural areas of Black Africa one estimate has put the number of children required for
ensuring two live sons, at 8 (United Nations, 1989: p. 66). The availability of economic resources
for the formation of human capital is prejudiced. Moreover, the pressure of proliferating families
on land eventually leads to its degradation and, accordingly, the consumption of the "natural
capital" used for eking out a living.
We can also illustrate the differential ability to save of two communities, one a young, high
fertility Black (B) community, the other a White (W) low fertility, ageing one, by using yearly
earnings (E) data commensurate with the consumption levels in Table 11.2. Before being
discounted for the probability of employment in a stationary labour market a 100 per cent
employment level is assumed.
TABLE 13.3
PER CAPITA EARNINGS FOR TWO POPULATIONS (B & W) WITH DIFFERENT
AGE STRUCTURES BUT WITH SIMILAR EARNINGS PER AGE INTERVAL
Age E B(x) ExB(x) W(x) ExW(x)
15-19 R6800 ,107 R 728 ,086 R 585
20-24 7 100 ,092 653 ,086 611
25-29 750O ,091 683 ,082 615
30-34 785O ,070 550 ,080 628
35-39 830O ,057 473 ,075 623
40-44 870O ,045 392 ,073 635
45-49 9 100 ,036 328 ,065 592
50-54 960O ,030 288 ,055 528
55-59 10 100 ,024 242 ,044 444
60-64 10600 ,018 191 ,038 403
65-69 530O ,012 64 ,032 170
Per capita of total population 4592 5834
Discounted for probability of employment in
a stationary job market (,27) 1 240 (,70) 4084
This discount applied is the inverse of the manpower coefficient of replacement, which is a
purely demographic magnitude. Matching those earnings data with the consumption CC) figures
in Table 11.2 we have the following outcome:
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Black
White
W-B
E
R1240
R4084
R2 844
C
R1704
R1846
R 142
E-C
-R464
R2 238
R2 702
If we posit that everybody consumes only the HSL nummum and that each W individual
transfers R464 to each B individual to compensate for the latter's earnings deficit (by way of the
national budget, for instance) he has Rl 774 available annually to add to savings. The investment
of these annual amounts over a period of 28 years (the length of life of a generation) at a 7,5 per
cent rate of return (the returns to South Africa's fixed capital stock over the period 1982-1994),
engenders a productive asset worth R 164 380 which could, at a 7,5 per cent return, yield an
annual dividend of R12 330 per capita. It is, of course, hardly likely that in practice, the
"discretionary income" (E-C less transfer) would be saved in toto; the major portion would
probably be used to raise consumption levels. Even so, Table 13.3, considered together with
Table 11.2, which demonstrates, at least, the potential for saving, serves as a confirmation of the
obstacles in the way of economic growth and development posed by high fertility and the
resultant economically adverse age composition.
However, when the ageing process is reaching an advanced stage, savings may also be adversely
affected. In a research project of the World Bank, into the causes of variations in savings rates
across countries, it was found that "an increase in the young age dependency ratio of 3,5
percentage points leads to about 1 percentage point decline in private saving; an increase in the
old age dependency-ratio has a negative savings effect more than twice as large" (World Bank,
1999, p. 4).
On the basis of the sources of data quoted with Table 11.5 (Chapter 11) the savings ratios of the
four population groups, expressed as percentages of 1994 disposable personal income (DPI),
amounted to 6,6, 5,1, 3,4 and 1,7 per cent for Whites, Asians and Coloureds and Blacks
respectively, producing an average of 4,4 per cent. Projecting the DPI to 2004 on a constant per
capita basis, produces a marginal savings ratio of 2,8 per cent, the result of the lowest per capita
DPI, lowest savings ratio group increasing fastest in number. There is a possibility that the
increasing inequality of income among Blacks may raise their savings propensity somewhat but
not to the extent of preventing declining aggregate ratios. By the turn of the century the White
population will have reached the stage where the demographically determined ability to save will
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start to wane. The relative size of the economically active age category, 15-64, will diminish,
while the net consumer age group 65+ will be expanding faster than the net consumer under 15
portion will shrink in size. Future levels of saving and investment are in jeopardy.
Recently, government has been adding to their jeopardy. As explained in Chapter 12 it has been
actively reducing saving directly by approximately R20 000 million per annum I during the seven
years 1992 to 1998 and is expected to continue in this manner, as the socio-economic services to
the fastest growing group are being expanded, whose per capita contribution to the funding of
those services is lowest. During the seven years in question government reduced the savings (net
of depreciation allowances) from R226 743 million - the contributions of individuals and
companies - to R86 649 million, or by 62 per cent (SARB, March 1999, p S-125). Part of it
occurred during a time when excess savings had to be generated to effectuate a transfer of debt
payments to overseas creditors. At ruling rates of taxation the redistribution of resources to the
fastest growing section proved irreconcilable with a zero balance on current account of the
national budget. And such balance would most likely have meant a transfer of savings from
individuals and companies to government without changing the overall picture. Inroads into
savings by the State have, however, not been confined to the above amounts of dissaving.
Included in the amount of tax revenue actually collected is a 57,8 per cent portion (the 1998
figure) derived from progressive personal income tax and company taxation, most of which
would in all likelihood have been saved if not appropriated by the State, and which did not
prompt a compensatory contra on the part of the beneficiaries of redistributive State expenditure.
The analysis in Chapter 12 would underscore Coale and Hoover's contention in this regard (1958
esp. cho 16). The South African government is transforming on a large scale, savings and would-
be savings into consumption in transactions which are related to population growth; and
particularly differential growth; and in the process relocates saving and investment among
economic sectors. The rescue or life-maintenance character of these activities is obvious, but not
their productive capacity building potential. Even if life-maintenance operations do provide a
supply of enterprise equi-proportional to the supply of population numbers - an unlikely event in
South Africa - the sacrifice of savings and investment, the strategic factor of production co-
operant with human endeavour, may still give hostages to fortune. Resources which could have
been used in the formation of new capital, to raise future levels of living, have to be applied to
the maintenance of proliferating numbers of the rapidly growing population.
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I In June 1991 this was revised upward to R28 500 million (SARB, 1999, June, p. S-130).
Chl3 (ST-JLS)
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
393
By contrast, the depreciation allowances included in gross corporate savings can be used to
enhance the productivity of the capital stock in that obsolete equipment can be replaced by new
capital apparatus embodying the latest technology. Investment of the net corporate savings
expands the capital stock, whose latest additions are usually also more productive than the older
vintages.
In Chapter 9 it has been demonstrated that a high rate of growth of the labour force (r.),
accompanying rapid population growth (rN), could favour the generation of S and I insofar as it
raises, or maintains at a high level, the marginal product of capital. But this is only true where
there are no obstacles (such as trade unions) in the way of the effective employment of the
demographically driven supply of labour, a condition not satisfied in real life in South Africa.
Also, such rapid growth could benefit S and I if per capita income is not prejudiced by it, since
the composition of the extensive expansion of demand entailed provides a less risky market to
supply than intensive expansion (increase in income per capita with rN lagging far behind).
Again, the condition has not been satisfied since 1981, 1994-1996 excepted, from which date the
income per capita has been moving downward monotonically until 1993. And so, for almost two
decades, the rapid increase in, particularly, Black population numbers has been an
impedimentum to, rather than a stimulant of, S and 1.
It is simple logic that population, and concomitantly labour force, growth requires an equivalent
widening of capital (Sw) to keep the per capita endowment constant, which leaves less of it
available for its deepening (Sd) and, accordingly less for raising levels of living. Making use of
rl rather than rN, because the ICOR is defined in terms of employed labour, we have
SdlY = SlY - Sw/Y
= SlY -rl' ICOR
Entering the appropriate data into this equation results in the following outcome for three periods
selected for reasons proffered in Chapter 9, Table 9.1.
SlY Sw/Y SdlY
% % %
1960 - 1976 12,5 8,1 = 4,4
1976-1984 11,7 12,2 = -0,5
1984 - 1994 4,4 12,5 = -8,1
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During 1960-76, the second half of La Belle Époque, enough was saved to provide for the
expanding population (as represented by r.) and to leave a sizeable portion for the deepening
process. The GDP in total, and per capita, grew vigorously. During the initial downward phase of
the Kondratieff, 1976-1984, S was just about sufficient to have met the widening needs. During
1984-1994 S could only provide one-third of I required for widening purposes, which, if the
demands of r; prevailed, would have turned the S/Y component into a negative 8,1 per cent. The
economy stagnated and per capita income declined.
In the neo-classical steady state growth model, population growth, represented by rL in the above
equation, would furnish its own solution to the demands on S and I entailed in the widening
process by way of the lowering of the ICOR, that is, an increase in the productivity of capital
(which has already been demonstrated as a theoretical possibility in Chapter 9) and for which one
researcher has found some statistical support, but only in the more prosperous countries in the
Third World (Isbister, undated: p. 628). The model's assumption of full employment of all
factors of production implies an unencumbered influence of total labour supply, as defined by
the labour force magnitude, on the marginal product of capital. And this, as already explained
above, is foreign to the South African situation where the marginal product of labour has, in fact,
to be raised by increasing KIL to match some wage demands which are not remotely related to
demographically-determined labour supply. This latter aspect will be dealt with in Chapter 15.
The situation outlined above can be portrayed as either an inability of saving levels to match
population movements or as population growth in excess of the population's ability to provide
for its future needs at constant levels of living. In the absence of sustained, substantial
supplements by foreigners (foreign capital inflow) investment funds are due to remain in deficit
of requirements.
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CHAPTER 14
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE
14.1 THE CURRENT ACCOUNT OF THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
14.1.1 Factor endowment and international trade
With population as the embodiment of the labour factor of production, we need to enquire into
the role of overall factor endowment in international trade (X and M in the system of abbreviated
designations). To this end it is assumed that people's tastes, and the policy framework within
which foreign trade operates, are given, and that three categories of products generated by the
economy can be distinguished:
A) Non-tradeables, of which public administration, community and welfare services are prime
examples.
B) Import-competing products which may, on occasion or regularly, enter into export trade
transactions.
C) Predominantly export products for which the domestic demand is minimal or not significant.
The economic sectors responsible for the production of all three categories generate income
which has an import demand component, while the production itself of B and C requires imports
of intermediate goods and capital equipment. The more factors of production are being absorbed
in category A transactions - in which determinants of a demographic nature feature prominently
- the more difficult it is for B and C to effect equilibrium between X and M, particularly if A
sector employment exerts upward pressure on wages.
For international differences in factor endowments to form the basis for comparative advantage
in tradeables the following conditions need to be satisfied (transport costs provisionally ignored):
Competition prevails allowing supply to exercise its influence in factor remuneration (which is
not offset by demand for its products); factor intensities differ (unchangingly) from one product
to the next; the production function of any tradeable is the same in all countries; and factor inputs
are of similar quality internationally. A Heckscher-Ohlin (1933, 1949) type of foreign trade
model - widely acknowledged to be the appropriate framework for examining movements in
relative wages (Davis, 1998, p. 479; Krugman, 1995) - would then apply. The greater the
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disparity, among nations, in factor endowments, the higher is the degree of complementarity, and
the greater are the potential opportunities for international trade.
The abundant factor(s) of production, with a correspondingly low rate of return or price relative
to that of the scarce factor(s), can be used to advantage as a strategic input to produce goods and
services which are abundant-factor intensive in production. The results would qualify as import-
competing products and/or exportables. Conversely, products which are scarce factor-intensive in
production would be candidates for importation. A large and rapidly growing population, in an
unrestrained labour market, accompanied by a relatively scarce supply of capital, would ceteris
paribus, confer a comparative advantage on a country in the production of labour-intensive
goods and services. A recent example of a successful application of the principle is to be
observed in the very high export-led growth of the Asian tigers who entered the international
market (as a first step) as producers of lesser skilled labour-intensive products. Other populous
Asian countries like India, China and Pakistan, still more recently, are asserting themselves in
similar fashion (Nattrass, 1998; Wood, 1997).
In accordance with the above account it is possible to distinguish between labour-intensive,
capital (usually cum technology)-intensive, and natural resource-intensive products and
industries. Within this frame of reference various sectors in the economy can be assessed as
potential candidates for providing opportunities to labour-abundant (particularly semi-skilled and
unskilled) economies for an internationally beneficial application of their preponderating factor
of production.
(i) The staple foods producing sector. The subsistence agriculture in the traditionally Black
Homelands occupies a rather singular position. It does operate in an import-competing
sector. But absorbing underemployed labour, which has to seek supplementary income in
migrant labour opportunities, the "absorption" is, in fact limited to the periods of resting
in between rounds of migrant labour participation. In commercial agriculture the
productive process becomes more labour intensive as the size of farming units is being
reduced by population pressure (land tenure systems permitting) and the returns per unit
of land are being maximised. The same is true of urban farming where the land input
cannot but be minimal. In a study of 100 cities in 30 countries, as reported by the United
Nations Development Programme, it was found that one-third of the residents were
growing food for own use or for sale, releasing rural production for export or reducing
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imports of food. In Moscow two-thirds of families grow food, and in Calcutta a quarter of
the city's fish consumption was supplied by tanks fed with sewage (Anon, New Scientist,
1996). The converse took place in South Africa. The average size of a commercial
farming unit has been ever expanding since 1952, when it was 730 hectares, to reach
1350 hectares in 1996. The labour input declined from 1 per 68 hectares to 1 per 88
hectares, while capital equipment was being substituted for it (Department of Statistics,
1976, pp 7.7, 9.4; SSA, 1999). The redistribution of land currently under way may make
for greater labour intensity unless the new owners are going to practice subsistence
farming, in which case natural resource intensity will prevail at low levels of
productivity.
(ii) Non-staple comestibles, plantation produce and industrial raw materials. Natural resource
inputs have a greater role to play here than in the first sector but plentiful labour supplies,
at relatively low efficiency wages, still rank as a significant determinant of international
competitiveness. The fruit industry in the Western Cape and the subtropicallowveld, and
that which is irrigation-based along the Orange and other rivers, are cases in point. There
is less danger here, than in the first, of population growth becoming a trade reversal force
by way of rising domestic consumption.
(iii) Mining and minerals. With its endowment of minerals and metals - in contrast with the
fertility of its topsoil - South Africa must be accounted a natural resource abundant
country. The international demand, concomitant with the geographical uneven
distribution of deposits eclipses South Africa's labour abundance as a desideratum in
profitable production. However, plentiful supplies of low-skilled, low-wage labour, in
combination with technology, used to serve the South African gold mining industry, and
thus its Balance of Payments (BoP), well over many decades. This is no longer true as the
depletion of the higher grades of ore resources is being accompanied by rigid wages. In
export statistics the relevant products are likely to emerge as capital-intensive, as opposed
to labour-intensive (not to natural resource-intensive).
(iv) Manufacturing. Beneficiation of minerals and metals involves a natural resource cum
capital-intensive productive process, but if factor intensity attribution is limited to the L
and K dichotomy the later will prevail in designation, and the derived manufactured
category C products will figure prominently in South African exports. Labour abundance
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can assert itself in the light manufacturing industries responsible for the production of
textiles, clothing, leather products, processed foods, etc. which are the standard
cornerstones of industrialisation's initial stages, and are appropriate candidates for import
substitution. South Africa's problem in this regard is that whereas it has a decided
comparative advantage in many natural resource-based products because of limited
competition, it has to contend potentially with the competition of a major portion of the
world's population in the production of labour-intensive commodities; an exercise
rendered more difficult by domestic labour action.
(v) Services. South Africa owes its comparative advantage in a service export, namely
tourism, to its natural resource endowment once more (climate, natural beauty, nature
reserves, game parks). At the same time it serves, according to the former DG of the
South African Chamber of Business as a "strong catalyst for the creation of employment
for young people, first time jobseekers and women" (Parsons, 1998, pp 5,6; cf. Also
Tsikata, 1998, p. 28; El Toukhy, 1998, p. 28). lts contribution (exclusive of passenger
fares) to service exports has grown from 20,3 per cent in 1990 to 37,8 per cent in 1997
(SARB, March 1999, p. S-88). The other services featuring in international trade require
a fairly high degree of sophistication, and do not bestow upon a large supply of labour an
advantage unless it is fairly highly skilled. Eight of the world's industrialised countries
are responsible for 53 per cent of international trade in services. South Africa's share lags
far behind those of NICs such as Taiwan, Korea and China (The Economist, May 1996).
14.1.2 The Qualifying assumptions
Whether or not factor endowments will be commensurately reflected in a country's foreign trade
will depend on whether the qualifying assumptions postulated at the beginning are being realised
in practice. Those relating to production functions and factor input proportions appear to be,
while not completely lacking in verisimilitude, less than fully representative of the real world,
particularly that part of it characterised by economic dynamism. What with differences among
countries in managerial skills, quality of labour, composition of capital, technology, climate, etc.
different production functions are most likely to occur. Products are not uniquely or
unambiguously factor-intense, and factor-intensity reversals do take place over time. Technology
is surging ahead, changing some labour-intensive products into capital-intensive ones. It seeks
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among others, to economise on raw materials by reducing wastage and increasing the final
product yield of a given output of such materials, thus prejudicing the exports of labour abundant
economies. The share of non-fuel raw materials and food in the total import bill of industrialised
countries had diminished from 39 per cent in 1965 to approximately 19 per cent in 1988 (Gillis,
et.al., 1992, p. 424). Concomitantly the real price level of internationally traded commodities (oil
excluded) has been declining by one-third between 1973 and 1998 (IMF, 1999). The German
Development Institute (1994) would have it that the competitive advantage based on factor
endowments other than technology is waning as the latter and know-how emerge as dominant
base of international competitiveness. A technology scholar asserts that "the brain content of
products is increasing by leaps and bounds while the matter content is becoming less and less
significant" (VanWyk, 1991, p. 148). The Commission on Population and Quality of Life
maintains that economic activities requiring an abundant and ill-trained workforce are becoming
increasingly scarce (SAPA-AFP, 1994). The industrialised countries, in the meantime, with not
dissimilar factor endowments, are maximising trade among themselves by means of research,
invention, specialisation and product differentiation.
If, in the presence of the above developments, the potential benefits (for purposes of comparative
advantage) of abundant supplies of lesser skilled labour are not to be dissipated, it has to be
priced in proportion to its relative abundance - the demographically determined supply - just as
the relative scarcity of the other factors of production has to be reflected in their remuneration. It
is contended that the Newly Industrialising Countries of the East achieved this by limiting
unbridled action on the part of trade unions, which led to the accusation, against the governments
concerned, of practising less than fair labour standards. The counter-argument was that workers
were amply compensated by way of increasing job opportunities at rising levels of wages as
record rates of economic growth were being realised (Fields, 1990, p. 26).
As will be re-affirmed in the next Chapter, the strategy of trade urnons in South Africa
essentially converts abundant lesser skilled labour into a scarce factor of production. The supply
of labour as manifested in the size of the labour force is not an issue at the negotiating table. It is
the interests of the trade union members, however unrepresentative of the masses, that prevail.
The labour force at large is prevented from determining its remuneration and employment. In
agriculture, a net earner of foreign exchange, trade union activity has been mostly absent until
1997 and abundant labour was permitted to have its beneficial effect on production and exports.
In gold mining, another very important net earner of foreign exchange, the increasing depth of
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operations and the lowering of the gold content of ore would have been reducing the marginal
physical productivity of labour ahead of restoration by means of retrenchment of workers,
substitution of capital for labour and the abandonment of mines whose operations have become
uneconomical. Exports declined. At times an increasing dollar price, or Rand price as the
exchange rate depreciated, came to the rescue as the powerful National Union of Mineworkers
sought ever increasing wages since the 1970s. The international competitiveness of many
branches of manufacturing, which is a net consumer of foreign exchange to the tune of some R42
000 million in 1996/7 (Industrial Development Corporation, 1998) - and handicaps growth
accordingly - is equally endangered by trade union action. An econometric exercise has put the
elasticity of South African exports with respect to the price of labour at -0,348, and with respect
to the price of imports, at -0,387 (Van der Westhuizen & Lawrence, 1994, p. 51).
When COSATU vowed that it was not going to allow export promotion to be based on "cheap
labour" it was effectively inhibiting a prominent role for labour-intensive products in South
Africa's exports. This stance implies relatively high efficiency wages. And, indeed, a researcher
of the World Bank found that "South Africa is generally at a disadvantage in competing in low-
wage unskilled labor intensive activities partly because of its relatively high wage level relative
to productivity and, until recently, high material costs. For example, MONITOR estimated that
in 1995 the cost of producing a yard of ringspun woven fabric was 0,79 US dollar in South
Africa against 0,69 (Italy), 0,64 (Japan), 0,1 (USA), 0,38 (Brazil), 0,35 (Korea), 0,34 (Thailand)
and 0,22 (India)" (Tsikata, 1998, p. 28; See also Nattrass, 1998, p. 82). In the activities at issue
South Africa is in competition with the world's most populous NIC's and emerging economies
of the East - such as China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia. With regard to China, where sustained
gains in labour productivity were responsible for 42 per cent of economic growth during 1979-
1994 (Hu & Khan, 1997, p. 2), it was maintained that "one hundred million unemployed Chinese
crowd their cities looking for work at less than one dollar a day" (Francis, 1997, p. 22). The
difference, between South Africa and China and Korea, in the use of factor endowments is
illustrated in Table 14.1.
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TABLE 14.1
COMPOSITION OF MANUFACTURED EXPORTS BY FACTOR INTENSITY
Factor-intensity
category
South Africa
1995-96 %
China
1995 %
Korea
1995 %
~aturalresources
Unskilled labour
Technology
Human Capital
32,0
11,8
16,1
40,2
25,2
40,5
13,1
19,3
8,6
36,0
26,9
26,5
100,0 * *
Source: Tsikata, 1998, p. 26. *The percentages do not add up to 100.
In light of our exposition above the factor intensity structure of South African manufactured
exports, as in Table 14.1, does not come as a surprise. The 32 per cent share of the natural
resource-intensity category appears to be congruous with factor endowments, but the 11,8 per
cent of exports attributable to unskilled labour-intensive products (compared to 40,5 per cent and
36,0 per cent for China and Korea respectively) and the human capital-intensive component of
40,2 per cent (assumed to be physical capital-intensive as well), contradict the relative
availability of the two factors of production. While management, co-responsible for levels of
productivity, and the innate nature of metal and mineral beneficiation processes constitute part of
the explanation, the limitations on the use of unskilled labour are imposed by organised labour.
Capital and natural resources do not dispute the terms of their engagement; labour does.
More revealing still are the comparative data on South Africa's manufactured exports (X) and
imports (M) which juxtapose capital and labour-intensities only, as in Table 14.2.
TABLE 14.2
THE FACTOR INTENSITIES OF SOUTH AFRICA'S MANUFACTURED
EXPORTS AND IMPORTS
1975 1993
X% M% X% M%
Capital-intensive 29,5 23,8 51,8 22,3
Intermediate capital-intensive 41,0 28,3 22,2 26,1
Labour-intensive 21,4 42,4 16,8 41,5
Ultra labour-intensive 8,2 5,5 9,1 10,1
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Source: Bell & Cattaneo, 1997, pp 11, 12.
It is clear that not only are South Africa's exports more capital-intensive than her imports, but
that their capital-intensity has risen between 1975 and 1993. In the ultra labour-intensive
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category the percentages for X and M are not significantly different in 1993, but its share in M
has been almost double that of 1975. In the non-differentiated labour-intensive class the 1993
figure for M was close to two-and-a-halftimes that of X (41,5 versus 16,8 per cent).
In South Africa's foreign trade the abundant human factor of production is not fulfilling the
function that is expected of it in terms of its supply. Relatively scarce capital, in co-operation
with scarce highly skilled labour, is required to bear the brunt of the burden.
In the case of the bulky primary products whose production is yet serving as a source of
employment of low-skilled workers, the obstacle of the economics of distance has to be
surmounted. As a rule the bulkier the commodity the higher are the transport costs as a
percentage of the value of X. Balassa (1964, p. 369) had estimated the percentage to vary from 2
per cent in respect of tin to 40 per cent for iron ore and bananas. According to Drucker low
labour cost is only efficacious in foreign trade as long as the manufacturing process is
unequivocally labour-intensive. He maintained that when labour costs fell below 15 per cent of
total cost the expense of distance began to outweigh the advantage of low wages (1990/91, p.
78). Technological advance has been reducing the labour cost of some formerly labour-intensive
operations - for example, the assembly of radios and computers - to below 20 per cent. As it is,
inland freight charges can be even more burdensome than international transport costs. A
producer of ferrochrome, for instance, complained that to rail his product to the Richard's Bay
port cost more than to ship it from there to New Orleans in the USA (Rosenthal, 1996).
Lastly, there is still the premised assumption of a given (unchanging) policy framework to be
considered. It does not accord with reality, and particularly so during the 1990s. The
liberalisation of trade, and globalisation, arising from the Uruguay round of trade negotiations,
and the establishment of the World Trade Organisation in 1995, with South Africa as a signatory,
effected more than just marginal changes. South Africa (designated as a middle income country)
was committed to a five year tariff reduction programme and the phasing out of the General
Export Incentive Scheme (GElS); and it transpired that she had been moving faster in this regard
than agreed upon in the multilateral trade negotiations (Tsikata, 1998, Annex 1, p. 4; Mittner,
1999, p. 51; Bell & Cattaneo, 1997, p. 25). The nominal rate of protection applying to the
economy as a whole diminished from 29 per cent in 1990 to 15,2 per cent in 1996 (Tsikata, 1998,
Annex 1, p. 10). The Uruguay round of agreements dealt rather more leniently with agriculture to
the detriment of lesser developed agricultural commodity exporting countries like South Africa:
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only 21 per cent reduction in volume of subsidised exports over a period of 6 years was called
for, and income support to farmers was allowed. In 1996 government subsidies added the
following percentages to farmers' returns from their production in highly developed economies:
European Union 48, USA 38, Canada 46, Japan 74, Switzerland 82 (Mosoung, 1996, p. 11).
South African farmers had to make do without such assistance (VanZyl, 1999). The EU General
system of Preference applies to South Africa, but excludes agricultural products. To secure
reasonable access to EU markets for the latter, South Africa had to enter into negotiations which
lasted all of four years.
The new international trade dispensation is providing easier access for South African capital-
intensive exports on world markets, but also greater competition in the production of import-
competing goods. The most likely outcome, in view of the exposition above, is a perverse one:
an exacerbation of capital and skilled labour scarcity, and an augmentation of lesser-skilled
labour abundance, which latter is not going to be allowed to be reflected in the wage level.
Distinguishing statistically the effect of South Africa's international trade on employment is
problematic in a market continually shedding part of its manpower in a process of substitution of
capital and technology for labour. The ILO (1998) estimated that manufacturing sectors which
experienced a significant decrease in tariffs between 1994 and 1998 showed a 5,3 per cent loss in
employment compared to 6,5 per cent loss in the case of those sectors operating under a regime
of no, or slight, decrease in tariff rates. This was associated with an increase in (mostly) capital-
intensive exports of 80,5 per cent for the former and 22,2 per cent for the latter (Institute for
Futures Research, 1999). So, evidently, freer trade has acted as an unemployment decelerator;
but did it have a significant impact on the tide of job losses among the lesser skilled workers?
Probably not (see also Bruton, 1998, p. 931). If the results of the October Household Sample
Surveys are to be credited, the employment of semi-skilled and unskilled ("elementary") workers
in the formal sector of the economy declined by 21,4 and 31,5 per cent respectively, between
1994 and 1997, while that of the skilled category increased by 22,5 per cent (SSA, 1998, p. 34).
Labour and ultra labour-intensive imports - some of them entering the country illegally - have
been growing rapidly, reducing the manpower engaged in domestic production (Nattrass, 1998,
p. 84; Mittner, 1999; CSS, 1994, 1998).
Given the poor rating of South Africa in the international competitiveness stakes, trade
liberalisation is adding another dimension to the problems of the import-competing sectors which
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had developed under the protection of custom duties and, for a period after the second world war,
import control. In its Global Competitive Index list of 49 countries the World Economic Forum
ranked South Africa forty-third, or just six places higher than the worst performer, and it was in
the realm of human resources performance that she was particularly found wanting (1996, p. 15).
The forum proffered the index as a measure of the "fitness of a country's economic institutions
and structure to produce growth in view of the overall structure of the world economy" (p 12).
This arrearage is reflected in the probable effects of trade liberalisation on South Africa's
manufacturing industry over the period 1995-2002 as projected by ILO researchers.
TABLE 14.3
PROJECTED PER CENT CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT BY FACTOR-INTENSITY
OF PRODUCTION
Aggregate Change in Change in
Exports Imports
Capital-intensive -0,3% 4,5% 1,8%
Intermediate
Capital-intensive -1,3% -0,5% 8,2%
Labour-intensive -3,4% -6,6% 2,1%
Ultra labour-intensive -1,8% -8,2% 7,0%
Total -1,7% 0,4% 4,1%
Source; Bell & Cattaneo, 1997, pp 21-22.
According to Table 14.3 employment in only capital-intensive export industries is due to benefit,
while increased imports of labour and ultra labour-intensive products will be reducing the
employed labour force of the light manufacturing industries. The sectors producing the basics of
human life are increasingly unable, in consequence of international competition, to provide the
wherewithal for the acquisition of such basics through employment.
14.2 POPULATION AS SOURCE OF DEMAND
The discussion above has already showed up the discord between the exigencies of foreign trade
and South Africa's factor endowments as it surfaces in the disjunction of the supply and the use
of labour, which is a source of disequilibrium in demand for exports and imports. It produces a
bias in favour of imports. Demographic forces have been, and are, producing a labour abundance
whose function in international trade is confined to the consumption of imports, rendering
equilibrium in the BoP current account and, accordingly, a reasonable and sustained rate of
economic growth, progressively more difficult. Even labour which does make a contribution to
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South Africa's manufactured exports is yet responsible for an excess of imports by way of capital
and intermediate inputs needed to sustain or expand production.
There remains the function of population as determinant of the size of the domestic market to be
taken into consideration. The latter can be measured by population size (N) (as affected by its
composition) multiplied by the income per capita (Ypc); NYpc that is. To pre-empt the
frustration of inferences about the influence of N we have to abstract from population quality
differentials (consistently defined as a function of entrepreneurship endowment) between large
and small countries, and to premise a "tolerable" level of Ypc which is not being reduced by an
expanding N. In addition it is assumed that a state of complete globalisation, which deprives
governments of all forms of intervention in a world which constitutes one unencumbered,
comprehensive market, does not obtain. Which means that a nation can opt for predominantly
import-competing, inward-industrialisation (substantially international trade-dissociative, i.e.
depending on the dynamics of the internal market), or for outward, or export (associative),
orientation as strategy for economic development, though some degree of combination of the two
is not an unusual occurrence. The size of the domestic market can play a decisive role in the
choice. Its importance is founded in the following attributes: a lesser degree of business
sophistication and effort is required to the benefit of the "infant" entrepreneur to supply it than
foreign markets, which latter can erect protectionist barriers; it can, if large enough, allow the
attainment of the economies of scale, or a minimum of efficiency, in a variety of products
domestically demanded; it can provide the base from which export operations can be launched in
which recourse can, for example, be had to marginal cost pricing to enhance competitiveness in
foreign markets - some supporting evidence is proffered by an econometric exercise which
indicated that domestic sales and exports were complementary, the quantity of exports
responding by 0,479 per cent to a 1 per cent increase in the price of domestic sales (Van der
Westhuizen & Lawrence, 1994, p. 51); to the extent that it affords a nation command over a
portion of its economic activities it reduces the impact of external influences on a country's
welfare. The magnitude of these potential benefits in terms of foreign trade operations is
positively correlated with the size of the domestic market and, hence, with N.
The widening of the market accorded by the addition to N is, indeed, the basis of the argument
for regional integration or the establishment of common markets. "Economies of scale in
production are allowed which could permit the establishment of industries that would not be
viable at lower levels of output", argued McCarthy in favour of Southern African regional
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integration (1992, p. 7). And Senghaas claimed: "The fact that societies like that of Japan had a
large population, and that their development process began relatively late, allowed the
dissociative bias of development policy to continue for a long time ... " (1985, p. 34). While
pointing out that none of the countries now highly industrialised has developed under a régime of
continuous free trade, he concluded that "populous territorial states are protected by their very
size, for the larger the population the smaller the relative GDP share of foreign trade" (p. 27) (see
also Allen, 1981, p. 232). It has been estimated that, with a Ypc of 700 US dollars, a country
which has fewer than 25 million inhabitants is likely to experience an export level of
approximately 25 per cent of GDP compared to 15 per cent for a typically large country with the
same income per capita (Gillis et.al., 1992, p. 417).
The smaller the domestic market and the average size of its enterprises, the greater the risk that
its industries can be harmed, or even destroyed, by imports from large foreign suppliers of whose
production those imports constitute a minuscule portion. The production cost of these foreign
supplies - particularly in the case of end-of-season leftovers - could be regarded by producers as
of historic interest only which is to be ignored, if unsaleable in the country of origin, to render
gross proceeds the equivalent of profit. Anti-dumping legislation cannot be effective if dumping
is to be proved after an industry in the small country has been put out of business. At the same
time the economic limitations imposed by the domestic market of such communities oblige an
export oriented strategy for purposes of economic development. "Most cogent reasons for import
substitution", according to Ray (1998, p. 676), "disappear for countries that have small internal
markets. Such countries must fight their battles on the world market from day one".
However, when large and rapidly growing populations do not meet the qualifying conditions
posited above, they could be equally vulnerable in respect of their BoP. If they are meagrely
endowed with entrepreneurship and their economies are heavily dependent on agriculture whose
returns to increased application of labour are diminishing, a drought is most likely to cause a
deficit on the BoP. The population elasticity of demand for food (and other basic needs) which is
close enough to 1, in conjunction with price inelasticity, will prevail. Hunger or famine may
occur in the absence of imports. When the maize crop of South Africa - though not classified
among the "developing" category of nations, even while the economic situation of a major
portion of its population would answer to that description - plunges from 10 or 12 tons to 4 tons,
as has happened, a large amount of foreign exchange is forfeited due to the lack of exportable
surpluses, while, in addition, scarce foreign exchange has to be expended to import some 2
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million tons of maize. This may be regarded as a short run trade reversal. A chronic or structural
trade reversal eventuates when the limited land area of a country can no longer sustain the
growing population whose consumption can only be maintained by means of regular imports. In
Chapter 7 on natural resources we already had occasion to refer to erstwhile exporters of food
who had become importers. Previously able to support itself, Africa had, by 1989, to import 35
per cent of its food, and is becoming increasingly dependent on food aid (Rhomire, 1992, p.
142). In these circumstances, the larger is the population and the faster its growth, the more
difficult is the attainment of equilibrium in the BoP current account.
Prebisch (1959, 1971), a one-time secretary-general of the United Nations Economic
-
Commission for Latin America, advanced the thesis, based on Latin American experience, that
both the demand for, and labour supplies of, the fast growing populations of the poorer countries,
in their dealings with the richer industrialised ones, militate against their economic interests. He
proffered a model of a world consisting of an economically advanced centre and an
underdeveloped periphery. In the labour scarce centre trade unions and monopolistic markets
result in prices which rise, but never fall, when technological progress occurs. In the periphery,
where labour surpluses are prevalent and markets are more competitive, this progress leads to
falling prices and stable real wages. Its growing labour force has to be employed in economic
pursuits of declining productivity which exerts downward pressure on wages. It is also
disadvantaged by the centre's income inelastic demand for its exports, which are primary
products for the most part, while its demand for the centre's exports is highly income elastic.
Accordingly, efforts to increase its foreign exchange earnings by lowering its prices does not
meet with success. Its exports lag behind imports when demand increases in both centre and
periphery, leading to declining terms of trade and deficits on the balance of payments for the
latter. The developed world captures all the benefits of economic progress.
While Prebisch's portrayal of the differences between First and Third World is valid, his
conclusion about the terms of trade (the net barter terms, that is) has been found wanting. The
historic evidence for different periods is mixed and many researchers have found that the
Prebisch hypothesis cannot be sustained (Staley, 1970: pp. 166/7, Gillis, et.al., 1992: p. 426).
However, the World Bank reported in its 1990 World Development Report (p. 13) that during the
nineteen-eighties Sub-Saharan Africa had, as a result of a fall in the prices of their exports, been
deprived of 15 per cent of real import purchasing power (the income terms of trade). To the
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extent that this can arise from population pressure, proliferating numbers are, on this score, a
liability, not an asset.
The post-1940 experience of South Africa appears to have contrasted with the logic expounded
above. When this country began its import substitution process it was still a small country with a
limited domestic market as measured by its 1946 population of 12 400 000. Bolstered by high
customs duties and import control the operation flourished for a considerable period of time.
Since import substitution did not reduce levels of imports, but raised them, due to the demand for
capital and intermediate goods required for economic growth, the success should be attributed to
the performance of its commodity exports. These have been favoured by the war conditions and
the post-war reconstruction of war-ravaged Europe and Japan, which also limited the competition
South African producers of consumer goods for the internal market had to cope with. These
auspicious circumstances, as was to be expected, did not endure, while the quality of gold ore
reserves - in the past a major source of foreign exchange earnings, and one which does not have
to brave the kind of competition ordinary merchandise is subjected to - was diminishing
inexorably, to register a share in exports of 13,5 per cent in 1998, compared to 40 per cent in
1984 (SARB, March 1986, p. S-62; March, 1999, p. S-84).
By the end of the century South Africa had become a medium-sized country with almost 45
million inhabitants. But it had not yet managed to reduce the share of capital and intermediate
goods in the merchandise imports bill significantly below 80 per cent (Industrial Development
Corporation, 1998; Hawkins, 1996, p. 206). The size of the domestic market is presumably still
too restricted to allow of the economies of scale being realised in this respect. Population size
does not, however, appear to be the obstacle. During the hey-day of import substitution, when
this matter was very much at issue (and probably exhaustively discussed) it was considered that
45 to 50 million inhabitants would be adequate for the purpose. The problem resides, rather, in
the level of the Ypc: upward of 40 per cent of the South African population can be regarded as
not fully integrated into the modem sector of the economy, which portion can be delineated as
economically marginal (E.M.P.) embodying the underemployed and most of the unemployed
members of the labour force.
In consequence, the nature of South African merchandise imports and the direct link of their
volume to economic growth (to which they function as prerequisite) denote that the latter is
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unremittingly constrained by the BoP current account - to a rate of approximately 2 to 2,2 per
cent per annum I - in the absence of the required financial accommodation by the capital account.
14.3 THE CAPITAL ACCOUNT
Any circumstance that impacts upon the current account has significance for the capital account,
the latter registering not only the flow of foreign capital, but also the movement of a country's
foreign exchange reserves (which are presumed to be just enough to act as a safety valve, and not
to finance chronic deficits). Hence, the analyses in all the Chapters from 11 onwards are relevant.
This is summarily captured in the national accounts system of designation (but disregarding
transfer payments registered in the services account):
X-M =GNP-GDE
= (C-C) + (T-G) + (S-I)
A surplus of X features in the capital account as an addition to foreign exchange reserves, which
also means an augmentation of the quantity of high-powered money, of the ability to finance
future imports or to invest in foreign countries. It is unlikely to be considered a economic
problem. Rather it is an excess of imports, signalling that domestic expenditure exceeded
national production in value, and requiring a compensatory amount on the capital account, that is
regarded thus, unless the country at issue is economically powerful enough to have its currency
accepted by outsiders as forex reserves.
The equivalence of the two C magnitudes above can mask the fact that not all the consumer
goods consumed have been domestically produced. When, as is likely happen in the lesser
developed communities (LDCs), the accumulation of factors of production other than labour fails
to match population growth - which can be denoted as a population-related structural deficiency
(PRSD) - to the extent of inhibiting the production of an adequate supply of food, or of exports
to buy food - the supplementation by First World donors emerges as a sort of moral imperative.
By implication the economic burden of improvident parenthood is shifted internationally from
the poorer to the more affluent nations where parenthood is very limited in scale. UNICEF,
whose function it is to promote the interests of the world's children declared categorically: "The
I Other writers have estimated this rate at around 3 per cent (Van der Walt & De Wet, 1994).
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fact of the matter is that significant increases in aid will have to be paid for by the taxpayers of
the industrialised nations" (Eberstadt, 1995, p. 236). The flow of capital from the highly
developed to the least developed countries consisted overwhelmingly of concessionary
government transfers to governments of the LDCs in question, in the form of grants, repayments
not required, soft loans and some commercial lending. Some governments in Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA) paid, or had to pay less than 2 per cent interest. Between 1977 and 1986 only 5 per cent of
the net flow originated in the private sector which, understandably, is interested in market related
rates of returns (Eberstadt, 1995: p. 207). This sector's decisions on the location of foreign direct
investment is positively related to market size in which a large N has a role, but then only when
it is accompanied by levels of Ypc considered "tolerable" or "satisfactory" which are not
negatively correlated with increases in N. "Larger economies" it has been reported, "attracted the
bulk of foreign direct investment. This is because of the potential for local sales and also the
existence of more diverse resources that make local sourcing more feasible" (El Toukhy, 1998, p.
473). The discovery, in a small, poor country, of an exploitable natural resource of which the
world is in short supply, can cause a deviation from this tendency.
It has been suggested that if international government aid to some of the SSA countries were to
be terminated they would simply cease to function. For example, in 1997 it constituted 38,3 per
cent of Tanzania's GNP, 85,4 per cent of Somalia's, 87,8 per cent of Mozambique's and 123 per
cent of Rwanda's (Versi, 1997, p. 37). Large repayable foreign debts have been accumulated as a
result. That of SSA (exclusive of South Africa) increased from 63 000 million US dollars in
1981 to 166 500 million dollars in 1993, the debt/GDP ratio reaching 123 per cent in 1993
(Baynham, 1993, p. 3; Sonko, 1994, p. 39). During 1990-93 the servicing of the debt absorbed
some 19 per cent of SSA' s export earnings, while rescheduling of the debts and additional
borrowing, to pay for the servicing thereof, reduced the loss of foreign exchange temporarily
only to raise the level of indebtedness in a vicious spiral of circular causation.
It is agreed that their external debts are a millstone around the necks of SSA. The reason is that
the funds have not been invested productively and, particularly, have not created the export
capacity required for the servicing of the debts. The blame can, apparently, be laid, in part, at the
door of government policy and maladministration. It has been averred, for example, that food aid
got stuck to the fingers of bureaucrats and government élites in some of the receiving countries
(George, 1987: pp. 5,6) while in others it became a substitute for local production (the cargo-cult
phenomenon). But a significant factor has been the high proportion, of the debts incurred, that
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has been used to finance the importation of food (Rhomire, 1992: p. 144; Fair, 1994, p. 144),
which did not entail a release of resources for application in projects of development, but served
to prevent proliferating human numbers from suffering hunger or dying. Some of the aid
channelled into investment projects proved to be white elephants (Versi, 1997, p. 38).
In consequence, pressure has been brought to bear upon creditor nations to write off these debts
or exempt the debtors from part of their obligations. UNICEF (1990) leading the indictment of
the former, would have it that the Third World debt crisis was responsible for the death of half a
million children under the age of five, because of the cutbacks in health services necessitated by
the payment of interest on, and redemption of the debts. The response to this of a researcher
(Eberstadt, 1995: Chapter 10) was that the net transfers of funds to the Third World, during the
time the contrary was contended, continued to be positive, that there was no evidence that child
mortality had not continued its historic downward trend and that if the governments concerned
did not increase their expenditure on health and education it was because they chose to do so, and
not because of the demands of debt servicing.
A quote from the twice-monthly Report of the World Development Forum may relay the
quintessence of the problem: "What everybody knows, but few have been willing to say publicly:
all the multi-billions in loans and other aid to the Third World countries will go down the
sinkhole if those countries do not adopt tougher birth control programs ... Third World aid
without birth control is like trying to pour water uphill" (1988, p. 1).
In South Africa both the substantial EMP component of the population and the modem
manufacturing sector - which is presumed to create jobs for them - do not generate enough forex
to satisfy their own need of it. The low income levels of the EMP imply negligible saving. Their
maintenance through the national budget by way of social services and relief programmes adds to
the dissaving (T-G), which reduces the aggregate Savings (S) required for Ypc - maintaining or
- enhancing investment (I). If we postulate that the GDP growth rate, to be consistent with a zero
(X - M) value, should not exceed 2,2 per cent per annum, then up to the beginning of the 1990s
population growth exceeded that limit. Which meant that an inflow of foreign capital had to
come to the rescue, which it did fairly regularly until 1981 (SARB, 1994, June Supplement, p. B-
148), the last year of a long period of rising Ypc. From 1985 to 1993, arising from foreign
disinvestment and obligatory repayments of debts, large positive amounts of (S-I) had to be
generated to finance the transfers on capital account. As a result domestic I and Ypc could not be
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maintained, while the foreign exchange rate of the Rand plunged, raising the costs of M and the
levels of inflation. After 1993 the process has been reversed, as indicated in Table 14.4, so that it
became possible for economic growth to exceed population growth for some years.
TABLE 14.4
THE CONTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN CAPITAL TO SAVINGS
R'OOO 000
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Gross domestic savings 58188 65903 73899 81931 91661 90140 91697
Gross Investment 53213 59854 75106 91856 98953 98953 105163
BoP capital account -4975 -6049 1207 9925 7292 8813 13466
Source: SARB, March 1999, p. S-125.
It is seen that foreign capital made a very sizeable contribution to the financing of investment in
South Africa during the four years 1995 to 1998, after recording net outflows over a period of ten
years.
With population growth down to below 2,0 per cent per annum since the middle 1990s, the BoP
should, ceteris paribus, prove to be less of an impediment to its economic accommodation;
unless the expansion of the EMP component nullifies such tendency. At the same time, the
volatility in international capital movements ensuing from globalisation, in conjunction with a
less than satisfactory credit rating, introduces greater uncertainty about the availability of foreign
funds for domestic capital formation as well as the international value of the currency. "The risks
of self-fulfilling runs on national currencies", confirmed Rodrick, "have been magnified by the
explosion in short-term liquidity, and countries are under greater threat of contagion from
financial crisis elsewhere" (1998, p. 5).
14.4 IN SUMMARY
The benefits to be derived from international trade are associated with the application of the
principle of comparative advantage in the employment of available factors of production. If the
production of exports and imports were unchangingly and internationally uniformly factor-
specific, (in terms of dominance), while factor remuneration were directly related to their scarcity
(inversely to their abundance), the abundance of lesser skilled labour, stemming from rapid
population growth, could be expected to accord South Africa a comparative advantage in the
Ch14 (ST-JLS)
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
414
production of labour-intensive merchandise. The expectation is not substantiated by statistical
evidence on exports and imports. This outcome is a function of the following circumstances:
factor combinations required in the production of undifferentiated export and import items are
not unique or unchanging; South Africa is, apart from lesser skilled labour, also well endowed
with advantageously marketable deposits of minerals and metals, the beneficiation process, if not
the recovery, of which is capital-intensive, in addition to being natural resource-intensive; trade
union intervention prevents the remuneration of lesser skilled labour from reflecting its
abundance; and South Africa has to compete with populous countries where labour abundance is
equally, or even more, pronounced and is allowed to be expressed in the levels of efficiency
wages.
The section of the population which becomes economically marginalised in consequence and
does not contribute to exports is nevertheless responsible for some portion of the import bill, thus
making the achievement of BoP equilibrium more difficult. The expanding EMP, moreover,
reduces the possibility of a domestic market size in which the establishment of adequate import-
competing capital and intermediate goods industries becomes a viable proposition. With the
maintenance or expansion of production depending on these latter as inputs, their price elasticity
would be low, and a depreciation of the Rand - vulnerable as a result of both current and capital
account - while advantaging export industries, raises the costs and prices of the importers which
may also be exporters. Their continued international competitiveness is not ensured by a single
round of depreciation.
The economy is rendered inflation-biased. Inasmuch as the SA Reserve Bank is avowedly
committed "to protect the value of the South African currency" (SARB, March 1999, p. 92) it
would tend to pursue monetary policies which, at the same time, restrain capital formation and,
thus, growth.
In these circumstances - and particularly during the last two decades of the twentieth century -
there is (has been) little or no benefit to be derived from South Africa's large and expanding
supplies of lesser skilled labour. Human quantities unsupported by appropriate economic
qualities, and unwilling or unable to submit to the remuneration outcomes that would be imposed
by population related supplies in an unencumbered labour market, do not impart international
comparative advantage. Free trade is effectively enhancing the abundance of this factor of
production which is not permitted to affect its remuneration. Increased unemployment is
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inevitable except in the unlikely event of labour being persuaded to raise productivity without
concomitant compensation. For international trade to generate employment for this abundant
factor of production "cheap labour" (low efficiency wages) is manifestly an imperative. In this
regard trade liberalisation and COSATU are incompatible.
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CHAPTER 15
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
15.1 INTRODUCTION
The presence in South Africa of demographically and culturally distinguishable population
groups, ranging from the lowest fertility component (LFC), the Whites, to the highest fertility
component (HFC), the Blacks, facilitated the demonstration of the economic effects of
population trends, with particular emphasis on those associated with the HFC.
The quintessence of the analyses in the aforegoing Chapters is that there is little or no economic
merit in proliferating human quantities if they are not accompanied by commensurable human
qualities required for economic growth and development. The outcome of the absence of such
concomitance can, in sum, be portrayed by juxtaposing the consumer and producer roles of
population as embodiment of consumers and of the two human factors of production: (i)
entrepreneurs (ENT) and (ii) the rest of the labour force (L).
15.2 THE POPULATION AS CONSUMERS
The potential economic merit of a rapidly growing, youthful population or community (inhering,
that is, in the N factor ofNx Ype) resides in consumption which, in itself, does not require talent,
enterprise or exertion, and cannot be sustained in the absence of production which does demand
such attributes. The merit is of dubious avail when, as in South Africa's open economy,
consumption has, directly and indirectly, a substantial import content and its sustainment
requires sizeable transfers and redistributional social service provision by government. Growth-
inhibiting BoP problems and low savings levels are the result. With its numerical preponderance,
the HFC - its numbers increased 4,95 times during the period 1936 to 1999, compared to 2,53
times in the case of the LFC - is possessed of a countervailing force to its PRSD-induced poverty
in the form of an unassailable majority in South Africa's universal adult suffrage elections since
1994. The political power thus acquired allows of an (intensified) redistribution of income
through budgetary policy, apart from a host of other measures meting out preferential treatment
to the HFC. The consumption bias of natural, provincial and local government budgets is
enhanced and is being aggravated by the ensuing government dissaving and the servicing of the
concomitantly accumulating national debt.
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The approximately unitary population elasticity of this consumption introduces a degree of
stability into the economy. But it is a stability of relative stagnancy, the consumption for the
most part being confined to basics of life, or survival goods, instead of prosperity goods that
economic vitality is associated with. Before the onset, in 1982, of the long-run downtrend in
income per capita South Africa's economic growth would have benefited from the role of rapidly
growing population numbers in consumption. Thereafter its influence was overshadowed by
other, hostile, factors in the economic environment, and it became a Ypc-depressing factor.
Whatever stimulus the proliferation of human numbers as such - unadorned, that is, with
requisite economic qualities - may provide to the economic process, it does that by way of
resource-depletion, not of resource-creation, which, in the case of natural resources, spells loss of
future productive capacity and impoverishment. The resource-creative role is fulfilled by the five
factors of production acting in unison, in part substitutionally and in part complementally. For
each of them quality is as important as quantity, and, in the case of the two human factors of
production, crucially more so.
1S.3 THE POPULATION AS PRODUCERS
1S.3.1 Entrepreneurship
The supply of enterprise, as implied in Entrepreneurship (liberally associated with those in
executive positions) can be denoted by ENT x Ach in which ENT stands for the relative number
of entrepreneurs and Ach for the level of achievement of the average executive. The South
African supply of enterprise, which has been presented in Chapter 6 as the fans et origo of
economic growth and development, is lacking in both respects. The scarcity of this factor of
production, and the likelihood of its exacerbation in time to come, are evidenced in the following
comparison, by population group, of labour force (Lf) growth and relative numbers of
entrepreneurs:
Whites Asians Coloureds Blacks Aggregate
1996-2006 LF growth p.a. 0,5% 1,8% 1,7% 3,3% 2,7%
1996 Entrepreneurial
content ofLF, % 13,3% 5,8% 1,1% 0,2% 2,6%
Growth of entrepreneurial component 1996-2006 per annum 0,8%
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It is seen that the HFC, most in need of it, is the least well endowed with this factor of
production. This is a critical economic-demographic imbalance. It will need a great deal of
upward mobility and emergence of new talent among this group to raise the growth of the
entrepreneurial content of the LF from 0,8 per cent to equal that of the aggregate LF, which is
2,7 per cent per annum. Since the HFC is the major contributor to the size (71 per cent) and
growth (91 per cent) of the LF it will also have to be the major source of supplementation's to the
supply of enterprise to obviate rampant unemployment, if not economic retrogression. So far the
overwhelming majority of entrepreneurs have sprung from the ranks of the LFC; but their share
in the aggregate LF was only 16 per cent in 1996 - and projected to decline to 12 per cent by
20 Il - and it is not to be expected that the entrepreneurial content of the LFC could expand
significantly beyond the present level, or that the Ach factor could compensate for the numerical
deficiency. As employees, they have been depicted as practitioners of a paternalistic,
authoritarian style of management "focused on control and not in the softer issues such as
motivation and participative management" (Mittner, April 9, 1999). And, having to contend with
stresses engendered by the medley of Western and African cultures and an aggressive labour
movement, they fail to elicit the most efficient performance from their workforce.
Those of them employing 50 or more persons, (designated employers) are coerced by law to
institute affirmative action (AA) measures "to ensure that suitably qualified people from
designated groups (Blacks, women, disabled persons) have equal opportunities and are equitably
represented in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce of a designated employer"
(RSA Employment Equity Bill, Section 15(1)). This, stipulates the Bill, is not to be interpreted as
an "absolute barrier to the prospective or continued employment or advancement of people who
are not from the designated groups" (section 15(4). In other words, there could be exceptions to
the rule that preferential treatment is to be meted out to the designated groups. A candidate will
be "suitably qualified" not only because of formal qualifications or prior learning or relevant
experience but also because of a "capacity to acquire within a reasonable time the ability to do
the job" (section 20(3)). This is backed up by section 20(5): "an employer may not unfairly
discriminate against a person solely on the grounds of that person's lack of relevant experience".
Employers are required to prepare plans indicating how progress is going to be made towards the
implementation of AA goals ("representivity") over a period of 1 year (minimum) to 5 years
(maximum), and thereafter to submit job audits reflecting the demographic profile of their
workforce at different occupational levels. Contravention of some provisions of the law is
punishable by fines ranging from R500 000 and R800 000. The burden of proof is on the
employer.
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This legislation is an extension, to the private sector, of the principles enunciated in the
government's AA programme for the public sector, where, within five years' time, members of
the designated groups have replaced some 60 per cent of the holders of office at the managerial
level (Giliomee, 1999), entailing an inevitable loss of expertise. Although the attainment of goals
in the private sector appears to reflect a lower level of urgency, the economic effects are likely to
be similar. It can be inferred that candidates entitled to preferential treatment need have no
experience and no qualifications other than an untried and unproven "capacity to acquire the
ability to comply with the requirements of a job". "Suitably qualified" thus defined is alien to the
Eurocentric entrepreneur's perception of merit as condition for appointment. During the period of
training of an AA appointee - which at the managerial level could be lengthy - his remuneration
represents an unrequited cost. Or when his employment represents no more than tokenism, the
cost continues until he resigns because he suffers the frustration of being side-tracked.
Implementation of AA at the managerial level proves to be fraught with difficulties. It has been
contended that "the lack of understanding between the two main cultures within South Africa's
big companies ranks as the main reason why there are so many problems with the effective
integration of black managers into white business ... It is obvious white and black basically
continue to live in separate worlds" (Mittner, 1999, March 5, p. 26). White managers are accused
of retaining "the belief that Blacks are incompetent ... and that affirmative action lowers
standards" and resignations of top Black managers occur frequently because "they feel alienated
from the predominantly white culture or experience racism in the workplace" (Mittner, 1999,
April 9, p. 24).
The obvious way for the alienated, around the problem is either the application of individual
entrepreneurial initiative in the founding of an own enterprise, or being offered opportunities in
culturally kindred enterprises such as those established by way of Black empowerment. This
latter process (started by private sector businessmen as gesture of beneficence to the
disadvantaged) is being advanced by the conditions imposed by section 53 of the Employment
Equity Bill which requires that employers submitting tenders for state contracts have to
demonstrate that they are advancing the cause of AA. Black-controlled companies would,
therefore, qualify automatically and have the advantage of a preferential rating, while they are
being favoured by the formulation of conditions of tender. They have, for example, been
awarded government contracts (over the period April to December 1998) worth R4 100 million
out of an aggregate of R8 600 million, which ratio bears no relation to their contribution to the
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GDP (Finance Week, 1999, March 26, p. 7). In the case of the bidding for State-owned forests, it
has been asserted that "many empowerment companies bring nothing to the table. Most add
neither management expertise nor money" (Finance Week, 1999, April16, p. 9).
This policy can be likened to the application of the infant entrepreneurs (infant industry)
principle. Only, in this case the action is not directed against foreign competitors. And, instead of
enhancing the ability of the infant industries to compete against foreign suppliers in the domestic
market, it is more likely to enervate it. In essence, the action is retrogressively substitutional
rather than additive; a substitution of a less efficient resource-use for the more efficient use.
Economic growth is constrained. And there is no certainty that the cause of equity is being
served. The economic system sponsored by the post-1994 government has become known as
crony-capitalism, in which the HFC rank and file are not the prime beneficiaries, while intra-
HFC inequality is burgeoning (Giliomee, 1999; IFR, 1998).
The economic cost of the iniquities of apartheid for which restitution is sought - and the non-
economic elements of which have probably been more offensive to the underdeveloped HFC
than those of an economic nature - is indeterminate; which renders it a useful medium in the
advocacy of government action. Once having identified apartheid as the root of all ills - by
weight of numbers in the political process, among others - and, thus, the unique cause of the
HFC's economic arrearage, examination of equally, if not more, significant co-determinants -
such as demographic and cultural factors - is rendered nugatory. The paradigm thus established
permits of measures economically injurious to the population in the aggregate while benefiting
some individuals whose personal claims to restitution are also indeterminate.
Having in mind the results of precipitate AA in the public sector, the enforcement of AA in the
private sector does not have the flavour of a recipe for economic success. Placing hurdles in the
way of the factor of production at the pinnacle of development is economically debilitating. The
successful fulfilling of its function is already arduous enough not to be burdened with policies
which engender an enterprise-inhospitable environment. It is not in the interest of employment
creation.
To judge by the articulated wish for an African renaissance and pronouncements in similar vein,
together with an acceleration of the trend towards the small family system among the HFC,
South Africa would conceivably enter upon a new era of entrepreneurial initiative at the turn of
the century. A Black executive chairman of an advertising agency has confidently declared that
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"there is a new breed of young African people who know what they are about, extremely well
educated ... and they are saying the predominant culture is Black, this country is on the African
continent, that is has a Black majority and that it is African people who are going to set the tone
of change and everybody else must just follow or leave the country" (Democratic Party, 1998, p.
14). In the context of this discourse the words requiring elucidation are "the tone of change". Do
they connote the discarding of the prevailing Euro-oriented corporate culture? If they do, is
eminence of achievement going to be the watchword as reflected in the attributes encompassed
in the profile of an entrepreneur? Or are they a manifestation of Tl-power in which maximum
economic progress and employment are not prime considerations?
At his inauguration, President Mbeki, the expounder of the Africa renaissance conception, stated
that South Africa could no longer falsely be labelled as an European outpost. Geographically and
in terms of the origins of the majority group and their political control this is incontrovertible.
Adjudged, however, by the composition of the economic growth initiators the South African
economy has been the creature of Western traditions, whatever failings in other respects they
might have manifested. Less than reassuring is the view of a Black academic that Africa has
failed economically because of flawed value systems (Ramogale, 1997, p. 10); and the
conviction of the managing director of a parastatal (an AA appointment) that "Black South
Africans needed to undergo a cultural transformation if they wished to influence the economic
transformation of the country in any meaningful way" (Business Reporter, 1996, p. 13). But the
transformation towards a welfare or socialist state advocated by a partner in the governing
alliance, COSATU, in which "the main motive forces ... are primarily represented by African
workers and the African rural poor" (COSATU, 1996, par. 5.9) has the character of the
abnegation of individual responsibility associated with entrepreneurship. And Curriculum 2005
does not radiate a quest for distinction in school careers to lay a groundwork for achievement - in
the economic sphere, among others - in later life.
Supportive of the qualms comprehended in the above estimations is the conclusion of Bruton,
after reviewing relevant literature and acclaiming the "hard slog" approach of East Asian firms:
"... no quick and easy fixes to development problems are available ... The achievement of the
hard slog in tum requires consideration of the more fundamental aspects of society -
entrepreneurship, institutions, values, social incentives, commitment to growth and a variety of
other factors that define society ... having roots deep in the ethos and history of a society
[which] requires that explanation and policy prescription probe these precincts that are so alien
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to mainstream thinking" (1998, pp 930/933; also Klitgaard, 1994, p. 491). It is these "softer
issues" in Economics that have to be addressed; a central theme in this dissertation.
If the diagnoses thus proffered have prognostic value, given the demographic imbalance, the
outlook inspires less confidence than is to be inferred from the enthusiasm of the executive
chairman cited above. In the meantime South Africa, which owes a great deal of its economic
development to immigration from the highly industrialised countries, has been suffering net
losses, through emigration, of growth-initiating manpower (SSA, 1999, pp 20/21).
15.3.2 Labour
The supply of labour can be portrayed as L X SKx PE In which L stands for the (non-
executive) LF numbers, predominantly determined by demographic forces, SK for the skill
content of the average worker as generated by education, training and experience and PE for the
intensity of productive effort of the average member of the LF, which is a function of workers'
attitudes, work ethos and the attitude and quality of management. A single index of Sk can be
conveniently arrived at by weighting each skill category with its potential employment multiplier
on the assumption that each of them is a prerequisite for the employment of the lower orders, the
lowest being awarded a weight of 1. The PE factor cannot be captured in a statistical magnitude
in like manner, and is usually assessed by way of international comparisons in which, as
portrayed in Chapter 14 on international trade, the South African labour force features inferiorly.
Changes in PE over time are, however, being proximated by means of value added per worker
(YIL) the amount of capital per worker (KIL), and multiple or total factor productivity (TFP).
Any poverty that is being caused by large families and proliferating numbers, is very likely to
impact adversely on PE.
As a result of the declining fertility of the least developed community (the Black population)
which has been preceded by very high levels, their LF numbers are growing faster than their
population in the aggregate, 2,7 per cent per annum against 2,2 per cent projected for the period
1996 to 2006. The potential economic benefit of this differential, like that of their high co-
efficient of LF replacement and renewal, becomes a non-event when it is dissipated by a lack of
job opportunities to allow its materialisation. The influences of fertility on female labour force
participation has been waning, both because of its historic decline and because maternity by
itself has become less of a consideration in attachment to the labour force. Among Black women
it has never been a significant consideration. Their high birth frequency could, however, have an
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adverse effect on their productive effort. The female labour force has been, and will continue to
be, growing faster than the male component.
The value of Sk of Blacks is just over one-quarter of Whites', one-half of Asians' and three-
quarters of Coloureds' levels. Over time, however, 1965 to 1991, its level has risen by 17 per
cent compared to a stationary level among Whites, and an improvement of 20 per cent for the
Coloured, and 39 per cent for the Asian population. But the combination of the low skill content
of its LF and its dominant 72 per cent share in the LF increment, restricted the improvement in
the total South African workforce to only 5,4 per cent during the period in question. The low
skill content of the majority group coincides with a low level of educational achievement, 38 per
cent of those 20 years and older not having passed standard 5, and 72 per cent having passed
standard 8 or a lower school grade (Central Statistical Service, 1996,p. 78). The large majority
also seems to be unprepared or financially unable to serve artisan apprenticeships.
The PE factor is equally uninspiring. The World Competitiveness Report ranked South Africa
worst among 48 countries with regard to the "people factor". The South African collaborator in
the drawing up of the report maintained that "the values of society do not support
competitiveness. People in our country lack energy and enthusiasm" (Marud, 1995,p. 5) and the
former executive director of the National Productivity Institute believes that the South African
value system was not conducive to productive behaviour (Annual Report 1996). The Unisa
Graduate School of Business Leadership, in a comparative study of five countries, found that a
South African project leader would need an input of economic resources 2,6 times, 2,8 times, 3,0
times and 3,1 times that which a New Zealand, an Australian, an American and a Canadian
opposite number respectively would require for a similar project (Booyens, 1997,p. 3). Labour
productivity increased by 160,5 per cent during 1975 to 1992 in Taiwan, compared to 11,3 per
cent in South Africa (Breier, 1995). In the automobile industry the South African worker
averages a production of 7 units per annum compared to 11 for an Australian, 12 to 13 for a
European and 40 for a Japanese worker. The average number of defects per 100 cars assembled
in Japan is 50, in the USA 75 and in South Africa 350 (Du Toit, 1995,p. 11). In a study of
productivity growth in the SA Manufacturing sector, broken down into capital intensive,
intermediate capital intensive and labour-intensive industries, the increase (for 4 periods) in
value added per worker was decomposed into a capital deepening factor and a residual
designated as total factor productivity (TFP), reflecting improvements in the quality of capital
and of labour (a possible proxy for our PE). Capital deepening emerged as the predominant
factor, the TFP even registering negative values in 1945-54 and 1981-90 (though the latter could
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also be linked to under-utilised capacity) (Wright, Leibbrandt & Bell, 1993, pp 10, 58). Capital
equipment, in its turn, was found to be inefficiently used concomitantly with "over-
capitalisation" (Standish and Galloway, 1991, pp 21, 26) which again may tie in with a lack of
discipline South African workers have been accused of (Goshi, 1996, p. 13), and managerial
inadequacies.
Both Sk and PE would, of course, have positive values, but in comparison with those of better
performing economies, they figure as fractions and, thus, as a discounting of L.
15.4 POVERTY
The two human factors of production, ENT and L, need the co-operation of, at least, one of the
other three factors to produce the necessities of life. At the initial stage of development or under-
development of a community natural resources usually serve this purpose. Their supply, given
that there are no more minerals and metals to be discovered, is strictly limited in amount.
Accordingly, as population numbers continue to expand diseconomies of scale begin to operate,
reducing the income (or GDP) per capita (Yp.c., or YIN), when all the bounties of nature have
been exploited. Consumption of non-renewable resources means, in the nature of things, an
irretrievable loss of future availability. This can even be true of renewable resources. In South
Africa mining production, per head of the population, in value added terms at 1990 prices, stood
at R541 in 1996 after peaking at R1254 in 1970. Gold production declined from 42,9 grams to
11,7 grams per capita. Value added by agriculture has barely kept pace with population growth,
the per capita amount (at 1990 prices) having stood at R317 in 1946-48, R345 in 1969-71 and
R325 in 1994-96 (SA Reserve Bank, March 1997 and previous issues; CSS, 1995, South African
Statistics).
To compensate for the constraints imposed by natural resources, technology has to be developed
and capital formed to accommodate increasing population numbers economically, or, at a
minimum, prevent impoverishment. Intermediate agro-input technology tends to create a
secondary need of technology to undo, or counteract, the harm inflicted upon the environment
and productivity by technology applied in the past. Insofar as rapid population growth is
associated with, and indeed a cause of poverty, it constitutes a more intractable and malignant
influence than affluence which can or could provide the means for combating the ecological
damage for which it has been responsible. Demographically induced poverty, which resolves
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into poverty-induced poverty, cannot afford such provision; and a reduction of the population
cannot be employed as a remedial measure.
It is also unlikely to afford the capital formation required to keep the labour force provided with
a constant amount per member (widening) given the incremental capital-output ratio (dK/dY);
or, if it does manage that, it is unlikely to raise productivity per labour force member through
capital deepening. The relevant situation in South Africa has been quantified in Chapter 13.
During 1960-1976 savings (net of depreciation allowances) were adequate to provide for the
widening requirements (8,1% of GDP) and leave 4,4 per cent for increasing the amount of
capital per member of the labour force. During 1976 to 1984 labour force growth requirements
could not be satisfied in full, while during 1984 to 1994 only one-third of such requirements
could be met. It is necessary to observe that, statistically, the absolute size of the ICOR after
1976, at 4,3 - 4,5, was larger than the 2,8 per cent per annum LF growth rate and was thus
responsible for the larger share in the widening statistic. However, a zero LF growth rate would
release all savings for capital-deepening, whereas the ICOR would not conceivably diminish to
zero. To keep a LF growing at 2,8 per cent per annum equipped, from own resources, with a
constant amount of capital per capita at any reasonable level of the ICOR, is likely to be beyond
the ability of poorer communities suffering from anaemic economic growth.
The difficulty is aggravated by the fact that not all of the savings are available for industrial
capital formation, some of them having to be applied in "demographic investments", to provide
organised living facilities for communities, that is: the lay-out of townships, housing, streets,
sanitation, water and electricity reticulation, public buildings, schools, hospitals, health clinics,
etc. There is, of course, no rule that can advise us what percentage of total S would, in fact, be
used for such investments, because in practice, among poor communities, it would represent a
residual rather than a determinant (based on needs) of what would remain for the formation of
industrial capital (non-demographic investments). When it becomes a co-determinant, assuming
the status of a claim on resources on a par with others, its insidious consequence for economic
growth in low-saving communities emerges. For example: let us assume that a minuscule
investment ofR30 000 is required (twice the free gift ofR15 000 given to the poorest of the poor
by the government for housing) to provide the living facilities in question per nuclear family in
South Africa. Accommodating the yearly increment of275 000 families (a growth rate of2,7 per
cent per annum, backlog and depreciation ignored) will then absorb 47 per cent of total (net)
savings generated according to the 1996 figure for the latter. The economic burden will be
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rendered additionally onerous by the fact that the saving required for this purpose is, almost in its
entirety, not accomplished by the beneficiaries who, up to the time of need satisfaction, are for
the most part consumers only. And very large numbers of them, due to unemployment, are
destined never to become earners even in gross terms.
The problem is compounded by the effect of rapid and differential population growth on the
supply of savings. The redistributive transfer of economic resources from the low to the high
fertility component of the population by way of expenditure on health, education, housing
subsidies and social welfare, arising from differentially proliferating numbers, led to dissaving
by the South African government which reduced total savings by an average of R20 000 million
per year over the seven years 1992-19981, to diminish the actual net total generated to an annual
average of R12 390 million, instead of the R32 390 million it would have been, had the current
account of the budget recorded a zero balance (SARB, March 1999, p. S-125). Capital formation
and economic growth are stunted.
What with human quantities unaccompanied by comparable human qualities, natural resources
limited or inexorably diminishing in quantity and quality as the non-renewable resources, in
particular, are being exhausted, and insufficient additions to the supply of technology and capital
to keep pace with population growth (in part because the latter inhibits the accumulation of the
necessary non-human factors of production), impoverishment, if not poverty, is bound to occur.
The large majority of the poor are Blacks due to the fact that they constitute the large majority of
the population, their high fertility, the vicious circle of poverty begetting poverty, traditional
cultural traits, benign neglect and discrimination. The most conspicuous manifestations of this
poverty are the squatter camps around towns and cities, land invasions and illegal occupation of
urban property, street children and child labour. (Not all squatters are necessarily poor; they
simply avoid rent and service charges; and for some street children their status is a voluntary
option). (See Urban Foundation 1994) The 1995 October Household Survey (Central Statistical
Service, 1996, p.52, 68) reveals that of the residential structures occupied by Blacks in urban
areas 15,4 per cent consisted of shacks, and 42 per cent of all dwellings had inside flush toilets
(compared to 70,2 per cent for Coloureds, 96,6 per cent for Asians and 98,5 per cent for Whites).
IBefore the June 1999 national accounts' revision.
ChIS· JLS
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
432
Poverty or affluence or welfare is not measured by income of GDP per capita (Ypc) only. But it
remains, and can be considered, a most important indicator, since it represents the source to be
tapped for the provision of many forms of welfare. The level of the per capita income in South
Africa has a history of a monotonically upward movement since the end of the second world war
up to 1974, which year can be considered to mark the end of the golden era of the Kondratieff
(or long wave); starting with R4514 (at 1990 prices) in 1948 and ending on R7945. Thereafter it
moved falteringly to describe a cycle with a trough in 1977 but ending on an all-time high of
R8354 in 1981. During the following twelve years the trend was downwards with few
interruptions, to register a nadir of R6823 per capita in 1993; a decline of 18 per cent or 1,7 per
cent per annum. By 1998 it had risen to R7025; an amount which was still below that of 1967.
Since Ypc is a quotient it goes without saying that both the numerator Y, and the denominator N,
(representing population numbers) have an influence on the outcome. (We are abstracting from
the possibility that dN may become a function of Ype the subj ect matter of the economic theory
of fertility). While this is true in the statistical sense it does not tell us anything about the causal
connection. There are writers who would exonerate N from all responsibility for an adverse
performance of Ypc and cast Y in the role of the villain, as if the generation of Y is an
abiogenetic process without the need of the intervention of the elements of N. Levine and Renelt,
searching for empirical linkages between economic growth and a variety of variables, in a
sensititivy analysis of cross-country regressions, found a negative correlation between population
growth and GDP (1992, p. 950). Which prompted the IMF to conclude that "the economic and
social development and the alleviation of poverty hinge critically on greater success in slowing
the rate of population growth" (1997, p. 89).
A study of the historic course of Ypc in South Africa during 1946 to 1974 or 1946 to 1981
reveals that N can act as a reinforcing agent of growth via two routes: (i) the maintenance of
demand as achieved economic growth puts increasing amounts of purchasing power into
increasing numbers of hands; (ii) the support of the marginal product of capital as
demographically-determined expanding supplies of labour constrain wage levels when there is
no, or little, interference by trade unions.
In the first route N represents a secondary force attendant upon a growth of Y that was induced
and fostered by non-demographic factors. During 1946-1974 (1981) these comprised the
following: the voracious demand emanating from a resource-poor Europe after the devastation
caused by the 1939-45 war and inducing a very rapid growth of world trade, creating many
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opportunities for South African exporters who had to face relatively little competition at home
and overseas; rising international terms of trade, predominantly favourable foreign balances of
payments; a buoyant import-substitution production process, with import control affording
maximum protection to domestic producers, and a predominantly peaceful labour force. The
thriving economy resulting from this business-benevolent ambience attracted immigrants who
supplemented the supply of entrepreneurship and highly skilled white collar professionals and
technicians to boost the economic quality of the labour force, thus supporting an enhancement of
economic performance.
By the end of the 1970s all these propitious circumstances had evanesced, to be replaced by
vigorously hostile forces such as the violence in the ANC's struggle for political power and the
abolition of apartheid, trade and, later on, financial sanctions, while foreign disinvestment
proceeded apace; and anti-South Africa movements overseas propagated and organised boycotts.
The considerable net immigration flow was reduced to a trickle and, at times, reversed into a net
emigration movement.
Route (ii) was effectively closed when COSATU in response to an ANC directive that the trade
union federation "should continue with any ridiculous wage demands they cared to make" (and
most were ludicrous) "because it might help to bring the hated government to its knees" (Van
den Berg, 1990) engaged upon belligerent rolling mass action in an attempt, in tandem with a
campaign of non-payment for residential services - continued after its raison d'être had ceased to
exist - to render the country ungovernable.
And so N became an unmitigated drag upon levels of living; both as denominator and as a
numerator-reducing agent.
Population (embodying the result of fertility, mortality, morbidity, migration in the quantitative
sense and economic culture in the qualitative sense) has been, at best, an economic growth-
supporting force, whose hospitable attribute materialised when there was economic growth,
sufficient to equal or exceed its own rate of increase. With rapid population growth dN is always
in operation as an economic welfare-reducing agent regardless of what happens to dY. The
former advances without any economic effort while dY requires much human endeavour
associated with economic quality and not quantities, in co-operation with other factors of
production. The source of this endeavour is likely to shrink in relative terms as the South African
population component with the least ENT content continues to increase fastest. In this fertility
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(and growth rate) differential (between Blacks and non-Blacks) we have a positive association of
high fertility and high levels of poverty. Regardless of whether or not the former is a cause of the
latter, the coincidence leads to a charitable redistribution of economic resources, which is
inimical to growth: the economic accommodation of quantities of life reduces the resources
remaining for the enhancement of quality of life. The intensity of this redistribution is closely
correlated with the political power attained through high fertility operating on an ever expanding
poverty-stricken component of the total population, which is continuously eroding the potential
for further redistribution.
15.5 UNEMPLOYMENT"
The combination of a proliferating labour force (LF), a less than robust economy and militant
trade unions (TUs) in alliance with the government, is a recipe for a stagnating job market, even
in the absence of increasingly sophisticated labour-saving technology.
Seen from the employment perspective, the most significant aspect of TU activity IS the
severance of the nexus between the predominantly demographically determined supply of,
particularly lesser skilled labour, and the market supply that is allowed to influence wage levels;
accompanied by the employment-inhospitable environment engendered by their actions to
promote the interests of their members. Whatever interest they profess in the fortunes of the LF
at large, their labour market activities are centred on the welfare of their members only. Their
prime concern, apart from maximising the remuneration of their members, is not the
maximisation of employment, but the prevention of retrenchments which reduce their
membership. And they request the unemployed not to enter into competition with them for jobs.
Overtly, the labour militancy evidences for the most part, a dissatisfaction with their
remuneration. A "living wage" - which has the ring of the high moral ground to it, but has no
connection with the marginal product of labour, and is not statistically delineated - used to be the
target of agitation. By 1996 the wage gap, as between the upper and lower echelons in the skill
hierarchy, appeared to have become the bone of contention. An office-bearer of COSATU
maintained that "the most immediate obstacle causing so much tension in the workplace today is
• It is to be noted that labour market magnitudes are beset with uncertainties since the surveys and censuses of the
CSS under new management (and now known as Statistics South Africa (SSA)) have introduced discontinuities in
the historic series relating to size of LF, employed and unemployed. There is, in consequence, disagreement among
the different sources of statistics and estimates (De Lange, SARB, CSS, SSA, Sadie). The post-1994 data proffered
below represent an extension of the pre-1995 series.
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the huge wage gap ... management use their counterparts in the First World Germany and United
States as a yardstick for payment. But affordability for workers' pay is determined by what Third
World workers in Indonesia and Malaysia earn ... management must stop seeing labour as a cost
or a factor of production" (Coleman, 1996). The Minister of Trade and Industry (who became
. Minister of Finance in 1996) averred that trade unions were using management's salaries as a
benchmark when negotiating new wage levels (Manuel, 1995). The Secretary-General of
COSATU insisted that the South African labour market be treated as a First World institution in
wage negotiations. This implies that the Third World lesser skilled labour surpluses were to be
ignored.
The gap may be inordinately wide as a legacy of historic circumstances, but it has been market
related. The demographically determined differential supplies of the various skill categories were
not interfered with by Black TU action before these unions were accorded legal status. Relative
scarcity was, accordingly, permitted full scope to function in establishing Black wage levels,
while the very small managerial category has been, and is, in a position to fix its own
remuneration. Actually, during the decades before 1980 it was repeatedly argued that
management was using Black labour wastefully. If true, it was useful waste which, in light of the
rapid economic growth, was affordable and provided a rapidly growing lesser skilled LF with
increasing employment opportunities.
It is not inconceivable - particularly in light of their participation in the pre-1994 violent political
struggle - that Black TUs stance may have more to it than the usual capital/labour confrontation.
The "capital", that is the private sector economic power, is mostly in the hands of a different
ethnic group - the White minority - so that any harm inflicted upon the economy could
conceivably be considered as a decimation of the power of an "enemy", as these employers are
sometimes referred to; a deep-seated adversative stance which renders the problem rather more
intractable than in an ethnically homogeneous community. The over-representation of the SACP
in COSATU and government leadership cannot be ignored either. Eventually an accumulation of
unemployment that has left the majority of the LF without a job in the formal sector may be
advanced as an argument for a revolutionary socialist (communist) régime. In the circumstances
a contrat social does not have the flavour of a probable ingredient of an amicable modus vivendi.
These circumstances and concomitant imponderabelia contribute to an environment of
uncertainty in which employers, contemplating long-term programmes, have to operate. It is not
conducive to flourishing capital formation for growth, development and employment creation.
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Trade Union intervention in the labour market - and legislation allows them to strike legally also
for socio-economic reasons which are not employer/employee related - establish wage levels
which pre-empt, at any given level of economic growth and GDP, a maximisation of
employment. ILO research personnel have contended that wage increases did not have a major
effect on numbers employed in South Africa, as in other countries (Dasnois and Randall, 1996,
p. 19). This assessment may be in consonance with Fallon's (of the World Bank, 1992) finding
that the elasticity of Black employment with respect to wage levels was no more than -0,28; but
not with his statement that the poor Black employment record can "overwhelmingly be traced to
upward movements in Black wages" (1992, p. 27) and that wages, and not the low user cost of
capital, were the critical factor (p 28). He added that White wages adjusted to maintain
approximately full employment among their ranks. Another author concluded that, among the
variables specified in his "equilibrium" co-integration functional equations, Black wages
emerged as a "major negative influence on economic development" (read GDP Growth: Piazolo,
1995, pp316/7). He considered that as one of the misdemeanours of apartheid which, with influx
control, would have created an artificial scarcity of Black workers. If his attribution is a valid
interpretation, then it would seem that post-apartheid trade unionism has imparted an extra
dimension to artificial scarcity. In 1998, after further research into South African labour markets,
Fallon and Lucas estimated the average (across sectors) long-run wage elasticity for Black
formal sector employees at -0,71. While not identifying wages as the major factor inhibiting
employment growth - there are also rising capital intensity, declining private investment and
skills insufficiencies to be taken into account - the earlier finding on the significance of their
effect was re-affirmed. "Rising real product wages have had a substantial dampening effect on
the demand for Black workers ... If Black real product wages had remained constant in 1970 to
1994, Black formal employment would have grown at 1,48 per cent per year instead of the 0,9
per cent actually achieved" (pp 10/11). Similar conclusions have been reached in other studies
(Barker, 1999, p. 12) even while the ILO has been disparaging organised Business' contentions
about the job-destructive inflexibility of South Africa's labour market (1999).
Whatever the precise elasticity statistic may be, it cannot capture the entire effect of labour
market conditions which comprise not only wage levels, but also the nuisance value of TU
activity, economic turbulence occasioned by their manifestations of belligerence, and obligations
imposed by new legislation to which employers have not been accustomed.
Of the TU confederations, COSATU, claiming membership of around 2 million (or some 13 per
cent of the LF), mostly lesser skilled workers, is the most important since it is an influential
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partner in the governing ANC/COSATU/SACP alliance. The ANC, while not always ad idem
with its ally, does not want to lose the latter's support as the well-organised election-winning arm
of the government. In consequence, COSATU has been instrumental in having various labour-
beneficent Acts passed by parliament. To the AA ensconcing Employment Equity Bill discussed
above - which is applicable to all ranks of employees - can be added the Labour Relations Act,
the Basic Conditions of Employment Act and the Skills Development Act. Their salient features
- apart from re-affirming the traditional workers' rights such as collective bargaining and the
right to strike - can be summarily stated.
Collective bargaining is to take place at the sectoral, rather than the plant, level, and agreements
reached can be extended to all firms in a sector whether or not they were party to the
negotiations. Which means that allowance will not be made for differences in marginal product
of labour among individual companies, while the establishment of small and medium-sized
enterprises can be pre-empted or their continued existence jeopardised as a result of not being
permitted to match wages to lower productivity levels. The working week - for the purposes of
overtime, the remuneration for which is raised from time-and-a-third to time-and-a-half - is
reduced from 46 to 45 hours. Minimum wages for agricultural and domestic workers are
envisaged. Dismissals and retrenchments are to be negotiated with the workers, and lengthy
periods of notice will have to be observed, while there is no bar to claims of unfair practice by
the workers involved, since the onus is on the employer to prove that it is not. Some dismissals
are automatically unfair, and those affected can claim up to 12 months' compensation from date
of dismissal. The period of maternity leave is stretched from 3 to 4 months, and liberal sick leave
provisions will obtain (which tend to be used for extended weekends). The minimum period of
paid annual leave is fixed at 3 weeks (previously 2 weeks) so that together with 12 public
holidays (but disregarding sick leave) workers are paid for not working 10per cent of a 52 weeks
working year. Employers have to contribute an amount equal to 1 per cent out of their payroll as
a new training levy.
To these rules and regulations must be added all the AA provisions of the Employment Equity
Bill, section 27 of which requires that "disproportional remuneration differentials" are to be
reduced in accordance with advice from an Employment Conditions Commission. Whether this
will eventuate by lowering the remuneration of high level manpower or raising the wages of
lesser skilled workers the result would be the same: a movement further away from the sway of
the unfettered supply of human factors of production in the market.
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This labour legislation exhibits the symptoms of having been inspired by that of advanced
economies where the Ypc is a multiple of South Africa's; the proportion of unskilled labour and
the levels of unemployment are a small fraction of that of South Africa, and the ability to
ameliorate the effects of unemployment through the national budget is much greater. The
Department of Labour has, in fact, acknowledged the co-operation of the Black Lobby, the Civil
Rights desk and the attorney-general of the USA in the framing of the laws (Giliomee, 1998, p.
11), while the Chairman of the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, and former German Economics
minister, asserted that if South Africa were serious about job creation it should repeal the labour
laws which, he judged, were cast in the mould of the German model (Malan, 1999, p. 5.1). These
laws have been depicted by a labour law specialist as "the most TU-friendly imaginable ... for
all practical purposes we have a labour government" (Backer, 1996: 17). The Institute of
Management Resources in California found "the labour laws hopelessly biased to the workforce
which has the lowest productivity profile in the world" (Todd, 1996). The chairman of Anglo-
American Corporation was reported as stating that the Labour Relations Act conferred upon TUs
a level of protection unequalled anywhere in the world (Britz, 1995: 2). Another maintained that
the South African labour movement was "the most powerful in Africa, if not in the world"
(Lunsche, 1994).
The legal requirements listed above are all destined to raise the costs, and lower the level, of
employment. Transnet managing director complained that implementation of the new labour
laws would add R800 million to RI000 million annually to the operating costs of the parastatal
which was already suffering a loss of some R2 million a day. Even the ILO admitted that aIO
per cent rise in the costs of some sectors could occur (De Lange, 1999, p. S.5; ILO, 1999;
Mittner, 1999, March 12). The AA provisions of the Employment Equity Bill compound the
adverse effects. Members of the LF appointed under the auspices of AA could decide that they
need not concern themselves about the quantity and quality of their inputs, secure in the
knowledge that they have to be retained to satisfy the demographic targets, while the employers
may find the costs of dismissal exorbitant (cf. Black & Rankin, p. 459). Productivity suffers. For
the USA, well-known for its AA (in favour of a minority) a 1991 estimate has put the
opportunity costs of AA - "bad hiring decisions under government coercion, negative effects on
morale and a misallocation of financial resources" - at 236 billion dollars (Jafta, 1998, p. 5).
"Race-based affirmative action policies encourage a culture of entitlement that undermines
initiative, self-confidence and self-reliance" (p 5). A pernicious effect, particularly when
practised in favour of a majority group as in South Africa, is the devaluation of human capital. In
the case of employees - workers who do not operate on own account - AA reduces or denies
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returns, in the form of a wage premium or job preferment, to human capital formation, thus
removing the incentive to invest in this way. The effects are amplified when the process is not
practised at the margin - i.e. in respect of new appointments - but involves a substitution of
competent persons in office by lesser experienced, under-qualified individuals. The rule of
meritocracy is disowned; the quality of the LF is debased.
In the perceptions of South African businessmen the sum total of the labour market conditions
featured above cast an aura of inhospitality towards enterprise. The supply of entrepreneurship,
already inadequate for the accommodation of the LF in the aggregate, is trammelled. Employers'
reaction can encompass one or more of the following:
(i) They shift increased labour costs on to consumers, which process is facilitated if an
inflationary spiral, induced by preceding wage hikes, is already in operation. Research at
the SA Reserve Bank elicited the conclusion that "changes in labour costs are at the core
of the inflation process ... " (Pretorius & Smal, 1994). This leads to potentially
investment-curbing monetary policy inasmuch as the Reserve Bank is committed to the
protection of the Rand.
(ii) They substitute capital and technology for labour to raise the marginal product of labour
and to diminish dependency on labour, rather than engaging in the training of workers
which is a longer term exercise, and may raise wages pari passu with higher skill levels
consequent upon such training. A survey of 587 enterprises revealed that among
manufacturers whose production process was not inherently capital-intensive the labour
factor was the major determinant of increased capital intensity (Welcher, 1990: 74).
Relatively scarce capital was being employed as if it were abundant in supply, and
abundant labour was being used as if it were a scarce factor of production.
(iii) They retrench part of their workforce.
(iv) They change, as far as possible, the professional status of their workers from employee to
that of independent contractor (or entrepreneur).
An adverse effect on employment is a foregone conclusion. Countervailing employment-creating
widening of capital is inhibited. Capital available for such widening - and referring to employed
labour, which was, and is, only a portion of the total LF - diminished from 5,4 per cent of GDP
during 1960-76 to 3,1 per cent during 1976-84 to -0,8 per cent in 1984-94 and to -5,0 per cent
during 1994-98 (inferred from SARB, various issues).
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The negative percentages imply rates of capital formation lower than were needed to preserve
the levels of employment, given the intensity of the deepening process. They spell reductions in
the number of the employed.
In the domain of international trade the disregard of lesser skilled labour abundance in
remuneration arrangements vitiates the possible comparative advantage that could have
emanated from this abundance. Thus the soft undercarriage of the South African economy, the
Balance of Payments, is rendered increasingly vulnerable; a vulnerability that is being
exacerbated by the liberalisation of international trade, which is, in effect, pressuring the
marginal product of South African labour downward. An outward-looking international trade
policy and an inward-looking labour movement are mutually exclusive forces. While
remuneration (at constant prices) per employee in this country has increased by 6,7 per cent
between 1990 and 1995 (SARB), that of Zimbabwe, for instance, has dropped by over 50 per
cent (Zimbabwe Reserve Bank, 1996, p. 3). Lesotho fears the infection of their labour market by
the South African example while their garment workers, operating at a productivity level
equalling that of parent companies in Taiwan, earn 44 per cent of their South African
counterparts' wage, and "without a strike, a bus boycott or other disruptions" (Lunsche, 1994, p.
2). Which, among other reasons, is why the secretary-general of COSATU warned the
government that "its blind loyalty to trade liberalisation will collapse the economy" (SAPA,
1995), and why the economy often has to rely on depreciating rates of exchange to promote the
survival of some enterprises. And still the Minister of Labour wanted wages in the prominently
foreign exchange-earning gold mining industry - a wasting resource and subject to periodically
disastrous drops in price, and which cannot shift its increased cost on to buyers of its product - to
be raised above those prevailing in the protected, net foreign exchange-consuming,
manufacturing industry (Mboweni, 1997).
It is conceivable that entrepreneurs would be able to surmount the obstacles presented by the
labour market conditions portrayed above, and still accommodate upward of, say, 90 per cent of
the labour supply and accessions to the LF. But such favourable outcome is conditioned by the
requirement of a LF composition which is representative of a highly developed country, a status
South Africa has not consummated. For an intimation of South Africa's LF deficiencies in this
regard, the 1985 LF by skill (White and Blue collar workers separately) has been projected to the
year 2005, and the results compared to the numbers that might be demanded, assuming that the
1965-1985 experience in the labour market, would be replicated. Immigration was excluded. The
results are assembled in Table 15.1.
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TABLE 15.1
Skill
category
Difference between probable numbers supplied and
demanded by the year 2005 in the formal sector
I
II
III
IV
Deficit of
Deficit of
Surplus of
Surplus of
Total
83000
835000
1 465000
5860000
-921 000
+7325 000
Source: Sadie - 1991, pp150-151.
The figures are indicative of a seriously flawed skills composition: a relative scarcity of high-
level manpower (categories I and II, the managerial professional, technical and other highly
skilled classes) and an abundance of semi-skilled and unskilled workers. It is this abundance, the
issue of high fertility, that is not permitted to exercise a commensurate effect on wage levels in
the formal sector.
If we accept that the availability of white-collar categories I and II is a prerequisite for the
employment of the other classes of workers, the above manpower balance sheet disequilibrium is
not tenable as a real life situation. The economy can function with unused surpluses but not with
strategic manpower that is non-existent. Equilibrium would require that the above deficits be
reduced to zero. (It is assumed that immigration does not act as a gap-filler and that the Ach
factor among entrepreneurs remains constant). But this will entail increases in the surpluses of
categories III and IV. Statistically, the reduction in question will occasion an increase in the
surpluses at the lower end from 7 325 000 to 11 576 000, implying that less than half of the
20 156000 strong LF will be accommodated in the formal sector by the year 2005. While that is
not proffered as a probabilistic outcome - it has the appearance of a disaster scenario - it is, in
light of the post-1989 experience, not even a very pessimistic picture. After having shed workers
in its employ at a rate of 101 000 per annum on average between 1989 (the year of the peak) and
1998, the economy's projected performance implies an average increase in formal sector
employment of 82 000 per year after 1996. And in 1996, 82 000 each year over 9 years looked
like a very ambitious employment target, while the GEAR (the Growth, Employment and
Redistribution programme, RSA, 1996) scenario of 409 000 jobs to be created annually by the
year 2000 had the appearance of pure fantasy.
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But it will still leave almost 400000 out of an annual increment in the LF of 482000, outside the
formal job market, which means that 83 per cent of the LF increment will have to seek refuge in
the informal sector and/or depend on state aid. Another alternative is a life of crime, which is
more profitable than seeking a job: of every 1000 crimes committed in South Africa, it has been
estimated, 450 are reported, and of these only 17 per cent result in a conviction in a court of law
(SA Institute of Race Relations, 1996: p. 3).
The matter can also be explored by examining labour's share in the GNP. By virtue of the
stability of the employee remuneration component of the GDP (Y at factor costs) we may posit
that Y is a constant (k) multiple of the wage bill (W x L = wage x number of workers employed).
Between 1989 and 1996, for instance, the component rose from 60,9 per cent to 63,3 per cent in
1992 and declined thereafter to 60,7 per cent in 1996/97, to average 61,8 per cent over the period
(SARB, various issues). Accordingly Y = k (WL) and y = w + f (the lower case letters standing
for rates of growth). Table 15.2 tells us how the increase in Y was absorbed by wage and
employment increments, respectively, during four successive time intervals, and compares these
with the growth in the total labour force (dLF).
TABLE 15.2
THE SHARES OF WAGE LEVEL AND EMPLOYMENT INCREMENTS
IN ECONOMIC GROWTH
Period
1946-60
1960-75
1975-89
1989-1998
y=w+f
4,4% = 2,1 + 2,3
5,0~o =2,3 + 2,7
2,2% = 1,1 + 1,1
0,82% = 0,86-0,04
dLF
2,1%
2,5%
2,7%
2,7%
The following percentages of the LF employed in the formal sector underscore the information
in Table 15.2.
1946
1960
1970
1980
1985
1990
1998
72,2%
74,0%
76,6%
71,3%
64,6%
58,5%
43,0%
It is clear that the increase in the average wage was less than half of the growth in Y until the
middle of the seventies - which can be considered to represent the end of the golden era of the
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Kondratieff - allowing an absorption of increasing portions of the LF, to reduce unemployment
and/or underemployment, as judged by the formal sector performance. Thereafter wage increases
absorbed half of the growth in GDP during 1975-89, so that only 41 per cent of the LF growth
was accommodated. In the 1989-98 period the increase in average remuneration was responsible
for 120 per cent of the addition to the wage bill, leading to an absolute reduction in the marginal
and aggregate level of employment, leaving more than one-half of the LF not at work in the
formal sector at any point of time. Some supporting evidence is provided by the following
estimates of the GDP elasticity of employment in the
Formal sector Formal & Informal sector
1970-80 0,76 0,77
1980-90 0,49 1,01
1990-96 -0,55 0,16
Source: Loots, 1998, pp 330/1
In formal sector context the last decade of the twentieth century was a period not only of jobless
anaemic growth, but, more injurious still, one of job-destructive economic activity. Even during
the three years of exceptionally "luxuriant" growth (1994 to 1996), averaging 3,1 per cent per
annum, employment continued sliding by between 1,2 and 1,8 per cent per annum. According to
the SSA (1998, p. 34) the semi-skilled and unskilled workers have been the sufferers, their
employed ranks having been emaciated at a rate of 5,5 per cent per annum between 1994 and
1997. It is these two categories of labour which are, in particular, the concomitant of high
fertility. This outcome is concordant with the magnitudes presented in Table 15.1 and the SSA's
findings in its 1997 October Household Survey (1998, p. 25) relating to the relative incidence of
unemployment (according to the strict definition, which means the exclusion of those who have
not actively taken steps to find jobs) among the four population groups, as follows:
Whites 4,4%
Indians 10,2%
Coloureds 16,0%
Blacks 29,3%
Average 22,9%
The incidence differentials are positively correlated with skill and fertility differentials.
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Synoptically, the outcome of the above labour market trends can be portrayed as follows for the
year 1998:
Labour force
Employed in the
Formal sector
Informal sector
Subsistence farmers and
Migrants in waiting
Non-employed
16660 000
7 170 000
1 080 000
810 000 9 060 000
7600 000
= 45,6% ofLF
When the SSA's ratios are applied fewer than one half of the 7 600 000 non-employed would
qualify as unemployed according to the strict definition (1998, p. 3). Such disparity, together
with differences in the interpretation of the LF size (or economically active population), divests
the unemployment statistics of much of its meaning. Emerging as economically rather more
meaningful are the numbers of jobholders per 100 of those in the (i) 15 to 64 age group and (ii)
aggregate population, and how these numbers have changed over time. The figures for two dates,
twenty-eight years apart, are as follows:
(i) In the age group 15 to 64
(ii) In the aggregate population
1970
57
31
1998
35
21
The employment base of the population has been steadily eroded. Any potential benefits that
could have emanated from the ageing process among the HFC's ranks have been dissipated.
Between the two dates the burden of economic care of each 100 jobholders has been aggravated
from 325 to 477 persons (which produces a marginal burden ratio of984 persons).
When we add the employment ratio (EMR) to our initial specification of the effective amount of
labour on offer, we have L x Sk x PE x EMR as the amount of labour in productive activity.
There are here three discounts to which L is subject, at least two of them closely related to the
growth and size of L. Potential benefits that might arise from large and rapidly expanding L are
rendered nugatory.
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Fertility levels in excess of the replacement level that have been, and are, producing lower
skilled labour in abundance, and are preponderantly the cause of the lack of human capital in
question, have no economic merit. They add to the unmitigated burden of the community.
Improvident parenthood, in concomitance with a labour movement unwilling and an employer
corps unable, to accommodate it economically, is exacting an alarming toll. In the circumstances
economic growth becomes all the more important, not because it is the source of new jobs, but
because it is required to ameliorate, through redistribution, the poverty induced by the
economically surplus population. In the meantime, affirmative action is in progress which -
requiring as it does the reflection in the workplace of the population's ethnic composition - is
tantamount to accrediting reproductive largesse with superior status as occupational merit. It is
not calculated to promote a flourishing of the economy.
However, the pernicious effect of joblessness is not confined to poverty. The organisations
UMSA (Unemployed Masses of South Africa) and the Malamulala Social Movement have a
countervailing role to play by continuing to insist that their members have a right to decide for
themselves whether they wanted to be "exploited" or not to gain entry into the ranks of the
employed (SA Chamber of Business, 1998, p. 1). Their opportunity cost is zero.
15.6 THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF A LIFE
To estimate the economic value of a life at birth - in our example that of a male member of the
Black population destined to enter the labour force as an unskilled worker - we have recourse to
the following data and assumptions:
(i) The series of earnings by age used in Table 13.3 but with the R6800 per annum entered
in that Table against age 15-19 now assumed to start when the child is born, rising by 1
per cent per annum up to the age of 60. The amounts are multiplied by the age-specific
probabilities of employment which are assumed to average 0,27 over a lifetime. This
statistic is derived from the manpower coefficient of replacement in a stationary job
market (jobs becoming available being only those occasioned by death and retirement
among the manpower group). Thus the probable earnings (E) per year are determined.
(ii) The consumption by age (C) data as assembled in Table 11.2 which are consistent with
the earnings levels mentioned in (i) above.
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(iii) Next, the differences between E and C values are determined, and these are multiplied by
the probabilities of survival by age from a life Table (1991-96) for Black males.
(iv) The results of the step (iii) operation are multiplied by 5 to make provision for the fact
that quinquennial age groups are being used in the exercise.
(v) The values obtained in step (iv) are discounted to the date of birth at a rate of7,5 per cent
which measures the average net returns to fixed capital stock in South Africa during
1982-1996. (This rate marks the end of a long period of diminishing returns, from a peak
of 16,9 per cent in the immediate post-war years). Whatever the arguments against the
discounting procedure, it is an economic imperative, representing as it does the
alternative productive use of economic resources which would have benefited the
community in the absence of the new birth.
Table 15.3 shows a negative amount of R8 370 as the economic value of a life examined here.
Every new birth reduces the economic well being of the community. To reveal the significance
of the demographic forces involved, the exercise was repeated using the same earnings and
consumption series, but applying the (i) probability of employment by age of White males,
averaging at 0,70 over a lifetime, compared to 0,27 in the exercise for Blacks, and (ii) their
probability of survival by age. Both forces at issue are of a purely demographic nature, involving
fertility, mortality and age structure. While the second is a function of mortality only, the lower
survival ratios of the Black population can also be regarded as representative of its more youthful
age structure which results from higher mortality and fertility. When, as occurred during the
1990s, the vacancies resulting from mortality and retirement are not filled in toto, the probability
of employment is reduced below its already low level of 0,27.
Compared to the negative R8 370 found in the case of Black males the White population shows a
positive R6 600.
When the discounting procedure is omitted the outcome for the Black population is a positive
R9 360, but the disadvantage of its high fertility is not thereby eliminated. The amount pertaining
to the older, low fertility, White population is 24 times as much. Because of demographic factors
only, the economic value of the average Black male is therefore one-twenty fourth of that of his
White counterpart. Inclusion of the female populations in the exercise does not change the
conclusion.
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The outcome of the computations above reinforces the conclusions drawn in section 15.5. The
high fertility of the HFC is impoverishing the families concerned and the population at large.
In the last instance, the significance of the economic value of a life is not divorced from the
value system of a society. There is no reason why a society could not hold non-economic values
in higher regard. Rationally, the condition attached to such choice is that any inimical economic
consequences have to be accepted. In practice, this condition is seldom satisfied. The culture of
arrogation prevails.
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TABLE 15.3
THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF A LIFE (BLACK MALES)
Earnings Probability Probable Consumption Probabilities Columns Column 9
Age rate p.a. of earnmgs p.a. of Survival (6) x (7) (8) x 5 discounted
employment E C E-C at 7,5% p.a.
0-4 R6800 - - R860 -R860 ,93 -R800 -R4000 -R3220
5-9 R7100 - - R1200 -R1200 ,92 -RII04 -R5520 -R3095
10-14 R7500 - - R1490 -R1490 ,92 -R1371 -R6855 -R2677
15-19 R7850 ,12 R942 R1880 -R938 ,92 -R863 -R4315 -R1174
20-24 R8300 ,25 R2075 R2100 -R25 ,91 -R23 -R115 -R22
25-29 R8700 ,32 R2784 R2100 R684 ,89 R609 R3045 R402
30-34 R9100 ,34 R3094 R2100 R994 ,87 R865 R4325 R400
35-39 R9600 ,36 R3456 R2100 R1356 ,85 R1153 R5765 R370
40-44 RI0I00 ,35 R3535 R2100 R1435 ,82 R1177 R5885 R260
45-49 RI0600 ,35 R3710 R2100 R1610 ,78 R1256 R6280 R195
50-54 R11200 ,34 R3808 R2100 R1708 ,73 R1247 R6235 R135
55-59 R11700 ,32 R3744 R2100 R1644 ,67 RII01 R5505 R83
60-64 R11700 ,25 R2925 R2100 R825 ,59 R487 R2435 R26
65-69 R5800 ,14 R812 R1770 -R958 ,50 -R479 -R2395 -R18
70-74 - R1660 -R1660 ,38 -R631 -R3155 -R23
75-79 - R1660 -R1660 ,26 -R432 -R2160 -R8
80-84 - R1750 -R1750 ,15 -R263 -R1315 -R3
85+ - R1900 -R1900 ,13 -R57 -R285 -Rl
Aggregate ,27 R9360 -R8370
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